Author granted license

Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2008

ISSN

0736-9921

Publisher

University of Chicago Press

Language

en-US

Abstract

In a large number of products liability lawsuits, sellers assert that plaintiffs' claims should be rejected because their products fall under some federal regulatory regime, and that the regulatory statute takes precedence over or preempts state tort law. This paper is an attempt to set out a positive theory of the doctrine on preemption of products liability claims. The federal case law is largely consistent with an approach that seeks to minimize the costs of erroneous decisions to preempt tort lawsuits. In particular, two factors explain many of the outcomes of the preemption cases in federal courts: agency independence and the degree of congruence between the regulatory and common law standards.

Comments

Boston University School of Law Working Paper Series, Law and Economics Working Paper No. 03-17

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