Document Type
Article
Publication Date
7-2015
ISSN
0021-0552
Publisher
University of Iowa College of Law
Language
en-US
Abstract
Antitrust enforcement regimes rely on penalties against two groups of actors for deterrence: penalties against the violating firm and penalties against the violating firm's agents. Here, I examine the economics of punishing agents versus firms. My area of application is antitrust, but the argument applies generally to other fields in which the government has the choice of punishing the agent, the firm, or both. This analysis suggests that whenever the firm has an incentive, given existing penalties, to engage in some illegal act that may result in relatively modest punishment for its agents, the firm can almost always induce its agents to carry out the illegal act. It follows that almost any plausible effort to use penalties against agents to deter price fixing can be undone by the firm's own system of rewards for agents. For deterrence, penalties against the firm sufficient to eliminate the firm's incentive to fix prices are necessary.
Recommended Citation
Keith N. Hylton,
Deterrence and Antitrust Punishment: Firms Versus Agents
,
in
100
Iowa Law Review
2069
(2015).
Available at:
https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/382
Working paper available on SSRN
Comments
Published as: "Deterrence and Antitrust Punishment: Firms Versus Agents," in Symposium Honoring Herbert Hovenkamp, 100 Iowa Law Review 2069 (2015).
Updated with published version of article on 9/22/22
Working paper available on SSRN