Author granted license

Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International

Document Type


Publication Date





Boston University School of Law




We appreciate Michael Dorf’s serious engagement with our book and his conclusion that “it responds effectively to the charge that liberalism focuses on rights to the exclusion of responsibilities.”1 He charges us, however, with an “errant theodicy” – with making the “claim that we have . . . the freedoms we have in virtue of a freestanding principle that respectful treatment of persons requires granting them autonomy as responsibility.”2 He also criticizes us for deriving basic liberties from a “freestanding interest in autonomy.”3 In this response we aim to clarify our argument concerning responsibility as autonomy and to reject the interpretation of our book as deriving basic liberties from any such freestanding principle of autonomy.

Link to Publisher Site (BU Community Subscription)



To view the content in your browser, please download Adobe Reader or, alternately,
you may Download the file to your hard drive.

NOTE: The latest versions of Adobe Reader do not support viewing PDF files within Firefox on Mac OS and if you are using a modern (Intel) Mac, there is no official plugin for viewing PDF files within the browser window.