Document Type
Article
Publication Date
10-2017
ISSN
0144-8188
Publisher
Elsevier
Language
en-US
Abstract
This paper derives optimal remedies for patent infringement, examining damages awards and injunctions. The fundamental optimality condition that applies to both awards and injunctions equates the marginal static cost of intellectual property protection with the marginal “dynamic” benefit from the innovation thereby induced. When the social value of the patent is sufficiently high, the optimal award induces socially efficient investment by giving the innovator the entire social value of her investment.
Recommended Citation
Keith N. Hylton & Mengxi Zhang,
Optimal Remedies for Patent Infringement
,
in
52
International Review of Law and Economics
44
(2017).
Available at:
https://doi.org/https://doi-org.ezproxy.bu.edu/10.1016/j.irle.2017.07.001
