Litigation Settlement and Collusion

Authors

Robert Marshall, Pennsylvania State University, College of the Liberal Arts - Department of EconomicsFollow
Michael J. Meurer, Boston University School of LawFollow
Jean-Francois Richard, University of Pittsburgh

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2-1994

ISSN

00335533

Publisher

Oxford University Press

Language

en-US

Abstract

Private enforcement of regulatory policy is a significant feature of many government-sponsored contests, such as procurements. Although private enforcement is supposed to promote social welfare, we show that competitors can use it to achieve collusive outcomes. In a noncooperative duopoly setting, we show that the threat of litigation, and the possibility of settlement can dramatically affect ex ante competition in the relevant market. Essentially, the settlement process provides a legal mechanism for the exchange of side-payments, while the possibility of a court decision provides the plaintiff with a credible threat against the defendant so as to avert cheating. The result does not require repeated play, ex ante contracts, or other commitment devices. In the federal procurement context, we show that our results are robust to alterations in the court remedy, bargaining power of the litigants, and many other factors.

Recommended Citation

Robert Marshall, Michael J. Meurer & Jean-Francois Richard, Litigation Settlement and Collusion , in 109 The Quarterly Journal of Economics 211 (1994).
Available at: https://doi.org/10.2307/2118433