Document Type
Article
Publication Date
3-1999
ISSN
2374-8524
Publisher
William & Mary Law School
Language
en-US
Abstract
If liberal conceptions of privacy survive appropriately vigorous feminist critique and re-emerge in beneficially reconstructed forms, then why haven't more feminists gotten the message and embraced, rather than spurned, such privacy? If liberal privacy survives feminist critique, does it face an even more serious threat if contemporary society has both diminishing expectations of and taste for privacy? Does the transformation of the very notion of "private life," due in part to the rise of such new technologies as the Internet and its seemingly endless possibilities for making oneself accessible to others and gaining access to others, suggest the need for liberal and feminist defenders of privacy to rethink the value of privacy and whether it is, indeed, indispensable for citizenship and a good life? Finally, if privacy is indispensable, is it consistent with liberal principles to force people not to surrender their privacy, even if they wish to, just as liberal governments force people not to surrender their freedom?
Recommended Citation
Linda C. McClain,
Reconstructive Tasks for a Liberal Feminist Conception of Privacy
,
in
40
William & Mary Law Review
759
(1999).
Available at:
https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/2887
