Document Type
Article
Publication Date
3-2016
ISSN
0029-2524
Publisher
University of North Carolina School of Law
Language
en-US
Abstract
In this Article we use game theory to argue that perceptions of widespread corruption in the judicial processes in developing countries create ex ante incentives to act corruptly. It is rational (though not moral) to preemptively act corruptly when litigating in the courts of many developing nations. The upshot of this analysis is to highlight that, contrary to judicial narratives in individual cases — such as the (in)famous Chevron–Ecuador dispute used herein as an illustration — the problem of corruption in transnational litigation is structural and as such calls for structural solutions. The article offers one such solution: the establishment of an international court of civil justice.
Recommended Citation
Maya Steinitz & Paul Gowder,
Transnational Litigation as a Prisoner's Dilemma
,
in
94
North Carolina Law Review
751
(2016).
Available at:
https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/3454
