Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2018
Publisher
Northwestern University School of Law
Language
en-US
Abstract
In McCleskey v. Kemp, the Supreme Court rendered statistical evidence of racial disparities doctrinally irrelevant to a criminal defendant’s equal protection claim. Fifteen years later in Grutter v. Bollinger, Chief Justice Rehnquist—part of the McCleskey majority—invoked admissions data to support his conclusion that the University of Michigan Law School had unconstitutionally discriminated against White applicants. This facially inconsistent treatment of statistical data invites the following inquiry: Why do judges (including Supreme Court Justices) rely on social science in some cases, yet reject it in others? We suggest that one answer lies at the intersection of Critical Race Theory and empirical scholarship on motivated social cognition. This “eCRT” lens illuminates how ostensibly neutral biases and heuristics, when informed by socially salient racial stereotypes, will predictably and systematically lead judges to overvalue “evidence” that rationalizes existing racial disparities and legitimizes the status quo.
Recommended Citation
Jonathan Feingold & Evelyn Carter,
Eyes Wide Open: What Social Science Can Tell Us About the Supreme Court's Use of Social Science
,
in
112
Northwestern University Law Review Online
1689
(2018).
Available at:
https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/829
