Title

Asymmetric Market Failure and Prisoner's Dilemma in Intellectual Property

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

Spring 1992

ISSN

0162-9174

Publisher

University of Dayton School of Law

Language

en-US

Abstract

Underlying many contemporary discussions of intellectual product regulation are two implicit economic models: one having to do with primary resource allocation, and one having to do with both allocative effects and administrative costs. The implicit allocative model is what game theorists call the "prisoner's dilemma." I have identified the model that implicitly addresses both allocative and administrative cost issues as "asymmetric market failure." My primary goal here is to explicate these two models. The more clear one is about underlying models, the easier it is to unpack them, show their virtues and inadequacies, and investigate the ways they should be supplemented.

Comments

Translated and published as "Fallas Asimetricas del Mercado y el Dilema del Prisionero en Propiedad Intelectual", Revista Latinoamericana de Propiedad Intelectual 2 (2011). [Spanish]

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