Document Type
Article
Publication Date
Spring 2012
ISSN
1553-4367
Publisher
George Mason University School of Law
Language
en-US
Abstract
This paper examines the law and economics of third-party financed litigation. I explore the conditions under which a system of third-party financiers and litigators can enhance social welfare, and the conditions under which it is likely to reduce social welfare. Among the applications I consider are the sale of legal rights (such as contingent tort claims) to insurers, to patent trolls, and to financiers generally
Recommended Citation
Keith N. Hylton,
The Economics of Third-Party Financed Litigation
,
in
8
Journal of Law, Economics & Policy
701
(2012).
Available at:
https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/388
Working paper available on SSRN
Comments
Published as: "The Economics of Third-Party Financed Litigation," 8 Journal of Law, Economics & Policy 701 (2012).
Updated with published version of paper on 9/22/22
Working paper available on SSRN