Document Type
Article
Publication Date
1-2015
ISSN
2156-6208
Publisher
University of Chicago Press
Language
en-US
Abstract
Class action litigation has generated a series of recent Supreme Court decisions imposing greater federal court supervision over the prosecution of collective injury claims. This group of cases raises the question whether class action waivers should be permitted on policy grounds. I examine the economics of class actions and waivers in this paper. I distinguish between the standard one-on-one litigation environment and the class action environment. In the standard environment, waivers between informed agents enhance society's welfare. In the class action environment, in contrast, not all waivers are likely to enhance society's welfare.
Recommended Citation
Keith N. Hylton,
The Economics of Class Actions and Class Action Waivers
,
in
23
Supreme Court Economic Review
305
(2015).
Available at:
https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/157
Working Paper version of published article
Comments
Updated with published article: 9/20/2022
Old version of paper available on SSRN.