Title
Political Economy of Criminal Procedure
Document Type
Book Chapter
Publication Date
2009
Editor(s)
N. Garoupa
ISBN
9781782547457
Publisher
Edward Elgar
Abstract
This chapter presents a public choice theory of criminal procedure. The core idea is that criminal procedure is best understood as a set of rules designed to thwart attempts to use the state's law enforcement power in a predatory fashion or in order to transfer wealth generally. For the most part we focus on a set of core procedural protections that can be considered long-established norms.
Recommended Citation
Keith Hylton & Vikramaditya S. Khanna,
Political Economy of Criminal Procedure
,
in
Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, Volume 3: Criminal Law and Economics
171
(N. Garoupa ed.,
2009).
Available at:
https://doi.org/https://doi-org.ezproxy.bu.edu/10.4337/9781782547457
