Numerical Analysis of Asymmetric First Price Auctions

Authors

Robert Marshall, Pennsylvania State University, College of the Liberal Arts - Department of EconomicsFollow
Michael J. Meurer, Boston University School of LawFollow
Jean-Francois Richard, University of Pittsburgh
Stromquist Walter, Duke University

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

9-1994

ISSN

0899-8256

Publisher

Elsevier

Language

en-US

Abstract

We propose numerical algorithms for solving first price auction problems where bidders draw independent valuations from heterogeneous distributions. The heterogeneity analyzed in this work is what might naturally emerge when subsets of distributionally homogeneous bidders collude. Bid functions and expected revenues are calculated for two special cases. Extensions to more general asymmetric first price auctions are discussed. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D44, C63, C72, D82.

Recommended Citation

Robert Marshall, Michael J. Meurer, Jean-Francois Richard & Stromquist Walter, Numerical Analysis of Asymmetric First Price Auctions , in 7 Games and Economic Behavior 193 (1994).
Available at: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1994.1045