Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2008
ISSN
2156-6208
Publisher
University of Chicago Press
Language
en-US
Abstract
In a large number of products liability lawsuits, sellers assert that plaintiffs' claims should be rejected because their products fall under some federal regulatory regime, and that the regulatory statute takes precedence over or preempts state tort law. This paper is an attempt to set out a positive theory of the doctrine on preemption of products liability claims. The federal case law is largely consistent with an approach that seeks to minimize the costs of erroneous decisions to preempt tort lawsuits. In particular, two factors explain many of the outcomes of the preemption cases in federal courts: agency independence and the degree of congruence between the regulatory and common law standards.
Recommended Citation
Keith N. Hylton,
Preemption and Products Liability: A Positive Theory
,
in
16
Supreme Court Economic Review
205
(2008).
Available at:
https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/717
Working paper available on SSRN
Comments
Updated with published version of paper on 9/23/22
Working paper available on SSRN