Negligence and Two-Sided Causation

Authors

Keith N. Hylton, Boston University School of LawFollow
Haizhen Lin, Indiana University - Kelley School of Business
Hyo-Youn Chu, College of International Studies, Kyung Hee University

Author granted license

Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

12-2015

ISSN

0929-1261

Publisher

Springer Nature B.V.

Language

en-US

Abstract

We extend the economic analysis of negligence and intervening causation to "two-sided causation" scenarios. In the two-sided causation scenario the effectiveness of the injurer's care depends on some intervention, and the risk of harm generated by the injurer's failure to take care depends on some other intervention. We find that the distortion from socially optimal care is more severe in the two-sided causation scenario than in the one-sided causation scenario, and generally in the direction of excessive care. The practical lesson is that the likelihood that injurers will have optimal care incentives under the negligence test in the presence of intervening causal factors is low.

Comments

Published as: Keith Hylton, Haizhen Lin & Hyo-Youn Chu, "Negligence and Two-Sided Causation," 40 European Journal of Law and Economics 393 (2015).

Updated with published version on paper on 9/21/22

Working paper available on SSRN

Recommended Citation

Keith N. Hylton, Haizhen Lin & Hyo-Youn Chu, Negligence and Two-Sided Causation , in 40 European Journal of Law and Economics 393 (2015).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/193