Document Type
Article
Publication Date
11-1994
ISSN
0016-8092
Publisher
Georgetown University Law Center
Language
en-US
Abstract
Professor Hylton's paper presents an economic theory of the duty to bargain in good faith under the National Labor Relations Act. The duty to bargain alters bargaining incentives in two ways. First, it imposes a duty to disclose relevant information on the informationally advantaged party. Second, by conditioning the right to act unilaterally on satisfaction of bargaining obligations, the duty to bargain brings about a partial reallocation of the parties' entitlements. This partial reallocation increases the potential gains from honest contracting relative to the benefits of exploiting an informational advantage and thus alters incentives in a way that makes honest dealing more likely.
Recommended Citation
Keith N. Hylton,
An Economic Theory of the Duty to Bargain
,
in
83
Georgetown Law Journal
19
(1994).
Available at:
https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/2625
