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University of Texas School of Law




I describe a model of competition law enforcement that treats competition and innovation policy as the inseparable partners they ought to be. The enforcement authority determines an optimal punishment knowing that if it sets the penalty too high it will reduce firms’ incentives to invest in innovation, and if firms do not invest, new goods and new markets will not be created. The authority therefore moderates the penalty in order to maintain innovation incentives. The implications of this framework for competition policy and for innovation policy are quite different from what is commonly observed today. I discuss implications for competition law enforcement, standard essential patents, and the Supreme Court’s decision in FTC v. Actavis.


Published as: "A Unified Framework for Competition Policy and Innovation Policy," 22 Texas Intellectual Property Law Journal 163 (2014).

Updated with published version of paper on 9/22/22

Working paper available on SSRN

Find on SSRN

Working paper available on SSRN

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