Boston University School of Law
I agree with just about everything Jonathan Macey (2017) says in his symposium contribution. His claim that bureaucratic tendencies toward regularity—specifically, treating like cases alike—generate errors in categorization seems appropriate to me. His explanations of the pathologies in financial regulation should fall in the category of essential or required reading for anyone who chooses to write on the topic. Where I differ from Macey is in the choice of framework, or perspective from which to view the pathologies. Whereas Macey adopts an “error cost” framework, which is clearly appropriate for this symposium, I would build explicitly on a “public choice” framework.
Keith N. Hylton,
Comment on 'Error and Regulatory Risk in Financial Institution Regulation'
Boston University School of Law, Law and Economics Research Paper
Available at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/551