Are Arbitrators Biased in ICSID Arbitration? A Dynamic Perspective
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
1-28-2021
ISSN
0144-8188
Publisher
Elsevier
Language
en-US
Abstract
Concerns over arbitrator impartiality and independence in ICSID arbitration have led to reform proposals geared towards a multilateral investment court. Due to the ad hoc nature of appointments, it has been suggested that arbitrators may strategically render decisions in biased ways with the goal of encouraging reappointments. Although criticism against arbitrator bias has attracted significant attention, so far limited empirical evidence has been provided to support such concerns. This paper introduces a dynamic perspective to examine concerns of bias arising from ad hoc appointment. I find that contrary to conventional views held by critics of investor-state arbitration, on average, arbitrators tend to decide against their reputation from prior decisions in ICSID arbitration, which implies an effort to establish a reputation for being neutral and unbiased. This finding challenges one of the premises of proposals to replace arbitration with an investment court.
Recommended Citation
Weijia Rao,
Are Arbitrators Biased in ICSID Arbitration? A Dynamic Perspective
,
in
66
International Review of Law and Economics
(2021).
Available at:
https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2021.105980
Pre-publication draft
The version of this article on SSRN is the pre-publication draft.
Comments
Article no. 105980