Arbitration: Governance Benefits and Enforcement Costs

Authors

Keith N. Hylton, Boston University School of LawFollow

Author granted license

Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

1-2005

ISSN

0745-3515

Publisher

Notre Dame Law School

Language

en-US

Abstract

These remarks, presented at the 2004 AALS Annual Meeting panel on civil procedure, review the economic theory of arbitration and related empirical evidence. For parties who can choose between alternative legal regimes, the key determinants of that choice are the governance benefits and enforcement costs connected to the rules under each regime. The choice between arbitration and litigation should be made on the same basis. The empirical literature, though sparse, suggests that superior governance benefits provide a significant reason for arbitration agreements.

Comments

Updated with published version of paper on 9/23/22

Working paper available on SSRN

Recommended Citation

Keith N. Hylton, Arbitration: Governance Benefits and Enforcement Costs , in 80 Notre Dame Law Review 489 (2005).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/667