Author granted license

Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2002

ISSN

0043-0420

Publisher

Washburn University, School of Law

Language

en-US

Abstract

This paper, prepared for the 2001 Washburn Torts Seminar, argues that tort law has some properties that make it superior to statute-based regulatory schemes as a system of environmental protection. In particular, two arguments, one based on enforcer-malfeasance and one based on information, suggest that tort law is preferable to statutory regulation. I sketch these arguments and apply them to nuisance law. The result is a set of conditions or rules-of-thumb for determining where tort law is preferable to environmental regulation. The framework implies that emission standard regulation can and should be implemented without preempting nuisance law.

Comments

Boston University School of Law Working Paper Series, Law and Economics Working Paper No. 01-11

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