Information and Causation in Tort Law: Generalizing the Learned Hand Test for Causation Cases

Authors

Keith N. Hylton, Boston University School of LawFollow

Author granted license

Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2014

ISSN

2194-6515

Publisher

De Gruyter Publishing House

Language

en-US

Abstract

This paper discusses the economics of causation in tort law, describing precise implications for precautionary incentives when courts are and are not perfectly informed. With precautionary incentives identified, we can ask whether the causation inquiry enhances welfare, and if so under what conditions. Perhaps the most important innovation applies to the Hand Formula. When causation is an issue, the probability of causal intervention should be part of the Hand test, and the generalized Hand test offers a method of distinguishing significant classes of causation cases. I close with implications for the moral significance of causation and for economic analysis of tort law.

Comments

Updated with published version of paper on 9/24/22

Working paper available on SSRN

Recommended Citation

Keith N. Hylton, Information and Causation in Tort Law: Generalizing the Learned Hand Test for Causation Cases , in 7 Journal of Tort Law 35 (2014).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/809