The Law and Economics of Products Liability

Authors

Keith N. Hylton, Boston University School of LawFollow

Author granted license

Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

6-25-2013

ISSN

0745-3515

Publisher

University of Notre Dame Law School

Language

en-US

Abstract

This paper presents a largely positive analysis of products liability law, in the sense that it aims to predict the incentive effects and the welfare consequences of the law, with close regard to its specific legal tests and the real-world constraints that impinge on these tests. The other major part of this paper is a normative assessment of the parts of products liability law that should be reformed. In contrast with the prevailing law and economics literature suggesting that products liability law reduces social welfare, I argue that the law probably improves social welfare, though it is in need of reform in several respects.

Comments

Published as: "The Law and Economics of Products Liability," 88 Notre Dame Law Review 2457 (2013).\

Updated with published version of paper on 9/22/22

Working paper available on SSRN

Recommended Citation

Keith N. Hylton, The Law and Economics of Products Liability , in 88 Notre Dame Law Review 2475 (2013).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/392