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Interpretative theory has become a major growth industry over the past two decades. Legal academics in particular have invested heavily in the enterprise, producing a burgeoning literature that addresses many of the most important problems of legal interpretation.1 The discussion to date, however, has largely neglected one critical aspect of interpretative theory: the selection of appropriate standards of proof for legal propositions. That neglect will not bother or surprise interpretative skeptics who doubt the utility of searching for "true" or "better" meanings of texts, but it ought to prove troubling to any theorist who wants to make absolute or comparative claims about legal meaning.

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