Title

Why Blinding? How Blinding? A Theory of Blinding and Its Application to Institutional Corruption

Document Type

Book Chapter

Publication Date

2016

Editor(s)

Christopher T. Robertson & Aaron S. Kesselheim

ISBN

9780128026335

Publisher

Elsevier, Academic Press

Language

en-US

Abstract

This chapter presents a theory of why blinding is a useful solution to bias, and how it works as a solution to bias. I draw from the familiar uses of blinding in biomedical science and in court procedures to show how blinding typically involves the disaggregation of functions within a system, so that some individuals have some information and other individuals have other information, while collectively achieving system goals without certain kinds of bias. Blinding is usefully distinguished from other solutions, including proscription, professionalism, and the provision of disclosures.

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