The Economics of Injunctive and Reverse Settlements

Authors

Keith N. Hylton, Boston University School of LawFollow

Author granted license

Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

Spring 2010

ISSN

1465-7260

Publisher

Oxford University Press

Language

en-US

Abstract

This paper extends the economic literature on settlement and draws some practical insights on reverse payment settlements. The key contributions follow from the distinction drawn between standard settlements, in which the status quo is preserved, and injunctive settlements, w and under which reverse settlements will be observed among injunctive settlements. Reverse settlements are likely when the stakes associated with the injunction are large relative to damages and litigation costs. The analysis has broader implications for efficient remedies and legal rules. (JEL Kl0, K40, K41, D24, 034).

Comments

Updated with published version of paper on 9/24/22

Working paper available on SSRN

Recommended Citation

Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Injunctive and Reverse Settlements , in 12 American Law and Economics Review 181 (2010).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/764