Serial Collusion by Multi-Product Firms

Authors

Michael J. Meurer, Boston University School of LawFollow
William Kovacic, King's College London – The Dickson Poon School of LawFollow
Robert Marshall, Pennsylvania State University, College of the Liberal Arts - Department of EconomicsFollow

Author granted license

Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

8-13-2018

Publisher

Boston University School of Law

Language

en-US

Abstract

We provide empirical evidence that many multi-product firms have each participated in several cartels over the past 50 years. Standard analysis of cartel conduct, as well as enforcement policy, is rooted in the presumption that each cartel in which a given firm participates is a singular activity, independent of other cartel conduct by the firm. We argue that this analysis is deficient in many respects in the face of serial collusion by multi-product firms. We offer policy recommendations to reign in serial collusion, including a mandatory coordinated effects review for any merger involving a serial colluder, regardless of the apparent nature of the merger.

Comments

King's College London Law School Research Paper No. 2018-28

Published as: William E. Kovacic, Robert Marshall & Michael Meurer, "Serial Collusion by Multi-Product Firms," 6 Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 296 (2018).

Recommended Citation

Michael J. Meurer, William Kovacic & Robert Marshall, Serial Collusion by Multi-Product Firms , in No. 18-18 Boston University School of Law, Law and Economics Research Paper (2018).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/415