Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2010
ISSN
0003-6056
Publisher
American Bar Association.
Language
En-US
Abstract
The recent financial crisis and recession provide an opportunity to reexamine the dynamic versus static efficiency tradeoff in antitrust enforcement policy. We examine implications of the optimal antitrust enforcement model when dynamic efficiency is incorporated. The “dynamic enforcement model” examined here provides a positive theory of Section 2 doctrine, some suggestions for modifying enforcement in light of its dynamic costs, and implies antitrust enforcers should put a greater weight on dynamic efficiency during recessions.
Recommended Citation
Keith N. Hylton,
Optimal Antitrust Enforcement, Dynamic Competition, and Changing Economic Conditions
,
in
77
Antitrust Law Journal
247
(2010).
Available at:
https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/508
