Title

The Economics of Third-Party Financed Litigation

Authors

Keith N. Hylton, Boston University School of LawFollow

Author granted license

Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

Spring 2012

ISSN

1553-4367

Publisher

George Mason University School of Law

Language

en-US

Abstract

This paper examines the law and economics of third-party financed litigation. I explore the conditions under which a system of third-party financiers and litigators can enhance social welfare, and the conditions under which it is likely to reduce social welfare. Among the applications I consider are the sale of legal rights (such as contingent tort claims) to insurers, to patent trolls, and to financiers generally

Comments

Published as: "The Economics of Third-Party Financed Litigation," 8 Journal of Law, Economics & Policy 701 (2012).

Updated with published version of paper on 9/22/22

Working paper available on SSRN

Recommended Citation

Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Third-Party Financed Litigation , in 8 Journal of Law, Economics & Policy 701 (2012).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/388