Title

Informative Advertising and Product Match

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

3-1994

ISSN

0167-7187

Publisher

Elsevier

Language

en-US

Abstract

This paper studies informative advertising in a variety of market structures for which some consumers are informed about two differentiated products while other consumers are uninformed. We characterize a unique symmetric subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in advertising and pricing. and analyze the welfare properties of the equilibrium. Remarkably, total surplus 5s non-monotonic m advertising. In a duopoly market, the equilibrium level of advertising may be more or less than socially optimal. We also study the effect of a trade association. and compare these results with the first-best solution and a multiproduct monopolist.

This document is currently not available here.

Link to Publisher Site Link to Publisher Site (BU Community Subscription)

Share

COinS