Author granted license

Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

7-2013

Publisher

Boston University School of Law

Language

en-US

Abstract

The common law process appears to have checks and balances that prevent the self-interest of a particular embedded actor (judge or lawyer) from having a substantial distortive effect. The question that follows is whether the Restatement project is also immune, to the same extent as the common law, from the self-interested incentives of actors involved in its creation. I argue that the Restatement process is far more vulnerable to distortion from self-interest than is the common law process.

Comments

Published as: "The Economics of the Restatement and of the Common Law," in Symposium The Restatement of ..., 79 Brooklyn Law Review 595 (2014).

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