Document Type
Article
Publication Date
Fall 1991
ISSN
00914029
Publisher
Hofstra University School of Law
Language
en-US
Abstract
In this Article, protests are analyzed, from both an economic and legal perspective, as a decentralized mechanism for oversight of the competitive procurement process. Attention focuses on the protest process at the General Services Administration Board of Contract Appeals (hereinafter "the Board" or "GSBCA"). It is argued that protests are an effective means of deterring and correcting agency problems among procurement personnel and, consequently, accomplishing the procurement objectives of the government. Drawbacks of the protest process are identified, explanations are offered for the existence of these negative side effects, and solutions are proposed. In addition, protests are compared to centralized oversight methods, i.e., audits. Furthermore, we assess the trade-offs between granting greater decision-making discretion to procurement personnel and controlling agency problems.
Recommended Citation
Robert Marshall, Michael J. Meurer & Jean-Francois Richard,
The Private Attorney General Meets Public Contract Law: Procurement Oversight by Protest
,
in
20
Hofstra Law Review
1
(1991).
Available at:
https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/2428
