Document Type
Article
Publication Date
10-2011
Publisher
Boston University School of Law
Language
en-US
Abstract
This paper examines the law and economics of third-party financed litigation. I explore the conditions under which a system of third-party financiers and litigators can enhance social welfare, and the conditions under which it is likely to reduce social welfare. Among the applications I consider are the sale of legal rights (such as contingent tort claims) to insurers, to patent trolls, and to financiers generally.
Recommended Citation
Keith Hylton,
The Economics of Third-Party Financed Litigation,
No. 11-57
Boston University School of Law, Law and Economics Research Paper
(2011).
Available at:
https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/388
SSRN URL
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1971229
Comments
Published as: "The Economics of Third-Party Financed Litigation," 8 Journal of Law, Economics & Policy 701 (2012).