Brown Shoe Versus the Horizontal Merger Guidelines

Authors

Keith N. Hylton, Boston University School of LawFollow

Author granted license

Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

7-2011

ISSN

1573-7160

Publisher

Springer

Language

en-US

Abstract

The new Horizontal Merger Guidelines, if treated by courts as a source of law, would reduce the discretion traditionally exercised by courts in defining relevant markets and market power in merger cases. This is an undesirable shift in the balance of power because courts have used the market power inquiry stage of merger analysis as a general checkpoint or weigh station for evaluating factors relevant to the welfare effects of a merger.

Comments

Published as: "Brown Shoe Versus the Horizontal Merger Guidelines," in Symposium The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 39 Review of Industrial Organization 95 (2011).

Recommended Citation

Keith N. Hylton, Brown Shoe Versus the Horizontal Merger Guidelines , in 39 Review of Industrial Organization 95 (2011).
Available at: https://doi.org/https://doi-org.ezproxy.bu.edu/10.1007/s11151-011-9311-y