Patent Litigation, Licensing, Nonobviousness, and Antitrust
Document Type
Encyclopedia Entry
Publication Date
1-2010
Editor(s)
Keith N. Hylton
ISBN
9781782547457
Publisher
Elgar Online
Language
en-US
Abstract
In early work on optimal patent design Nordhaus (1969) focused on selection of an optimal patent life, chosen to strike an appropriate balance between the need to stimulate research and the desire to avoid monopolistic production of the invention. More recently, the scope (Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) and Klemperer (1990)) and timing (Scotchmer and Green (1990)) of the patent grant have also been studied as instruments of patent policy. I investigate the same trade- off analyzed by Nordhaus but I con-sider the instruments of patent validity and antitrust policy, and take patent scope, timing, and life as given. The motivation for this choice is that it is more representative of American patent policy than the use of patent life as an instrument, and it allows me to explore the interaction of patent litigation, output restriction, and the incentive to innovate, more easily than if I considered patent scope or timing. In addition, the model developed below captures many of the salient policy issues associated with chemical or pharmaceutical product innovation.
Recommended Citation
Michael J. Meurer,
Patent Litigation, Licensing, Nonobviousness, and Antitrust
,
in
4
Encyclopedia of Law and Economics
262
(Keith N. Hylton ed.,
2010).
Available at:
https://doi.org/10.4337/9781849805285.00017
