Author granted license

Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommerical-ShareAlike 4.0 International

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2017

ISSN

2398-7723

Publisher

American Journal of International Law

Language

en-us

Abstract

Tallinn 2.0 grapples with the application of general international law principles through various hypothetical fact patterns addressed by its experts. In doing so, its commentary sections provide a nonbinding framework for thinking about sovereignty, raising important considerations for states as they begin to articulate norms to resolve the question of precisely what kinds of nonconsensual cyber activities violate well-established international laws — a question that will likely be the focus of international lawyers in this area for some time to come.

This essay focuses on one area of state practice where states are already dealing with these issues: the use of hacking techniques by law enforcement agencies to collect evidence stored on foreign-located computers whose location is unknown at the time of the search. It shows how the resulting cross-border cyber-exfiltration operations are in tension with international legal norms, and face a greater risk of public exposure than those conducted by military or intelligence agencies. It then argues that, for the United States, these potential drawbacks may present an opportunity, by providing a specific context for the articulation of norms in cyberspace.

Comments

Portions of this essay are drawn from Ahmed Ghappour, Searching Places Unknown: Law Enforcement Jurisdiction on the Dark Web, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1075 (2017).

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