Antitrust Around the World: An Empirical Analysis of the Scope of Competition Laws and Their Effects

Authors

Keith N. Hylton, Boston University School of LawFollow
Fei Deng, National Economic Research Associates

Author granted license

Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2007

ISSN

0003-6056

Publisher

American Bar Association

Language

en-US

Abstract

Since the early studies of Arnold Harberger,' George Stigler,² and Richard Posner,³ there has been a growing movement calling for the use of empirical evidence to judge the effectiveness of antitrust law in securing its goals.⁴ That there have been relatively few such studies is attributable to the lack of useful statistical information on the law, enforcement policies, and penalties.

In this article, we present an effort to use information on competition laws around the world to assess their scope and effectiveness. The foundation of this study is a dataset that codes key features of the competition laws of 102 countries.⁵ It first compares the scope of the laws overall and then assesses various subcomponents, such as the law governing dominance, collusive conduct, and mergers. The second question examined is whether a nation's competition law has any effect on the intensity of competition within its borders.

Comments

Updated with published version of paper on 9/25/22

Working paper available on SSRN

Recommended Citation

Keith N. Hylton & Fei Deng, Antitrust Around the World: An Empirical Analysis of the Scope of Competition Laws and Their Effects , in 74 Antitrust Law Journal 271 (2007).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/852