Nuisance

Authors

• Keith N. Hylton, Boston University School of LawFollow

Document Type

Encyclopedia Entry

Publication Date

1-2026

Editor(s)

Alain Marciano and Giovanni Battista Ramello

ISBN

978-3-031-76421-9

Publisher

Springer Nature

Language

en-US

Abstract

This entry sets out the law and the economic theory of nuisance. Nuisance law serves a regulatory function: it induces actors to choose the socially preferred level of an activity by imposing liability when the externalized costs of the activity are substantially greater than the externalized benefits or not reciprocal to other background external costs. Proximate cause doctrine plays a role in supplementing nuisance law.

Recommended Citation

Keith N. Hylton, Nuisance , in Encyclopedia of Law and Economics 1765 (Alain Marciano and Giovanni Battista Ramello ed., 2nd Edition 2026).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/4215