Author granted license

Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International

Document Type

Book Chapter

Publication Date

1982

Editor(s)

J. Ronald Pennock & John W. Chapman

ISBN

0814765831

Publisher

New York University Press

Language

en-US

Abstract

Two notions concerning the relation of rights to utilitarianism seem widely accepted, by both utilitarians and their critics. The first is that utilitarianism is hostile to the idea of moral rights. The second is that utilitarianism is capable of providing a normative theory about legal and other institutional rights. This chapter chiefly concerns the second thesis, and argues against it. But it also says something about the first. In previous writings I have challenged the first thesis, but here I shall suggest that it is sound. The upshot is that utilitarianism has a great deal of trouble accommodating rights.

Comments

This chapter was included in volume 24 of the NOMOS series.

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