Emory University School of Law
To the modern corporate scholar and lawyer, the internal affairs doctrine seems in the natural order ofthings. Corporate law is state law. Each corporation is formed under the law of its chosen state ofincorporation. To ensure consistency and predictability, that law must govern the corporation's internalaffairs. Yet the origin of such a doctrine is puzzling. Respecting the firm's choice of corporate law, thedoctrine forces state legislatures into competition to attract incorporations. But how did legislatures come to concede their traditional territorial regulatory authority, and instead agree to compete? This Article solves this puzzle, offering the first account of the doctrine's surprising origins.
Widespread acceptance of the internal affairs doctrine among U.S. states assures that a firm's choice ofcorporate law will be respected outside the incorporating state. According to the dominant paradigm, this respect for firm choice creates a common market for corporate law, enabling regulatory competition. Both proponents and critics of competition agree that state legislatures compete - or at least have competed - to sell corporate charters to raise state revenues. In the debate over state competition, all sides take the internalaffairs doctrine as a given. But if legislators compete to maximize private benefits in the form of state revenues, why do states recognize foreign corporation law at all? How did state legislatures ever come to surrender their traditional territorial jurisdiction, and instead agree to a choice of law convention forcing them into direct competition?
To date, the puzzle of the internal affairs doctrine has been overlooked. The doctrine's existence has been taken for granted, requiring little in the way of comment, criticism, or explanation. I explain the unexpectedorigins of the doctrine and its persistence through the early years of modern charter competition in the early part of the twentieth century. This historical analysis shows that the doctrine's origin had nothing to do with regulatory competition. Instead, it emerged before state charter competition, at a time when firms had little choice about where to incorporate. Competition came later, under circumstances radically different from those under which the doctrine was first articulated. That the earlier-crafted doctrine later facilitated regulatory competition was hardly by design. Instead, its path to facilitating modern charter competition depended on a fortuitous sequence of events, driven by ideology, interest group influences, and institutional inertia. This story of historical contingency debunks common assumptions about the emergence of thedoctrine, which modern corporate scholars implicitly view to have been inevitable.
Before Competition: Origins of the Internal Affairs Doctrine,
Emory University School of Law Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series
Available at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/871