Numerical Analysis of Asymmetric First Price Auctions
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
9-1994
ISSN
0899-8256
Publisher
Elsevier
Language
en-US
Abstract
We propose numerical algorithms for solving first price auction problems where bidders draw independent valuations from heterogeneous distributions. The heterogeneity analyzed in this work is what might naturally emerge when subsets of distributionally homogeneous bidders collude. Bid functions and expected revenues are calculated for two special cases. Extensions to more general asymmetric first price auctions are discussed. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D44, C63, C72, D82.
Recommended Citation
Robert Marshall, Michael J. Meurer, Jean-Francois Richard & Stromquist Walter,
Numerical Analysis of Asymmetric First Price Auctions
,
in
7
Games and Economic Behavior
193
(1994).
Available at:
https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1994.1045
