Document Type
Working Paper
Publication Date
2008
Publisher
Boston University School of Law
Language
en-US
Abstract
This chapter presents a public choice theory of criminal procedure. The core idea is that criminal procedure is best understood as a set of rules designed to thwart attempts to use the state's law enforcement power in a predatory fashion or in order to transfer wealth generally. For the most part we focus on a set of core procedural protections that can be considered long-established norms.
Recommended Citation
Keith Hylton,
Political Economy of Criminal Procedure,
No. 08-16
Boston University School of Law Working Paper Series, Law & Economics
(2008).
Available at:
https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/859
SSRN URL
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1121441#
