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Supreme Court of the United States




Section 703(a)(1) is straightforward: It prohibits all discrimination against an employee “with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(a)(1). The Department does not dispute that job transfers concern “terms and conditions” of employment. See Resp. Br. 1, 35. So, if the statute’s words are honored, and Jatonya Muldrow can show that the Department’s transfer decisions were imposed “because of” her sex, the Department is liable.

Yet the Department maintains that some discriminatory job transfers escape Title VII’s reach. It relies nearly exclusively on the phrase “discriminate against” in Section 703(a)(1), which, the Department asserts, silently incorporates a material harm requirement. But those words do no such thing. This Court has explained that to “discriminate against” an individual means to treat her worse compared to someone else who is similarly situated. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1740 (2020). That is exactly how Muldrow maintains the Department treated her. The Department transferred her when it would not have transferred a similarly situated male colleague. Section 703(a)(1) requires nothing more than that.

This Court should hold that Section 703(a)(1) means what it says and reverse.



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