Title

Patent Litigation, Licensing, Nonobviousness, and Antitrust

Document Type

Encyclopedia Entry

Publication Date

1-2010

Editor(s)

Keith N. Hylton

ISBN

9781782547457

Publisher

Elgar Online

Language

en-US

Abstract

In early work on optimal patent design Nordhaus (1969) focused on selection of an optimal patent life, chosen to strike an appropriate balance between the need to stimulate research and the desire to avoid monopolistic production of the invention. More recently, the scope (Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) and Klemperer (1990)) and timing (Scotchmer and Green (1990)) of the patent grant have also been studied as instruments of patent policy. I investigate the same trade- off analyzed by Nordhaus but I con-sider the instruments of patent validity and antitrust policy, and take patent scope, timing, and life as given. The motivation for this choice is that it is more representative of American patent policy than the use of patent life as an instrument, and it allows me to explore the interaction of patent litigation, output restriction, and the incentive to innovate, more easily than if I considered patent scope or timing. In addition, the model developed below captures many of the salient policy issues associated with chemical or pharmaceutical product innovation.

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