Title
Asymmetric Market Failure and Prisoner's Dilemma in Intellectual Property
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
Spring 1992
ISSN
0162-9174
Publisher
University of Dayton School of Law
Language
en-US
Abstract
Underlying many contemporary discussions of intellectual product regulation are two implicit economic models: one having to do with primary resource allocation, and one having to do with both allocative effects and administrative costs. The implicit allocative model is what game theorists call the "prisoner's dilemma." I have identified the model that implicitly addresses both allocative and administrative cost issues as "asymmetric market failure." My primary goal here is to explicate these two models. The more clear one is about underlying models, the easier it is to unpack them, show their virtues and inadequacies, and investigate the ways they should be supplemented.
Recommended Citation
Wendy J. Gordon,
Asymmetric Market Failure and Prisoner's Dilemma in Intellectual Property
,
17
University of Dayton Law Review
853
(1992).
Available at:
https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/1987
Comments
Translated and published as "Fallas Asimetricas del Mercado y el Dilema del Prisionero en Propiedad Intelectual", Revista Latinoamericana de Propiedad Intelectual 2 (2011). [Spanish]