Introductory Note to Prosecutor v. Ratko Mladić (U.N. Int’l Residual Mechanism Crim. Tribunals App. Chamber)

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INTRODUCTORY NOTE TO PROSECUTOR V. MLADIĆ (U.N. INT’L RESIDUAL MECHANISM CRIM. TRIBUNALS APP. CHAMBER)
BY STEVEN ARRIGG KOH*
[June 8, 2021]

Introduction

On June 8, 2021, the UN International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (Mechanism) Appeals Chamber delivered its appeals judgment in Prosecutor v. Ratko Mladić. The judgment affirmed the 2017 trial judgment of Trial Chamber I of the UN International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), which convicted Mladić, the Bosnian Serb commander, of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes during the war in Bosnia between 1992 and 1995, as well as affirming his sentence of life imprisonment. This constituted Mladić’s final appeal, opening the door for his assignment to a prison somewhere in Europe.¹

Background

The Mladić case is intimately bound up in the history of the ICTY and contemporary international criminal law. As is well known, the UN Security Council established the ICTY in The Hague in 1993 to prosecute perpetrators of atrocity crimes in the Balkan region. The ICTY constituted the first modern incarnation of an international war crimes tribunal since the post-World War II Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals. Just a year later, the Security Council established the UN International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in Arusha, Tanzania. Both tribunals were ad hoc—created with limited jurisdiction and for a limited existence—with a unified appeals chamber in The Hague. After hundreds of prosecutions, the ICTR closed in 2015 and the ICTY closed in 2017; both were succeeded by the lower-cost Mechanism, which performs several essential functions, such as tracking and prosecution of remaining fugitives, retrials, and—most relevantly for the present purposes—appeals proceedings.²

The Mladić case straddles the historical line between the ICTY and the Mechanism. Mladić, the Commander of the Main Staff of the army of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1992 to 1996, was branded the “Butcher of Bosnia” due to his notorious military reputation during the wars following the breakup of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. In July 1995, the ICTY Prosecutor jointly indicted him and former Bosnian Serb president Radovan Karadžić, although the indictment was amended several times to include, inter alia, the charge of genocide for the humanitarian catastrophe that occurred that same month in Srebrenica. Both men subsequently evaded arrest and remained fugitives for many years. Karadžić was arrested in Serbia in 2008 and, given that Mladić was still at large, the trial proceeded on the indictment without Mladić; he was convicted in 2016. Mladić was arrested in 2011 and was convicted in 2017. The Mechanism heard the subsequent appeal.

The Appeals Chamber’s Decision

The Mladić appeals judgment both affirms the Trial Chamber’s judgment and echoes the findings of Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, the aforementioned ICTY “sister case” against the former Bosnian Serb president. The key to understanding the Mladić opinion—and most ICTY legacy cases—is to think primarily through joint criminal enterprise (JCE), a mode of group criminal liability established early in the ICTY’s history. JCE resembles the American criminal law concept of conspiracy; however, the actus reus (or criminal act requirement) differs: American conspiracy, an inchoate offense, typically requires a slight “overt act,” whereas JCE requires that a group member actually perpetrate a criminal act.³ In the Mladić indictment, prosecutors alleged (1) an “overarching JCE” in which the Bosnian Serbs between 1992 and 1995 tried to remove Croats/Muslims permanently from Bosnia, plus (2–4) three “smaller” JCEs (spreading terror in Sarajevo, elimination of the Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica, and taking UN personnel hostage).

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The Mechanism affirmed the ICTY Trial Chamber’s 2017 finding that Mladić, as commander of the Main Staff of the Bosnian Serb army between 1992 and 1995, was part of all JCEs and thus criminally responsible for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Much of this was expected: as an evidentiary matter, Mladić was a more straightforward case than Karadžić, given that more video and other evidence existed of Mladić “on the ground” than of President Karadžić. The notable exception was Count 1: the Mechanism affirmed the Trial Chamber’s acquittal on that count, which had alleged that he perpetrated genocide in Bosnian municipalities outside of Srebrenica. In other words, the Appeals Chamber affirmed the Trial Chamber’s finding that the prosecution failed to prove the specific genocidal intent to destroy a substantial part of the Bosnian Muslim population. The prosecution appealed on this ground (again) and lost (again)—just as it did in Karadžić. The Appeals Chamber also affirmed the Trial Chamber’s sentence of life imprisonment, the maximum sentence available under the ICTY statute.

Conclusion

The Mladić appeals judgment brings to a close the last major case that the ICTY initiated. On the one hand, Mladić powerfully exemplifies the ICTY’s positive, transformative legacy. First, the ICTY plainly brought to justice the infamous “Butcher of Bosnia”: the central goal of international criminal law is to achieve justice for victims,4 and this case certainly did that—including for the families living on in the wake of the Srebrenica massacre. Second, the conviction reaffirms the Tribunal’s improbable success: the ICTY slowly built institutional legitimacy and international authority to the point where Mladić’s arrest evolved into a geopolitical and moral imperative, even removing an obstacle to Serbia’s push for European Union membership.5 And third, most broadly, the ICTY stands as a catalyzing “first mover” tribunal in a modern era of international criminal accountability that aspires to end impunity for “the most serious crimes of concern to the international community.”6

But Mladić reminds us—almost thirty years after the ICTY’s establishment—both of the limits of the “Hague tribunal” model of international criminal prosecution and the proliferation of diverse modes of international criminal accountability today. Mladić is one of the last judgments of the “Hague tribunal” institutional model, wherein the ICTY and ICTR were established and fully funded by the UN Security Council and international community. But ongoing challenges with this institutional arrangement—including the high cost and flagging perceptions of legitimacy in the Balkan region—led to the successive wave of “hybrid” tribunals. Such tribunals featured a mix of domestic and international judges in or near the location of the atrocity crimes, as in the case of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, founded in 2003. A third model is the permanent International Criminal Court (ICC), created by a multilateral treaty but facing the central challenges of state party ratification and enforcement. Other tribunals, such as the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (established 2009) or the Kosovo Specialist Chambers & Specialist Prosecutor’s Office (established 2017), represent variations on such models.7

Such international enforcement models complement and contrast with another major front in contemporary criminal law enforcement: the ongoing empowerment of domestic jurisdictions to investigate and prosecute international and transnational crime. As is well known, the ICC functions on a foundation of deferential complementarity, wherein it will only prosecute if a country is unwilling or unable to prosecute.8 Contemporary international investigative mechanisms share in this deference, building an evidentiary record for atrocity crimes in Myanmar and Syria, leaving formal prosecution to future national, regional, or international actors.9 Meanwhile, national jurisdictions such as the United States are continuing to reach abroad, asserting jurisdiction over not only atrocity crimes but also for a variety of extraterritorial offenses under the “long arm” of foreign affairs prosecutions, which may implicate both defendant rights and foreign relations more broadly.10

In sum, Mladić achieves the central, noble aim of international criminal law: ending impunity for those who have perpetrated the most serious global crimes. And—owing to both the ICTY’s successes and its challenges—the case exemplifies the Hague tribunals as modern catalysts in the dynamic context of international and transnational criminal law enforcement.
ENDNOTES

1 See generally Steven Arrigg Koh, Geography and Justice: Why Prison Location Matters in U.S. and International Theories of Criminal Punishment, 47 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 1267 (2013) (describing the process whereby international convicts are assigned to a prison in Europe or Africa).


3 See generally https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub/211.


9 See Steven Arrigg Koh, Core Criminal Procedure, 105 Minn. L. Rev. 251, 314-16 (2020) (discussing the history of establishment of such investigative mechanisms).

PROSECUTOR V. MLADIĆ (U.N. INT’L RESIDUAL MECHANISM CRIM. TRIBUNALS APP. CHAMBER)*
[June 8, 2021]

UNITED NATIONS

International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals

Case No.: MICT-13-56-A
Date: 8 June 2021
Original: English

IN THE APPEALS CHAMBER

Before: Judge Prisca Matimba Nyambe, Presiding
Judge Aminatta Lois Runeni N’gum
Judge Seymour Panton
Judge Elizabeth Ibanda-Nahamya
Judge Mustapha El Baaj

Registrar: Mr. Abubacarr Tambadou
Judgement of: 8 June 2021

PROSECUTOR
v.
RATKO MLADIĆ

PUBLIC REDACTED

JUDGEMENT

The Office of the Prosecutor:
Mr. Serge Brammertz
Ms. Laurel Baig
Ms. Barbara Goy

Counsel for Mr. Ratko Mladić:
Mr. Branko Lukić
Mr. Dragan Ivetić

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND

2. Mladić was born on 12 March 1942 in Božanović, Kalinovik Municipality. From 27 September 1965 until 10 May 1992, he was a member of the Yugoslav People’s Army (“JNA”) and held various positions in military posts throughout the former Yugoslavia. On 12 May 1992, the Bosnian Serb Assembly appointed Mladić as Commander of the Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska (“VRS”). He remained in command of the VRS Main Staff until at least 8 November 1996.

3. Mladić was indicted on 24 July and 16 November 1995 and, following several amendments, the operative indictment against him was filed on 16 December 2011. The Prosecution charged Mladić with individual criminal responsibility pursuant to Articles 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of the ICTY (“ICTY Statute”) on 11 counts of genocide, crimes against humanity, and violations of the laws or customs of war under Articles 3, 4, and 5 of the ICTY Statute. The crimes covered by the Indictment were allegedly committed between 12 May 1992 and 30 November 1995 on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

4. The Trial Chamber acquitted Mladić of genocide under Count 1 of the Indictment and convicted him pursuant to Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute of genocide, crimes against humanity (persecution, extermination, murder, deportation, and inhumane acts), and violations of the laws or customs of war (murder, terror, unlawful attacks on civilians, and taking of hostages). The Trial Chamber found him responsible for committing these crimes through a “leading and grave role” in four joint criminal enterprises.

5. The Trial Chamber found that, from 12 May 1992 until 30 November 1995, Mladić participated in a joint criminal enterprise with the objective of permanently removing Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from Bosnian Serb-claimed territory in Bosnia and Herzegovina through persecution, extermination, murder, inhumane acts (forcible transfer), and deportation (“Overarching JCE”), and convicted him of these crimes.

6. The Trial Chamber further found that, between 12 May 1992 and November 1995, Mladić participated in a joint criminal enterprise with the objective of spreading terror among the civilian population of Sarajevo through a campaign of sniping and shelling (“Sarajevo JCE”), and convicted him of the crimes of terror, unlawful attacks on civilians, and murder.

7. The Trial Chamber also found that, from the days immediately preceding 11 July 1995 to at least October 1995, Mladić participated in a joint criminal enterprise with the objective of eliminating the Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica by killing the men and boys and forcibly removing the women, young children, and some elderly men (“Srebrenica JCE”), and convicted him of the crimes of genocide, as well as persecution, inhumane acts (forcible transfer), murder, and extermination.

8. Further, the Trial Chamber found that, from approximately 25 May 1995 to approximately 24 June 1995, Mladić participated in a joint criminal enterprise with the objective of capturing United Nations (“UN”) personnel deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina and detaining them in strategic military locations to prevent the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (“NATO”) from launching further military air strikes on Bosnian Serb military targets (“Hostage-Taking JCE”), and convicted him of the crime of taking of hostages as a violation of the laws or customs of war.

9. The Trial Chamber sentenced Mladić to life imprisonment.

A. THE APPEALS

10. Mladić presents nine grounds of appeal challenging his convictions and sentence. Mladić requests that the Appeals Chamber reverse all erroneous findings of the Trial Chamber, quash his convictions, and acquit him. In the alternative, Mladić seeks a retrial or a reduction in his sentence. The Prosecution responds that Mladić’s appeal should be dismissed in its entirety.

11. The Prosecution presents two grounds of appeal challenging certain findings or conclusions of the Trial Chamber pertaining to the Overarching JCE and its acquittal of genocide under Count 1 of the Indictment.
Prosecution requests that the Appeals Chamber correct the Trial Chamber’s errors and convict Mladić of genocide under Count 1 of the Indictment pursuant to the first category of joint criminal enterprise, or alternatively, the third category of joint criminal enterprise, or as a superior under Article 7(3) of the ICTY Statute. Mladić responds that the Prosecution’s appeal should be dismissed in its entirety.

12. The Appeals Chamber heard oral submissions regarding these appeals on 25 and 26 August 2020.

III. THE APPEAL OF RATKO MLADIĆ

B. Alleged Errors Related to the Overarching JCE (Ground 3)

120. The Trial Chamber found that, between 1991 and 30 November 1995, the Overarching JCE existed with the objective of permanently removing Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from Bosnian Serb-claimed territory in Bosnia and Herzegovina through the crimes of persecution, extermination, murder, inhumane acts (forcible transfer), and deportation. It concluded that members of the Overarching JCE included Radovan Karadžić, Momočilo Krajišnik, Biljana Plavšić, Nikola Koljević, Bogdan Subotić, Momočilo Mandić, Mićo Stanišić, and Mladić. The Trial Chamber found that members of the Overarching JCE used units from the VRS and the Ministry of Interior of Republika Srpska (“MUP”), as well as paramilitary formations, regional and municipal authorities, and territorial defence units subordinated to or working closely with the VRS and the MUP, as “tools to commit the crimes in the Municipalities” in furtherance of the joint criminal enterprise.

121. The Trial Chamber further found that Mladić, as Commander of the VRS Main Staff from 12 May 1992 until at least 8 November 1996, significantly contributed to the Overarching JCE through his acts and omissions. The Trial Chamber also found that Mladić knew crimes were committed against non-Serbs in the Municipalities, and that, through his statements and conduct, by 12 May 1992 at the latest, he shared the intent to achieve the common objective of the Overarching JCE.

122. Mladić submits that the Trial Chamber erred in finding: (i) the existence of and his membership in the Overarching JCE; and (ii) that he significantly contributed to and shared the intent to further the Overarching JCE. The Appeals Chamber will address these contentions in turn.

1. Alleged Errors Regarding the Overarching JCE and Mladić’s Membership (Ground 3.A)

123. As recalled above, the Trial Chamber concluded that between 1991 and 30 November 1995, the Overarching JCE existed with the common objective to permanently remove Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from Bosnian Serb-claimed territory and that, by 12 May 1992, Mladić significantly contributed to and shared the intent of the joint criminal enterprise.

124. Mladić submits that the Trial Chamber erred in finding the existence of and his membership in the Overarching JCE by: (i) improperly relying on adjudicated facts to establish the underlying crime base; (ii) according insufficient weight to exculpatory evidence in relation to his participation; and (iii) expanding the scope of the joint criminal enterprise as well as making inconsistent or erroneous findings with respect to his relationship with the Bosnian Serb leadership and his role in the VRS. He contends that, as a consequence of the Trial Chamber’s errors, the Appeals Chamber should overturn his convictions in relation to the Overarching JCE, or, in the alternative, reverse findings to the extent of any errors. The Appeals Chamber will consider these arguments in turn.

(a) Reliance on Adjudicated Facts to Establish the Underlying Crimes of the Overarching JCE

125. Mladić submits that, in finding that the Overarching JCE existed, the Trial Chamber erred in its method of using adjudicated facts by: (i) relying solely on adjudicated facts that went to the acts and conduct of his proximate subordinates; and (ii) relying on adjudicated facts that were only corroborated by evidence admitted pursuant to
Rule 92 bis of the ICTY Rules (“Rule 92 bis evidence”). 389 He argues that these errors led to a “defective evidentiary approach” in making findings on the crime base for the Overarching JCE. 390 To illustrate the Trial Chamber’s erroneous approach, Mladić refers specifically to Scheduled Incidents B.10.2 and B.16.2 391 and generally to 13 other scheduled incidents of the Indictment and five chapters of the Trial Judgement. 392 Mladić submits that, as a result of the Trial Chamber’s errors, findings in the Trial Judgement with respect to the existence of the Overarching JCE are invalidated. 393

126. The Appeals Chamber will address Mladić’s contentions of error in turn. Before doing so, the Appeals Chamber recalls that adjudicated facts, within the meaning of Rule 94(B) of the ICTY Rules, are presumptions which, as such, do not require corroboration. 394 Adjudicated facts may relate to the existence of a joint criminal enterprise, the conduct of its members other than the accused, and facts related to the conduct of physical perpetrators of crimes for which an accused is alleged to be responsible. 395 In this context, trial chambers, after having reviewed the record as a whole, may rely on adjudicated facts to establish the underlying crime base when making findings in support of convictions. 396

(i) Scheduled Incident B.16.2

127. With respect to Scheduled Incident B.16.2, the Trial Chamber found that:

[On the evening of 30 September 1992, Serb MUP officers from the (Public Security Station (“SJB”)) Vlasenica arrived at Sušica camp and, on the order of Mane Đurić ([“Đurić”]), removed 140 [to] 150 non-Serb detainees in four trips. Serbs wearing military uniforms were also present when the last group of detainees was removed by the MUP officers. The MUP officers killed all the detainees. Considering that Sušica camp comprised only Bosnian-Muslim detainees, the Trial Chamber finds that those killed were Bosnian Muslims. 397

In making its findings on this event, the Trial Chamber considered Adjudicated Facts 1266 to 1268 as well as the evidence of Witnesses RM-066 and Ewa Tabeau. 398 It further determined that this incident constituted murder as charged under Counts 5 and 6 of the Indictment. 399

128. Mladić notes that to reach its findings on Scheduled Incident B.16.2, the Trial Chamber relied on Adjudicated Facts 1266 to 1268 and Prosecution evidence. 400 He argues that the Prosecution evidence was insufficient on its own to establish that MUP officers caused the deaths in Scheduled Incident B.16.2. 401 Mladić further contends that he was unable to challenge Adjudicated Facts 1266 to 1268 through cross-examination because the Prosecution’s evidence did not corroborate the facts that proved the elements of the crime. 402 Accordingly, Mladić submits that the Trial Chamber erred by relying exclusively on “unchallengeable” adjudicated facts to make its findings with respect to Scheduled Incident B.16.2. 403 Mladić also refers to his submissions in Ground 2 of his appeal that the standard imposed to rebut adjudicated facts is impermissibly high. 404

129. The Prosecution responds that the Trial Chamber properly considered the adjudicated facts to establish the crime base of the Overarching JCE and that Mladić demonstrates no error in relation to Scheduled Incident B.16.2. 405 It argues that nothing prevented Mladić from bringing countervailing evidence against the adjudicated facts, and [REDACTED]. 406

130. The Appeals Chamber notes that, in reaching its findings on Scheduled Incident B.16.2, the Trial Chamber considered that: (i) according to Adjudicated Fact 1266, on 30 September 1992, a public burial of more than 20 Serb soldiers killed in an ambush by the ABiH was held in Vlasenica town; 407 (ii) according to Adjudicated Fact 1267, during the night, three MUP officers arrived at the Sušica camp with a bus and the MUP officers removed all 140 to 150 inmates in four loads and killed them; 408 and (iii) according to Adjudicated Fact 1268, the massacre was reported to the Vlasenica Crisis Staff members, who took no action except to order the dismantling of the camp and the concealment of its traces. 409

131. Pursuant to the evidence of primarily Witness RM-066, the Trial Chamber further noted, inter alia, that: (i) after concerns about the safety of detainees of Sušica camp were raised with Đurić following the funeral in Vlasenica on 30 September 1992 and it was recommended to him that the detainees be transferred elsewhere until “things
calmed down”, Đurić “promised to send vehicles to have the detainees transferred”;\(^{410}\) (ii) the same evening, MUP officers from the SJB Vlasenica – including a man nicknamed “Chetnik”, a man called Garić, and Pedrag Bastah – came to Sušica camp with an order from Đurić to remove the detainees as soon as possible;\(^ {411}\) (iii) the last group of detainees, consisting mostly of local Muslims from Vlasenica, was loaded onto a small bus that also carried a number of Serbs wearing military and police uniforms, and the bus was escorted by a police car carrying Chetnik, Bastah, and Garić;\(^ {412}\) (iv) after the police officers removed the last group of detainees, a group of soldiers arrived at Sušica camp demanding to know where the Muslims were;\(^ {413}\) and (v) the massacre was reported to the Vlasenica Crisis Staff members, who took no action except to order the dismantling of the camp and the concealment of its traces.\(^ {414}\)

132. Recalling the statement of the law above,\(^ {415}\) the Appeals Chamber considers that it was within the Trial Chamber’s discretion to rely on Adjudicated Facts 1267 and 1268 to make findings concerning the removal and killing of Bosnian Muslim detainees by MUP officers and Mladić fails to show any error in this respect. In addition to the adjudicated facts, the Trial Chamber admitted a statement and heard testimony from Witness RM-066, who stated that [REDACTED].\(^ {416}\) The Appeals Chamber further observes that the Trial Chamber considered Witness Tabeau’s evidence as well as documentary and forensic evidence regarding missing persons from Vlasenica Municipality.\(^ {417}\) On this basis, Mladić’s submission – that the Prosecution evidence the Trial Chamber relied on is insufficient to create a link between the deaths of 140 to 150 detainees and the perpetrators of the killings – is without merit.

133. The Appeals Chamber also rejects Mladić’s argument that, since the Prosecution evidence did not corroborate the adjudicated facts, he was prevented from challenging them through cross-examination.\(^ {418}\) In this respect, the Appeals Chamber notes that [REDACTED].\(^ {419}\)

134. The Appeals Chamber has rejected Mladić’s submission that the burden imposed to rebut adjudicated facts is impermissibly high or that the Trial Chamber shifted the burden of proof by taking judicial notice of adjudicated facts relating to the conduct of his proximate subordinates.\(^ {420}\) The Appeals Chamber recalls that taking judicial notice of an adjudicated fact serves only to relieve the Prosecution of its initial burden to produce evidence on the point, and the defence may then put the point into question by introducing reliable and credible evidence to the contrary.\(^ {421}\) Nothing prevented Mladić from bringing evidence to refute Adjudicated Facts 1266 to 1268. Moreover, at trial, Mladić did not appear to dispute the facts pertaining to Scheduled Incident B.16.2 or Witness RM-066’s evidence in this regard. Rather, relying on Witness RM-066’s evidence, Mladić argued that the killing of 140 to 150 detainees was perpetrated by Serb police, who were not under the effective control of the VRS or under his authority, and could not be attributed to him given the lack of actus reus or mens rea.\(^ {422}\)

135. In light of the foregoing, Mladić fails to demonstrate that the Trial Chamber erred by relying exclusively on “unchallengeable” adjudicated facts to make findings on Scheduled Incident B.16.2.

(ii) **Scheduled Incident B.10.2**

136. In relation to Scheduled Incident B.10.2, the Trial Chamber found that:

[O]n 14 June 1992, at least 52 detainees from the oil cisterns near the Rajlovac barracks were forced onto a bus, driven by a Serb named Žuti, who was Jovan Tintor’s driver. There were two persons stationed on the bus as guards, and the Trial Chamber understands from Elvir Jahić’s evidence, describing them as members of the “Serb army-police forces”, that they were members of the VRS military police. The bus was escorted by four vehicles. Žuti stopped the bus near the village of Sokolina, near Srednje, and he and the two military policemen exited the bus. Immediately after, they attacked the bus with automatic weapons, hand grenades, and “zoljas”, and the detainees who tried to escape were shot and killed. After the shooting, some detainees were still alive. A few minutes later, one of the vehicles that had escorted the bus, approached. The driver stepped out, entered the bus, and started firing at the bodies and survivors with an automatic rifle. He threw two hand grenades and left. In all, at least 47 of the detainees were killed, 38 of whom were found in a mass grave. Of them, 26 were found in civilian clothes. Based on the evidence of Witness RM-145 [. . .], the Trial Chamber finds that all 52 detainees were Bosnian Muslims.\(^ {423}\)
In making this finding, the Trial Chamber considered Adjudicated Fact 1229, as well as the evidence of Witnesses Elvir Jahić, RM-145, and Tabeau.424 It further determined that this incident constituted murder as charged under Counts 5 and 6 of the Indictment.425

137. Mladić notes that to reach the finding in respect of Scheduled Incident B.10.2, that at least 47 of the 52 detainees were killed by members of the VRS, the Trial Chamber relied on Adjudicated Fact 1229 which “established part of the elemental requirements”.426 Mladić submits that, in respect of this scheduled incident, the Trial Chamber also received the evidence of Witnesses Jahić and RM-145, which he could not challenge because it was admitted pursuant to Rule 92 bis of the ICTY Rules.427 He also reiterates that the burden to rebut adjudicated facts is “impermissibly high”.428 Accordingly, Mladić submits that the Trial Chamber erred by relying on “unchallengeable” adjudicated facts to establish the elements of the crime.429

138. The Prosecution responds that the Trial Chamber properly considered the adjudicated facts and Rule 92 bis evidence to establish the crime base of the Overarching JCE and that Mladić demonstrates no error in relation to Scheduled Incident B.10.2.430 The Prosecution submits that it was within the Trial Chamber’s discretion to take judicial notice of adjudicated facts that relate to the acts and conduct of an accused’s subordinates, proximate or otherwise, and to rely on adjudicated facts alone or in combination with Rule 92 bis evidence in making crime-based incident findings.431 The Prosecution further argues that, in any event, Mladić falsely asserts that he could not challenge or cross-examine evidence supporting Adjudicated Fact 1229, as he cross-examined Witness RM-145, whose evidence was entered through Rule 92 ter of the ICTY Rules, on events pertinent to the relevant adjudicated fact.432

139. With respect to Mladić’s submission that Adjudicated Fact 1229 was “unchallengeable” as he was not able to cross-examine the Rule 92 bis evidence led in support of it, the Appeals Chamber, recalling the law on the use of adjudicated facts, considers that it was within the Trial Chamber’s discretion to rely on Adjudicated Fact 1229 to find that at least 47 detainees from oil cisterns near Rajlovac barracks in Sokolina were killed by members of the VRS police and Mladić fails to show any error in this respect. The Appeals Chamber further considers that Mladić’s argument fails to recognize that adjudicated facts admitted under Rule 94(B) of the ICTY Rules are not the equivalent of untested evidence admitted pursuant to Rule 92 bis of the ICTY Rules.433 Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber presumes that this argument is in reference to the evidence of Witness Jahić, whose statement was admitted pursuant to Rule 92 bis of the ICTY Rules.434 However, this submission ignores the fact that Mladić cross-examined Witness RM-145, who also gave supporting evidence about the attack on 14 June 1992 and whose evidence the Trial Chamber considered when making its findings.435 Additionally, a review of the Mladić Final Trial Brief reflects that Mladić did not dispute the occurrence of the events of 14 June 1992 or the credibility of Witness RM-145’s evidence.436 Rather, Mladić simply argued at trial that the physical perpetrators of this event were not under the VRS’s or his command and control.437

140. Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber recalls that it has rejected Mladić’s submissions that the burden imposed to rebut adjudicated facts is impermissibly high and that the Trial Chamber shifted the burden of proof by taking judicial notice of adjudicated facts relating to the conduct of his proximate subordinates.438 The Appeals Chamber reiterates that taking judicial notice of an adjudicated fact serves only to relieve the Prosecution of its initial burden of production, and the defence may introduce reliable and credible evidence to the contrary.439 As with Scheduled Incident B.16.2, nothing prevented Mladić from bringing evidence to refute Adjudicated Fact 1229 with respect to Scheduled Incident B.10.2. There is no indication that he presented such evidence.

141. Given the foregoing, Mladić fails to demonstrate that the Trial Chamber erred by relying on an “unchallengeable” adjudicated fact in making findings on Scheduled Incident B.10.2.

(iii) Other Scheduled Incidents

142. Mladić submits that, similar to Scheduled Incidents B.10.2 and B.16.2, the Trial Chamber also took a “defective evidentiary approach” in relation to 13 other scheduled incidents and five chapters of the Trial Judgement.440 According to Mladić, these comprise Scheduled Incidents A.4.4, A.6.4, A.6.6, A.6.7, A.7.2, A.7.4, A.7.5, B.1.1, B.1.2, B.10.1, B.13.3, B.13.4, and C.6.1, as well as Chapters 4.2.4, 4.3.6, 4.5.5, 4.5.6, and 4.8.7 of
the Trial Judgement. He contends that this approach occurred systematically in establishing the crime base for the Overarching JCE.

143. The Prosecution responds that Mladić’s challenge to these 13 other incidents, amounting to a single sentence in his appellant’s brief, fails to identify any error and should be summarily dismissed.

144. The Appeals Chamber observes that, in this respect, Mladić merely enumerates scheduled incidents of the Indictment and chapters of the Trial Judgement without making any attempt to substantiate his allegation of a “defective evidentiary approach”. Consequently, Mladić fails to satisfy his burden on appeal and his submissions in this regard are dismissed.

(iv) Conclusion

145. In light of the foregoing considerations, the Appeals Chamber finds, Judge Nyambe dissenting, that Mladić has failed to demonstrate that the Trial Chamber committed any error in its method of relying on adjudicated facts when making findings on the underlying crimes of the Overarching JCE.

(b) Assessment of Exculpatory Evidence of Mladić’s Membership in the Overarching JCE

146. Mladić submits that the Trial Chamber erred in finding that he was a member of the Overarching JCE by disregarding or giving insufficient weight to direct and exculpatory evidence that he acted in opposition to the common criminal objective of the joint criminal enterprise. He points to evidence of his “positive attitude and behaviour” towards Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat civilians, including: (i) evidence of his care for non-Serb civilians during the conflict, as well as evidence that they remained in their municipalities during the conflict and were given a choice to leave or remain in their villages; (ii) evidence that he reported concerns to Karadžić and the Minister of the Interior about the commission of crimes by “MUP forces” against non-Serbs, and that he called for affirmative action to be taken; and (iii) excerpts from his military notebooks containing direct evidence of constraints he experienced in the Municipalities and the protection he intended to provide to non-Serbs. The Appeals Chamber will consider these arguments in turn.

(i) Evidence of Care for Non-Serb Civilians

147. Mladić submits that the Trial Chamber failed to give sufficient or any weight to evidence of his positive attitude and behaviour toward Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat civilians through his “concerted efforts to take care of civilians” and the measures employed to provide security for Bosnian Muslim villagers during the conflict. In support, he points to minutes of a Pale Municipal Assembly meeting, as well as the evidence of Witnesses Branko Basara, Safet Gagula, RM-802, and Sveto Veselinović.

148. Mladić further submits that the Trial Chamber did not include in its reasoning the evidence of Witnesses Slavko Mijanović, Mile Ujić, and Elvedin Pašić – stating that non-Serbs remained in their municipalities during the conflict. He also contends that the Trial Chamber erroneously found Witness Vinko Nikolić’s evidence, that over 8,000 Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats continued to live in Sanski Most Municipality, unreliable and did not give sufficient weight to the witness’s clarification during cross-examination that over 4,400 Bosnian Muslims remained. Mladić argues that the Trial Chamber also failed to provide analysis of the probative value of evidence from Witness RM-009 that Bosnian Muslims “left their villages freely”, and from Witness Dragiša Masal that Mladić made concerted efforts to give civilians the choice of remaining or leaving municipalities, and to allow unarmed individuals to farm the land and receive humanitarian aid. According to Mladić, the Trial Chamber did not take this evidence into account when making its findings.

149. The Prosecution responds that Mladić did not act to protect non-Serbs, that he repeats arguments that failed at trial without showing any error, and that the Trial Chamber expressly considered the evidence that he points to in his appellant’s brief. Regarding the alleged voluntary departure of non-Serbs, the Prosecution responds that Mladić ignores the Trial Chamber’s express rejection of this argument at trial, and that those who requested to leave never returned out of fear or because their homes were torched. The Prosecution further submits that the Trial Chamber reasonably concluded that Witness Vinko Nikolić’s evidence was not sufficiently reliable to rebut
the adjudicated fact that almost all Bosnian Muslims had left Sanski Most by the end of 1992 because the witness admitted that his estimates were without basis. According to the Prosecution, Mladić’s mere assertions that the Trial Chamber failed to give sufficient weight to pieces of supposedly “exculpatory evidence” warrant summary dismissal.

150. Mladić replies that the Prosecution does not directly engage with his submissions and fails to undermine his arguments that the Trial Chamber failed to afford certain evidence sufficient weight.

151. Regarding Mladić’s claim that he made concerted efforts to take care of non-Serb civilians, the Appeals Chamber observes that the Trial Chamber expressly considered evidence to which Mladić refers on appeal. In particular, the Trial Chamber noted: (i) the relevant Pale Municipal Assembly meeting minutes that the Pale SJB were to guarantee the safety of non-Serb civilians; (ii) Witness Basara’s evidence that members of his brigade in the VRS protected civilians in Muslim villages in Sanski Most Municipality; (iii) Witness Gagula’s statement that, while Serb representatives in Knežina, Sokolac Municipality indicated that they would protect Muslim civilians, many Muslims left the village in the second half of May 1992 and significantly toward the end of June 1992; (iv) Witness RM-802’s evidence that Bosnian Serb political authorities made preparations to take care of the Muslim civilian population by lining up buses to transport the women, children, and the elderly out of Večići, Kotor Varoš Municipality; and (v) Witness Veselinović’s evidence regarding the treatment of refugees and Bosnian Muslims in Rogatica Municipality.

152. The Trial Chamber nevertheless found that regarding: (i) Pale Municipality, between late June and early July 1992, over 2,000 Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croats involuntarily left in convoys escorted by the Pale SJB; (ii) Sanski Most Municipality, Witness Basara’s evidence was not credible and unpersuasive in light of a “large amount of reliable evidence” showing that the VRS was involved in transfers and evacuations, and that it carried out attacks and shelling campaigns to “mop up” predominantly Muslim villages and hamlets; (iii) Sokolac Municipality, Bosnian Muslims in, inter alia, Knežina fled their homes from 12 May 1992 onwards due to perceived threats of violence and the lack of protection from municipal authorities; (iv) Kotor Varoš Municipality, between June and November 1992, large parts of the non-Serb population were involuntarily moved out, including in Večići, in convoys by, inter alia, members of the VRS, MUP, and Kotor Varoš Crisis Staff; and (v) Rogatica Municipality, thousands of Muslims involuntarily left starting in May 1992 as a result of fear generated by threats and violence, and that the perpetrators of these displacements were members of the VRS.

153. The Appeals Chamber further observes that the excerpt of Witness Veselinović’s evidence, to which Mladić points, concerned efforts taken by Serb municipal authorities to protect exclusively Serb refugees, rather than non-Serbs. Having reviewed the foregoing evidence cited by Mladić, the Appeals Chamber notes that none relates to his personal actions or demonstrates his efforts to provide care or security for Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat civilians. The Appeals Chamber therefore finds that Mladić’s cursory submissions fail to substantiate his claim that the Trial Chamber erred by giving insufficient weight to evidence of his care for non-Serb civilians.

154. The Appeals Chamber now turns to Mladić’s arguments that the Trial Chamber did not include in its reasoning evidence that non-Serbs remained in their municipalities during the conflict and that he made concerted efforts to give civilians the choice to remain or leave. Mladić submits that the Trial Chamber failed to include Exhibit D799, Witness Mijanović’s statement, in its analysis on findings related to Ilidža Municipality. A review of the Trial Judgement indicates that the Trial Chamber expressly referred to Exhibit D799 and summarized Mijanović’s evidence that, inter alia, the Serb authorities in Ilidža Municipality did not expel non-Serbs. The Trial Chamber found that, aside from one specific incident, it did not receive any evidence “indicating that residents [in Ilidža] were forcibly displaced”. In view of this finding, the Appeals Chamber considers that there was no need for the Trial Chamber to discuss Exhibit D799 further and Mladić does not show any error in this respect.

155. Regarding the Trial Chamber’s alleged failure to discuss in its reasoning Exhibit D691, Witness Ujić’s statement that non-Serbs remained in Rogatica Municipality during the conflict, the Appeals Chamber observes that the paragraphs of the Trial Judgement that Mladić challenges in this respect do not concern Rogatica, but other municipalities, namely Ilidža and Kotor Varoš. Mladić identifies no reason why the Trial Chamber should
have considered this evidence when addressing crimes in other municipalities and fails to demonstrate any error in this respect. The Appeals Chamber notes that, in any event, the Trial Chamber expressly referred to Witness Ujić’s evidence, including Exhibit D691, in relation to events in Rogatica Municipality.²⁹¹

156. The Appeals Chamber is also not convinced by Mladić’s submission that the Trial Chamber erred by not including in its analysis Witness Pašić’s testimony that non-Serbs remained in the Kotor Varoš Municipality during the conflict.⁴⁹² The Appeals Chamber observes that the Trial Chamber explicitly considered relevant portions of Witness Pašić’s testimony regarding the flight of 50 to 70 Bosnian Muslims from the village of Hrvaćani in mid-1992 and the fate of those who remained.⁴⁹³ The Trial Chamber found, based on the totality of evidence, that between June and November 1992, large parts of the non-Serb population in Kotor Varoš Municipality were forcibly displaced by, inter alios, members of the VRS, MUP, and Kotor Varoš Crisis Staff.⁴⁹⁴ In doing so, the Trial Chamber explicitly recalled Witness Pašić’s testimony that a “group of 50 to 70 Muslims” encountered Serb soldiers, who told the group “there was nothing left for them in Hrvaćani and that they should go to Turkey”.⁴⁹⁵ Mladić simply isolates portions of Witness Pašić’s testimony that support his position and ignores the rest of the witness’s evidence and the Trial Chamber’s findings regarding events in Kotor Varoš Municipality. His arguments therefore fail to establish any error in the Trial Chamber’s assessment of Witness Pašić’s evidence or in its finding that non-Serbs involuntarily left the municipality.

157. As to Mladić’s contention regarding Witness Vinko Nikolić, the Appeals Chamber is not convinced that the Trial Chamber gave insufficient weight to the witness’s “clarification” made during cross-examination.⁴⁹⁶ In summarizing the evidence concerning Sanski Most Municipality, the Trial Chamber stated that Witness Vinko Nikolić estimated that more than 8,000 Muslims and Croats continued to live in the municipality during the war.⁴⁹⁷ During the witness’s cross-examination, this number was challenged by the Prosecution, who stated that by February 1995, the Banja Luka State Security Service estimated around 4,400 non-Serbs remaining in Sanski Most.⁴⁹⁸ When asked to clarify his estimate of 8,000, Witness Vinko Nikolić stated that the number included “Muslims and Croats”, that it was a “[f]ree estimate”, and that he “spontaneously came up with that number”.⁴⁹⁹ The Appeals Chamber notes that, contrary to Mladić’s submission,⁵⁰⁰ at no point during the cross-examination did the witness “clarify” his estimate. The Trial Chamber explicitly considered that the witness’s estimate of 8,000 had no basis, and that the witness could not justify this figure in light of evidence indicating a “significantly lower” number.⁵⁰¹ If therefore considered the witness’s evidence insufficiently reliable.⁵⁰² In the view of the Appeals Chamber, Mladić fails to show any error in the Trial Chamber’s assessment of Witness Vinko Nikolić’s evidence.

158. Turning to Mladić’s contention that the Trial Chamber gave insufficient weight to evidence that Bosnian Muslims left their villages freely and submitted requests to return, the Appeals Chamber notes that he relies on Exhibit P843, a statement from Witness RM-009, and Exhibit P854, a December 1992 report from the Kotor Varoš Light Brigade.⁵⁰³ In Exhibit P843, Witness RM-009 stated that in mid-1992 at least 50 buses full of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats left Kotor Varoš Municipality.⁵⁰⁴ The witness specified that “[t]hey were leaving freely, in the sense that they were not forced in the buses, but the main reason for this was because they were afraid of what would happen to them if they stayed. The non-Serb population was under pressure and I would say that they were persecuted.”⁵⁰⁵ The witness also noted that thousands of non-Serbs left “[b]ecause of the crimes that were committed against them by either the special unit or the military personnel”.⁵⁰⁶ The Appeals Chamber notes that the ‘Trial Chamber duly considered this evidence,⁵⁰⁷ as well as Exhibit P854, indicating that many Bosnian Muslims were submitting requests to return to their villages.⁵⁰⁸ The Trial Chamber considered, however, that according to Witness RM-009’s testimony, such requests would have been submitted to and approved by the local war presidency, “but these people never returned”.⁵⁰⁹ The Appeals Chamber further observes that, in relation to Kotor Varoš specifically, the Trial Chamber rejected the Defence arguments that people voluntarily made the decision to leave.⁵¹⁰ Recalling its findings that Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats in Kotor Varoš faced, inter alia, restrictions on their freedom of movement, limited access to medical care, dismissals from employment, killings, unlawful detention, as well as cruel and inhumane treatment, the Trial Chamber found that non-Serb civilians who left the municipality “did not have a genuine choice but to leave”.⁵¹¹ The Appeals Chamber considers that Mladić relies on an isolated excerpt of Witness RM-009’s evidence and ignores the entirety of the evidence,
159. The Appeals Chamber finally turns to Mladić’s submission that the Trial Chamber disregarded Exhibit D942, Witness Masal’s evidence that Mladić made concerted efforts to give civilians the choice to leave or remain and that he allowed unarmed individuals to farm the land and receive humanitarian aid. The Appeals Chamber observes that the paragraphs of the Trial Judgement Mladić challenges in this respect relate to Kotor Varoš and Sanski Most Municipalities, neither of which is mentioned in the excerpt of Exhibit D942 on which Mladić relies. Mladić makes no argument as to why the Trial Chamber should have considered the evidence he points to when assessing crimes in Kotor Varoš and Sanski Most Municipalities. Mladić therefore fails to identify any error in this respect.

160. Given that Mladić does not demonstrate an error with respect to any of the pieces of evidence to which he points on appeal, the Appeals Chamber dismisses his contention that the Trial Chamber, in assessing his membership in the Overarching JCE, erred in failing to address or give sufficient weight to evidence of his efforts to provide care to non-Serbs or evidence that they remained or voluntarily left their villages during the conflict.

(ii) Evidence that Mladić Reported Concerns to Karadžić and the Minister of the Interior

161. In alleging that the Trial Chamber gave insufficient weight to his actions protecting the non-Serb population who remained in the Municipalities, Mladić refers to Exhibits D1503 and P3095 to demonstrate that he reported concerns to Karadžić, the President of Republika Srpska, and the Minister of the Interior about the commission of crimes by MUP forces against the non-Serb population and that he called for “affirmative action” to be taken. The Prosecution responds that Mladić exaggerates the exculpatory value of his reports to Karadžić and the Minister of the Interior about crimes committed against non-Serbs. The Prosecution submits that Mladić’s reports were about Željko Ražnatović (“Arkan”) and his paramilitary unit, which were not found to be part of the Overarching JCE. Additionally, the Prosecution contends that these reports requested action to be taken against Arkan’s paramilitary unit only towards the end of the conflict and that they reveal Mladić being “predominantly concerned about [the] abuse of VRS members and looting of army materiel.” Mladić replies that the Prosecution does not directly engage with his submissions and fails to undermine his arguments that the Trial Chamber failed to afford certain evidence sufficient weight.

164. The Appeals Chamber notes that Exhibit D1503 is a letter from Mladić to Karadžić, dated 20 October 1995, reporting on the activities of Arkan’s paramilitary unit. The Appeals Chamber observes that Mladić’s reference to “MUP forces” in relation to Arkan or his paramilitary unit is a misinterpretation of the Trial Judgement. While Mladić argued at trial that Arkan’s paramilitary unit was subordinated to the MUP, the Trial Chamber did not make any finding on this matter in light of its findings that there was insufficient evidence to show that Arkan participated in the realization of the Overarching JCE. In the letter, Mladić stated that the “general behaviour and individual acts” of Arkan’s paramilitary unit have complicated the situation in the field and “spread fear among the population.” He further presented 12 “verified reports” of “extremely inhumane, unscrupulous and ruthless conduct” of Arkan’s paramilitary unit towards “the population and VRS members,” such as: (i) threatening, arresting, physically abusing, maltreating, beating, using firearms to inflict wounds, and humiliating officers and privates; (ii) seizing military equipment, weapons, documents of VRS officers, and expensive cars from the VRS without authorization; (iii) looting and wantonly destroying abandoned houses; and (iv) murdering 11 non-Serbs in Sanski Most and one member of the VRS near Novi Grad. In the letter, Mladić stated that he had issued orders to remove paramilitary formations that had refused to submit to the VRS, and that he expected Karadžić to prohibit such conduct.

165. The Appeals Chamber observes that, referring to Exhibit D1503, the Trial Chamber discussed the evidence that Mladić had informed Karadžić about crimes committed by Arkan’s paramilitary unit, including the murder of 11 non-Serbs in Sanski Most, and that Mladić had expected Karadžić to prohibit the continued presence of this group. While the Trial Chamber did not expressly refer to Exhibit P3095 in the Trial Judgement, such an omission...
is not erroneous. In this regard, Exhibit P3095 is a letter, dated 24 September 1995, from Mladić to the President and the Minister of the Interior of Republika Srpska, complaining that Arkan’s paramilitary unit was not under VRS command, was abusing VRS officers and looting VRS material, was causing armed clashes, and was upsetting the population at large by “liquidat[ing] a certain number of loyal Muslim citizens, including family members of some VRS servicemen”. The letter requests Arkan to be held accountable. In this letter, Mladić also requested that, inter alia, Karadžić revoke power given to Arkan and that the MUP take measures against Arkan. Exhibits P3095 and D1503 are therefore similar in nature – both are from autumn 1995, reveal Mladić’s strong disapproval of criminal acts committed by Arkan’s paramilitary unit, and address Karadžić, stating that action should be taken to prohibit the paramilitary group’s operation.

166. Based on the foregoing, the Appeals Chamber concludes that the Trial Chamber did consider evidence that Mladić reported concerns to Karadžić and the Minister of the Interior about the commission of crimes against the non-Serb population, and that he called for action to be taken. In assessing his contribution to the Overarching JCE, the Trial Chamber also considered evidence that Mladić noted crimes committed by paramilitary groups and that he ordered their disarmament. Mladić therefore fails to demonstrate that the Trial Chamber disregarded evidence or gave insufficient weight to his actions protecting the non-Serb population who remained in the Municipalities when determining his participation in the Overarching JCE.

(iii) Evidence from Mladić’s Notebook Entries of Constraints During the War and Assistance Provided to Non-Serbs

167. Mladić submits that the Trial Chamber erred by not giving sufficient weight to his military notebook entries that contain direct evidence of the constraints he faced during the war as well as the protection he intended to provide Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats. He states that the Trial Chamber relied on his notebooks “only four times” in its analysis of crimes that occurred in the Municipalities. The Prosecution responds that Mladić fails to demonstrate any error in the Trial Chamber’s analysis of his notebook entries or substantiate how his purported intention to protect non-Serbs could impact the findings in the Trial Judgement regarding his contributions to the Overarching JCE.

168. Regarding the alleged constraints he faced, Mladić points to his notebook entries (Exhibits P353 and P356), indicating, inter alia, that the VRS had issues with morale and discipline in the army as well as control over paramilitary formations, with the lack of cooperation between civilian and military structures, and with the provision of ammunition and military equipment. The Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber considered Exhibits P353 and P356 with respect to issues regarding the declining morale in the army, discipline in paramilitary formations, the shortage of ammunition, as well as the provision and financing of soldiers to the VRS. Beyond these specific exhibits, the Trial Chamber considered other evidence concerning the lack of discipline in the VRS, the “imperfect functioning of [the] military and civilian justice branches”, as well as plundering and “war profiteering” by members of the VRS as well as paramilitary units. Mladić ignores the Trial Chamber’s rejection of Defence arguments regarding the lack of loyalty and obedience to the VRS command. The Trial Chamber found that “occasional indiscipline in the VRS did not undermine Mladić’s overall ability to exercise command and control over his subordinates”. The Appeals Chamber therefore concludes that the Trial Chamber did consider evidence of the constraints Mladić faced during the war and further finds that, given its broad discretion in evidence assessment, Mladić fails to demonstrate that the Trial Chamber gave insufficient weight to such evidence.

170. With respect to the “protection he intended” to provide to non-Serbs, Mladić refers to his notebook entries (Exhibits P353 and P356) as well as two orders he issued in 1992 and 1994, respectively (Exhibits D1514 and D187). A review of the excerpt of Exhibit P353 to which Mladić points indicates that, in a conversation between Mladić and Colonel Petar Salapura in mid-July 1992, it was raised that the “people of Podžepje (Muslims) [were] asking to be given flour supplies”. The following text appears immediately after: “Decision: provide the basic foodstuffs, flour and oil”. While the Trial Chamber did not explicitly refer to this aspect of Exhibit P353, the Appeals Chamber observes that the Trial Chamber considered extensive evidence about the delivery and restriction of humanitarian aid in the territory of Republika Srpska between 1992 and 1995. This includes evidence that Mladić allowed the provision of aid to civilian populations of the “opposing side”. Based on
evidence in the record, the Trial Chamber found that, while Mladić initially showed willingness to allow the passage of humanitarian aid through Republika Srpska in 1992 and 1993, his orders and conduct became “increasingly obstructive” in 1994 and 1995.\(^{556}\) It subsequently considered his restrictions on humanitarian aid from 10 April 1994 onwards to be a factor in determining that he significantly contributed to the Overarching JCE.\(^{557}\) Mladić fails to demonstrate any error in the Trial Chamber’s assessment of the evidence in this regard.

171. The Appeals Chamber now turns to allegations of error with respect to Exhibits D1514 and D187. The Appeals Chamber observes that Exhibit D1514 is an order issued by Mladić on 28 November 1992 to the Commander of the VRS Drina Corps, Rogatica Brigade.\(^{558}\) According to this exhibit, “unknown persons [had] disturbed [the] Muslim population in S. Burati and Vrharje” and Mladić ordered the Commander of the Rogatica Brigade to, \(^{559}\) “inter alia: (i) immediately take measures to protect the Muslim population in these villages from possible violence, because they expressed loyalty to Republika Srpska; and (ii) explain to soldiers and units that “any violence against the people of these villages will be politically harmful for Republika Srpska, its army and the Serbian people in general”\(^{559}\). The Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber discussed this exhibit at paragraph 4524 of the Trial Judgement.\(^{560}\) Mladić’s submission that the Trial Chamber failed to consider this evidence is therefore without merit.

172. Exhibit D187 is an order that Mladić issued on 16 April 1994 regarding the treatment of civilians and prisoners of war in Goražde.\(^{561}\) This exhibit reflects Mladić’s statement that:

\[\text{via global media the Muslim propaganda keeps launching disinformation that the members of the VRS started a total annihilation of [the] Muslim population in order to compromise [Republika Srpska] and force the UN Security Council to make resolutions which are unfavourable to the Serbs.}\(^{562}\]

On this basis, Mladić ordered, \(^{562}\) “inter alia, that: (i) “cruel treatments are severely forbidden, as well as abuse and physical destruction of civilian population, prisoners of war and members of the international organizations”\(^{563}\); (ii) all members of the VRS are duty-bound to protect the civilian population in Goražde by transferring them to more adequate locations; (iii) all prisoners of war “are to be treated in compliance with the international law of war”; and (iv) all members of international organizations are to be sheltered on the territory of Republika Srpska.\(^{564}\) While this exhibit is not explicitly referenced in the Trial Judgement, the Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber considered evidence of a similar nature, namely evidence concerning the protection of civilians and prisoners of war as well as courteous treatment of foreigners.\(^{564}\) Given that the Trial Chamber is presumed to have considered all evidence and is not obligated to refer to every piece of evidence on the record,\(^{565}\) and observing that the Trial Chamber considered evidence of a similar nature, the Appeals Chamber finds that Mladić fails to demonstrate that the Trial Chamber gave insufficient weight to such evidence.

173. The Appeals Chamber observes that, in assessing his significant contribution to the Overarching JCE, the Trial Chamber considered arguments and evidence that Mladić disseminated orders and instructions to subordinates to, \(^{566}\) “inter alia: (i) follow the laws and regulations of the VRS, Republika Srpska, international humanitarian law, customary laws of war, and other international laws; and (ii) protect the civilian population.\(^{566}\) The Trial Chamber concluded, however, that despite such orders, the Bosnian Serb military and civilian justice system failed to investigate crimes and arrest or punish perpetrators – members of the VRS or Serb forces – who committed crimes against non-Serbs.\(^{567}\) Regarding the treatment of prisoners of war, the Trial Chamber considered evidence that Mladić deliberately misled the international community on the conditions in camps, and “attempted to conceal the crimes committed therein by portraying the camp[] conditions in a more favourable light”.\(^{568}\) Given the Trial Chamber’s findings and assessment of evidence on the record, Mladić fails to demonstrate that the Trial Chamber erred by not considering or giving sufficient weight to evidence concerning the “protection he intended” to provide to non-Serbs when determining his participation in the Overarching JCE.
Conclusion

174. In light of the foregoing, the Appeals Chamber finds, Judge Nyambe dissenting, that Mladić does not demonstrate that the Trial Chamber erred in its assessment of the evidence to which he points and purports to be exculpatory relating to his membership in the Overarching JCE.

(c) Alleged Errors Regarding the Scope of and Mladić’s Participation in the Overarching JCE

175. Mladić submits that the Trial Chamber expanded the Overarching JCE to include the entirety of 1991 and included the actions and speeches of politicians from a period during which he was absent, undermining the conclusion that he was part of the common plan of the Overarching JCE. He also contends that the Trial Chamber was “inconsistent” in its interpretation of his interactions with other members of the Overarching JCE – finding that he had “influence” over and “was subject” to the political leadership. Mladić finally argues that the Trial Chamber gave undue weight to his role in establishing the VRS and that he directed military operations in furtherance of the war effort and in compliance with duties delegated to him by Karadžić.

176. The Prosecution responds that Mladić’s submissions show no error in the Trial Chamber’s analysis of his participation in the Overarching JCE or inconsistency in his influential capacity with respect to the political leadership. According to the Prosecution, the Trial Chamber reasonably found that Mladić contributed to the Overarching JCE through his command and control of the VRS.

177. Turning to Mladić’s contention that the Trial Chamber expanded the scope of the Overarching JCE to include 1991, which included actions and speeches from a period during which he was absent, the Appeals Chamber recalls that joint criminal enterprise liability requires: (i) a plurality of persons; (ii) the existence of a common purpose which amounts to, or involves, the commission of a crime; and (iii) the participation of the accused in the common purpose. In this case, prior to its assessment of whether Mladić was part of the Overarching JCE, the Trial Chamber found that the Overarching JCE existed from 1991 until 30 November 1995 and that the plurality of persons included members of the Bosnian Serb leadership. The Trial Chamber found that Mladić only contributed and shared the intent to achieve the common objective of the Overarching JCE by 12 May 1992 at the latest. The Trial Chamber’s assessment of the existence of the Overarching JCE was therefore independent of its assessment of Mladić’s participation. Mladić fails to show that, to determine whether the Overarching JCE existed in 1991, the Trial Chamber erroneously expanded the scope of the joint criminal enterprise or erroneously considered the conduct and speeches of the Bosnian Serb leadership prior to Mladić’s participation.

178. The Appeals Chamber is also not convinced that the Trial Chamber erred in its interpretation of Mladić’s interactions with other members of the Overarching JCE. Having reviewed the impugned paragraphs in the Trial Judgement, the Appeals Chamber observes that they contain a summary of the evidence and findings on, inter alia, Mladić’s control and authority over the VRS as well as his participation in Bosnian Serb Assembly meetings and relationship with the Bosnian Serb political leadership. In particular, the Trial Chamber recalled evidence and considered arguments that Mladić was not a member of the Supreme Command of the VRS (“Supreme Command”) and did not have voting rights within the Bosnian Serb Assembly, but that he was invited to attend meetings between 1992 and 1995 to brief the Supreme Command on the military situation. The Trial Chamber also found that he actively participated in policy discussions in the Bosnian Serb Assembly, often suggested to Bosnian Serb politicians what position they should take during peace negotiations, and addressed policy issues in detail “with the purpose of influencing” the Bosnian Serb political leadership in its decision-making. The Appeals Chamber considers that, contrary to Mladić’s submissions, the Trial Chamber did not make “inconsistent interpretations” of his interactions with the members of the Overarching JCE, but rather clearly found that Mladić actively participated in high-level political discussions with the purpose of influencing political decisions. His contentions in this regard are therefore without merit and fail to identify any error.

179. As to Mladić’s submission that the Trial Chamber gave undue weight to his role as Commander of the VRS and that he directed military operations in furtherance of the war effort and in compliance with duties delegated to him by Karadžić, the Appeals Chamber recalls that in order to hold an accused responsible pursuant to joint criminal enterprise liability, it must be established that he or she performed acts that in some way were directed to the
furthering of the common plan or purpose of the joint criminal enterprise. These acts need not be criminal per se but they may take the form of assistance in, or contribution to, the execution of the common objective or purpose. Moreover, the fact that the participation of the accused amounted to no more than his or her “routine duties” will not exculpate the accused.

180. The Appeals Chamber notes the Trial Chamber’s conclusion that between 12 May 1992 and 30 November 1995, members of the VRS committed crimes in furtherance of the Overarching JCE in the Municipalities. In finding that Mladić participated in the Overarching JCE, the Trial Chamber concluded that he, inter alia: (i) was the Commander of the VRS Main Staff; (ii) issued orders regarding the establishment and operations of the VRS; (iii) had knowledge of crimes being committed against non-Serbs in the Municipalities by his subordinates; (iv) deliberately misled the media and international community about crimes committed on the ground; (v) had the authority but did not take appropriate or further steps to investigate or punish perpetrators of crimes; (vi) placed severe restrictions on the delivery of humanitarian aid; and (vii) repeatedly used derogatory terms to refer to Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats as well as introduced and controlled a centralized system of spreading propaganda related to Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats. Given the Trial Chamber’s findings on Mladić’s acts and conduct furthering the Overarching JCE and in line with the jurisprudence that performing routine duties will not exculpate the accused, the Appeals Chamber considers it inconsequential that Mladić, as Commander of the VRS Main Staff, was acting in accordance with his obligations as delegated to him by Karadžić. The Appeals Chamber finds, Judge Nyambe dissenting, that Mladić therefore fails to show that the Trial Chamber committed any error in this regard.

(d) Conclusion

181. Based on the foregoing, the Appeals Chamber, Judge Nyambe dissenting, dismisses Ground 3.A of Mladić’s appeal.

2. Alleged Errors Regarding Significant Contribution and Mens Rea (Ground 3.B)

182. As recalled above, the Trial Chamber found that Mladić significantly contributed to achieving the objective of the Overarching JCE to permanently remove Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from Bosnian Serb-claimed territory in Bosnia and Herzegovina through the crimes of persecution, extermination, murder, inhumane acts (forcible transfer), and deportation. The Trial Chamber further found that Mladić shared the intent to achieve the common objective of the Overarching JCE through the commission of the above-noted crimes, and that he held this intent by 12 May 1992 at the latest.

183. Mladić submits that the Trial Chamber erred in finding that he significantly contributed to and intended to participate in the Overarching JCE. He requests that the Appeals Chamber reverse his convictions based on the first form of joint criminal enterprise, or that it reverse them to the extent of any error identified. The Appeals Chamber will address his contentions in turn.

(a) Significant Contribution

184. The Trial Chamber found, in Chapters 9.3.2 through 9.3.12 of the Trial Judgement, that Mladić’s acts and omissions during the existence of the Overarching JCE were so instrumental to the commission of the crimes that without them the crimes would not have been committed as they were, and that, therefore, Mladić significantly contributed to achieving the objective of the Overarching JCE. This conclusion rested on findings that Mladić: (i) between May 1992 and at least October 1995, issued orders regarding the establishment and organization of VRS organs and corps, including assignments and promotions; (ii) from May 1992 until 1995, held daily briefings and occasional meetings with VRS Main Staff officers and corps commanders, regularly visited and inspected VRS units, and issued orders and directives to VRS units and other groups; (iii) tasked brigade commanders of the VRS First Krajina Corps to cooperate with the MUP; (iv) from May 1992 to October 1995, was in direct contact with members of the leadership in Serbia and members of the Yugoslav Army (“VJ”) General Staff to ensure the military needs of the VRS were met; (v) addressed the Bosnian Serb Assembly during several of its sessions on issues surrounding the development of policies of the Bosnian Serb political leadership, and often suggested to Bosnian
Serb politicians what position they should take during peace negotiations in order to achieve the strategic objectives as initially defined, Mihajloović between September 1992 and at least March 1995, introduced and maintained a controlled and centralized system of spreading propaganda related to Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims; (vii) made deliberately misleading statements to members of the media and international community in relation to crimes committed on the ground; (viii) did not take appropriate or further steps to investigate or punish perpetrators of crimes; and (ix) placed severe restrictions on the delivery of humanitarian aid from 10 April 1994 onwards.

185. Mladić submits that the Trial Chamber erred in finding that he significantly contributed to the Overarching JCE. Specifically, he challenges the Trial Chamber’s findings that: (i) he had command and control over members of the MUP; (ii) he had command and control over VRS forces; and (iii) he failed to adequately investigate and/or punish crimes. Mladić submits that, as a consequence of errors in the Trial Judgement, the Trial Chamber’s findings on his guilt under the first form of joint criminal enterprise are invalidated as, inter alia, the element of actus reus cannot be considered to have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

186. The Appeals Chamber recalls that for an accused to be found criminally liable on the basis of joint criminal enterprise liability, a trial chamber must be satisfied that the accused acted in furtherance of the common purpose of a joint criminal enterprise in the sense that he significantly contributed to the commission of the crimes involved in the common purpose. An accused’s contribution need not be necessary or substantial, it need not involve the commission of a crime, and the law does not foresee specific types of conduct which per se could not be considered a contribution to a joint criminal enterprise.

(i) Command and Control Over Members of the MUP

187. The Trial Chamber found that the MUP cooperated closely with the VRS and that, when MUP units were participating in combat operations, from at least 12 May 1992 to 26 September 1995, they were re-subordinated to the command of the VRS while still being under the direct command of MUP officials. It also found that MUP members were involved in a large number of crimes, including murder, unlawful detention, cruel or inhumane treatment, and persecution, committed in 12 municipalities, and that they were either under the operational supervision of the VRS or under the supervision of the MUP. In relation to his significant contribution to the Overarching JCE via control of the MUP, the Trial Chamber considered that Mladić, inter alia, issued orders and directives to VRS units as well as “other groups”, and tasked brigade commanders of the VRS First Krajina Corps to cooperate with the MUP.

188. Mladić submits that the Trial Chamber relied on adjudicated facts to establish that he had command and control over MUP forces, thereby failing to give sufficient weight to evidence that he lacked de jure or de facto control over such forces, and conflating coordinated action with re-subordination. In his view, this evidence was sufficient to “enliven the evidentiary debate and rebut the adjudicated facts” relied upon by the Trial Chamber. According to Mladić, effective command and control of the MUP was a “critical component” to the Trial Chamber’s consideration of his contribution. He argues that, based on a proper weighing of evidence at trial, no reasonable trier of fact could have concluded that he exercised effective command and control of the MUP to establish a significant contribution to the Overarching JCE.

189. The Prosecution responds that Mladić’s arguments are grounded in a misreading of the Trial Judgement. It submits that, in relation to Mladić’s contribution to the Overarching JCE, the Trial Chamber’s finding concerning the MUP is expressly limited to the MUP forces under the command of the VRS First Krajina Corps at Manjača camp. In addition, the Prosecution submits that Mladić refers to irrelevant evidence, and fails to show any impact of his arguments on the Trial Chamber’s conclusion that he significantly contributed to furthering the common purpose. The Prosecution further argues that Mladić’s submissions have no bearing on his liability for crimes committed by any MUP forces not re-subordinated to the VRS, as crimes of perpetrators who were subordinated to another member of the Overarching JCE are attributable to him.

190. The Appeals Chamber observes that Mladić challenges the Trial Chamber’s reliance on adjudicated facts at paragraph 3794 of the Trial Judgement. The Appeals Chamber notes that, in the impugned paragraph, the Trial Chamber relied on: (i) Adjudicated Fact 1354 to state that, in accordance with the law in effect in the Republika...
Chamber limited its command and control over the MUP. Rather, in determining Mladić these adjudicated facts, is inapposite. Any error in the assessment of this evidence would have no impact on the impact his liability through his membership in the Overarching JCE. Consequently, even if Mladić were to establish that the Trial Chamber erred in regard to his command and control over the MUP, such an error would not impact his liability through his membership in the Overarching JCE.

191. The Appeals Chamber notes that paragraph 3794 of the Trial Judgement does not address Mladić’s role or contribution. Rather, this paragraph is contained in Chapter 9.2.7 of the Trial Judgement, which discusses the role of the MUP, and is part of the Trial Chamber’s analysis regarding the scope of the Overarching JCE as a whole (Chapter 9.2). The Trial Chamber further specified, at the conclusion of Chapter 9.2.7 and Chapter 9.2 generally, that it would only address Mladić’s membership in the Overarching JCE and his role with regard to the MUP in Chapter 9.3 of the Trial Judgement.

192. As to Mladić’s contribution to the Overarching JCE through his command and control of other Serb forces subordinated to the VRS, the Trial Chamber addressed the MUP in paragraph 4404 of the Trial Judgement and recalled only findings related to Manjača camp in Banja Luka Municipality. According to the Trial Chamber, the VRS First Krajina Corps was in charge of Manjača camp, and the MUP members who committed crimes were operating under the command of the VRS First Krajina Corps. Given that Mladić, as Commander of the VRS Main Staff, issued orders to the VRS First Krajina Corps, the Trial Chamber found that Mladić “commanded and controlled the Manjača camp command, including the subordinated MUP units”. In the same paragraph, the Trial Chamber also recalled its finding that, on 3 August 1992, Mladić issued orders to, inter alios, the Manjača camp command, units of the VRS First Krajina Corps, and the Prijedor Security Services Centre (“CSB”), an organ of the MUP, to allow reporters and a team of the International Committee of the Red Cross (“ICRC”) to visit various detention camps, including Manjača. Finally, when summarizing Mladić’s actions relevant to his significant contribution to the Overarching JCE, the Trial Chamber considered, inter alia, that Mladić “controlled VRS units and issued orders to other groups”. The Appeals Chamber therefore considers that, contrary to Mladić’s submission, the Trial Chamber did not find that he significantly contributed to the Overarching JCE through a general command and control over the MUP. Rather, in determining Mladić’s contribution to the Overarching JCE, the Trial Chamber limited its findings of his command and control of the MUP to Manjača camp and to the orders he issued to the Prijedor CSB. These findings, summarized in paragraph 4404 of the Trial Judgement, are based on extensive evidence – including witness testimonies, exhibits, and adjudicated facts – addressed in other sections of the Trial Judgement. Mladić does not challenge these findings, nor does he demonstrate that the Trial Chamber erred by relying on adjudicated facts to find that he had command and control over the MUP forces at Manjača camp or that he issued orders to the Prijedor CSB.

193. Given that the adjudicated facts Mladić seeks to challenge at paragraph 3794 of the Trial Judgement pertain to the general subordination of the MUP to the VRS and not to his specific conduct or contribution to the Overarching JCE, the Appeals Chamber considers that the evidence he points to on appeal, which he presented at trial to rebut these adjudicated facts, is inapposite. Any error in the assessment of this evidence would have no impact on the Trial Chamber’s conclusions regarding Mladić’s control of Manjača camp or his orders to the Prijedor CSB. At this juncture, the Appeals Chamber further recalls that members of a joint criminal enterprise may be held responsible for crimes carried out by principal perpetrators, provided that the crimes can be imputed to at least one member of the joint criminal enterprise and that the latter – when using the principal perpetrators – acted in accordance with the common objective. The Appeals Chamber notes the Trial Chamber’s findings that MUP units were used as tools to commit the crimes in the Municipalities in furtherance of the common purpose of the Overarching JCE, that Stanišić, as Minister of the Interior, was a member of the Overarching JCE, and that Stanišić had overall command and control over MUP forces. The Appeals Chamber observes that Mladić has not challenged these findings regarding Stanišić and the MUP in relation to the Overarching JCE.
194. In light of the foregoing, the Appeals Chamber finds, Judge Nyambe dissenting, that Mladić does not demonstrate that the Trial Chamber erred in relation to his significant contribution to the Overarching JCE via command and control of MUP forces.

(ii) **Command and Control over VRS Soldiers**

195. In relation to the Overarching JCE, the Trial Chamber considered that many of the principal perpetrators of crimes in the Municipalities were VRS members, who were under the operational command of one of the corps and ultimately of the VRS Main Staff. It concluded that Mladić significantly contributed to achieving the objective of the Overarching JCE by, *inter alia*, issuing orders regarding the establishment and organization of the VRS and its organs, being closely involved in VRS activities, as evidenced by regular briefings, meetings, and inspections, and commanding and controlling VRS units.

196. The Trial Chamber found, *inter alia*, that Mladić: (i) from 12 May 1992 until at least 8 November 1996, was Commander of the VRS Main Staff; (ii) between May 1992 and April 1995, issued orders and directives to the VRS regarding its establishment, organization, military operations, and combat strategies; (iii) from May 1992 until 1995, was personally kept informed of developments on the battlefield through daily reports from corps commanders, and held daily briefings and occasional evening meetings with VRS Main Staff officers and corps commanders; (iv) between May 1992 and May 1995, regularly visited and inspected VRS units or ordered VRS Main Staff officers to conduct such inspections in order to be informed on the units’ state of combat readiness and to assist on specific tasks; and (v) from May 1992 to July 1995, issued several orders to various VRS units with detailed instructions regarding combat strategies, military operations, deployment of units, authorization of offensive operations, use of weapons and ammunition, and ceasefire agreements.

The Trial Chamber also found that the VRS had a well-functioning communication system, which allowed Mladić to effectively and quickly communicate with his subordinates. In addition, it concluded that Mladić was respected as a leader by his subordinates and possessed a “very high level of command and control over [them]”. The Trial Chamber explicitly rejected Defence arguments regarding Mladić’s limited influence as well as the lack of subordinate loyalty and obedience to the VRS command, and noted that occasional indiscretion in the VRS did not undermine his overall ability to exercise command and control.

197. Mladić submits that the Trial Chamber failed to give sufficient weight to evidence that the lack of professional or trained subordinates significantly affected his ability to command and control VRS soldiers. He specifies that the Trial Chamber erred by failing to adequately consider: (i) the wider repercussions of the lack of professional subordinates on his ability to instruct subordinates and to ensure that military combat operations were carried out within VRS rules and procedures; and (ii) his efforts to deal with the lack of professional subordinates, namely through visits to VRS commands and units by him and other VRS Main Staff personnel as well as through a meeting with VJ representatives to acquire more trained personnel. Mladić submits as an example that the Trial Chamber failed to include relevant evidence in its assessment of an 8 July 1993 meeting, such as references in his notebook about problems in the VRS and the MUP. Mladić argues that no reasonable trier of fact could have concluded that he exercised effective command and control over VRS subordinates to support a finding that he significantly contributed to the Overarching JCE.

198. The Prosecution responds that the Trial Chamber’s conclusions were reasonable and grounded in findings as well as detailed analysis of evidence on the functioning VRS command structures and Mladić’s exercise of command and control over them. According to the Prosecution, the Trial Chamber considered evidence of VRS indiscipline and found that occasional lack of discipline did not undermine Mladić’s overall ability to exercise command and control over the VRS. In addition, the Prosecution submits that Mladić’s generic argument that he lacked professional subordinates does not demonstrate that he lacked effective command and control over VRS subordinates.

199. With regard to Mladić’s contention that the Trial Chamber failed to sufficiently consider how the lack of professional or trained subordinates affected his command and control of the VRS, the Appeals Chamber observes that he makes reference to Exhibits P5241, D566, D686, P338, D559, D939, P356, and P346 as well as the testimonies of Witnesses Kovač and RM-511. A review of the Trial Judgement reveals that, in addressing arguments...
regarding command and control issues in the VRS, the Trial Chamber explicitly considered Exhibits P5241, 664 D566, 665 D686, 666 P338, 667 and D559. 668 The Trial Chamber, however, did not explicitly refer to Exhibits D939, P356, P346, nor to Witness RM-511’s testimony from 13 November 2012 and Witness Kovač’s testimony from 16 November 2015 in relation to issues of command and control of the VRS. Notwithstanding, the Appeals Chamber recalls that a trial chamber is not obliged to refer to every piece of evidence on the trial record, and it is to be presumed that all the evidence presented to it, as long as there is no indication that it completely disregarded any particular piece of evidence. 670 In this regard, the Appeals Chamber notes that the portions of Exhibits D939, P356, and P346, as well as the testimonies of Witnesses RM-511 and Kovač, to which Mladić refers, discuss the lack of professional soldiers and the poor level of training in various VRS units. 571 This evidence is similar to extensive evidence the Trial Chamber expressly noted and considered in the Trial Judgement that certain VRS units were untrained or unprofessional. 672 After reviewing such evidence, the Trial Chamber rejected Mladić’s claim that VRS units lacked discipline, which included issues such as untrained and unprofessional soldiers. 673 For example, with regard to the VRS First Krajina Corps, the Trial Chamber concluded that, even if there were instances of lack of discipline or organization, any such problems did not affect the VRS First Krajina Corps’s overall ability to meaningfully control its subordinate units, and that the chain of command and reporting system “fully functioned between the VRS Main Staff, the VRS First Krajina Corps, and its subordinate units”. 675 With regard to the SRK, 676 the Trial Chamber addressed evidence that there were many unprofessional men in its brigades, but found that such evidence did not contradict the Trial Chamber’s consideration that the SRK was under normal military command, with subordinates being disciplined and following orders. 677 The Trial Chamber also considered extensive evidence suggesting that the lack of professional commanding officers and staff in various SRK brigades affected the quality of command and control and led to problems with discipline, disobedience, and inefficient command and control. 678 It found, however, that this evidence was limited to specific incidents or moments in time and therefore found that it did not contradict Adjudicated Facts 1808 and 1864, which state that the SRK generally functioned under normal command and control and that subordinates were very disciplined and followed orders. 679 In light of the foregoing, the Appeals Chamber finds that Mladić does not demonstrate that the Trial Chamber failed to sufficiently consider how the lack of professional or trained subordinates affected his command and control of the VRS.

200. With regard to the argument that the Trial Chamber failed to adequately consider that Mladić and other VRS Main Staff personnel visited commands and units “as a strategy to deal with the lack of professional subordinates”, Mladić references Exhibits P3029 and P347 as well as paragraph 662 of the Mladić Final Trial Brief. 680 The Appeals Chamber observes that the Trial Chamber referenced the paragraph of the Mladić Final Trial Brief to which Mladić points on appeal when summarizing his submissions and recalls that a trial chamber has the discretion to select which legal arguments to address. 681 The Appeals Chamber further notes that the Trial Chamber considered Exhibit P3029 to the effect that Mladić and VRS Main Staff inspection teams regularly visited VRS commands, units, and their combat positions, and that this was essential for Mladić to familiarize himself with the situation on the ground, including the implementation of his orders and the activities of his forces, and to exercise authority over his subordinate forces. 682 While the Trial Chamber did not expressly refer to Exhibit P347 in relation to Mladić’s inspection of VRS units in the Trial Judgement, 683 this exhibit is similar to extensive evidence that the Trial Chamber considered in relation to Mladić or other members of the VRS Main Staff visiting units, between 1992 and 1995, for the purposes of inspection. 684 The Trial Chamber considered that, in many of these inspections, Mladić or members of the VRS Main Staff assessed whether units were combat ready, 685 which included issues such as the lack of well-trained or professional officers and soldiers. 686

201. The Appeals Chamber is also not persuaded by Mladić’s submission that, with respect to the 8 July 1993 meeting, the Trial Chamber failed to note several weaknesses he referenced in his notebook, Exhibit P358, such as declining discipline within the VRS and the dismantling of the MUP. 687 The Appeals Chamber observes that the Trial Chamber not only considered this exhibit in the Trial Judgement, but expressly summarized evidence that “Mladić noted that there were several weaknesses, such as that discipline was getting worse within the VRS and that the MUP had been dismantled” 688.
202. In light of the foregoing, the Appeals Chamber finds, Judge Nyambe dissenting, that Mladić’s submissions reflect mere disagreement with the Trial Chamber’s assessment of the evidence with respect to his command and control of the VRS. Mladić does not show any error in the Trial Chamber’s findings that he was respected as a leader, possessed a “very high level of command and control over his subordinates”, and that occasional indiscipline did not undermine his overall ability to exercise command and control. Accordingly, his submissions do not demonstrate error in the Trial Chamber’s finding that he significantly contributed to the Overarching JCE through his command and control of the VRS.

(iii) Knowledge, Investigation, and Punishment of Crimes

203. The Trial Chamber found that, as the Commander of the VRS Main Staff, Mladić was under a duty to take adequate steps to prevent, investigate, and/or punish crimes by members of the VRS and other Serb forces under his effective control. It considered that, while he issued orders to comply with the laws and regulations of the Republika Srpska and the VRS, the Geneva Conventions, customary laws of war, and other international laws, he did not take appropriate or further steps to investigate or punish perpetrators of crimes. On the contrary, the Trial Chamber found that Mladić facilitated the commission of crimes by providing misleading information to representatives of the international community, non-governmental organizations, the media, and the public about crimes against Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats and about the role that Serb forces had played in those crimes. The Trial Chamber concluded that Mladić’s misleading statements regarding crimes committed on the ground and inadequate steps to investigate and/or prosecute these crimes constituted part of his significant contribution to achieving the objective of the Overarching JCE.

204. Mladić submits that the Trial Chamber erred by failing to give sufficient weight to and adequately consider certain evidence when finding that he significantly contributed to the Overarching JCE by not taking appropriate steps to investigate and/or punish perpetrators of crimes. Specifically, he argues that the Trial Chamber: (i) erred by not giving sufficient weight to evidence that he could not have known certain crimes had been committed as they were not reported to him; (ii) failed to give sufficient weight to evidence that he ordered investigations and punishment for crimes committed; (iii) failed to give a reasoned opinion on exculpatory evidence listed in Chapter 9.3.10 of the Trial Judgement; (iv) erroneously qualified his alleged failure to punish crimes as a significant contribution based on “an absence of evidence”; and (v) gave insufficient weight to institutional issues of the military justice system in a state of crisis and to its independence.

205. The Prosecution responds that the Trial Chamber properly considered the totality of the evidence, including measures Mladić took to investigate and punish crimes, and reasonably concluded that the measures were inadequate. It contends that Mladić’s arguments misrepresent the Trial Judgement and the evidence, are irrelevant or consist of mere assertions, and thus should be summarily dismissed. The Prosecution also submits that it is immaterial that Mladić may not have been informed about certain crimes and that his submissions do not support this claim. Furthermore, the Prosecution argues that the Trial Chamber properly found that Mladić failed to take appropriate measures to investigate and punish crimes, and that the examples he provides do not concern him personally. According to the Prosecution, the Trial Chamber provided a reasoned opinion on the “supposed ‘exculpatory evidence’” listed in Chapter 9.3.10 of the Trial Judgement and, contrary to Mladić’s submissions, the military justice system was functioning for the duration of the war. Regarding Mladić’s submission about the independence of the military justice system, the Prosecution responds, inter alia, that the Trial Chamber found that, in many instances, decisions to release suspects were made after the VRS exerted pressure to drop cases or release perpetrators of crimes. The Prosecution argues that, even if the Trial Chamber erred in finding that Mladić’s failure to investigate or punish crimes significantly contributed to the Overarching JCE, such an error would have no impact on his convictions as this was only one of numerous contributions in relation to this joint criminal enterprise.

206. Mladić replies that the Prosecution has erroneously asserted that evidence of his subordinates ordering prosecutions is irrelevant because this does not involve him personally. He argues that the Prosecution also errs in stating that the Trial Chamber did not find that the military justice system suffered from institutional issues that inhibited its functioning. He further submits that the Prosecution incorrectly claims that he ignored relevant findings
and that it also incorrectly submits that two isolated incidents of the VRS exerting pressure on military courts to drop cases or release perpetrators are “findings about what actually happened.”

a. Evidence that Mladić Lacked Knowledge of Crimes

207. The Trial Chamber found that Mladić knew that the crimes of persecution, murder, extermination, deportation, and inhumane acts (forcible transfer) were committed against Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats in the Municipalities, including in detention facilities. This finding was based on evidence the Trial Chamber reviewed and its determinations on: (i) Mladić’s position as Commander of the VRS Main Staff; (ii) receipt of detailed reports by the VRS Main Staff; (iii) Mladić’s personal receipt of regular updates; (iv) his involvement in the VRS units’ activities; and (v) the fact that the commission of crimes was widely acknowledged, reported on by international media outlets, and commented on by the UN.

208. Mladić submits that the Trial Chamber failed to give sufficient weight to evidence that he could not have known that certain crimes were committed by VRS soldiers against Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats. To support this argument, Mladić points to four instances – relating to incidents in Manjača camp, murders in Zecovi, the VRS First Krajina Corps’s false reporting on the number of “Green Berets” killed in Kozarac, and the same unit’s false reporting on an incident in Grabovica – where he was misinformed or not informed about certain crimes. In addition, in oral submissions replying to the Prosecution, the Defence raised a new argument that Mladić could not have known about the killings in Keraterm camp (Prijedor Municipality) as the camp was operated by the MUP. The Appeals Chamber considers this argument open for summary dismissal as oral arguments are strictly limited to briefs filed on appeal, unless otherwise authorized. In any event, the Appeals Chamber observes that Mladić’s oral submissions are repetitive of those already considered by the Trial Chamber and that they do not undermine the Trial Chamber’s finding, based on evidence, that the VRS participated in killings at Keraterm camp referenced at paragraph 1121 of the Trial Judgement.

209. Regarding Manjača camp (Banja Luka Municipality), Mladić submits that a report, dated 8 July 1992, from the operational team of the camp to the VRS First Krajina Corps Command, stated that a prisoner, Husein Delalović, had died of natural causes on 6 July 1992, while Witness RM-709 testified that Delalović had been shot. The Appeals Chamber observes that the Trial Chamber discussed Delalović’s death and considered that, according to Witness RM-709, six to seven guards took Delalović away and shot him, while the report of 8 July 1992 stated that Delalović died of natural causes. The Trial Chamber could not, however, determine Delalović’s ethnicity and ultimately did not include his killing among the crimes for which Mladić was held liable under Scheduled Incidents B.1.4. Given that Delalović’s killing does not underpin Mladić’s conviction and that any error would have little or no impact on findings in the Trial Judgement, the Appeals Chamber dismisses Mladić’s arguments in this regard.

210. As to killings in the village of Zecovi, Prijedor Municipality, Mladić submits that “no one was informed of the crime”, and the incident only became known after the perpetrators were arrested and indicted in 2014. The Appeals Chamber observes that the Trial Chamber considered evidence of killings in the Brdo area, comprising the villages of, inter alia, Zecovi and Čarakovo. The Trial Chamber found that, although evidence suggested that the number of victims in the Brdo area was much higher, the evidence could establish beyond reasonable doubt only the killing of 21 victims in the village of Čarakovo and on or around Žeger Bridge. A review of the Trial Judgement reveals that the deaths in Zecovi thus did not form part of the crime base supporting Mladić’s conviction. The Appeals Chamber accordingly dismisses Mladić’s arguments with respect to killings in Zecovi in this regard.

211. With respect to the killing of the “Green Berets”, Mladić points to Witness Osman Selak’s testimony that during a high-level meeting General Momir Talić ordered that a report to the VRS Main Staff be changed to indicate that only 80 to 100 Green Berets had been killed in Kozarac, whereas the real number was 800. Mladić relies on this to argue that he was never put on notice of the real number of deaths or their nature. The Appeals Chamber observes that the Trial Chamber explicitly discussed Witness Selak’s testimony that a meeting occurred on 27 May 1992, that Dragan Marčetić informed those present of 800 people being killed after an attack on Kozarac, Prijedor...
Evidence that Mladić execution. To support his submission, Mladić about crimes committed by VRS subordinates, and where he or his subordinates ordered their investigation and prosecution.

According to Mladić, the VRS First Krajina Corps, soldiers who executed a group of Bosnian Muslim men in Kenjari were arrested and handed over for proceedings. Based on the foregoing, the Appeals Chamber accepts Mladić’s submission regarding the false reporting on this incident in Grabovica School. However, despite the false reporting, the Appeals Chamber notes that one of the reports from the VRS First Krajina Corps to the VRS Main Staff stated, as the Trial Chamber observed, that “a brutal massacre of the captured members of the Green Berets started because of the wounding of four and the killing of one soldier of the Kotor Varaš Light Infantry Brigade and the burning of wounded soldiers on Gola Planina (Jajce”). As such, the Appeals Chamber considers that the VRS Main Staff was informed of a potential crime, raising the obligation to investigate. The Appeals Chamber therefore finds that this example does not support Mladić’s contention that he could not have known that certain crimes were committed.

In view of the foregoing, the Appeals Chamber considers that Mladić does not demonstrate that the Trial Chamber erred by failing to give sufficient weight to evidence that he could not have known certain crimes were committed by his subordinates.

Evidence that Mladić Took Measures to Investigate and/or Punish Crimes

As noted above, the Trial Chamber found, in assessing his significant contribution to the Overarching JCE, that Mladić did not take appropriate or further steps to investigate or punish perpetrators of crimes.

Mladić argues that the Trial Chamber gave insufficient weight to evidence of instances where he learned about crimes committed by VRS subordinates, and where he or his subordinates ordered their investigation and prosecution. To support his submission, Mladić refers to evidence that: (i) according to Basara, a brigade commander in the VRS First Krajina Corps, soldiers who executed a group of Bosnian Muslim men in Kenjari were “handed over for further proceedings”; (ii) Mladić launched an investigation after learning that the Commander of the Igman Infantry Brigade failed to report crimes to his superiors; (iii) Basara prevented killings of detainees by ordering them to be taken to a Sanski Most police station; (iv) Stanislav Galić ordered the arrest of VRS soldiers who had killed detainees, and (v) Mladić took measures to improve the conditions in Manjača camp, and “took affirmative action” to punish perpetrators of certain killings in Manjača.

Regarding the incident in Kenjari, Sanski Most Municipality, Mladić refers to Basara’s evidence that four soldiers executed 17 Muslim men, and that when Lieutenant Ranko Brajić learned about this crime, the four soldiers were arrested and handed over for proceedings. The Appeals Chamber observes that the Trial Chamber explicitly considered this aspect of Basara’s evidence about the killings and that Brajić had the perpetrators arrested and “handed over for further proceedings”. The Trial Chamber further noted that, according to Basara, he did not know what happened next with the arrested persons. The Trial Chamber addressed this incident when considering the punishment or non-punishment of crimes, stating that it did not receive evidence allowing it to conclude that the four soldiers were not investigated or prosecuted following their arrest, and thus did not consider this incident further. In light of the above, the Appeals Chamber finds that Mladić does not demonstrate an error in the Trial Chamber’s assessment of this evidence.

Mladić submits that Velimir Dunjić, Commander of the Igman Infantry Brigade, failed to report crimes of his detachment to his superiors, and when Mladić heard about this misconduct, he immediately initiated an investigation. According to Mladić, this resulted in Dunjić’s summary dismissal and the arrest and prosecution of
anyone suspected to have engaged in criminal activity. 748 The Trial Chamber did not explicitly address this matter in the Trial Judgement. The Appeals Chamber notes that the evidence raised in the Mladić Final Trial Brief does not support the contention that Mladić launched an investigation or that anyone suspected to have engaged in criminal activity was arrested and prosecuted. Rather, the evidence appears to indicate that Dunjić was dismissed by Marčetić, Galić, and/or on the proposal of Colonel Ljuban Kosovac. 749 The evidence reveals that Dunjić’s dismissal appears to have been related to disagreements with, *inter alios*, Galić, 750 and his lack of professional discipline rather than his failure to report crimes to his supervisors. 751 This submission therefore does not demonstrate that the Trial Chamber gave insufficient weight to evidence that Mladić took measures to investigate or punish perpetrators of crimes.

218. Regarding Basara’s prevention of deaths in Sanski Most, Mladić refers to paragraph 1202 of the Mladić Final Trial Brief, which points to evidence provided by Witness RM-706. 752 This evidence relates to the killing of at least 28 Bosnian Muslim men on or about 31 May 1992 between the hamlet of Begići and Vrhpolje Bridge in Sanski Most Municipality, and how Basara prevented the killing of 20 others whom he sent to a police station. 753 The Appeals Chamber considers that this example does not relate to investigations or prosecutions and, as such, does not support Mladić’s contention that the Trial Chamber gave insufficient weight to evidence that he or his subordinates ordered investigation and prosecution of crimes committed by the VRS. Moreover, this example also ignores the Trial Chamber’s findings related to crimes committed by members of the VRS under Basara’s command. 754

219. Mladić avers that, on 1 June 1992, Galić ordered the arrest of VRS soldiers who had killed detainees at Velagići School (Kljuć Municipality), and refers to paragraph 1273 of the Mladić Final Trial Brief, which cites the evidence of Witness Rajko Kalabić. 755 The Trial Chamber discussed Witness Kalabić’s testimony about this incident and, in particular, Galić’s reaction—ordering the arrest of the suspected perpetrators when he heard about the killings. 756 The Trial Chamber noted evidence that an investigating judge was subsequently sent to the school and several VRS soldiers were arrested in connection with the killings. 757 However, after being held briefly, these soldiers were released without being tried for their participation in the killings. 758 In considering whether the perpetrators of killings at Velagići School were punished, the Trial Chamber found that, following “a blackmail operation” by members of the Kljuć Brigade, the investigating judge ordered the release of the arrested soldiers with the consent of the President of the Supreme Military Court and officers of the VRS Main Staff. 759 The Trial Chamber observed that “[n]o further steps were taken to investigate, prosecute, or punish the perpetrators until 1996”. 760 This submission therefore does not demonstrate that the Trial Chamber gave insufficient weight to evidence that Mladić took measures to investigate or punish perpetrators of crimes.

220. Mladić submits that, when advised of killings in Manjača camp, he took “affirmative action” to punish the VRS perpetrators, resulting in their suspension and criminal reports being filed. 761 To support his submissions, he refers to paragraphs 366 and 367 of the Trial Judgement. 762 These paragraphs of the Trial Judgement make no mention of any actions taken by Mladić and Mladić does not explain how they support his contention that the Trial Chamber gave insufficient weight to evidence that he or his subordinates ordered investigation and prosecution of crimes. 763 Additionally, Mladić ignores the Trial Chamber’s findings that perpetrators of killings at Manjača camp were not punished or prosecuted until years after the war. 764

221. In light of the foregoing, the Appeals Chamber finds that Mladić fails to demonstrate that the Trial Chamber erred by giving insufficient weight to evidence of instances where he learned about crimes committed by VRS subordinates and he or his subordinates ordered their investigation or prosecution.

c. Failure to Give Sufficient Weight to Exculpatory Evidence

222. In finding that Mladić failed to take appropriate or further steps to investigate or punish perpetrators, the Trial Chamber considered, *inter alia*, evidence of his command over the VRS as well as orders he issued to initiate investigations and to comply with domestic and international laws. 765

223. Mladić notes that the Trial Chamber found in Chapter 9.3.10 of the Trial Judgement that he ordered investigations on several occasions and issued orders directing subordinates to comply with laws and regulations. 766 He submits that the Trial Chamber nevertheless concluded, based on its findings in Chapter 9.2.12 of the Trial
Judgement, that he significantly contributed to furthering the common criminal objective by failing to take adequate steps to prevent or investigate crimes and/or arrest or punish the perpetrators.\(^762\) He argues that the Trial Chamber failed to provide a reasoned opinion by omitting to analyze exculpatory evidence set out in Chapter 9.3.10 of the Trial Judgement, thus indicating that it failed to accord sufficient weight to such evidence.\(^768\)

### 224. In Chapter 9.2.12 of the Trial Judgement, the Trial Chamber considered evidence concerning the response of the Bosnian Serb military and civilian justice system to crimes committed by members of the VRS and other Serb forces.\(^769\) It found that, between 12 May 1992 and 30 November 1995, the Bosnian Serb military and civilian justice system failed on many occasions to investigate crimes committed by members of the Serb forces in the Municipalities, file criminal reports, and detain, arrest, or punish perpetrators of these crimes.\(^770\) In Chapter 9.3.10, the Trial Chamber considered whether Mladić personally failed to take steps to prevent or investigate crimes committed in the Municipalities and arrest or punish the perpetrators.\(^771\) Recalling its findings in Chapter 9.2.12, conclusions on Mladić’s command and control of the VRS and certain Serb forces, as well as determinations that he knew that crimes were committed against Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats in the Municipalities, the Trial Chamber ultimately found in Chapter 9.3.10 that Mladić did not take appropriate or further steps to investigate or punish perpetrators of crimes.\(^772\) In coming to this conclusion, the Trial Chamber, at paragraph 4545 of the Trial Judgement, explicitly considered what Mladić regards as “exculpatory evidence”,\(^773\) namely that he issued orders to comply with laws and regulations, and initiated investigations.\(^774\) There is accordingly no merit in Mladić’s argument that the Trial Chamber omitted to analyze “exculpatory evidence” set out in Chapter 9.3.10 of the Trial Judgement and erroneously based its findings on his joint criminal enterprise liability solely on evidence in Chapter 9.2.12.\(^775\) Mladić therefore does not demonstrate that the Trial Chamber erred by failing to give a reasoned opinion or failing to accord sufficient weight to evidence addressed in Chapter 9.3.10.

d. Error in Finding Significant Contribution on the Basis of Lack of Evidence

225. In finding that Mladić did not take appropriate or further steps to investigate or punish perpetrators of crimes, the Trial Chamber stated that it “did not receive evidence” to conclude that he ordered any substantial or meaningful investigations, or whether he followed up on the few investigations he may have ordered.\(^776\)

226. Mladić argues that the Trial Chamber found, “due to an absence of evidence”, that he failed to order the investigation and prosecution of crimes committed by Bosnian Serbs against Bosnian Muslims or Bosnian Croats.\(^777\) According to Mladić, “[t]hese omissions” formed part of the basis for the Trial Chamber’s findings that he significantly contributed to furthering the objective of the Overarching JCE.\(^778\) In his view, proof that crimes occurred and went unpunished is not sufficient to establish the requirements of significant contribution or to sustain a conviction.\(^779\) Relying on the Kordić and Ćerkez Appeal Judgement, Mladić submits that the Trial Chamber’s finding is a “grossly unfair outcome” as he was convicted “despite a lack of evidence on an essential element of the crime”.\(^780\) Mladić also references an appeal judgement of the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) to argue that “measures taken by a commander cannot be faulted merely because of shortfalls in their execution”.\(^781\)

227. For the reasons that follow, the Appeals Chamber is not convinced that the Trial Chamber erred by making findings on Mladić’s significant contribution to the Overarching JCE based on an “absence of evidence” – namely the lack of evidence that perpetrators were investigated or punished for their crimes.\(^782\) First, the Trial Chamber’s conclusion that Mladić did not take appropriate or further steps to investigate or punish perpetrators of crimes is based on its assessment of extensive evidence and several key considerations.\(^783\) In this regard, the Trial Chamber considered that Mladić: (i) as Commander of the VRS Main Staff, exercised effective command and control over the VRS and re-subordinated Serb forces, and thus had a duty to take adequate steps to prevent, investigate, and/or punish crimes by subordinates under his command;\(^784\) (ii) possessed the authority to order investigations within the military justice system, but did so primarily for breaches of military discipline and crimes committed against the VRS;\(^785\) (iii) knew crimes were being committed by his subordinates against non-Serbs in the Municipalities;\(^786\) and (iv) “deliberately misled” the international community and non-governmental organizations about conditions in detention facilities and “attempted to conceal the crimes committed therein” by portraying camp conditions in a more favourable light.\(^787\) The Trial Chamber further considered that, despite a functioning military justice system, it did not receive evidence that Bosnian Serbs were prosecuted for war crimes between 12 May 1992 and 30 November
1995. 788 To the contrary, it found, based on a review of extensive evidence in the Municipalities, that: (i) the Bosnian Serb military and civilian justice system failed on many occasions to investigate, arrest, or punish perpetrators who were members of the VRS and other Serb forces; (ii) on multiple occasions where crimes were committed by members of the VRS against non-Serbs, criminal reports were not filed, investigations were not initiated by military prosecutors or investigating judges, suspects were not arrested or detained, and perpetrators were unlawfully released from detention to return to their units; and (iii) in many instances, decisions to release suspects were made after VRS officers exerted pressure on the military courts to drop cases or release perpetrators of crimes and, once released, these individuals were rarely remanded in custody.789 Given these extensive considerations, the Appeals Chamber finds that it was reasonable for the Trial Chamber to conclude that Mladić failed to take appropriate or further steps to investigate or punish perpetrators. 790

228. Second, the Appeals Chamber recalls that for an accused to be found criminally liable on the basis of joint criminal enterprise liability, it is sufficient that he acted in furtherance of the common purpose of a joint criminal enterprise in the sense that he significantly contributed to the commission of the crimes involved in the common purpose.791 Beyond that, the law does not foresee specific types of conduct which per se could not be considered a contribution to a joint criminal enterprise.792 Within these legal confines, the question of whether a failure to act could be taken into account to establish that the accused significantly contributed to a joint criminal enterprise is a question of fact to be determined on a case-by-case basis.793 It is also recalled that the relevant failures to act or acts carried out in furtherance of a joint criminal enterprise need not involve carrying out any part of the actus reus of a crime forming part of the common purpose, or indeed any crime at all.794 That is, an accused’s contribution to a joint criminal enterprise need not be in and of itself criminal, as long as the accused performs (or fails to perform) acts that in some way contribute significantly to the furtherance of the common purpose. 795

229. In the present case, the Trial Chamber considered that, as the Commander of the VRS Main Staff, Mladić was under a duty to take adequate steps to prevent, investigate, and/or punish crimes committed by members of the VRS and other Serb forces under his effective control.796 On that basis, it considered that his failure to take such steps constituted part of his contribution to the Overarching JCE. 797 The Appeals Chamber observes that, in the jurisprudence of the ICTY, a failure to take effective and genuine measures to discipline, prevent, and/or punish crimes committed by subordinates, despite having knowledge thereof, has been taken into account in assessing, inter alia, an accused’s mens rea and contribution to a joint criminal enterprise where the accused had some power and influence or authority over the perpetrators sufficient to prevent or punish the abuses but failed to exercise such power. 798 Therefore, the Trial Chamber’s consideration of Mladić’s failure to take adequate steps was consistent with the applicable jurisprudence.

230. Third, the Appeals Chamber finds that Mladić’s references to the Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement and the Bemba Appeal Judgement do not support his submissions. The paragraph to which he cites in the Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement recites the law on the standards of appellate review and defines an error causing a miscarriage of justice as “[a] grossly unfair outcome in judicial proceedings, as when a defendant is convicted despite a lack of evidence on an essential element of the crime.” 800 As discussed above, the Appeals Chamber considers that Mladić was not convicted based on an absence of evidence on an essential element of a crime. Rather, the Trial Chamber’s conclusion that he failed to order investigations and prosecutions is based on an extensive assessment of evidence of his powers and role as Commander of the VRS Main Staff as well as his conduct.801

231. With regard to Mladić’s reference to the Bemba Appeal Judgement from the ICC, the Appeals Chamber notes that Mladić relies on it to argue that “measures taken by a commander cannot be faulted merely because of shortfalls in their execution.” 802 The Appeals Chamber recalls that it is not bound by the findings of other courts – domestic, international, or hybrid – and that, even though it may consider such jurisprudence, it may nonetheless come to a different conclusion on a matter than that reached by another judicial body. 803 Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber considers that the circumstances of that case are distinguishable from those in the present case. The accused in the Bemba case took measures in reaction to allegations of crimes such as establishing investigative commissions and missions, which ultimately had limited impact. 804 In the present case, the Trial Chamber found that, despite possessing authority to order investigations for war crimes and crimes against humanity, Mladić primarily ordered investigations and punishment for breaches of military discipline and crimes against the VRS.805
Trial Chamber further stated that it did not receive evidence on whether Mladić followed up on the “few investigations” he may have ordered regarding war crimes and crimes against humanity. 806

232. In light of the foregoing, the Appeals Chamber dismisses Mladić’s submissions that the Trial Chamber erred in finding that he failed to order investigations or prosecutions of crimes committed by his subordinates based on an “absence of evidence”.

e. Limitations on Mladić and an Independent Military Justice System

233. The Trial Chamber found that the military courts in Republika Srpska were fully operational by the early autumn of 1992 and had jurisdiction over the crime of armed rebellion, crimes against the state, crimes against humanity, and violations of the Geneva Conventions. 807 According to the Trial Chamber, the jurisdiction of these courts also extended to crimes committed by police officers and paramilitaries subordinated to military units. 808 The Trial Chamber further found that proceedings before the military courts continued throughout the war, despite problems such as shortages of staff and materials, and difficulties locating suspects and witnesses. 809 The Trial Chamber observed that the military courts focused on crimes committed against the VRS and noted that it did not receive any evidence of Bosnian Serbs being prosecuted for war crimes against non-Serbs during this period. 810 The Trial Chamber found that, between 12 May 1992 and 30 November 1995, the Bosnian Serb military and civilian justice system failed on many occasions to investigate crimes committed by members of the VRS and other Serb forces, and to arrest and/or punish perpetrators. 812

234. Mladić submits that the Trial Chamber “failed to appreciate the limitations” he faced while the military justice system was in a “state of crisis” and the realities that he was unable to submit matters for investigation and prosecution in the conflict situation. 813 He argues that by failing to consider the “restrictive realities of applying justice in conditions of conflict”, the Trial Chamber imposed a standard upon him that was impossible to meet. 814 Mladić further submits that the Trial Chamber erred by “simply juxtapos[ing him] with the structure of the military justice system” and that it failed to “provide an appropriate nexus” between him and the decisions made by independent prosecutors or judges. 815 In his view, the independence of the military justice system meant that decisions about prosecutions did not involve him. 816

235. In support of his argument that the Trial Chamber failed to “appreciate the limitations” he faced, Mladić refers to, inter alia, his final trial brief, 817 which discusses the difficulties faced by military courts during the conflict. 818 The Appeals Chamber notes that these submissions do not address difficulties he personally faced. The rest of his argument on appeal in this regard also does not identify any evidence that the Trial Chamber ought to have addressed. In any event, the Appeals Chamber observes that the Trial Chamber explicitly considered difficulties faced by the military courts during the war and found that they reported problems such as shortages of staff and materials and difficulties locating suspects and witnesses. 819 It nevertheless concluded that proceedings before the military courts continued throughout the war. 820 Additionally, Mladić ignores the Trial Chamber’s findings that he possessed the authority to order investigations within the military justice system and that he did so on numerous occasions, but primarily with respect to crimes committed against the VRS or breaches of military discipline. 821 The Appeals Chamber therefore finds that Mladić does not demonstrate that the Trial Chamber erred in failing to appreciate the limitations he faced in raising issues for investigation and prosecution during the war.

236. The Appeals Chamber is also not persuaded by Mladić’s submission that the Trial Chamber erred by “simply juxtapos[ing him] with the military justice system in finding that he did not take appropriate steps to investigate or punish perpetrators of crimes. 822 As previously noted, on the basis of extensive evidence, the Trial Chamber concluded that, in practice, on multiple occasions in which crimes had been committed against non-Serbs by members of the VRS or other Serb forces, criminal reports were not filed, investigations were not initiated by military prosecutors or investigating judges, suspects were not arrested or detained, and perpetrators were unlawfully released. 823 Given these findings as well as conclusions that Mladić possessed the authority to order investigations in the military justice system, 824 but failed to order any substantial or meaningful investigations into war crimes and crimes against humanity, 825 the Trial Chamber’s findings are based on evidence it considered rather than juxtaposing Mladić’s conduct with decisions of an allegedly independent military justice system.
**Conclusion**

237. Based on the foregoing, the Appeals Chamber finds, Judge Nyambe dissenting, that Mladić fails to demonstrate that the Trial Chamber erred in finding that he significantly contributed to the common criminal purpose of the Overarching JCE.

(b) **Mens Rea**

238. In assessing Mladić’s mens rea with respect to the Overarching JCE, the Trial Chamber found that he knew that the crimes of persecution, murder, extermination, deportation, and inhumane acts (forcible transfer) were committed against Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats in the Municipalities, including in detention facilities. It also found that Mladić’s statements and conduct demonstrated his intent for the crimes to be committed on discriminatory grounds. In reaching this finding, the Trial Chamber considered Mladić’s: (i) repeated use of derogatory terms to refer to Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats; (ii) recalling of historical crimes that were allegedly committed against Bosnian Serbs and his references to the threat of “genocide” against the Bosnian Serbs; (iii) statements indicating an intention not to respect the laws of war in Croatia in 1991 and later references to repeating the destruction inflicted during that conflict; and expressions of commitment to an ethnically homogeneous Republika Srpska, even in territories that previously had a large percentage of non-Serb inhabitants. The Trial Chamber further considered that Mladić’s orders to respect the Geneva Conventions, his statements to personnel of the UN Protection Force (“UNPROFOR”), and his involvement in peace negotiations were not indicative of his true state of mind. The Trial Chamber concluded that Mladić shared the intent to achieve the common objective of the Overarching JCE through the commission of crimes and that he held this intent by 12 May 1992 at the latest.

239. Mladić submits that the Trial Chamber erred in determining that he possessed and shared the intent to achieve the common objective of the Overarching JCE. Specifically, he argues that the Trial Chamber erred by: (i) applying a “defective method” in determining his mens rea; (ii) preferring circumstantial evidence and disregarding or failing to give sufficient weight to clearly relevant direct evidence that contradicts findings in the Trial Judgement of his mens rea; and (iii) relying on isolated parts of his speeches at two Bosnian Serb Assembly sessions. Mladić argues that as a consequence of these errors, the Trial Chamber’s findings on his mens rea are invalid and do not support his liability, and requests that the Appeals Chamber reverse his convictions in relation to the Overarching JCE, or, in the alternative, reverse the Trial Chamber’s findings to the extent of any errors. The Appeals Chamber will address these submissions in turn.

(i) **Alleged Error in Conflating Mens Rea and Actus Reus**

240. Mladić submits that the Trial Chamber employed a “defective method” when determining his mens rea that resulted in its erroneous finding that he shared the intent to further the common objective of the Overarching JCE. He contends that the Trial Chamber erred in two respects. First, Mladić argues that the Trial Chamber erroneously made inferences of his mens rea in its actus reus analysis. To support this argument, he relies on the Milutinović et al. Trial Judgement and points to parts of the Trial Judgement that address his significant contribution but contain matters that “should have only been considered in the context of [his] mens rea”. Second, Mladić submits that the Trial Chamber erred in using its finding on his mens rea “to substantiate its actus reus findings”. In this regard, he refers to parts of the Trial Judgement and relies on the Stanišić and Simatović Appeal Judgement to argue that the mens rea can only be considered after the actus reus has been established. Mladić submits that the “collective consequence of these errors” was that, when the Trial Chamber determined his mens rea, “it had already drawn a relevant inference from the evidence”. In his view, the evidence analyzed in the mens rea section was “indelibly tainted so that it could only lead to the conclusion of guilt”.

241. The Prosecution responds that Mladić identifies no error in the Trial Chamber’s assessment of his mens rea, as he does not point to any instance where the Trial Chamber in fact made inferences on his mens rea in its actus reus analysis, or that it used findings on his mens rea to substantiate its actus reus findings. In addition, the Prosecution submits that Mladić misconstrues the law, misrepresents the Trial Judgement, and disregards relevant findings.
In relation to his first contention that the Trial Chamber erred by assessing his mens rea in its significant contribution analysis, Mladić submits that, according to the Milutinović et al. Trial Judgement, where the same evidence is used to determine the actus reus and the mens rea, the “actus reus elements” are “very limited, physical, and two-dimensional contributions of the individual”, whereas the mens rea analysis uses the same evidence as a basis to infer “the three-dimensional aspects” of behaviour, such as the individual’s influence, knowledge, and intent behind his words.

After reviewing the relevant portions of the Milutinović et al. Trial Judgement, the Appeals Chamber observes that the ICTY trial chamber in that case was assessing whether the accused’s participation in a meeting met either the significant contribution or the mens rea element relevant to his participation in a joint criminal enterprise. In the Appeals Chamber’s view, contrary to Mladić’s submissions, at no point did the ICTY trial chamber in the Milutinović et al. case establish a distinction between “two-dimensional” actus reus elements and “three-dimensional” mens rea aspects. In any event, the Appeals Chamber recalls that a trial chamber’s determinations are not binding on other trial chambers or on the Appeals Chamber. Of even greater significance, there is no legal requirement that a trial chamber’s analysis as to an accused’s mens rea and actus reus be done separately and Mladić fails to substantiate that this was required of the Trial Chamber when assessing the mens rea and actus reus elements pertaining to the Overarching JCE. To the contrary, trial chambers are free to organize their judgements as they see fit so long as they fulfil their obligation to provide a reasoned opinion.

As illustrations of the first alleged error, Mladić refers to paragraphs 4459, 4460, 4471, 4472, 4473, 4477, and 4478 of the Trial Judgement. The Appeals Chamber notes that these paragraphs are part of Chapter 9.3.7 of the Trial Judgement where the Trial Chamber addressed Mladić’s participation in the development of Bosnian Serb governmental policies. The Appeals Chamber further observes that paragraphs 4459, 4460, 4471, 4472, and 4473 of the Trial Judgement contain summaries of evidence rather than analysis of such evidence or inferences drawn from it. As such, the Appeals Chamber considers that these references do not support Mladić’s contention that the Trial Chamber was making mens rea inferences in its actus reus analysis. In paragraphs 4477 and 4478 of the Trial Judgement, the Trial Chamber considered Mladić’s arguments that he, inter alia, “did not have a tendency to get involved in political matters” and “did not have voting rights within the Bosnian Serb Assembly”. It found, however, that he, inter alia: (i) attended and actively participated in policy discussions during Bosnian Serb Assembly sessions and meetings with members of the Bosnian Serb government; (ii) discussed these policies at several meetings with high-level political figures and representatives of the international community, and expressed his commitment to the strategic objectives; and (iii) often suggested to Bosnian Serb politicians what position they should take during peace negotiations in order to achieve the strategic objectives as initially defined. It is clear that the findings reflect that the Trial Chamber was addressing Mladić’s conduct in the context of a significant contribution assessment rather than his intent. Mladić’s contention that the Trial Chamber made inferences on his mens rea in its analysis of his significant contribution is therefore incorrect. The Appeals Chamber further notes that Mladić also appears to challenge paragraphs 4465, 4468, 4486, 4627, 4629, and 4686 of the Trial Judgement in that the Trial Chamber was making inferences on his mens rea in sections related to his significant contribution. The Appeals Chamber considers that paragraphs 4465, 4468, and 4486 of the Trial Judgement merely contain references to evidence reviewed in Chapter 9.3.13 and brief summaries of that evidence, rather than analysis, while paragraphs 4627 and 4629 contain summaries of evidence, rather than analysis. Therefore, similar to paragraphs 4459, 4460, 4471, 4472, and 4473 of the Trial Judgement discussed above, the Appeals Chamber considers that the Trial Chamber, in summarizing the evidence, was not “making inferences” and thus rejects Mladić’s arguments in this regard. Finally, considering that paragraph 4686 of the Trial Judgement is the conclusion of Chapter 9.3.13 wherein the Trial Chamber analyzed Mladić’s mens rea, the Appeals Chamber considers it appropriate for Mladić’s intent to be assessed at this point in the judgement. His contention that the Trial Chamber made inferences concerning his mens rea in its significant contribution analysis, with respect to paragraphs 4465, 4468, 4486, 4627, 4629, and 4686 of the Trial Judgement, is therefore also dismissed.

The Appeals Chamber now turns to Mladić’s second alleged error concerning the Trial Chamber’s reliance on its mens rea findings to substantiate elements of his significant contribution. In support, Mladić references the Stanišić and Simatović Appeal Judgement to argue that “the actus reus determination must be established first, before
considerations of mens rea are determined.\textsuperscript{864} The Appeals Chamber observes that the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Stanišić and Simatović case considered whether the trial chamber in that case had erred by concluding that the joint criminal enterprise mens rea of both accused had not been established, prior to making any findings on the existence of a common criminal purpose that was shared by a plurality of persons.\textsuperscript{865} The ICTY Appeals Chamber, by majority, concluded that, in the circumstances of that case, the trial chamber should have determined the existence and scope of a common purpose, and whether the accused’s acts contributed to that purpose, before determining whether the accused shared the intent to further that purpose.\textsuperscript{866}

246. The Appeals Chamber considers that the circumstances in the Stanišić and Simatović case – where the trial chamber had failed to make any findings or to analyze any evidence on the existence of a common criminal purpose\textsuperscript{867} – are different from the current case. In the present case, the Trial Chamber established the existence of the Overarching JCE and its membership,\textsuperscript{868} assessed Mladić’s contribution,\textsuperscript{869} and addressed his mens rea.\textsuperscript{870}

247. The Appeals Chamber is further of the view that the Trial Chamber did not, as Mladić alleges, use its finding of his mens rea to substantiate its finding of his significant contribution.\textsuperscript{871} Having reviewed Mladić’s references to the Trial Judgement, the Appeals Chamber considers that these references show nothing more than the Trial Chamber cross-referencing between different sections in the Trial Judgement. Within its extensive assessment of evidence on Mladić’s significant contribution, the Trial Chamber at times referred to its summary of evidence or findings of fact in the mens rea section.\textsuperscript{872} The Appeals Chamber observes that the Trial Chamber used this practice of cross-referencing throughout the Trial Judgement instead of re-summarizing its findings of fact or summaries of evidence.\textsuperscript{873} The Appeals Chamber recalls that trial chambers need not unnecessarily repeat considerations reflected elsewhere in the trial judgement.\textsuperscript{874} Furthermore, nothing prevents a trial chamber from relying on the same evidence when making findings as to an accused’s actus reus and mens rea. Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber finds that Mladić does not demonstrate that the Trial Chamber used its finding of mens rea to substantiate its finding of his significant contribution or committed any error in this respect.

248. On the basis of the foregoing, the Appeals Chamber finds, Judge Nyambe dissenting, that Mladić has failed to demonstrate that the Trial Chamber erred by conflating or otherwise applying a defective method in assessing the mens rea and significant contribution elements in relation to the Overarching JCE.

(ii) Alleged Error in Assessment of Evidence

249. Mladić submits that, in assessing his mens rea, the Trial Chamber erred by disregarding or failing to give sufficient weight to clearly relevant direct evidence and preferring circumstantial evidence.\textsuperscript{875} He submits that the circumstantial evidence the Trial Chamber relied on was “of lower probative value” than other “stronger, more direct, and conflicting evidence”.\textsuperscript{876} To this effect, Mladić challenges the Trial Chamber’s reliance on the following circumstantial evidence to establish his mens rea for the Overarching JCE: (i) statements he made when posted in Knin with the 9th Corps of the JNA which were used to infer that he had the intent to disrespect the laws of war in Croatia; and (ii) his “passive presence” at two meetings in Pale Municipality (“Pale Meetings”).\textsuperscript{877} Mladić further argues that the Trial Chamber disregarded and omitted to provide reasoning in its analysis of the following direct and probative evidence: (i) his “anti-paramilitary” orders and conduct, which Mladić argues directly contradict his intent to further the Overarching JCE; (ii) the “genuine warnings in his orders for VRS soldiers to respect the Geneva Conventions”; and (iii) his “direct orders” to observe ceasefire agreements.\textsuperscript{878} In his view, had appropriate weight been given to direct evidence, no reasonable trier of fact could have concluded that his mens rea in relation to the Overarching JCE was established beyond reasonable doubt.\textsuperscript{879}

250. The Prosecution responds that Mladić’s arguments are grounded in misconceptions, and his examples demonstrate no error or disregard of evidence.\textsuperscript{880} Regarding circumstantial evidence, it submits that Mladić’s submissions misrepresent the Trial Judgement and the evidence,\textsuperscript{881} and wrongly imply that direct evidence has inherently greater value than circumstantial evidence.\textsuperscript{882} According to the Prosecution, Mladić also repeatedly mislabels evidence as either direct or circumstantial and addresses only a fraction of the vast amount of evidence underlying the Trial Chamber’s mens rea assessment.\textsuperscript{883} The Prosecution further responds that Mladić fails to demonstrate that the Trial Chamber disregarded direct evidence, as he misrepresents the law and the Trial Judgement, inflates the probative value of evidence on which he relies, and ignores relevant findings.\textsuperscript{884}
251. Mladić replies that the Prosecution has mischaracterized his submissions, as he does not assert that direct evidence is inherently more probative than circumstantial evidence. He clarifies that the Trial Chamber relied primarily on circumstantial evidence and did not provide the requisite level of analysis of direct and highly probative evidence in opposition. According to Mladić, this lack of “due consideration resulted in direct evidence being given insufficient weight in the Trial Chamber’s considerations”.

252. The Appeals Chamber recalls that a trial chamber may rely on direct or circumstantial evidence in reaching its findings. A trial chamber may draw inferences to establish a fact on which a conviction relies based on circumstantial evidence as long as it is the only reasonable conclusion that could be drawn from the evidence presented. The Appeals Chamber further recalls that the requisite mens rea for a conviction under the first form of joint criminal enterprise can be inferred from circumstantial evidence, such as a person’s knowledge of the common plan or the crimes it involves, combined with his or her continuous participation in the joint criminal enterprise, if this is the only reasonable inference available on the evidence.

253. The Appeals Chamber first turns to Mladić’s submissions challenging the Trial Chamber’s use of specific circumstantial evidence. Mladić avers that the Trial Chamber relied on statements he made when he was posted in Croatia to infer his intention to disrespect the laws of war in Croatia and “to repeat similar destruction” in the conflict in Bosnia. According to Mladić, statements made prior to his membership in this joint criminal enterprise should not be relied upon to establish his mens rea. Mladić further surmises that this was the reason why the Trial Chamber expanded the Overarching JCE from “at least October 1991” to ‘1991’” To support his submissions, Mladić refers to paragraph 4686 of the Trial Judgement.

254. The Appeals Chamber observes that, at paragraph 4686 of the Trial Judgement, the Trial Chamber listed, among several other factors, Mladić’s “statements indicating an intention not to respect the laws of war in Croatia in 1991, and his later references to repeating the destruction inflicted during this conflict”, when it found that he possessed discriminatory intent. The Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber’s reference to statements Mladić made in Croatia appears to be based on evidence set out in paragraphs 4617 to 4619 of the Trial Judgement. In these paragraphs, the Trial Chamber reviewed, inter alia, an audio recording and video transcripts of Mladić himself making threats to the effect that “if his demands were not met, he would cause destruction of a level [. . .] not yet seen before” in Croatian towns. The Trial Chamber further considered statements of a similar nature from 23 May 1992, during the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, wherein Mladić was recorded to have threatened reprisal attacks if his demands were not met, to have stated that “he would ‘order the shelling of entire Bihać [. . .] and it will burn too’”, and to have warned that “[t]he whole of Bosnia will burn if I start to ‘speak’”. The Trial Chamber also noted evidence that, in August 1992, Mladić warned UNPROFOR that “he would use heavy artillery weapons if [Croatian and Bosnian] forces did not cease combat activities in Central Bosnia” and that “he would most likely aim the heavy artillery weapons at densely populated areas”. Given evidence of Mladić’s express threats to destroy Croatian and Bosnian towns and target civilians, Mladić does not demonstrate that the Trial Chamber erred in considering “his statements indicating an intention not to respect the laws of war in Croatia in 1991, and his later references to repeating the destruction” among several other factors when assessing his mens rea. Specifically, while the Trial Chamber found that Mladić held the intent to contribute to the Overarching JCE by “12 May 1992 at the latest”; it was not unreasonable for the Trial Chamber to consider his conduct from 1991.

255. The Appeals Chamber is also not convinced by Mladić’s submission that the Trial Chamber expanded the Overarching JCE from “at least October 1991” to ‘1991’”. A review of the Trial Judgement reveals no indication that the Trial Chamber relied on his statements in Croatia in 1991 to expand the temporal scope of the Overarching JCE. As set out at the end of Chapter 9.2 of the Trial Judgement, which assessed the existence of the Overarching JCE, the Trial Chamber expressly noted that it had yet to determine Mladić’s membership and participation in the joint criminal enterprise and would only do so in the subsequent chapter of the judgement. Mladić’s arguments in this regard are based on a misreading of the Trial Judgement and do not demonstrate an error.

256. As to his “passive presence” at the two Pale Meetings, Mladić argues that the relevant evidence does not indicate his mental state but rather infers “tacit agreement based solely on his physical presence”. He further states that, “[o]f all evidence available to the Trial Chamber, a third person’s observation was included in [its] factual basis as the most probative”. The Appeals Chamber observes that the Trial Chamber summarized the evidence of
Witness Miroslav Deronjić regarding a meeting in Pale on 10 or 11 May 1992. The Trial Chamber noted that, according to Deronjić, Mladić and Karadžić were present at the meeting, and that when Deronjić reported that Glogova had been partially destroyed and that Bosnian Muslims had been evacuated by force, “all present in the room greeted his report with applause”. The Trial Chamber also summarized the evidence of Witness Abdel-Razek to the effect that, during a Christmas celebration in Pale on 7 January 1993, Karadžić stated that Muslims would be transferred out of Serb territory as the Serbs and Muslims could not live together anymore. The Trial Chamber further summarized Witness Abdel-Razek’s evidence that “Mladić, General Gvero, Krajišnik, and Plavić all agreed” and that “Krajišnik said that ethnic cleansing was necessary.”

257. The Appeals Chamber further notes that the Trial Chamber relied upon a vast amount of evidence concerning Mladić’s statements, conduct, and knowledge of crimes to determine his mens rea in relation to the Overarching JCE. It explicitly concluded that Mladić shared the intent to achieve the common objective of the Overarching JCE and that this conclusion was based on, inter alia, Mladić’s repeated use of derogatory terms to refer to Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, his recalling of historical crimes allegedly committed against Bosnian Serbs, his expressions of commitment to an ethnically homogeneous Republika Srpska, and his provision of misinformation while knowing about the commission of crimes in the Municipalities. In view of this body of evidence, as well as the Trial Chamber’s analysis of such evidence, Mladić provides no support for his claim that the Trial Chamber, outside of summarizing Witnesses Deronjić’s and Abdel-Razek’s evidence, relied on his presence or participation in these two Pale Meetings “as the most probative” to establish his mens rea. Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber finds that Mladić does not demonstrate that the Trial Chamber erred in referring to evidence of his participation in the two Pale Meetings in the context of assessing his mens rea.

258. The Appeals Chamber now turns to Mladić’s allegations that the Trial Chamber erred in disregarding direct and probative evidence demonstrating that he did not share the intent to further the common criminal purpose of the Overarching JCE. Mladić contends that the Trial Chamber failed to give sufficient weight to, and excluded from its mens rea analysis, evidence of his orders and conduct demonstrating his “anti-paramilitary position”, which is in contrast to the intent he supposedly shared with other members of the Overarching JCE that the paramilitaries commit crimes to further the joint criminal enterprise. To support his argument, Mladić cites what he asserts is extensive evidence of his orders in relation to paramilitary groups and meetings recorded in his military notebooks in line with his approach. A review of Chapter 9.3.13 of the Trial Judgement reveals that the Trial Chamber did not consider Mladić’s orders to disband, arrest, or eliminate paramilitary formations when addressing his mens rea pertinent to the Overarching JCE. Recalling that the Trial Judgement is to be considered as a whole, the Appeals Chamber observes that the Trial Chamber reviewed this evidence when assessing Mladić’s significant contribution and noted that several orders were attempts to bring paramilitary units under the VRS’s unified command. Contrary to his alleged “anti-paramilitary position”, the Trial Chamber found that some units operated under VRS command when crimes were committed in the Municipalities. In this regard, the Trial Chamber found that, from at least late June 1992, Mladić commanded and controlled Pero Elez’s paramilitary unit, which committed crimes in Kalinovik and Foča Municipalities. It also found that from 3 June 1992 onwards, Mladić commanded and controlled the paramilitary unit under “Ljubiša Savić, a.k.a Mauzer”, which committed crimes in Bijeljina Municipality. Therefore, the Appeals Chamber finds that Mladić fails to establish that the Trial Chamber erred in not considering his “anti-paramilitary position” in assessing his mens rea for the Overarching JCE. The Appeals Chamber further notes that, of the evidence he references, only a few items are orders from Mladić, or otherwise stemming from Mladić, to disarm paramilitary formations that did not submit to VRS command.

259. Mladić further asserts that the Trial Chamber failed to give sufficient weight to the “genuine warnings in his orders for VRS soldiers to respect the Geneva Conventions” and omitted to provide any reasoning on why this “direct evidence” of his intent did not form part of an evidentiary basis to arrive at another reasonable inference. The Appeals Chamber observes that the Trial Chamber considered extensive evidence of his orders to follow the Geneva Conventions and expressly addressed this evidence in its analysis of his mens rea in relation to the Overarching JCE. According to the Trial Chamber, evidence of, inter alia, his orders to respect the Geneva Conventions “[w]as not indicative of his true state of mind” as it was contradicted by “what happened on the ground”, his provision of misinformation, and “his other contemporaneous statements”. In the Appeals Chamber’s view, the
260. In a similar vein, the Appeals Chamber is not convinced by Mladić’s contention that the Trial Chamber failed to give sufficient weight, if any, to his orders to observe ceasefire agreements.\(^927\) He argues that the Trial Chamber only made findings on this evidence in relation to his *actus reus* and “failed to see its direct evidentiary representation of [his] *mens rea*”.\(^928\) The Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber considered evidence of Mladić’s orders to observe ceasefire agreements in various parts of the Trial Judgement, including the section discussing his intent to further the common purpose of the Overarching JCE.\(^929\) As part of its reasoning on his *mens rea* for the Overarching JCE, the Trial Chamber considered that Mladić “appeared on various occasions to pursue peaceful solutions to the conflict, and made statements [...] indicating his desire to further the peace process”, but that “these actions and statements, sometimes providing misinformation, [were] inconsistent with [his] other conduct and [were] directly contradicted by his other contemporaneous statements”.\(^930\) Similar to its assessment of his orders to respect the Geneva Conventions, the Trial Chamber found that Mladić’s “involvement in peace negotiations [was] not indicative of his true state of mind”.\(^931\) The Appeals Chamber considers that Mladić merely disagrees with the Trial Chamber’s findings without demonstrating that the Trial Chamber failed to consider, accord sufficient weight to, or provide a reasoned opinion on his orders to observe ceasefire agreements.

261. Based on the foregoing, the Appeals Chamber finds, Judge Nyambe dissenting, that Mladić fails to demonstrate any error in the Trial Chamber’s assessment of direct and circumstantial evidence in relation to his intent to achieve the common objective of the Overarching JCE.

### (iii) Alleged Error in Selectively Relying on Parts of Assembly Speeches

262. The Trial Chamber found that, on 12 May 1992, at the 16th Assembly Session (“16th Assembly Session”), Karadžić presented six strategic objectives, which most prominently included the demarcation of a Serbian state separate from any Croatian and Muslim state and involved the separation of people along ethnic lines.\(^932\) The Trial Chamber further found that, during the same session, the assembly adopted the six strategic objectives and Mladić, among others present, clarified his understanding of the objectives.\(^933\) Regarding the 24th Session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly (“24th Assembly Session”), held on 8 January 1993, the Trial Chamber considered evidence that the assembly “adopted a unanimous conclusion that Muslims should be taken out of ‘Serbism’ forever, and that the Muslims, as a nation, were a ‘sect’ of Turkish provenance; a communist, artificial creation which the Serbs did not accept”.\(^934\)

263. Mladić submits that the Trial Chamber erred by relying on “selective” parts of his speeches at the 16th and 24th Assembly Sessions when it assessed his *mens rea* pertinent to the Overarching JCE.\(^935\) With respect to the 16th Assembly Session, he argues that the Trial Chamber gave insufficient weight to statements he made opposing the common criminal objective of the Overarching JCE, and that it “methodically isolated phrases or passages and ascribed a sinister meaning to them”.\(^936\) In this regard, Mladić contends that the Trial Chamber referred to his warnings “against genocidal actions” but “confuse[d]” his reference to protecting people with fighting forces in the trenches.\(^937\) Mladić contends that the Trial Chamber also failed to provide a reasoned opinion for preferring certain parts of his statement over others.\(^938\) In his view, the Trial Chamber failed to “properly assess” whether the inference that he only sought military success, as opposed to permanent removal of civilians, was a reasonable alternative conclusion.\(^939\)

264. Mladić further submits that the same error is repeated in relation to the 24th Assembly Session, whereby the Trial Chamber gave no weight to his statements calming other members of the assembly and defending UNPROFOR.\(^940\) He contends that, rather than using his own statements, the Trial Chamber chose to use the statements of others to infer his intent.\(^941\) According to Mladić, another reasonable inference exists,\(^942\) namely that he “sought only legitimate military success (not permanent removal of civilians)”.\(^943\) He argues that, had the evidence been viewed in its totality, no reasonable trier of fact could have established that he shared the *mens rea* to achieve the objective of the Overarching JCE.\(^944\)
265. The Prosecution responds that Mladić’s arguments are based on the erroneous premise that a few fragments of isolated evidence may show error in the conclusions of the Trial Chamber that are based on a “holistic assessment of thousands of pieces of evidence”. The Prosecution submits that Mladić makes misleading and unsubstantiated assertions about the evidence without demonstrating any unreasonableness in the Trial Chamber’s approach and that he makes no attempt to show an impact on findings in the Trial Judgement. According to the Prosecution, the Trial Chamber considered Mladić’s claim that he sought only legitimate military success but reasonably rejected this on the basis of an overwhelming body of contrary evidence.

266. In relation to Mladić’s statements at the 16th Assembly Session, the Appeals Chamber is not convinced by the submission that the Trial Chamber gave insufficient weight to “statements made by [Mladić] in opposition of the supposed aim of the common criminal objective of the [Overarching] JCE”. The Appeals Chamber observes that the Trial Chamber considered Mladić’s alleged warning “against genocidal actions” and other sections of his speech that appeared contrary to the Bosnian Serb Assembly position. The Trial Chamber also explicitly considered Mladić’s claim that he only sought legitimate military success.

267. However, the Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber also considered the following statements that Mladić made at the 16th Assembly Session, including:

‘Ustašas, I know what kind of people Ustašas are. However, we must now see and assess [ . . . ] who our allies and our enemies are, and which enemy would be easier to handle. On the basis of this we must make our move and eliminate them, either temporarily or permanently, so that they will not be in the trenches.’

According to Mladić, the ‘thing’ that they were doing ‘need[ed] to be guarded as [their] deepest secret’. Serb representatives in the media and at political talks and negotiations would have to present the goals in a way that would sound appealing to those who they wanted to win over and the ‘Serbian people’ would need to know how to read between the lines.

Mladić also noted that the enemy, a ‘common enemy, regardless whether it is the Muslim hordes or Croatian hordes’ had attacked ‘with all its might from all directions’. He further said that ‘[w]hat is important now is either to throw both of them out employing political and other moves, or to organize ourselves and throw out one by force of arms, and we will be able to deal somehow with the other’.

268. In assessing his mens rea, the Trial Chamber recalled specific portions of Mladić’s statement to the effect that Bosnian Serb leaders needed to guard their “deepest secret”, that their objectives needed to be presented in a way that appealed to the Serbian people, and that what Krajišnik and Karadžić wanted would amount to genocide. The Trial Chamber also recalled his statement that “we must make our move and eliminate them, either temporarily or permanently, so that they will not be in the trenches”. The Appeals Chamber observes that Mladić’s statements, together with his conduct, underpin the Trial Chamber’s finding that he possessed the intent for crimes to be committed against Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats on discriminatory grounds, and ultimately its finding that he shared the intent to achieve the common objective of the Overarching JCE.

269. Given the foregoing, the Appeals Chamber is of the view that, contrary to Mladić’s submissions, the Trial Chamber did not isolate portions of his statements at the 16th Assembly Session, ascribe a “sinister meaning” to them, or otherwise confuse his references. Rather, as set out above, the Trial Chamber took a balanced account of Mladić’s statements in their context and considered them within the totality of evidence of all his statements and conduct pertinent to the Overarching JCE. Mladić therefore fails to demonstrate that the Trial Chamber gave insufficient weight to or failed to refer to sections of his speech that were allegedly in opposition to the common criminal objective of the Overarching JCE. Given the extensive consideration of his statements at the 16th Assembly Session in the Trial Judgement, the Appeals Chamber also rejects Mladić’s submission that the Trial Chamber erred by failing to provide a reasoned opinion on why the sections of the assembly transcript that it quoted were allegedly “more important” than others.
270. As to the 24th Assembly Session, Mladić refers to his interventions, contending that the Trial Chamber did not give them sufficient weight. In this regard, Mladić specifically points to: (i) his attempt to calm assembly members and to ask them to not “appear too heated and frightening” in order to “not create more damage to ourselves than necessary”, and (ii) his defence of UNPROFOR by stating: “I ask you not to develop such climate towards the UNPROFOR, there are those who work well”. The Appeals Chamber observes that the Trial Chamber considered evidence relating to the 24th Assembly Session but did not, in the Trial Judgement, expressly summarize or refer to the statements Mladić points to in his submission. Having reviewed the minutes of the 24th Assembly Session, the Appeals Chamber observes that Mladić appeared to urge assembly members to not “appear too heated and frightening” in relation to combat operations and that “35 aeroplanes took off of the Kennedy plane carrier thirty minutes ago and are flying in an unidentified direction”. He further made the statement to not antagonize UNPROFOR in response to an incident where the Vice-President of Bosnia and Herzegovina, travelling in an UNPROFOR vehicle, was killed by a Bosnian Serb soldier when the car was stopped and searched. Mladić further stated that “I don’t know how we are going to return to the Conference in Geneva” because of this incident and that “we must have a very, very sober head” to not “let some individual drive us to disaster”. The Appeals Chamber considers that, read in context, these statements reflect self-interest in protecting the image of the Bosnian Serb Assembly rather than protecting non-Serbs or UNPROFOR. Mladić therefore fails to demonstrate that the Trial Chamber erred by not expressly referring to these statements or that these statements would undermine findings in the Trial Judgement regarding his mens rea.

271. Mladić further contends that, in relation to the 24th Assembly Session, the Trial Chamber relied on statements of others to infer his intent. Having reviewed the pertinent portions of the Trial Judgement as well as evidence relating to the 24th Assembly Session, the Appeals Chamber considers that the Trial Chamber accurately summarized events at the session to the effect that Mladić was present, and that the assembly unanimously adopted the conclusion that Muslims were a “sect” of Turkish provenance and an artificial creation which the Serbs did not accept. However, the Appeals Chamber notes that there is no indication in the Trial Judgement that the Trial Chamber relied on these statements to infer his intent. Therefore, Mladić fails to demonstrate any error in this respect.

272. The Appeals Chamber now turns to Mladić’s submission that another reasonable inference – his legitimate military goals – was available on the basis of his statements at the 16th and 24th Assembly Sessions as well as his orders on the protection of civilians and on ceasefires. The Appeals Chamber recalls that the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt requires a finder of fact to be satisfied that there is no reasonable explanation of the evidence other than the guilt of the accused. It is further recalled that a trial chamber does not have to discuss every possible hypothesis or inference it may have considered, as long as it is satisfied that the inference it retained was the only reasonable one.

273. The Appeals Chamber observes that the Trial Chamber considered Mladić’s claim that he only sought legitimate military success rather than permanent removal of Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat civilians. As set out above, the Trial Chamber considered Mladić’s interventions at the 16th Assembly Session in a balanced manner, and found that the totality of all his statements and conduct demonstrated that he possessed the requisite mens rea. Furthermore, the Trial Chamber discussed Mladić’s orders to respect the Geneva Conventions and to protect civilians, as well as to respect ceasefires. As noted above, it found that these orders “were not indicative of his true state of mind”, as they were inconsistent with his other conduct, and directly contradicted by his other contemporaneous statements. In this regard, the Trial Chamber found that Mladić, inter alia, repeatedly used derogatory terms to refer to Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, made references to historical crimes committed against Bosnian Serbs, and made statements indicating an intention to not respect the laws of war in Croatia in 1991, and it also considered his later references to repeating the destruction inflicted during this conflict. In light of the foregoing evidence and the Trial Chamber’s assessment, the Appeals Chamber finds, Judge Nyambe dissenting, that the alternative inference Mladić proposes is not reasonable. Mladić’s submissions amount to a disagreement with the Trial Chamber’s assessment of evidence and ultimate finding on his mens rea without demonstrating any error in its conclusions.
(iv) **Conclusion**

274. On the basis of the foregoing, the Appeals Chamber finds, Judge Nyambe dissenting, that Mladić demonstrates no error in the Trial Chamber’s finding that he shared the intent to achieve the common objective of the Overarching JCE.

(c) **Conclusion**

275. Consequently, the Appeals Chamber, Judge Nyambe dissenting, dismisses Ground 3.B of Mladić’s appeal.

**C. Alleged Errors Related to the Sarajevo JCE (Ground 4)**

276. The Trial Chamber found that the Sarajevo JCE existed between 12 May 1992 and November 1995, with the objective of spreading terror among the civilian population of Sarajevo through a campaign of sniping and shelling, including through the commission of murder, terror, and unlawful attacks against civilians. 984 It found that members of this joint criminal enterprise included Radovan Karadžić, Stanislav Galić, Dragomir Milošević, Momčilo Krajišnik, Biljana Plavšić, Nikola Koljević, and Mladić. 985 The Trial Chamber determined that Mladić shared the intent to further, and significantly contributed to achieving, the Sarajevo JCE’s common purpose. 986 The Trial Chamber concluded that several sniping and shelling incidents in Sarajevo, except in relation to non-civilian victims, constituted murder, terror, and/or unlawful attacks against civilians, 987 and held Mladić guilty of these crimes through his participation in the Sarajevo JCE. 988

277. Mladić submits that the Trial Chamber committed several errors of law and fact in finding the existence of, and that he participated in, the Sarajevo JCE, and requests that the Appeals Chamber reverse his convictions for the crimes of murder, terror, and unlawful attacks against civilians in Sarajevo. 989

1. **Alleged Errors Related to the Crime of Terror and Mladić’s Mens Rea (Ground 4.A)**

278. Mladić submits that the Trial Chamber erred in holding him responsible for spreading terror among the civilian population through a campaign of sniping and shelling and in finding that he intended to further the Sarajevo JCE. 990 In particular, he argues that the Trial Chamber erred in: (i) exercising jurisdiction over the crime of terror; 991 (ii) failing to find that Sarajevo was a “defended city”; 992 (iii) finding the existence of the Sarajevo JCE and that Mladić shared the intent to further the joint criminal enterprise; 993 and (iv) the assessment of specific intent for the crime of terror. 994 The Appeals Chamber will address these contentions in turn.

(a) **Alleged Errors in the Exercise of Jurisdiction over the Crime of Terror**

279. The Trial Chamber determined that it had jurisdiction over acts of violence the primary purpose of which was to spread terror among the civilian population as a violation of the laws or customs of war punishable under Article 3 of the ICTY Statute (“crime of terror”), as charged under Count 9 of the Indictment. 995 In making this determination, the Trial Chamber recalled that the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Galić and D. Milošević cases had confirmed that the ICTY had jurisdiction over the crime of terror and found nothing in Mladić’s submissions that would lead it to deviate from the established jurisprudence. 996

280. Mladić submits that the Trial Chamber erred in exercising jurisdiction over the crime of terror and convicting him of this crime, and requests that the Appeals Chamber reverse his conviction under Count 9 of the Indictment. 997 In particular, he argues that the Trial Chamber failed to give sufficient weight to his submissions that there exist cogent reasons to depart from the jurisprudence which holds that the ICTY had jurisdiction over the crime of terror, asserting that the prohibition of spreading terror among the civilian population did not extend to its penalization under customary international law during the period of his Indictment due to insufficient evidence of settled, extensive, or uniform state practice. 998 Mladić further argues that the Trial Chamber was prohibited from exercising jurisdiction over the crime of terror because it was not defined with sufficient specificity to be foreseeable at the time of the Indictment, therefore infringing the principle of *nullum crimen sine lege*. 999

281. The Prosecution responds that the ICTY had jurisdiction over the crime of terror because it formed part of customary international law at the relevant time and that Mladić fails to show any cogent reasons to depart from
established ICTY jurisprudence in this respect. The Prosecution further asserts that: (i) at the time of Mladić’s crimes, several states on four continents had criminalized terror, and the widespread ratification by 1992 of Additional Protocols I and II to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (“Additional Protocols”) further demonstrates the customary international law status of the crime of terror; (ii) the principle of *nullum crimen sine lege* does not demand that crimes under customary international law be measured by the standards of specificity required for statutory provisions; and (iii) the crime of terror was defined with sufficient specificity and was foreseeable to Mladić, particularly since laws of the former Yugoslavia had criminalized terror.\(^{1003}\)

282. Mladić replies that the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Galić and D. Milošević cases did not consider the absence of a widespread or representative criminalization of terror, and that, in penalizing terror, the former Yugoslavia did not adopt the language of the Additional Protocols or attempt to define the concept of terror after ratifying the Additional Protocols.\(^{1004}\)

283. The Appeals Chamber recalls that the ICTY Trial Chamber in the Galić case determined, by majority, that the ICTY had subject-matter jurisdiction over the crime of terror under Article 3 of the ICTY Statute.\(^{1005}\) The ICTY Appeals Chamber in the same case confirmed, by majority, the ICTY’s jurisdiction over the crime of terror, clarifying that customary international law imposed individual criminal responsibility for violations of the prohibition of terror against the civilian population at the time of the commission of the crimes for which Galić was convicted.\(^{1006}\) The ICTY Appeals Chamber in the D. Milošević case, by majority, subsequently reaffirmed the ICTY’s jurisdiction over the crime of terror.\(^{1007}\) In light of this jurisprudence, the Appeals Chamber considers that the matter of the ICTY’s jurisdiction over the crime of terror was settled by the ICTY Appeals Chamber and was therefore binding on the Trial Chamber in the present case.\(^{1008}\) As it was not open to the Trial Chamber to depart from the existing jurisprudence in this respect, the Appeals Chamber rejects Mladić’s contention that the Trial Chamber erred in failing to give sufficient weight to his submissions that there exist cogent reasons to do so.

284. As to whether there exist cogent reasons for the Appeals Chamber to depart from the jurisprudence in this regard, the standards of appellate review require Mladić to demonstrate that the decision to exercise jurisdiction over the crime of terror was made on the basis of a wrong legal principle or was “wrongly decided, usually because the judge or judges were ill-informed about the applicable law”.\(^{1009}\) In this respect, Mladić relies chiefly on the dissenting views of Judges Schomburg and Liu in the Galić and D. Milošević Appeal Judgements, respectively, to argue that the state practice referred to by the majority in the Galić Appeal Judgement was not sufficiently extensive, uniform, or representative to give rise to individual criminal responsibility for spreading terror among the civilian population under customary international law at the relevant time.\(^{1010}\)

285. A review of the Galić Appeal Judgement reveals that the judges of the majority applied the same legal principles as Judge Schomburg in the Galić case and Judge Liu in the D. Milošević case in reaching their conclusions, namely that: (i) the ICTY has jurisdiction to prosecute a violation of a rule of international humanitarian law under Article 3 of the ICTY Statute when four conditions are fulfilled, including when “the violation of the rule must entail, under customary international law, the individual criminal responsibility of the person breaching the rule” (“Fourth Condition”);\(^{1011}\) and (ii) the fulfilment of the Fourth Condition may be inferred from, *inter alia*, state practice indicating an intention to criminalize the violation.\(^{1012}\)

286. In concluding that the Fourth Condition was fulfilled, the judges of the majority in the Galić case considered, *inter alia*, that: (i) references to terror as a war crime could be found in national and multinational documents as early as 1919 and 1945,\(^{1013}\) (ii) numerous states, including the former Yugoslavia, had criminalized terrorizing civilians as a method of warfare or in a time of war,\(^{1014}\) and (iii) a court in Croatia had entered a conviction under, *inter alia*, Article 51 of Additional Protocol I and Article 13 of Additional Protocol II for acts of terror against civilians which occurred between March 1991 and January 1993.\(^{1015}\) Judge Schomburg in the Galić case and Judge Liu in the D. Milošević case, by contrast, expressed doubt as to whether the evidence referred to by the majority in the Galić case was sufficiently extensive and uniform to establish customary international law.\(^{1016}\)

287. In the Appeals Chamber’s view, Judge Schomburg in the Galić case and Judge Liu in the D. Milošević case applied the same legal principles as the majority in the Galić case in determining the sufficiency of the evidence of state practice before them and merely disagreed on the result.\(^{1017}\) Bearing in mind that “two judges, both acting
reasonably, can come to different conclusions on the basis of the same evidence, both of which are reasonable 
the Appeals Chamber finds that Mladić fails to demonstrate that the finding by the ICTY Appeals Chamber that the ICTY had jurisdiction over the crime of terror was made on the basis of a wrong legal principle or was wrongly decided. In the absence of cogent reasons to depart from the controlling jurisprudence, the Appeals Chamber finds no error in the Trial Chamber’s determination that the ICTY had jurisdiction over the crime of terror in the present case.

288. As to Mladić’s contention that the definition of the crime of terror nonetheless violated the principle of *nullum crimen sine lege* for lack of specificity and foreseeability, the Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber set out the elements of the crime in accordance with the ICTY Appeals Chamber’s definition in the *Galić* Appeal Judgement, as clarified in the *D. Milošević* Appeal Judgement. In particular, the Trial Chamber stated that the crime of terror requires proof of, *inter alia*, acts or threats of violence committed with the primary purpose of spreading terror among the civilian population and directed against the civilian population or individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities causing the victims to suffer grave consequences.

289. Relying on Judge Shahabuddeen’s separate opinion in the *Galić* Appeal Judgement stating that “there is neither the required *opinio juris* nor state practice to support the view that customary international law knows of a comprehensive definition of [terror]”, Mladić argues that the ICTY was not in a position to define the elements of the crime. He further contends that the definition adopted by the ICTY, particularly the requirement that victims suffer “grave consequences” from the acts or threats of violence, did not provide a clear gravity threshold and was improperly determined through a jurisdictional analysis which was developed after the Indictment period.

290. The Appeals Chamber recalls that the principle of *nullum crimen sine lege* requires that a person may only be found guilty of a crime in respect of acts which constituted a violation of a norm which existed at the time of their commission. Moreover, the criminal liability in question must have been sufficiently foreseeable and the law providing for such liability must have been sufficiently accessible at the relevant time. This principle does not, however, prevent a court from interpreting and clarifying the elements of a particular crime, nor does it preclude the progressive development of the law by the court.

291. The Appeals Chamber notes that Judge Shahabuddeen specified in his separate opinion in the *Galić* Appeal Judgement that: (i) he agreed with the view that terror as charged is a crime known to customary international law; (ii) the ICTY could recognize that customary international law does know of a core or predominant meaning of “terror” for which there was individual criminal responsibility at the material times; and (iii) he was satisfied that a serious violation of the laws or customs of war within the meaning of Article 3 of the ICTY Statute, namely, by resorting to the core of terror, gives rise to such responsibility, which existed at the time of the alleged acts of the appellant. In the view of the Appeals Chamber, the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the *Galić* and *D. Milošević* cases merely clarified the elements of the crime of terror, which existed in customary international law, for the purposes of Article 3 of the ICTY Statute. The Appeals Chamber considers that this is consistent with the principle of *nullum crimen sine lege*, as recalled above. Consequently, Mladić fails to show any error in the Trial Chamber’s application of the elements of the crime of terror as clarified by the ICTY Appeals Chamber.

292. As to foreseeability, the Appeals Chamber recalls that the accused must be able to appreciate that his conduct was criminal in the sense generally understood, without reference to any specific provision. Although the ICTY did not apply the law of the former Yugoslavia to the definition of the crimes and forms of liability within its jurisdiction, it had recourse to domestic law for the purpose of establishing that the accused could reasonably have known that the offence in question or the offence committed in the way charged in the Indictment was prohibited and punishable.

293. To this end, it is worth noting that the Criminal Code of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (“SFRY” and “Criminal Code of the SFRY”, respectively) in force at the time of the Indictment period provided that “[w]henever, in violation of the rules of international law effective at the time of war, armed conflict, or occupation, orders that the civilian population be subject to […] application of measures of intimidation and terror […]
shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than five years or by the death penalty”.\textsuperscript{1035} In addition, the military manual of the SFRY applicable at the time provided, \textit{inter alia}, that: (i) “serious violations of the laws of war [are considered] as criminal offences”,\textsuperscript{1036} (ii) “[w]ar crimes and other serious violations of the laws of war include […] the application of measures of intimidation and terror [against a civilian population]”,\textsuperscript{1037} (iii) “[a]tacking civilians for the purpose of terrorising them is especially prohibited”,\textsuperscript{1038} and (iv) “[p]ersons who commit a war crime, or any other grave violation of the laws of war, […] may also answer before an international court, if such a court has been established”.\textsuperscript{1039} Against this background, the Appeals Chamber considers that Mladić does not demonstrate that the crime of terror was not reasonably foreseeable to him at the time of the events charged in the Indictment.

Furthermore, in the Appeals Chamber’s view, the specification that, for the purposes of Article 3 of the ICTY Statute, the crime of terror also requires that victims suffered “grave consequences”\textsuperscript{1040} in no way detracts from the conclusion that Mladić could reasonably have known that the commission of acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population was prohibited and punishable.\textsuperscript{1041} The Appeals Chamber finds, Judge Nyambe dissenting, that Mladić consequently fails to demonstrate that the Trial Chamber erred in exercising jurisdiction over the crime of terror due to lack of specificity and foreseeability in its definition.

(b) \textbf{Alleged Error in Failing to Find that Sarajevo was a “Defended City”}

In finding the existence of the Sarajevo JCE, the Trial Chamber considered, \textit{inter alia}, that, about two days after the policy regarding Sarajevo was outlined at the 16th Assembly Session, the SRK commenced its heavy shelling of Sarajevo, which, together with regular and frequent sniping, continued throughout the Indictment period.\textsuperscript{1042} The Trial Chamber found that the objective of the joint criminal enterprise involved the commission of, \textit{inter alia}, the crime of terror, and that “the infliction of terror among the civilian population was used to gain strategic military advantages and done out of ethnic vengeance”.\textsuperscript{1043} In making these determinations, the Trial Chamber rejected Mladić’s arguments that Sarajevo was a valid military target that could not be seen as an “undefended city” pursuant to Article 3(c) of the ICTY Statute.\textsuperscript{1044}

Mladić submits that, in convicting him of the crime of terror, the Trial Chamber erred by misconstruing and failing to give sufficient weight to his submissions regarding Sarajevo as a “defended city” pursuant to Article 3(c) of the ICTY Statute.\textsuperscript{1045} In particular, he argues that the Trial Chamber “erred by failing to consider Sarajevo as a defended city which constituted a legitimate military objective”.\textsuperscript{1046} Mladić contends that, had the Trial Chamber understood and considered his submissions in this respect, it could not have concluded that terror was the primary purpose of the campaign in Sarajevo and that he possessed the requisite \textit{mens rea} for this crime.\textsuperscript{1047} Accordingly, Mladić requests that the Appeals Chamber reverse his conviction under Count 9 of the Indictment.\textsuperscript{1048}

The Prosecution responds that Sarajevo as a whole was not a legitimate military target and that the Trial Chamber rightly rejected Mladić’s argument about Sarajevo as a “defended city”.\textsuperscript{1049} It contends that, regardless of the presence of legitimate military targets within Sarajevo, or of the military advantage offered by holding the city, a distinction must be made between civilian and military objectives.\textsuperscript{1050} The Prosecution also contends that Mladić was not charged with attacking undefended locales, but with terrorizing, unlawfully attacking, and murdering civilians as violations of the laws or customs of war pursuant to Article 3 of the ICTY Statute.\textsuperscript{1051}

Mladić replies that he does not contend that Sarajevo in its entirety constituted a valid military target but rather, that Sarajevo, as a defended city, constituted a valid military objective.\textsuperscript{1052} Mladić further asserts that he does not contend that categorizing a city as “defended” allows a party to avoid their obligations of distinction, but maintains that the Trial Chamber’s conclusion that his primary objective in Sarajevo was to spread terror among the civilian population was not the only reasonable inference available on the evidence.\textsuperscript{1053}

The Appeals Chamber recalls that Article 3 of the ICTY Statute sets out a non-exhaustive list of punishable violations of the laws or customs of war, including, \textit{inter alia}, under Article 3(c), the “attack, or bombardment, by whatever means, of undefended towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings” (“crime of attacking undefended locales”).\textsuperscript{1054} The crime of attacking undefended locales is thus one of the violations of the laws or customs of war within the jurisdiction of the ICTY pursuant to Article 3 of the ICTY Statute, which include, for instance,
the crimes of murder, terror, unlawfully attacking civilians, or hostage-taking. Mladić asserts that “the reference to Article 3 in the [Indictment should be understood to include a reference to Article 3(c)”.

However, nothing in the Indictment, Prosecution Pre-Trial Brief, or trial record suggests that Mladić was charged with the crime of attacking undefended locales. Mladić therefore does not demonstrate that the Trial Chamber erred by failing to give sufficient weight to his submissions and consider Sarajevo as a “defended city” pursuant to Article 3(c) of the ICTY Statute.

Moreover, Mladić conflates the question of whether Sarajevo was a “defended city” with whether it contained legitimate military objectives. In this respect, the Appeals Chamber recalls that the principle of distinction requires parties to a conflict to distinguish at all times between the civilian population and combatants, or civilian and military objectives, such that only military objectives may be lawfully attacked and the prohibition on targeting civilians is absolute. As such, Mladić’s general assertion that the strategic military importance, nature, and location of Sarajevo rendered the city and its contents broadly subject to legitimate attack falls to be rejected.

The Appeals Chamber is also not persuaded by Mladić’s suggestion that, if the Trial Chamber had recognized Sarajevo’s strategic military importance, it could not have concluded that the campaign in Sarajevo was primarily aimed at spreading terror as opposed to gaining military advantage. The Appeals Chamber observes that the Trial Chamber explicitly recognized that the infliction of terror among the civilian population, as the primary purpose of the sniping and shelling incidents in Sarajevo, was used to gain a strategic military advantage. In this respect, the Trial Chamber considered evidence showing, inter alia, that: (i) many civilians were targeted while carrying out daily activities of a civilian nature or when present at sites that were known as locations where civilians gathered; (ii) several of the sniping and shelling attacks were carried out during cease-fires or quiet periods, and civilians were more prone to being targeted when circumstances suggested that the shooting or shelling had stopped and it was safe for civilians to continue their daily activities; (iii) numerous civilians were targeted while they were at home or in neighbourhoods where there was no military activity or military personnel and equipment present in the immediate vicinity; (iv) the period of sniping and shelling continued, largely unabated, over almost four years; and (v) civilians in Sarajevo lived in extreme and constant fear of being hit by sniper or artillery fire.

In view of the above, the Appeals Chamber finds, Judge Nyambe dissenting, that Mladić fails to demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could, in principle, have concluded that terror was the primary purpose of the shelling and sniping campaign in Sarajevo. To the extent that Mladić alleges specific errors in the Trial Chamber’s assessment of evidence in this respect, the Appeals Chamber will evaluate such allegations in connection with the supporting submissions.

(c) Alleged Errors Relating to the Existence of a Sarajevo JCE and Mladić’s Intent

In finding the existence of the Sarajevo JCE and that Mladić shared the common criminal purpose and intended to establish and carry out a campaign of sniping and shelling against the civilian population of Sarajevo, the Trial Chamber considered, inter alia, that the policy of the Bosnian Serb leadership with regard to Sarajevo was outlined at the 16th Assembly Session, and that Mladić personally directed the SRK to shell Sarajevo and cut its utilities to force inhabitants outside. The Trial Chamber also noted that some of the evidence received may indicate that the Bosnian Serb leadership was genuinely concerned with the well-being of civilians. In this respect, the Trial Chamber pointed to statements of assurance by Bosnian Serb officials to international organizations, including Mladić’s assurances that Sarajevo was “under no threat from the VRS”, as well as certain orders prohibiting firing at civilians without approval. The Trial Chamber concluded, however, that these could not serve as a reliable basis for determining the Bosnian Serb leadership’s true state of mind in light of the totality of the evidence.

The Trial Chamber considered, inter alia, that Mladić’s statements at the 16th Assembly Session, as well as the language of the orders, evinced a lack of genuine concern for the well-being of civilians and the rule of law.

Mladić submits that the Trial Chamber erred in interpreting his statements at the 16th Assembly Session predominantly through the lens of its findings on the Sarajevo crime base and in disregarding evidence of orders prohibiting the targeting of civilians. He argues that, as a consequence of these errors, alone or in combination, the Trial Chamber erred in concluding that there was no other inference available on the evidence consistent
with his innocence, and thereby erroneously inferred the existence of the Sarajevo JCE and his intention to act in furtherance thereof. \(^{1077}\) Mladić accordingly requests the Appeals Chamber to reverse his convictions for the crimes of murder, terror, and unlawful attacks on civilians under Counts 5, 9, and 10 of the Indictment, respectively, or, in the alternative, reverse the Trial Chamber’s findings to the extent of the errors identified. \(^{1078}\)

305. The Prosecution responds that the Trial Chamber reasonably interpreted Mladić’s statements at the 16\(^{th}\) Assembly Session \(^{1079}\) and appropriately discounted Mladić’s orders not to fire at civilians. \(^{1080}\) The Prosecution further submits that the Trial Chamber’s findings on the existence and Mladić’s shared intent of the common criminal purpose do not hinge on his statements at the 16\(^{th}\) Assembly Session as the Trial Chamber relied on a wide range of evidence in reaching its conclusions. \(^{1081}\)

306. The Appeals Chamber recalls that explicit manifestations of criminal intent are often rare and that the requisite intent may therefore be inferred from relevant facts and circumstances, \(^{1082}\) such as, \textit{inter alia}, the accused’s words and/or actions, as well as the general context in which they occurred. \(^{1083}\) Mladić, by contrast, argues that the Trial Chamber should have viewed the statements made at the 16\(^{th}\) Assembly Session “independent of the crime base”, and refers to an analysis by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the \textit{Gotovina and Markač} case to support his argument. \(^{1084}\) In the Appeals Chamber’s view, however, Mladić misconstrues the ruling of the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the \textit{Gotovina and Markač} case. In that case, after having overturned the Trial Chamber’s findings as to the criminal nature of the context in which certain statements were made, the ICTY Appeals Chamber found that the existence of a joint criminal enterprise could no longer be inferred from those statements. \(^{1085}\) This does not stand for the proposition that a trial chamber should examine evidence related to intent “independent of the crime base”. As recalled above, intent is generally inferred from relevant facts and circumstances which include the accused’s conduct and the context in which it took place.

307. Moreover, having carefully reviewed the Trial Judgement, as well as the minutes of the 16\(^{th}\) Assembly Session, the Appeals Chamber finds nothing to suggest that the Trial Chamber erred in its assessment of Mladić’s specific statements. \(^{1086}\) The Trial Chamber determined that his statements at the 16\(^{th}\) Assembly Session evinced a desire to mislead the public about the truth of the Bosnian Serb leadership’s actions in Sarajevo. \(^{1087}\) Mladić, however, submits that “the warnings that ‘[t]he thing we are doing needs to be guarded as our deepest secret’ and ‘[o]ur people must know how to read between the lines’ could be understood as a warning not to divulge legitimate military strategies needlessly”. \(^{1088}\) The Appeals Chamber considers that Mladić merely proposes alternative interpretations without demonstrating the unreasonableness of the Trial Chamber’s interpretation of his statements at the 16\(^{th}\) Assembly Session. \(^{1089}\)

308. With respect to Mladić’s contention that the Trial Chamber erred by failing to give weight to orders prohibiting the targeting of civilians, \(^{1090}\) the Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber explicitly considered and discussed such orders, \(^{1091}\) but concluded that they evinced a concern with insubordination or wasting of ammunition, \(^{1092}\) and provided “mere lip-service” to support assurances to the international community and/or give the appearance of a leadership obeying the law. \(^{1093}\) Mladić takes issue with this assessment, contending that such orders constituted direct evidence of his intent and therefore should have weighed against a finding that he intended to further the Sarajevo JCE. \(^{1094}\) The Appeals Chamber notes, however, that, in assessing the probative value of orders prohibiting the targeting of civilians, the Trial Chamber did not only consider the language of such orders, but also, \textit{inter alia}, that: (i) such orders were not adhered to and the leadership did not take measures to enforce them; \(^{1095}\) (ii) the testimonial evidence concerning the existence of standing orders not to target civilians in Sarajevo was given by former members of the SRK who may have had an interest in protecting themselves; \(^{1096}\) and (iii) Mladić stated at the 16\(^{th}\) Assembly Session that Serbian people would need to know how to “read between the lines”. \(^{1097}\) Mladić shows no error in the Trial Chamber’s approach.

309. In light of the above, the Appeals Chamber finds, Judge Nyambe dissenting, that Mladić fails to demonstrate error in the Trial Chamber’s overall assessment of his intent to commit murder, terror, and unlawful attacks on civilians in relation to the Sarajevo JCE, especially given the totality of the factors relied upon by the Trial Chamber in this respect. \(^{1098}\)
(d) Alleged Errors in the Assessment of Specific Intent for the Crime of Terror

310. In finding that the sniping and shelling incidents in Sarajevo constituted the crime of terror, the Trial Chamber determined, *inter alia*, that: (i) the perpetrators wilfully made civilians not taking direct part in hostilities the object of their sniping and shelling; (ii) the perpetrators intended to spread terror among the civilian population of Sarajevo; and (iii) the infliction of terror was the primary purpose of the sniping and shelling incidents.  

311. Mladić submits that the Trial Chamber erred in applying the same “standard of proof”, and relying on the same set of circumstantial factors, to determine the perpetrators’ wilful intent to target civilians as it did to determine their specific intent to spread terror, which requires a “higher standard of proof”.  

312. The Prosecution responds that, for Mladić to be held liable as a member of the Sarajevo JCE, the physical perpetrators used as tools by the joint criminal enterprise members need not possess the intent for the crimes, and that, in any event, the Trial Chamber reasonably concluded that the SRK perpetrators of the sniping and shelling campaign specifically intended to spread terror among Sarajevo’s civilian population.  

313. The Appeals Chamber recalls that the *mens rea* of the crime of terror consists of the intent to make the civilian population or individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities the object of acts of violence or threats thereof, and of the specific intent to spread terror among the civilian population. Such intent may be inferred from the circumstances of the acts or threats of violence, such as, *inter alia*, their nature, manner, timing, and duration. Nothing precludes a reasonable trier of fact from relying on the same set of circumstances to infer that perpetrators wilfully made civilians the object of acts or threats of violence, and, at the same time, that such acts or threats of violence were committed with the primary purpose of spreading terror among the civilian population. Mladić’s argument that the Trial Chamber erred in so doing because a finding of specific intent requires a “higher standard of proof” is accordingly ill-founded.  

314. Moreover, in determining that spreading terror was the primary purpose of the sniping and shelling attacks in Sarajevo, the Trial Chamber considered the nature, manner, timing, location, and duration of the attacks, as well as: (i) that many civilians were targeted when carrying out daily activities such as while at the market, standing in line for food, or collecting water or firewood, and while in or around their homes or in parks and hospitals, or when travelling by tram; (ii) that children were also targeted while in school or playing or walking outside their house or on the street; (iii) that civilians were more prone to being targeted when circumstances suggested that the shooting or shelling had stopped and it was safe for them to continue their daily activities; (iv) the challenging living conditions they were subjected to; and (v) the constant and extreme fear they experienced of being hit by sniper or artillery fire. In this respect, Mladić recalls his submissions that Sarajevo was a legitimate military target, which the Appeals Chamber has dismissed above. He further argues that the existence of fear is not an element of the crime of terror, nor does its existence alone substantiate the conclusion that terror was intended, and that the origin of such fear cannot conclusively be attributed to the SRK in light of evidence of the ABiH sniping and attacking civilians in Sarajevo.  

315. The Appeals Chamber recalls that terror could be defined as “extreme fear”, and that such fear was merely one of several factors from which the Trial Chamber inferred specific intent in this case. The Appeals Chamber further observes that the Trial Chamber duly considered evidence of the ABiH’s involvement in the events in Sarajevo and considers that such evidence does not detract from the Trial Chamber’s findings regarding the SRK’s perpetration of sniping and shelling attacks against civilians in Sarajevo and the relevant intent pertinent to such conduct. Consequently, the Appeals Chamber finds, Judge Nyambe dissenting, that Mladić fails to show any error in the Trial Chamber’s assessment of the SRK perpetrators’ specific intent to spread terror among the civilian population in Sarajevo.
316. Based on the foregoing, the Appeals Chamber, Judge Nyambe dissenting, dismisses Ground 4.A of Mladić’s appeal.

2. Alleged Errors Related to the Crimes of Murder and Unlawful Attacks on Civilians and that Spreading Terror was the Primary Purpose of the Sarajevo JCE (Ground 4.B)

317. The Trial Chamber concluded that several sniping and shelling incidents in Sarajevo, except in relation to non-civilian victims, constituted the crimes of murder, terror and/or unlawful attacks on civilians, and held Mladić responsible for these crimes through his participation in the Sarajevo JCE.

318. Mladić submits that the Trial Chamber erred in law and in fact in its assessment of the majority of the incidents that it considered to form part of the Sarajevo JCE crime base, and that the cumulative effect of these errors impacts the Trial Chamber’s findings on the existence of the Sarajevo JCE. He requests the Appeals Chamber to reverse the Trial Chamber’s findings on the affected incidents, “remove” the specified incidents from consideration under Counts 5, 9, and 10 of the Indictment, and reconsider the existence of the Sarajevo JCE and his alleged intent to further its common purpose. In particular, he argues that the Trial Chamber erred in: (i) failing to consider evidence of legitimate military activity; (ii) relying on adjudicated facts; (iii) failing to provide a reasoned opinion; and (iv) inferring the responsibility of the SRK. The Appeals Chamber will address these contentions in turn.

(a) Alleged Errors in Failing to Consider Evidence of Legitimate Military Activity

319. The Trial Chamber found that, in relation to Scheduled Incident G.1, following an order from Mladić, from 5 p.m. on 28 May 1992 until early the next morning, members of the SRK fired artillery, rockets, and mortars against Sarajevo, injuring Witnesses RM-115 and Fadila Tarić and causing extensive damage to buildings. The Trial Chamber determined that Mladić personally directed the attack on Sarajevo, including selecting targets such as the Presidency, the town hall, police headquarters, and the children’s embassy and directing the fire away from Serb-populated areas.

320. Mladić submits that the Trial Chamber erred in finding that Scheduled Incident G.1 satisfied the elements of the crimes of terror and unlawful attacks on civilians. In particular, he argues that no reasonable trier of fact could have concluded beyond reasonable doubt, on the basis of the hearsay and circumstantial evidence of Witnesses Tarić and John Wilson, that the SRK was responsible for the shelling attacks which injured Witnesses Tarić and RM-115 and/or caused other grave consequences. He further argues that the Trial Chamber misconstrued the evidence of Witness RM-511 and relied on the hearsay evidence of Witness Wilson to erroneously conclude that the attacks were wilfully directed at civilians or civilian targets, in contrast with an assessment of the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Gotovina and Markač case under similar circumstances.

321. The Prosecution responds that the Trial Chamber reasonably found that Scheduled Incident G.1 formed part of the crimes of terror and unlawful attacks on civilians, and that Mladić fails to show any error in the Trial Chamber’s conclusions. It contends that the Trial Chamber did not base its conclusion regarding the SRK’s responsibility solely on the evidence of Witnesses Tarić and Wilson, but also on a wealth of other circumstantial evidence. The Prosecution further contends that the Trial Chamber correctly interpreted Witness RM-511’s evidence, which was among several other factors leading the Trial Chamber to reasonably conclude that Mladić and SRK members wilfully directed Scheduled Incident G.1 against civilians, and asserts that Mladić’s comparison of his case with the Gotovina and Markač case is inapposite.

322. The Appeals Chamber notes that, in reversing the conclusion of the ICTY Trial Chamber that certain artillery attacks were unlawful, the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Gotovina and Markač case considered, inter alia, that there was no evidence that an explicit order was given to commence the unlawful attacks. By contrast, the Trial Chamber in the present case received evidence of Mladić explicitly ordering the attack on Sarajevo and selecting civilian targets. The Appeals Chamber therefore considers the Gotovina and Markač case to be distinguishable from the circumstances of the present case.
323. The Appeals Chamber recalls that trial chambers have the discretion to rely on hearsay evidence and may infer the existence of a particular fact upon which the guilt of the accused depends from circumstantial evidence if it is the only reasonable conclusion that could be drawn from the evidence presented. Mladić’s implication that the Trial Chamber could not reasonably rely on hearsay and/or circumstantial evidence to reach its conclusions is accordingly ill-founded. Moreover, the Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber’s findings in relation to Scheduled Incident G.1 were not only based on the evidence of Witnesses Tarić, Wilson, and RM-511, but also on the testimonies of Witnesses RM-115, Milan Mandivolić, Bakir Nakaš, Nedžib Dozo, as well as documentary evidence.

324. In particular, in concluding that during Scheduled Incident G.1 shells were fired by the SRK and aimed at civilian targets, the Trial Chamber considered evidence, inter alia, that: (i) Witness RM-115 was seriously injured in the night of 28 May 1992 by shrapnel while at a civilian hospital; (ii) Witness Tarić was injured in the night of 28 May 1992 by shrapnel while hiding in the cellar of her house in the neighbourhood of Širokača, and learned of the model and calibre of the shell which caused her injuries and the origin of its fire from men in Širokača who had previously served with the JNA; (iii) the Stari Grad police station logbook recorded that, on 27 and 28 May 1992, VRS artillery shelled neighbourhoods within the vicinity of Širokača; (iv) Mladić was the Commander of the VRS Main Staff, which comprised the SRK and other corps; (v) on 29 May 1992, Witness Wilson heard an audiotape of Mladić ordering the attack on Sarajevo, selecting civilian targets while directing fire away from Serb-populated areas and determining the calibre of fire to be used at his direct command only; and (vi) on 30 May 1992, Mladić admitted his responsibility for the attack on Sarajevo to Witness Wilson.

325. The Trial Chamber also recalled the evidence of Witness RM-511, who, according to the Trial Chamber, “testified that Mladić ordered the shelling of Velešići and Pofalići, two neighbourhoods in Sarajevo, and that the civilians in these neighbourhoods be harassed throughout the night so that they could not rest”. In this regard, Mladić submits that “[W]itness RM-511 did not state that the Appellant had directed the bombardment of Sarajevo to harass civilians throughout the night”. A review of the transcript of Witness RM-511’s testimony shows that the witness was made to listen to an audiotape of Mladić ordering his subordinates to “[s]hoot at Velešići, and also at Pofalići, there is not much Serb population there […] [a]nd apply artillery reconnaissance, so that they cannot sleep that we roll out their minds”. The witness explained that the expression “roll out their minds” meant “to harass them throughout the night, so that they cannot rest” and confirmed that Mladić, [REDACTED]. In the Appeals Chamber’s view, the Trial Chamber could reasonably have concluded on the basis of such evidence that the shelling of Velešići and Pofalići was wilfully directed at harassing civilians. Mladić therefore fails to demonstrate an error in the Trial Chamber’s assessment of Witness RM-511’s evidence.

326. Having reviewed the evidence underlying the Trial Chamber’s conclusions regarding Scheduled Incident G.1, the Appeals Chamber considers that Mladić shows no error in the Trial Chamber’s approach or findings. The Appeals Chamber therefore finds, Judge Nyambe dissenting, that Mladić fails to show that the Trial Chamber erred in considering Scheduled Incident G.1 as part of the crimes of terror and unlawful attacks on civilians as well as in its determination of the existence of the Sarajevo JCE and his alleged intent to further its common purpose.

(b) Alleged Errors in Relying on Adjudicated Facts

327. The Trial Chamber found that, in relation to Scheduled Incident F.11, on 8 October 1994 during a series of shootings, an SRK member killed one person, hit two trams and seriously wounded 11 other people. It further found that, in relation to Scheduled Incident G.8, on 5 February 1994, members of the SRK fired a mortar shell from Mrković which hit Markale Market, killing 68 people and injuring over 140 others.

328. Mladić submits that the Trial Chamber erred by relying on adjudicated facts to reach essential findings, particularly with respect to the SRK’s responsibility, in relation to several alleged sniping and shelling incidents underpinning his convictions for the crimes of murder, terror, and/or unlawful attacks on civilians in Sarajevo. In particular, he contends that the Trial Chamber erred in: (i) failing to find that Adjudicated Fact 2303 was rebutted and then relying on it to conclude that the shots in Scheduled Incident F.11 were fired by a member of the
and (ii) relying on adjudicated facts to conclude that the shell in Scheduled Incident G.8 originated from SRK territory after acknowledging that the Prosecution’s own evidence could not support such a finding. The Prosecution responds that the Trial Chamber properly relied on adjudicated facts in relation to the events in Sarajevo and that Mladić fails to show any error in the Trial Chamber’s approach.

330. The Appeals Chamber recalls that “adjudicated facts that are judicially noticed […] remain to be assessed by the Trial Chamber to determine what conclusions, if any, can be drawn from them when considered together with all the evidence brought at trial”. As such, the final evaluation of the probative value of rebuttal evidence, which includes a final assessment of its reliability and credibility, as well as the extent to which it is consistent with or contradicts adjudicated facts, “will only be made in light of the totality of the evidence in the case, in the course of determining the weight to be attached to it”. The Appeals Chamber also recalls that, in order for it to assess arguments on appeal, the appealing party must provide precise references to relevant transcript pages or paragraphs in the decision or judgement to which the challenge is made. The Appeals Chamber notes, however, that Mladić only develops and supports his arguments with precise references to relevant adjudicated facts and/or paragraphs in the Trial Judgement in relation to Scheduled Incidents F.11 and G.8. The Appeals Chamber will therefore only consider Mladić’s arguments in relation to Scheduled Incidents F.11 and G.8, and summarily dismisses his submissions under this sub-ground of appeal in relation to Scheduled Incidents F.5, F.12, F.13, F.15, F.16, G.4, G.7, and G.18 as well as Unscheduled Sniping Incidents of 24 October 1994, 22 November 1994, and 10 December 1994.

331. The Appeals Chamber notes that, in reaching its conclusions in relation to Scheduled Incident F.11, the Trial Chamber considered a number of adjudicated facts, including Adjudicated Fact 2303 according to which the shots in question were fired by an SRK member. With respect to the origin of the fire, Mladić contends that he presented rebuttal evidence offering a reasonable alternative, which should thus have been considered sufficient to rebut the adjudicated facts and re-open the evidentiary debate. A review of the Trial Judgement shows, however, that the Trial Chamber duly noted that, “[i]n relation to the origin of the fire, […] the Adjudicated Facts and some of the evidence differ”. The Trial Chamber also thoroughly examined whether such evidence was sufficiently reliable to rebut the presumption of the accuracy of the adjudicated facts before determining that it could safely rely on them in its findings. In this instance, Mladić does not demonstrate that it was inappropriate for the Trial Chamber to rely on adjudicated facts notwithstanding his presentation of evidence that he argued was inconsistent with them. He also does not show that the Trial Chamber misapplied the burden of proof when evaluating his evidence presented to rebut the adjudicated facts.

332. As to its findings in relation to Scheduled Incident G.8, the Trial Chamber similarly considered a number of adjudicated facts – including Adjudicated Facts 2519 and 2525 according to which the mortar shell was fired from SRK-controlled territory. Mladić points to the Trial Chamber’s finding that evidence of investigations that were inconclusive as to the origin of fire did not contradict the adjudicated facts establishing the matter, and contends that the Trial Chamber impermissibly entered “into the arena of the parties” and “saved the Prosecution case” by relying on adjudicated facts instead of the Prosecution evidence. He argues that the fact that the Prosecution evidence was inconclusive as to the origin of fire should have been considered sufficient to rebut the adjudicated facts on this point.

333. The Appeals Chamber recalls that judicially noticed facts are presumed to be accurate, and therefore do not have to be proven again at trial, but may be challenged subject to that presumption. As such, the Prosecution was not required to adduce evidence supporting the origin of fire as stated in the adjudicated facts, even if, according to Mladić, the Prosecution intended to do so. Moreover, the Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber duly considered evidence disputing that the SRK fired the shell in Scheduled Incident G.8. The Trial Chamber also thoroughly examined whether such evidence was sufficiently reliable to rebut the presumption of the accuracy of the adjudicated facts before determining that it could safely rely on them in its findings. Mladić does not demonstrate that it was inappropriate for the Trial Chamber to rely on adjudicated facts notwithstanding that the record included relevant Prosecution evidence that the Trial Chamber did not rely upon.

334. The Appeals Chamber therefore finds, Judge Nyambe dissenting, that Mladić fails to demonstrate any error in the Trial Chamber’s reliance on adjudicated facts in its assessment of Scheduled Incidents F.11 and G.8.
(c) Alleged Error in Failing to Provide a Reasoned Opinion

335. The Trial Chamber found that, in relation to Scheduled Incident G.6, on 22 January 1994, three mortars were fired by a member or members of the SRK hitting a neighbourhood area where children were playing, killing six children and severely wounding six other civilians, five of whom were children.\(^{1177}\) It further found that, in relation to Scheduled Incident G.7, on 4 February 1994, three mortar shells were fired by an SRK member on a residential neighbourhood of Dobrinja, killing at least eight civilians and wounding at least eighteen persons who were queuing for humanitarian aid.\(^{1178}\)

336. Mladić submits that the Trial Chamber erred by failing to provide a reasoned opinion in finding that the perpetrators of the attacks in Scheduled Incidents G.6 and G.7 wilfully intended to target civilians.\(^{1179}\) In particular, he contends that the Trial Chamber elaborated on a number of specific incidents in reaching its conclusion that the perpetrators wilfully targeted civilians, but that Scheduled Incidents G.6 and G.7 were not included in this analysis.\(^{1180}\) Mladić further argues that circumstantial evidence such as Adjudicated Fact 2434, on which the Trial Chamber relied to conclude that the attack in Scheduled Incident G.6 was not directed at a legitimate military objective, cannot, by itself, demonstrate the wilful intent of the perpetrator to attack a civilian target.\(^{1181}\)

337. The Prosecution recalls its submissions that the SRK perpetrators’ intent is not required to be proven in order to hold Mladić liable as a member of the Sarajevo JCE, and responds that, in any event, the Trial Chamber’s conclusion on the SRK perpetrators’ wilful intent for Scheduled Incidents G.6 and G.7 with regard to murder, terror, and unlawful attacks on civilians was reasoned and reasonable.\(^{1182}\)

338. The Appeals Chamber recalls that the intent to make the civilian population or individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities the object of acts of violence or threats may be inferred from the circumstances of the acts or threats of violence, such as, \textit{inter alia}, their nature, manner, timing, and duration.\(^{1183}\) Mladić’s submission that the Trial Chamber erred in relying exclusively on circumstantial evidence such as Adjudicated Fact 2434, according to which an ABiH military unit was not the intended target of the attack in Scheduled Incident G.6,\(^{1184}\) to infer the wilful intent to attack civilians is accordingly ill-founded.

339. The Appeals Chamber further recalls that a trial chamber is not required to articulate every step of its reasoning and that a trial judgement must be read as a whole.\(^{1185}\) In the present case, a reading of the Trial Judgement shows that the Trial Chamber clearly considered Scheduled Incidents G.6 and G.7 among those incidents for which it inferred the intent to target civilians beyond reasonable doubt,\(^{1186}\) and in respect of which it explicitly “considered a number of factors in determining whether civilians or the civilian population were targeted.”\(^{1187}\) Such factors included, \textit{inter alia}, that the victims were civilians, that they were in residential areas when targeted, and that there were no military targets in their vicinity.\(^{1188}\)

340. In light of the above, the Appeals Chamber finds, Judge Nyambe dissenting, that Mladić does not demonstrate that the Trial Chamber failed to provide a reasoned opinion in finding that perpetrators of the attacks in Scheduled Incidents G.6 and G.7 wilfully intended to target civilians.

(d) Alleged Errors in Inferring SRK Responsibility from Circumstantial Evidence

341. The Trial Chamber found that, in relation to Scheduled Incident F.5, on 2 November 1993, a member of the SRK targeted, shot, and injured a Bosnian Muslim civilian in her leg.\(^{1189}\) It determined that the shot was fired by a member of the SRK on the basis that it originated from SRK-held territory.\(^{1190}\) The Trial Chamber similarly determined that the SRK was responsible for a number of other incidents on the basis that the fire in those incidents originated from SRK-held territory.\(^{1191}\)

342. Mladić submits that the Trial Chamber erred in inferring the SRK’s responsibility for alleged incidents such as Scheduled Incident F.5 on the sole basis that the fire originated from SRK-held territory.\(^{1192}\) He contends that the Trial Chamber failed to consider exculpatory evidence such as that the ABiH were, at times, tasked to snipe civilians in Sarajevo to make it appear as though the SRK were responsible,\(^{1193}\) and argues that the Trial Chamber’s errors in this regard affected a number of other incidents.\(^{1194}\)
343. The Prosecution responds that the Trial Chamber reasonably found the SRK to be responsible when fire originated from SRK-held territory since this was the only inference available on the evidence. As such, the Trial Chamber’s inference that the SRK must have been responsible for fire that originated from SRK-held territory is not per se unreasonable, unless the relevant evidence would suggest otherwise. In this respect, the Appeals Chamber notes that Mladić does not support his argument that the ABiH could also have been responsible for firing at civilians from SRK-held territory with references to any evidence underlying any of the specific incidents he contends were affected by the Trial Chamber’s alleged error.

344. The Appeals Chamber recalls that a trial chamber may infer the existence of a particular fact upon which the guilt of the accused depends from circumstantial evidence if it is the only reasonable conclusion that would be drawn from the evidence presented. As such, the Trial Chamber’s inference that the SRK must have been responsible for fire that originated from SRK-held territory is not per se unreasonable, unless the relevant evidence would suggest otherwise. In this respect, the Appeals Chamber notes that Mladić does not support his argument that the ABiH could also have been responsible for firing at civilians from SRK-held territory with references to any evidence underlying any of the specific incidents he contends were affected by the Trial Chamber’s alleged error.

345. Moreover, a review of the Trial Judgement shows that the Trial Chamber explicitly considered and analyzed exculpatory evidence disputing the origin of fire, including evidence of possible ABiH involvement, in respect of certain incidents. With respect to Scheduled Incident F.5, for example, the Trial Chamber considered the evidence of Witness Mile Poparić, who testified that there was a line of sight from ABiH-held territory to the impact site and that the shot could not have come from Serb-held positions. The Trial Chamber concluded that such evidence was not sufficiently reliable to rebut Adjudicated Facts 2263 and 2266 establishing that the shot was fired from SRK-held territory, and that any remaining contradictory evidence related to marginal aspects of the incident and did not affect the outcome of its finding. The Trial Chamber further noted that the only evidence to support the Defence’s argument that “ABiH units snuck into SRK-held territory and fired from there into the city” was hearsay evidence, which the Trial Chamber determined to be “very vague and sufficiently probative to affect the Trial Chamber’s finding in this regard”. In determining SRK responsibility with respect to several other incidents, the Trial Chamber “refer[red] to its considerations [ . . . ] as set out in its factual finding on Scheduled Incident F.5.” Mladić demonstrates no error in the Trial Chamber’s approach. The Appeals Chamber, Judge Nyambe dissenting, accordingly dismisses Mladić’s arguments in this respect.

346. Based on the foregoing, the Appeals Chamber, Judge Nyambe dissenting, dismisses Ground 4.B of Mladić’s appeal.

D. Alleged Errors Related to the Srebrenica JCE (Ground 5)

347. The Trial Chamber found that, between the days immediately preceding 11 July 1995 and at least October 1995, the Srebrenica JCE existed with the primary purpose of eliminating Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica by killing the men and boys and forcibly removing the women, young children, and some elderly men. The Trial Chamber concluded that the objective of the Srebrenica JCE involved the commission of the crimes of persecution and inhumane acts (forcible transfer) “in the days immediately preceding 11 July 1995”. By the morning of 12 July 1995, and “prior to the first crime being committed”, the crimes of genocide, extermination, and murder became part of the means to achieve the objective. According to the Trial Chamber, members of the Srebrenica JCE included Radovan Karadžić, Radislav Krstić, Vujadin Popović, Zdravko Tolimir, Jelko Borovčanin, Svetozar Kosorić, Radivoje Miličić, Radoslav Janković, Ljubiša Beara, Milenko Živanović, Vinko Pandurević, Vidoje Blagojević, and Mladić.

348. The Trial Chamber found that Mladić contributed significantly to the Srebrenica JCE and that he shared the intent to achieve its common objective. As a member of the Srebrenica JCE, the Trial Chamber found him guilty of the crimes of genocide, persecution, inhumane acts (forcible transfer), murder, and extermination.

349. Mladić submits that the Trial Chamber committed errors of law and fact in finding he participated in, significantly contributed to, and shared the intent for the Srebrenica JCE, and requests that the Appeals Chamber reverse his convictions for the crimes of genocide as well as murder, extermination, persecution, and inhumane acts (forcible transfer) as crimes against humanity.
1. Alleged Errors Related to the Common Plan for Forcible Transfer, Genocide, Extermination, and Murder (Ground 5.A)

350. Mladić submits that the Trial Chamber erred in its assessment of the evidence in relation to the Srebrenica JCE and in finding that he was part of a common criminal plan to: (i) forcibly transfer individuals; and (ii) commit genocide, extermination, and murder. The Appeals Chamber will address these arguments in turn.

(a) Alleged Errors Concerning the Common Plan for Forcible Removal

351. The Trial Chamber found that the VRS began attacking the Srebrenica enclave on 6 July 1995, and, as a result, thousands of Bosnian Muslims fled to Potočari seeking protection within the UNPROFOR compound. The Trial Chamber held that the displacement of the Bosnian Muslim civilians gathered in Potočari was organized by the VRS and the MUP and took place, for the first convoy only, under the supervision and escort of UNPROFOR. In considering the displacements, the Trial Chamber recalled: (i) the circumstances surrounding the movement of population from Srebrenica to Potočari, including the orders by the VRS 10th Sabotage Detachment to Srebrenica Town inhabitants to leave, the shells fired by the VRS at the UNPROFOR Bravo compound in Srebrenica, and the mortars fired along the road taken by the Bosnian Muslims fleeing towards Potočari; (ii) the situation in the UNPROFOR compound in Potočari and its surroundings, where the population sought refuge, namely the shots and shells fired around the compound, the dire living conditions, and the fear and exhaustion of the Bosnian Muslims who had sought refuge there; and (iii) that the VRS, assisted by MUP units, coordinated the boarding of buses, ultimately forcing women, children, and the elderly onto the buses while some were hit by members of the MUP, and that the VRS escorted the buses towards Bosnian Muslim controlled territory. Based on the above, the Trial Chamber concluded that the approximately 25,000 Bosnian Muslims, mostly women, children, and the elderly who left Potočari to go to Bosnian Muslim controlled territory, did not have a genuine choice but to leave.

352. With respect to Mladić’s role in the transfers, the Trial Chamber found that Mladić gave several orders in relation to the displacement of the Bosnian Muslim civilians from Srebrenica, including the transportation of Bosnian Muslim civilians out of Potočari. In particular, the Trial Chamber found that Mladić and other VRS officers, a representative of the Serb civilian leadership in Srebrenica, UNPROFOR members, and “representatives” of the Bosnian Muslim population “agreed” on 12 July 1995 that the evacuation of the Bosnian Muslim civilians would be organized by the VRS and Bosnian Serb police forces, and would take place under the supervision and escort of UNPROFOR.

353. Mladić submits that the Trial Chamber erred in inferring that he was part of a joint criminal enterprise to eliminate the Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica through their forcible transfer given that the totality of the evidence allowed for another reasonable inference – namely that he was acting in coordination with high-level Dutch Battalion (“DutchBat”)/UNPROFOR officials to evacuate civilians for humanitarian reasons. He asserts that there was ample evidence that the evacuations were necessary and observes that the Trial Chamber credited evidence that he had given civilians a choice to leave. In this context, he argues that the Trial Chamber gave no or insufficient weight to evidence that he evacuated civilians pursuant to UN requests to coordinate humanitarian evacuations. Mladić requests that the Appeals Chamber reverse the Trial Chamber’s findings of forcible transfer under the first form of joint criminal enterprise or, alternatively, reverse the findings to the extent of the errors identified.

354. The Prosecution responds that Mladić disagrees with the Trial Chamber’s evidentiary assessment without demonstrating error. It argues that the Trial Chamber considered and rejected Mladić’s argument that the evidence suggested that the civilian population was evacuated for humanitarian reasons.

355. Mladić replies that the Prosecution has taken the Trial Chamber’s findings out of context and did not respond to the errors he identified.

356. The Appeals Chamber observes that Mladić seeks to demonstrate under this ground of appeal that the evacuations were not unlawful. The Appeals Chamber recalls that forcible transfer entails the displacement of persons from the area in which they are lawfully present, without grounds permitted under international law. The requirement that the displacement be forced is not limited to physical force but can be met through the threat of force or coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power,
or taking advantage of a coercive environment. It is the absence of genuine choice that makes the displacement unlawful. While fear of violence, use of force, or other such circumstances may create an environment where there is no choice but to leave, the determination as to whether a transferred person had a genuine choice is one to be made in the context of a particular case being considered.\textsuperscript{1229} Displacement may be permitted by international law in certain limited circumstances,\textsuperscript{1230} provided it is temporary in nature\textsuperscript{1231} and conducted humanely.\textsuperscript{1232} Notably, however, displacement is not permissible where the humanitarian crisis that caused the displacement is the result of the accused’s own unlawful activity.\textsuperscript{1233} In addition, the participation of a non-governmental organization in facilitating displacements does not in and of itself render an otherwise unlawful transfer lawful.\textsuperscript{1234}

357. The Appeals Chamber observes that the Trial Chamber considered whether the displacement of the Bosnian Muslim civilians gathered in POTOČARI on 12 and 13 July 1995 was undertaken pursuant to an evacuation permitted by international law and found that this was not the case.\textsuperscript{1235} Mladić contends that the Trial Chamber failed to give sufficient weight to evidence that the transfers were necessary for humanitarian reasons and that he “worked in coordination with” UNPROFOR to evacuate the civilians.\textsuperscript{1236} The Appeals Chamber observes that, when addressing the attacks on Srebrenica, the displacement of the Bosnian Muslim civilians, and Mladić’s role in the Srebrenica JCE, the Trial Chamber considered the evidence to which Mladić points on appeal.\textsuperscript{1237} The Appeals Chamber also observes that the Trial Chamber correctly recalled that “the displacement of persons carried out pursuant to an agreement among political or military leaders or under the auspices of an organization does not necessarily make it voluntary”.\textsuperscript{1238} While Mladić seeks to emphasize cooperation with international organizations with respect to the relocations of civilians from Srebrenica, he ignores the Trial Chamber’s finding that DutchBat soldiers accompanied only the first convoys on 12 July 1995 but were then stopped by the VRS and that VRS soldiers stole DutchBat jeeps as well as weapons and equipment, rendering further DutchBat escorts impossible.\textsuperscript{1239} Mladić does not contest these conclusions.

358. Moreover, Mladić fails to undermine the core findings relied upon by the Trial Chamber to determine that the displacements from Srebrenica were not lawful. Significantly, the Trial Chamber recalled that it was the conduct of the VRS that precipitated the humanitarian crises that preceded the displacements as well as the violent nature in which the VRS effected the displacements.\textsuperscript{1240} The Trial Chamber concluded that, in such circumstances, the civilians who left Srebrenica in July 1995 “did not have a genuine choice but to leave”.\textsuperscript{1241} Furthermore, in assessing displacements cumulatively, which included those related to Srebrenica in July 1995, the Trial Chamber found that the transfers were “not carried out for the security of the persons involved, but rather to transfer them out of certain municipalities” and that no steps were taken to secure the return of those displaced.\textsuperscript{1242} On this basis, the Trial Chamber concluded that there “were no circumstances that justified the displacement […] as recognized by international law”.\textsuperscript{1243}

359. In view of the foregoing, the Appeals Chamber finds, Judge Nyanbo dissenting, that Mladić fails to demonstrate that the Trial Chamber erred with respect to the Srebrenica JCE in finding that the removal of Bosnian Muslim women, young children, and some elderly men from Srebrenica was forcible.

\textbf{(b) Alleged Errors Concerning the Common Plan to Commit Genocide, Extermination, and Murder}

360. The Trial Chamber found that, by the morning of 12 July 1995, the objective of the Srebrenica JCE developed to involve the commission of the crimes of genocide, extermination, and murder.\textsuperscript{1244} In reaching this finding, the Trial Chamber specifically considered its findings that Momir Nikolić, Kosorić, and Popović discussed the “killings on the morning of 12 July 1995” as well as findings that Tolimir first ordered that Batković camp be prepared for a large number of detainees and thereafter conveyed that this plan had been given up.\textsuperscript{1245}

361. As it concerns Mladić’s involvement in the Srebrenica JCE, the Trial Chamber found, \textit{inter alia}, that between at least 11 July and 11 October 1995, Mladić issued several orders to VRS forces, including the Drina Corps, concerning the operation in and around Srebrenica, provided misleading information about the crimes, and failed to take adequate steps to investigate and/or punish the perpetrators.\textsuperscript{1246} The Trial Chamber held that Mladić significantly contributed to achieving the objective of the Srebrenica JCE.\textsuperscript{1247}
362. The Trial Chamber further determined that Mladić shared the intent to achieve the common objective of the Srebrenica JCE, including genocidal intent, based on his statements and conduct throughout the take-over of the Srebrenica enclave, including: (i) his command and control over VRS and MUP units operating in and around Srebrenica in July 1995; (ii) his role in the Hotel Fontana meetings on 11 and 12 July 1995, including statements that the Bosnian Muslims could either “live or vanish”, “survive or disappear”, and that only the people who could secure the surrender of weapons would save the Bosnian Muslims from “destruction”; (iii) his presence in a meeting at the Bratunac Command Centre on 13 July 1995 with VRS and MUP officers during which the task of killing 8,000 Muslim males near Konjević Polje was discussed; (iv) his presence during the gathering and separation of Bosnian Muslims in Potočari on 12 and 13 July 1995; (v) his denial of the crimes committed in Srebrenica; and (vi) the measures he took to provide misleading information and prevent the media from knowing what was happening in Srebrenica. 1248

363. Mladić contends that the Trial Chamber gave insufficient weight to the lack of direct, indirect, or corroborative evidence that a meeting occurred between 11 and 12 July 1995 wherein the criminal objective to commit genocide, extermination, and murder was discussed or agreed upon. 1249 He submits that the Trial Chamber: (i) erroneously relied on hearsay evidence from Witness Momir Nikolić to indirectly conclude that such a meeting occurred; 1250 (ii) failed to take into account that the evidence demonstrated that Mladić would not have had the opportunity to attend such a meeting; 1251 and (iii) failed to sufficiently account for Prosecution and Defence evidence that the only known meeting including Mladić and his subordinates that occurred at that time involved no discussion of killings or any criminal objective. 1252

364. Mladić further submits that the Trial Chamber inferred his participation in the common criminal enterprise based on his statements at the Hotel Fontana meetings and command and control over the VRS and the MUP but erred by: (i) giving insufficient weight to the military context in which the statements at the Hotel Fontana meetings were made; 1253 and (ii) placing undue weight on his position and role in the military without sufficiently accounting for the absence of evidence “showing direct orders”. 1254

365. Mladić argues that, in light of the above, another reasonable inference was available and, therefore, the actus reus for the Srebrenica JCE supporting his convictions for genocide, extermination, and murder is not established beyond reasonable doubt. 1255 He requests that the Appeals Chamber reverse these convictions or, alternatively, reverse the findings to the extent of the errors identified. 1256

366. The Prosecution responds that it was not its case at trial, and that the Trial Chamber never found, that there was a specific meeting on the night of 11 to 12 July 1995, 1257 but rather that the plan “must have been discussed and decided upon sometime between the evening of 11 July [. . .] and 10:00 hours on 12 July”. 1258 Accordingly, the Prosecution argues that Mladić’s challenge to such a non-existent finding should be summarily dismissed. 1259 It further submits that the Trial Chamber specifically considered the argument that there was no evidence of a meeting where crimes were discussed and that Mladić fails to demonstrate how the Trial Chamber gave insufficient weight to that argument. 1260 The Prosecution argues that the Trial Chamber was entitled to rely upon the evidence as it did and that Mladić identifies no error. 1261 The Prosecution further contends that Mladić’s submissions that the Trial Chamber placed undue weight on his position and role in the military and gave insufficient weight to a lack of direct orders are unsupported. 1262

367. Mladić replies that the Prosecution fails to engage with or undermine the legal or factual bases of his submissions. 1263 He contends that the Prosecution submissions misrepresent his arguments and that the Prosecution incorrectly relies on inapplicable evidence. 1264

368. The Appeals Chamber observes that, contrary to Mladić’s submissions, the Trial Chamber made no finding that a meeting attended by Mladić and his subordinates occurred between 11 and 12 July 1995 wherein the common criminal plan to commit genocide, extermination, and murder was discussed or formulated. In this respect, Mladić simply points to evidence summarized by the Trial Chamber or arguments made by the Prosecution rather than any finding made by the Trial Chamber. 1265 Consequently, Mladić’s arguments that the Trial Chamber erroneously relied on Witness Momir Nikolić’s hearsay evidence to reach such a conclusion as well as his contentions that the evidence on the record would not have permitted Mladić to attend such a meeting are without merit and are dismissed. In light of this conclusion, the Appeals Chamber further dismisses as moot Mladić’s arguments that the Trial Chamber erred
by relying on Witness Momir Nikolić’s evidence because: (i) his evidence of a meeting occurring between 11 and 12 July 1995 did not establish a link with Mladić; (ii) it failed to account for Witness Bursik’s evidence and its own determination that Witness Momir Nikolić lacked credibility; and (iii) it relied upon Exhibit D1228 for the truth of its contents to establish the occurrence of this meeting contrary to Rules 43, 92 bis or 92 quater of the ICTY Rules and because the Prosecution did not rely on it in its closing submissions for this purpose.1266

369. Furthermore, Mladić does not show that the Trial Chamber failed to sufficiently account for evidence of his participation in a meeting in which no discussion of killings or any criminal act took place. Mladić’s arguments are premised on the Trial Chamber’s summaries of evidence of a meeting at the Bratunac Brigade headquarters on 11 or 12 July 1995,1267 which the Trial Chamber clearly considered and made findings on.1268 Mladić has not shown that the Trial Chamber disregarded this evidence or that it is inconsistent with its conclusion that the crimes of genocide, extermination, and murder became part of the means to achieve the elimination of Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica by the early morning of 12 July 1995, prior to the first crime being committed.1269 Notably, in reaching this conclusion, the Trial Chamber specifically considered its findings that: (i) the VRS intended to empty the enclave; (ii) the crimes of persecution and inhumane acts (forcible transfer) were committed following the attack, noting that the crimes of genocide, extermination, and murder became part of the means to achieve the objective by early 12 July 1995; (iii) Momir Nikolić, Kosorić, and Popović discussed the killings on the morning of 12 July 1995; and (iv) Tolimir first ordered that Batković camp be prepared for a large number of detainees and thereafter conveyed that this plan had been given up.1270

370. Turning to Mladić’s argument that the Trial Chamber failed to give sufficient weight to the military context in which his statements at the second Hotel Fontana meeting were made, the Appeals Chamber finds that the evidence cited by him does not support this argument.1271 The Trial Chamber found that Mladić intended to commit genocide based in part on statements made at the second Hotel Fontana meeting wherein he stated that the Bosnian Muslims could either “live or vanish” and “survive or disappear”.1272 Mladić points to the evidence of Witnesses Richard Butler and Kovač in support of his argument.1273 However, Witness Butler expressly declined to interpret Mladić’s statements quoted above,1274 while Witness Kovač’s evidence cited by Mladić relates only to the question of the surrender of the 28th Division of the ABiH, not the statements in question.1275 The Appeals Chamber finds that this evidence does not substantiate Mladić’s submission that the Trial Chamber failed to sufficiently consider the military context in which his statements were made and he has identified no error in this respect.

371. As to Mladić’s contention that the Trial Chamber placed undue weight on his position and role in the military without sufficiently accounting for the absence of evidence showing his direct orders, the Appeals Chamber observes that Mladić refers to paragraphs of the Trial Judgement assessing his contributions and his mens rea with respect to the Srebrenica JCE in isolation.1276 His undeveloped arguments do not demonstrate any errors in the conclusions reached in those paragraphs and, notably, ignore several findings of the Trial Chamber that he issued orders in relation to the Srebrenica operations.1277 Consequently, the Appeals Chamber dismisses these contentions.

372. Based on the foregoing, the Appeals Chamber finds, Judge Nyambe dissenting, that Mladić does not show that the Trial Chamber erred in relation to his participation in the Srebrenica JCE as it pertains to his convictions for genocide, extermination, and murder.

c. Conclusion

373. In light of the above, the Appeals Chamber, Judge Nyambe dissenting, dismisses Ground 5.A of Mladić’s appeal.

2. Alleged Error Regarding Significant Contribution (Ground 5.B)

374. In concluding that Mladić significantly contributed to the Srebrenica JCE, the Trial Chamber considered his acts vis-à-vis the VRS and subordinated MUP units, given that all of the principal perpetrators of the crimes forming part of the Srebrenica JCE were VRS or MUP members.1278 In this respect, the Trial Chamber found, inter alia, that: (i) Mladić exercised command and control over the VRS and the MUP forces deployed during the entire Srebrenica operation and its aftermath;1279 (ii) Mladić failed to take adequate steps to investigate crimes and/or punish members
of the VRS and other Serb forces under his effective control who committed crimes in Srebrenica;\textsuperscript{1280} and (iii) Mladić’s acts were so instrumental to the commission of the crimes that without them the crimes would not have been committed as they were.\textsuperscript{1281}

375. Mladić submits that the Trial Chamber erred by giving insufficient, if any, weight to exculpatory evidence of the \textit{actus reus} of the Srebrenica JCE and failing to provide a reasoned opinion on probative evidence.\textsuperscript{1282} In particular, Mladić argues that the Trial Chamber failed to give sufficient weight to: (i) evidence regarding his absence from Srebrenica when the crimes were committed, including the content of four orders issued between 14 and 16 July 1995 (collectively, the “Four Orders”) and the change in the command structure of the VRS during his absence;\textsuperscript{1283} (ii) evidence that the MUP was not under his effective control;\textsuperscript{1284} (iii) the military context and content of orders he gave in Srebrenica;\textsuperscript{1285} (iv) evidence undermining the authenticity and reliability of certain intercept communications;\textsuperscript{1286} and (v) evidence that he had no knowledge of crimes, and/or he was unable to prevent or punish them, and that he or his subordinates did prosecute or investigate certain crimes.\textsuperscript{1287} According to Mladić, had the Trial Chamber given sufficient weight to this evidence, it would not have concluded beyond reasonable doubt that he significantly contributed to furthering the objective of the Srebrenica JCE.\textsuperscript{1288} Mladić therefore requests that the Appeals Chamber reverse his convictions under the Srebrenica JCE or, alternatively, reverse the findings to the extent of any errors.\textsuperscript{1289} The Appeals Chamber will address each of Mladić’s arguments in turn.

(a) \textbf{Evidence of Mladić’s Absence from Srebrenica}

376. Mladić submits that, had sufficient weight been given to the evidence of his absence from Srebrenica at the time the crimes were committed, a reasonable trier of fact would not have concluded that he exercised command and control over VRS and MUP forces during that time period.\textsuperscript{1290} In this respect, Mladić argues that in relying on four orders issued between 14 and 16 July 1995 to illustrate his command and control while he was away in Belgrade,\textsuperscript{1291} the Trial Chamber failed to provide a reasoned opinion on how the Four Orders could be attributed to him.\textsuperscript{1292} In particular, he submits that the Trial Chamber failed to give sufficient weight to the content of the Four Orders, specifically that they: (i) relate to the day-to-day running of the army, and not to, \textit{inter alia}, military operations and Srebrenica;\textsuperscript{1293} (ii) were not sent to units in Srebrenica or to any MUP forces;\textsuperscript{1294} and (iii) had unique identification numbers, which indicates that the Four Orders emanated from the General Staff of the VRS.\textsuperscript{1295} He also contends that while the Trial Chamber accepted Witness Stevanović’s evidence that “s.r./signed” on a document did not always mean that the individual whose signature appeared on the document was aware of it or had actually signed it, the Trial Chamber did not consider this in respect of the Four Orders.\textsuperscript{1296}

377. Mladić further submits that the Trial Chamber failed to give sufficient weight to evidence of the change in the command structure while he was in Belgrade in July 1995, in particular that the then VRS Chief of Staff, Manojo Milovanović, replaced him as \textit{de jure} and \textit{de facto} Commander of the VRS.\textsuperscript{1297} He contends that the Trial Chamber placed undue weight on four intercept communications between 14 and 16 July 1995,\textsuperscript{1298} and that, even if authentic,\textsuperscript{1299} they provided insufficient evidence for a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that Mladić continued to exercise command and control of the VRS while he was away.\textsuperscript{1300}

378. The Prosecution responds that the Trial Chamber reasonably found that Mladić exercised command and control during the entire Srebrenica operation, including between 14 and 16 July 1995 when he was in Belgrade.\textsuperscript{1301} Specifically, it argues that the Trial Chamber considered the Four Orders in their context to find that Mladić issued them, and that they, along with other mutually corroborating evidence, demonstrate his exercise of command and control from Belgrade.\textsuperscript{1302} The Prosecution further contends that Mladić’s undeveloped argument that Milovanović replaced him as Commander of the VRS while he was in Belgrade should be summarily dismissed,\textsuperscript{1303} and that the Trial Chamber reasonably concluded that intercepted communications between 14 and 16 July 1995 demonstrate Mladić’s continued command and control over the VRS from Belgrade.\textsuperscript{1304}

379. The Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber found that irrespective of whether Mladić was in Srebrenica or in Belgrade in July 1995, he remained the Commander of the VRS Main Staff.\textsuperscript{1305} In reaching this finding, the Trial Chamber considered that, throughout July 1995, including during his travel to Belgrade, Mladić: (i) was in contact with the VRS Main Staff and maintained command and control; (ii) gave orders to VRS units which were implemented; (iii) took measures to ensure the implementation of his orders, including when he was not present on
the ground; and (iv) communicated over the phone with Milovanović on a regular basis. In particular, the Trial Chamber addressed in detail communications and orders by Mladčić, as well as conversations between Mladčić and other members of the Bosnian Serb leadership, including Milovanović, during his absence from Srebrenica. In light of the above, the Appeals Chamber finds that Mladčić’s submission in relation to the Trial Chamber’s weighing of evidence relating to his absence from Srebrenica reflects mere disagreement with the Trial Chamber’s assessment of evidence without demonstrating any error. The Appeals Chamber recalls that the mere assertion that a trial chamber failed to give proper weight to evidence is liable to be summarily dismissed.

With respect to the alleged failure to provide a reasoned opinion on how the Four Orders could be attributed to Mladčić, the Appeals Chamber recalls that, in claiming an error of law on the basis of the lack of a reasoned opinion, a party is required to identify the specific issues, factual findings, or arguments that the trial chamber omitted to address and explain why this omission invalidates the decision. In this regard, the Appeals Chamber considers that Mladčić does not demonstrate that the Trial Chamber failed to provide a reasoned opinion with respect to the Four Orders, given that it specifically described the content of each individual order in the Trial Judgement, considered the addressees, and noted that the Four Orders were either signed by or came from Mladčić. Further, and contrary to the arguments raised by Mladčić, the Four Orders do relate to the Srebrenica operations and/or Mladčić’s continued command over the VRS and the MUP during his time in Belgrade, and they are addressed to the Drina Crops or other units in Srebrenica. Mladčić also fails to demonstrate how the unique identification numbers associated with the Four Orders would undermine the Trial Chamber’s finding that he issued the Four Orders. Similarly, while the Trial Chamber did not expressly address, when assessing Mladčić’s role in issuing the Four Orders, Witness Stevanović’s evidence that “s.r./signed” did not always mean that the individual whose signature appeared on the document was aware of it or had signed it, the Trial Chamber recalled this evidence when examining his role in issuing another order signed in this manner in respect of which it concluded that the order was issued by Mladčić. Recalling that a trial judgement is to be considered as a whole, the Appeals Chamber finds that Mladčić fails to demonstrate that the Trial Chamber gave insufficient weight to this evidence or that it undermines the reasonableness of its findings relating to the Four Orders.

In relation to Mladčić’s contention regarding the change in the command structure, the Appeals Chamber observes that he merely repeats his submissions at trial that Milovanović replaced him as de jure and de facto Commander of the VRS while he was away in Belgrade. The Appeals Chamber recalls that on appeal a party cannot merely repeat arguments that did not succeed at trial, unless it can demonstrate that the trial chamber’s rejection of those arguments constituted an error warranting the intervention of the Appeals Chamber. While Mladčić refers to the evidence of Witnesses Milovanović and Stevanović to support his argument, the Appeals Chamber observes that Witness Milovanović’s evidence that, when the command and control structure did not function as intended, he always sought Mladčić’s approval before he proceeded, supports rather than undermines the Trial Chamber’s finding in question. Furthermore, Witness Stevanović’s testimony only shows that VRS Chief of Staff, Milovanović, might replace Mladčić as de jure Commander of the VRS during his absence. Mladčić does not demonstrate how this evidence could undermine the Trial Chamber’s finding, based on the totality of the evidence, that he remained the Commander of the VRS Main Staff during his absence from Srebrenica. The Appeals Chamber therefore finds that, apart from repeating his submissions at trial, Mladčić fails to demonstrate that the Trial Chamber’s rejection of those arguments constituted an error, thereby failing to satisfy his burden on appeal.

The Appeals Chamber will now turn to Mladčić’s submission that the Trial Chamber placed undue weight on four intercept communications as evidence of his command and control over the VRS during his absence from Srebrenica. The Appeals Chamber observes that, when considering communications and orders issued by Mladčić between 14 and 16 July 1995, the Trial Chamber examined the content of the four intercept communications, which showed, inter alia, the briefings he received and instructions he issued regarding the operations in the Zvornik area. Mladčić’s alternative interpretation that the four intercept communications do not contain any orders fails to show that the Trial Chamber’s conclusion was unreasonable. In this respect, the Trial Chamber noted that certain of the intercepts do contain orders or instructions, and in any event, the Appeals Chamber considers that the absence of orders from the four intercept communications would not, in itself, undermine the Trial Chamber’s finding that Mladčić remained the Commander of the VRS Main Staff during his absence from Srebrenica.
Srebrenica.\textsuperscript{1326} The Appeals Chamber therefore finds that Mladić’s arguments in this respect reflect mere disagreement with the Trial Chamber’s assessment of the evidence without demonstrating an error. The Appeals Chamber reiterates that the mere assertion that the Trial Chamber failed to give proper weight to evidence or that it should have interpreted evidence in a particular manner is liable to be summarily dismissed.\textsuperscript{1327}

383. In light of the foregoing, the Appeals Chamber finds, Judge Nyambe dissenting, that Mladić does not show an error in the Trial Chamber’s conclusion that he exercised command and control over VRS and MUP forces during his absence from Srebrenica.

\begin{flushright}
(b) Command and Control over Members of the MUP
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384. Mladić submits that, with a proper weighing of evidence, no reasonable trier of fact could have concluded that he exercised command and control over MUP forces.\textsuperscript{1328} In this respect, he argues that the Trial Chamber gave undue weight to the joint elements of the MUP’s cooperation with the VRS and insufficient weight to evidence that the MUP was acting as a separate entity.\textsuperscript{1329} Mladić therefore contends that the Trial Chamber conflated “cooperation and coordinated action” with “re-subordination”\textsuperscript{1330} and failed to consider the totality of the evidence demonstrating the MUP’s coordination with the VRS, as opposed to re-subordination.\textsuperscript{1331}

385. The Prosecution responds that Mladić fails to show any error in the Trial Chamber’s conclusion that, from 11 until at least 17 July 1995, MUP units under Borovčanin’s command deployed in the area of Srebrenica were under VRS command and that the Trial Chamber properly distinguished cooperation and coordination from re-subordination.\textsuperscript{1332} The Prosecution further contends that the evidence referenced by Mladić either supports the conclusions of the Trial Chamber or is irrelevant.\textsuperscript{1333}

386. The Appeals Chamber observes that the Trial Chamber found that from 11 until at least 17 July 1995 the MUP forces deployed in the sector of Srebrenica under Borovčanin were under the command of the VRS.\textsuperscript{1334} In reaching this finding, the Trial Chamber specifically addressed Mladić’s submission and related evidence that MUP forces were operating under their own command under Borovčanin as of 12 or 13 July 1995.\textsuperscript{1335} The Trial Chamber further addressed in detail other evidence demonstrating: (i) the involvement of MUP forces in the Srebrenica operation and in Potočari pursuant to an order from the VRS Supreme Commander;\textsuperscript{1336} (ii) the direct orders Borovčanin and his forces received from Mladić and other VRS officers about their deployment and military actions;\textsuperscript{1337} and (iii) the reporting of MUP activities to the VRS Bratunac Brigade.\textsuperscript{1338}

387. Against this background, and recalling that trial chambers have broad discretion in weighing evidence,\textsuperscript{1339} the Appeals Chamber finds Mladić’s contention – that the Trial Chamber gave undue weight to the joint elements of the MUP’s cooperation with the VRS and insufficient weight to evidence that the MUP was acting as a separate entity\textsuperscript{1340} – to reflect mere disagreement with the Trial Chamber’s assessment of the evidence without showing any error.

388. Moreover, contrary to Mladić’s assertion,\textsuperscript{1341} the Trial Chamber clearly distinguished coordination and re-subordination of military units.\textsuperscript{1342} In particular, the Trial Chamber pointed out that “[w]hen re-subordinated, the MUP forces followed orders issued by the VRS. The Commander of the VRS unit to which the MUP unit was re-subordinated and the Commander of the MUP unit coordinated their work in carrying out the tasks assigned by the VRS.”\textsuperscript{1343} On the basis of this and other supporting evidence, the Trial Chamber explicitly found that when MUP units were participating in combat operations from at least 12 May 1992 until at least 26 September 1995, they were re-subordinated to the command of the VRS, meaning that they were tasked by the VRS and followed orders issued by the VRS.\textsuperscript{1344} The Appeals Chamber further considers that evidence of joint operations of the MUP and the VRS does not, on its own, negate evidence of the MUP’s subordination to the VRS at the time in question, and that evidence that distinguishes between coordination and re-subordination is consistent with the Trial Chamber’s findings.\textsuperscript{1345} Considering the Trial Chamber’s detailed analysis of evidence demonstrating the re-subordination of the MUP to the VRS, as well as the MUP’s coordination with the VRS\textsuperscript{1346} the Appeals Chamber finds that Mladić fails to demonstrate that the Trial Chamber systematically adopted a selective approach to the evidence in its analysis in this respect. The Appeals Chamber also notes that Mladić selectively relies on certain portions of Witness Momir Nikolić’s testimony to prove this alleged cooperation and coordinated action, disregards Witness
Milorad Dodik’s testimony that Borovčanin received orders from Mladić, and ignores other evidence establishing that MUP units were re-subordinated to the VRS and to Mladić. Furthermore, Mladić’s claim that the fact that the VRS order of 13 July 1995, namely that “forces of the [VRS] mostly regrouped in order to go to Žepa”, did not mention the MUP does not undermine the Trial Chamber’s finding that MUP units were re-subordinated to the VRS. In fact, the Trial Chamber found that on 13 July 1995, Mladić tasked the MUP units with “organizing the evacuation of approximately 15,000 civilians from Srebrenica to Kladanj” and “[k]illing of about 8,000 Muslim soldiers”.

389. In light of the above, the Appeals Chamber finds, Judge Nyambe dissenting, that Mladić fails to demonstrate any error in the Trial Chamber’s finding that, from 11 until at least 17 July 1995, the MUP forces deployed in the sector of Srebrenica under Borovčanin were under VRS command and its dismissal of the argument that the MUP forces were operating under their own command in Srebrenica as of 12 or 13 July 1995.

(c) Orders Given by Mladić

Mladić submits that, in its analysis of his significant contribution to the Srebrenica JCE, the Trial Chamber failed to give sufficient weight to the military context and contents of legitimate military orders he issued in Srebrenica, and erroneously concluded that the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the orders was that he significantly contributed to the common criminal objective. Mladić contends that, in finding that Directive 7/1 did not rescind Directive 7, the Trial Chamber placed undue weight on the language of Directive 7, and, without providing a reasoned opinion, insufficient weight on the evidence of Witness Butler that operation Krivaja-95 (“Krivaja-95”) was a legitimate military operation. Mladić further submits that, in finding that his order of 13 July 1995 was intended to mislead the media and the international community about the events in Srebrenica, the Trial Chamber did not properly consider the language of the order and the context in which it was given, while placing insufficient weight on similar orders aimed at preventing classified military information from being leaked.

390. The Prosecution responds that Mladić fails to show error in the Trial Chamber’s conclusion that he significantly contributed to the common purpose by issuing orders concerning the Srebrenica operation to VRS and MUP forces. In this respect, the Prosecution argues that Mladić: (i) ignores that his contribution to the common purpose need not be per se criminal; (ii) merely seeks to substitute his interpretation of orders regarding Directive 4, Krivaja-95, and Directive 7; and (iii) fails to demonstrate that the Trial Chamber acted unreasonably in considering his orders concerning the Srebrenica operation. The Prosecution further responds that, given that none of the allegedly “similar orders” Mladić cites is comparable, the Trial Chamber reasonably concluded that the 13 July 1995 order limiting access for local and foreign journalists to the Srebrenica area and banning the provision of information on prisoners of war, evacuated civilians, and escapees was intended to keep the international community from learning what was happening in Srebrenica.

391. The Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber found that Mladić significantly contributed to achieving the common objective by, inter alia: (i) issuing several orders to VRS forces, including the Drina Corps, concerning the operation in and around Srebrenica between at least 11 July and 11 October 1995; and (ii) giving orders to MUP Commander Borovčanin and his units on 11 and 12 July 1995. In reaching these findings, the Trial Chamber conducted a comprehensive assessment of orders issued by Mladić concerning the Srebrenica operation, and considered that these orders were so instrumental to the commission of the crimes that without them the crimes would not have been committed as they were. The Appeals Chamber thus considers that the Trial Chamber reasonably concluded that Mladić significantly contributed to achieving the common objective by issuing orders concerning the Srebrenica operation to VRS and MUP forces.

392. Turning to the Trial Chamber’s alleged failure to give sufficient weight to the context and contents of orders that, according to Mladić, were legitimate military orders issued in Srebrenica, the Appeals Chamber recalls that an accused’s contribution to a joint criminal enterprise need not be in and of itself criminal, as long as he or she performs acts that in some way contribute to the furtherance of the common purpose. Thus, in the Appeals Chamber’s view, whether Mladić’s orders were legitimate in the military context is not relevant to determining his significant contribution to the common purpose. What matters is that the accused significantly contributed to the commission of
the crimes involved in the joint criminal enterprise. Considering the above, Mladić’s assertion that his orders were consistent with legitimate military operations in light of the military context of Srebrenica cannot serve to demonstrate an error in the Trial Chamber’s conclusion that Mladić significantly contributed to achieving the common objective. 

394. In any event, the Appeals Chamber finds that Mladić fails to substantiate his claim that the Trial Chamber did not properly weigh the evidence pertaining to his orders in Srebrenica. In relation to Mladić’s contention that Directive 4 ordered adherence to the laws of war, including the Geneva Conventions, the Appeals Chamber observes that this directive does not contain any reference to the laws of war, including the Geneva Conventions, and does not explicitly mandate respect for the laws of war. In fact, the Trial Chamber found that Directive 4 ordered the Drina Corps to inflict the heaviest possible losses on the ABiH and to force them to leave the Birač, Žepa, and Goražde areas with the Muslim population. Further, the Trial Chamber considered evidence that Mladić gave orders to respect the Geneva Conventions, but found that these orders were not indicative of his true state of mind. The Appeals Chamber thus finds that Mladić fails to demonstrate that the Trial Chamber erred in its assessment of Directive 4.

395. The Appeals Chamber now turns to Mladić’s argument that the Trial Chamber placed undue weight on the language of Directive 7, and, without providing a reasoned opinion, insufficient weight on Witness Butler’s evidence that Krivaja-95 was a legitimate military operation. The Appeals Chamber recalls that the mere assertion that the Trial Chamber failed to give sufficient weight to evidence or that it should have interpreted evidence in a particular manner is liable to be summarily dismissed. Furthermore, as explained above, whether a military operation is legitimate is irrelevant to determining Mladić’s significant contribution to the common purpose. In any event, the Appeals Chamber observes that the Trial Chamber carefully analyzed the context and content of both Directive 7 and Directive 7/1 and considered evidence from Witnesses Ljubomir Obradović and Milovanović, as well as other documentary evidence, in reaching its finding that Directive 7/1 did not rescind or amend the content of Directive 7. Furthermore, while Mladić selectively relies on Witness Butler’s evidence that “the VRS had the military legitimate right to attack the 28th Division” of the ABiH, he disregards this witness’s consistent statement that Directive 7/1 did not supersede but rather supplemented Directive 7 with additional technical information. The Appeals Chamber thus finds that Mladić fails to demonstrate that the Trial Chamber erred in its assessment of Directive 7.

396. The Appeals Chamber also finds no merit in Mladić’s contention that the Trial Chamber did not properly consider the language and context of his order of 13 July 1995, which prevented the entry of local and foreign journalists into the Srebrenica area and banned the provision of information on prisoners of war, evacuated civilians, and escapees. In this regard, the Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber’s finding in question was based on the totality of the evidence, and particularly on the language of the order in its context. Further, the orders referenced by Mladić in support of his argument on appeal were issued to prevent classified military information from being leaked, and are thus different from his 13 July 1995 order, which was issued to restrict the international community’s access to information in the midst of a mass murder operation. Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber finds that Mladić’s contention in relation to his 13 July 1995 order reflects mere disagreement with the Trial Chamber’s evaluation and interpretation of relevant evidence without demonstrating error. In this respect, the Appeals Chamber again recalls that the mere assertion that the Trial Chamber failed to give proper weight to evidence or that it should have interpreted evidence in a particular manner is liable to be summarily dismissed.

397. On the basis of the foregoing, the Appeals Chamber, Judge Nyambe dissenting, dismisses Mladić’s submission that the Trial Chamber erroneously concluded that he significantly contributed to the common criminal objective by issuing orders concerning the Srebrenica operation to VRS and MUP forces.

(d) Intercepts

398. Mladić submits that, although the Trial Chamber relied on certain intercepts to find that VRS forces committed crimes in Srebrenica and that he was complicit in those crimes, with a proper weighing of evidence, no reasonable trier of fact could have concluded that the intercepts were reliable and authentic. In this respect, he argues that the Trial Chamber erroneously disregarded evidence of Witness RM-316’s partisanship and limited training,
while relying on this witness to conclude that there was no evidence that the Intercepts were forgeries. Furthermore, according to Mladić, the Trial Chamber failed to give sufficient weight to: (i) the fact that [REDACTED]; (ii) the lack of continuity or chain of custody in providing the intercepts to the ICTY; (iii) the incorrect identification of VRS relay routes and frequencies; and (iv) the scepticism Witness Butler expressed regarding the reliability of the Intercepts. In addition, Mladić submits that the Trial Chamber failed to adequately address inconsistencies within the Intercepts.

The Prosecution responds that Mladić fails to show that the Trial Chamber’s assessment of the Intercepts was unreasonable in light of the totality of the evidence. It thus submits that Mladić’s mere assertion that the Trial Chamber disregarded or failed to give sufficient weight to certain evidence should be summarily dismissed. The Prosecution further argues that the alleged inconsistencies Mladić raises are not supported by the evidence.

The Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber found the Intercepts to be genuine contemporaneous reports of intercepted VRS communications, and did not accept the argument that they were forged or manipulated. In reaching these findings, the Trial Chamber assessed the Intercepts in the context of the entire trial record, treated them with caution, and considered whether there was corroboration or further detail provided by other sources of evidence. In particular, the Trial Chamber considered the evidence of Witness RM-316 as well as other evidence on the record, including evidence that the Intercepts were allegedly forgeries. In this context, Mladić’s argument that the Trial Chamber failed to give sufficient weight to certain evidence reflects mere disagreement with the Trial Chamber’s assessment of evidence without demonstrating any error.

Moreover, with respect to his submission regarding the Trial Chamber’s assessment of the reliability and authenticity of the Intercepts, the Appeals Chamber considers that Mladić merely repeats his submissions at trial without demonstrating any error. A party cannot merely repeat arguments that did not succeed at trial, unless it can demonstrate that rejecting them caused an error warranting the intervention of the Appeals Chamber. Furthermore, although Mladić refers to Witness Butler’s initial scepticism about the reliability of the Intercepts, this witness testified that he ultimately was “able to corroborate much of the information that was contained in those [I]ntercepts”.

Turning to Mladić’s submission that the Trial Chamber did not adequately address inconsistencies in the Intercepts, the Appeals Chamber recalls that it is within a trial chamber’s discretion to assess inconsistencies and determine whether the evidence as a whole is reliable and credible. In this case, the Appeals Chamber is not convinced that the alleged inconsistencies Mladić refers to are supported by the evidence. For example, although Mladić argues that Exhibits P1320, P1321, and P2126 are inconsistent with Exhibit P1332, the Appeals Chamber observes that Exhibit P1332 is unrelated to the other three Intercepts, which pertain to the same conversation and are, in fact, consistent with each other, as they concern the same operation. Furthermore, although Mladić argues that Exhibits P1645 and P1657 are inconsistent with each other, the Appeals Chamber observes that Exhibit P1645 is not an intercept but a handwritten note and that Mladić’s claims about the contents of Exhibit P1657 are incorrect because, contrary to his submission, [REDACTED] .

In light of the above, the Appeals Chamber finds, Judge Nyambe dissenting, that Mladić fails to demonstrate error in the Trial Chamber’s assessment of or reliance on the Intercepts.

(e) Knowledge, Investigation, and Punishment of Crimes

(i) Alleged Failure to Give Sufficient Weight to Probative Evidence

Mladić submits that, in finding that he failed to take adequate steps to investigate crimes and/or punish perpetrators, the Trial Chamber disregarded or failed to give sufficient weight to probative evidence that: (i) he had no knowledge of crimes and/or was unable to prevent or punish them; and (ii) he or his subordinates did investigate and prosecute certain crimes. With respect to the evidence that he had no knowledge of crimes, Mladić contends that the Zvornik Brigade daily combat report, dated 14 July 1995 ("Zvornik Brigade Report"), does not mention the commission of crimes, and that, to establish that crimes were reported, the Trial Chamber placed undue emphasis on Witness Ljubomir Bojanović’s evidence that such information would be reported up the chain of command.
According to Mladić, Witness Momir Nikolić confirmed that he concealed the killings from his commanders and provided misleading information about “asananja/sanitisation” to cover up reburials.\(^\text{1410}\) Mladić additionally argues that the Trial Chamber relied on a fuel order he signed to establish his knowledge of the crimes and the reburial operation, but failed to give sufficient weight to the fact that the unique identification number appearing on the fuel order was not his.\(^\text{1411}\)

405. Mladić further argues that the Trial Chamber failed to give sufficient weight to evidence of: (i) parallel reporting and investigation processes; (ii) the institutional limitations of the military justice system; and (iii) conflicts with the civilian authorities, which led to his inability to prevent crimes and punish MUP perpetrators.\(^\text{1412}\) With respect to evidence that he or his subordinates investigated and prosecuted crimes, Mladić points to: (i) ultimatums he issued on 23 September 1995 and 20 October 1995 stating that the MUP Command should prevent crimes and punish MUP perpetrators, or else face military action from the VRS;\(^\text{1413}\) and (ii) a meeting on 26 March 1996 to form a joint investigation commission between the MUP and the VRS to investigate crimes committed in Srebrenica.\(^\text{1414}\) Mladić argues that the Trial Chamber disregarded this evidence, ultimately leading to the impermissible inference that he failed to investigate crimes.\(^\text{1415}\)

406. The Prosecution responds that Mladić’s argument that the Trial Chamber disregarded and improperly weighed probative evidence should be dismissed.\(^\text{1416}\) Specifically, it argues that the Trial Chamber reasonably found that Mladić was aware of the crimes\(^\text{1417}\) and that he does not show that the Trial Chamber erred in concluding that he failed to take adequate steps to investigate the crimes and punish the perpetrators.\(^\text{1418}\)

407. The Appeals Chamber observes that, in reaching its finding that Mladić was aware of crimes committed in Srebrenica in July 1995 by members of the VRS and the MUP but failed to take adequate steps to investigate crimes and punish perpetrators,\(^\text{1419}\) the Trial Chamber recalled its previous findings, \textit{inter alia}, that: (i) in 1995, the Drina Corps maintained an effective command and control structure with a strong reporting chain and there was a fully functioning communication system in place at the time;\(^\text{1420}\) and (ii) VRS officers were aware of the killings of Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica and the Zvornik area, but there were no investigations or prosecutions with respect to the July 1995 killings in Srebrenica.\(^\text{1421}\) The Appeals Chamber further observes that the Trial Chamber explicitly pointed out that it “did not receive evidence to conclude that Mladić ordered any substantial or meaningful investigations into war crimes or crimes against humanity”.\(^\text{1422}\) Moreover, the Trial Chamber relied on its previous findings, based on extensive evidence, that Mladić: (i) possessed the authority to order investigations within the military justice system;\(^\text{1423}\) (ii) was under a duty to take adequate steps to investigate and/or punish the crimes;\(^\text{1424}\) (iii) was aware of crimes committed in Srebrenica in July 1995 by members of the VRS and the MUP;\(^\text{1425}\) and (iv) engaged in actions that were deliberately misleading.\(^\text{1426}\)

408. Having reviewed relevant portions of the Trial Judgement, the Appeals Chamber is not convinced that the Trial Chamber gave insufficient weight to evidence showing that Mladić had no knowledge of the crimes committed in Srebrenica.\(^\text{1427}\) In relation to the Zvornik Brigade Report, the Appeals Chamber fails to see how the absence of explicit reference to the commission of crimes in the report, which is only pertinent to 14 July 1995 and to the Zvornik Brigade’s area of responsibility, would undercut the Trial Chamber’s finding that Mladić was aware of crimes committed in Srebrenica as a whole.\(^\text{1428}\) With respect to Witness Bojanović’s evidence that the mass execution of detainees in the Zvornik Brigade’s area of responsibility would have been reflected in the daily combat report, the Trial Chamber explicitly considered this evidence in determining the concealment of crimes, but did not rely on it, on the basis that Witness Bojanović was not involved in the drafting of the report and accordingly found his comments speculative.\(^\text{1429}\) Regarding evidence concerning Witness Momir Nikolić, the Appeals Chamber observes that Mladić misinterprets Exhibit D1228, which shows that Witness Momir Nikolić discussed the killing of captured Muslims with his commander, Blagojević, on 12 and 13 July 1995, rather than concealed the killings from his commanders.\(^\text{1430}\) Furthermore, Mladić merely offers an alternative interpretation of Witness Momir Nikolić’s evidence without demonstrating the unreasonableness of the Trial Chamber’s finding that the reburial operation was reported.\(^\text{1431}\) Turning to the fuel order, contrary to Mladić’s assertion,\(^\text{1432}\) the Trial Chamber did not rely on it to determine his knowledge of the crimes or the reburial operation.\(^\text{1433}\) In this respect, Mladić merely disagrees with the Trial Chamber’s assessment of the unique identification number appearing on the fuel order without demonstrating an error.
With respect to Mladić’s alleged inability to investigate crimes given the parallel reporting and investigation processes, he merely repeats his submissions at trial, arguing, *inter alia*, that “probative evidence showed that the crimes were reported to the civilian authorities”. The Trial Chamber explicitly rejected this argument and found that “merely reporting the crimes to the MUP Commander would not satisfy [Mladić’s] duties as commander.” In addition, while Mladić refers to portions of Witness Theunens’s testimony to support his contention that he could not take direct steps to investigate crimes perpetrated by MUP officers, nothing in those portions of the testimony supports this contention. On the contrary, Witness Theunens stated, without reference to any particular situation, that when the MUP units were conducting operations under military command, the VRS Commander in the area had the duty to investigate alleged crimes. In relation to evidence of conflicts with the civilian authorities, the Appeals Chamber notes that Mladić simply repeats his submissions presented at trial, where the Trial Chamber found that Mladić possessed the authority to order investigations within the military justice system, without identifying any error on the part of the Trial Chamber. The Appeals Chamber reiterates that a party cannot merely repeat arguments that did not succeed at trial, unless it can demonstrate that rejecting them caused an error warranting the intervention of the Appeals Chamber.

Finally, with respect to Mladić’s submission regarding evidence that he or his subordinates prosecuted or investigated crimes, the Appeals Chamber observes that the ultimatums issued by Mladić, to which he points on appeal, did not concern Srebrenica crimes. As such, these ultimatums were not relevant to the Trial Chamber’s assessment of Mladić’s contribution to the Srebrenica JCE. As to the meeting to form the joint investigation commission, the Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber considered evidence in this respect in finding that “on 23 March 1996, Karadžić ordered the VRS and MUP to immediately form a mixed commission to investigate the alleged discovery of two decomposed bodies in the Pilica area”, however, it explicitly noted that the proposal to initiate such investigation by Drinić was never addressed.

In light of the foregoing, the Appeals Chamber finds, Judge Nyambe dissenting, that Mladić fails to demonstrate that the Trial Chamber committed an error in evaluating evidence regarding his knowledge of the crimes, his inability to punish crimes, and that he or his subordinates prosecuted or investigated crimes. In addition, recalling the finding that, *inter alia*, Mladić has failed to show an error in the Trial Chamber’s findings that he exercised command and control over VRS and MUP forces, which were under VRS command from 11 until 17 July 1995, even during his absence from Srebrenica, the Appeals Chamber, Judge Nyambe dissenting, finds Mladić’s claim of Momir Nikolić, the MUP, and other rogue members of the VRS committing revenge killings in Srebrenica without his knowledge to be speculative and unconvincing. His submissions in this regard are therefore summarily dismissed.

(ii) Alleged Error in Relying on Failure to Investigate and Punish Crimes to Determine Significant Contribution

Noting that the Trial Chamber relied on his failure to investigate and prosecute crimes committed in Srebrenica to determine his significant contribution to the Srebrenica JCE, Mladić submits that such omissions are insufficient evidence of his significant contribution. He argues that, as the ICC Appeals Chamber in *Bemba* confirmed, the measures taken by a commander cannot be faulted merely because of shortfalls in their execution.

The Prosecution responds that Mladić’s reliance on the *Bemba* Appeal Judgement, which addressed measures that had been taken to prosecute and investigate crimes, is inapposite to these circumstances where no measures were taken.

The Appeals Chamber recalls that the law does not foresee specific types of conduct which *per se* cannot be considered a contribution to the common purpose of a joint criminal enterprise. What matters is that the accused performs acts that in some way contribute to the furtherance of the common purpose. Within these legal confines, the question of whether a failure to act could be taken into account to establish that the accused significantly contributed to a joint criminal enterprise is a question of fact to be determined on a case-by-case basis. Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber recalls that failures to act or acts carried out in furtherance of a joint criminal enterprise need not involve carrying out any part of the *actus reus* of a crime forming part of the common purpose, or indeed any crime at all.
In the present case, as part of the factual determination of Mladic’s significant contribution to the Srebrenica JCE, the Trial Chamber considered, together with his other actions, that: (i) Mladic commanded and controlled VRS and MUP units during the Srebrenica operation and its aftermath; and (ii) Mladic failed to take adequate steps to investigate crimes and/or punish members of the VRS and other elements of the Serb forces under his effective control who committed such crimes, despite his duty and ability to do so and his awareness of the crimes.

The Trial Chamber further considered that the above-mentioned acts were so instrumental to the commission of the crimes that without them the crimes would not have been committed as they were. The Appeals Chamber recalls that a failure to intervene to prevent the recurrence of crimes or to halt abuses has been taken into account in assessing an accused’s contribution to a joint criminal enterprise as well as his intent, where the accused had some power, influence, or authority over the perpetrators that was sufficient to prevent or halt the abuses but failed to exercise such power. Therefore, Mladic fails to show that the Trial Chamber erred in considering his failure to take adequate steps to investigate crimes and/or punish perpetrators in determining whether he significantly contributed to the Srebrenica JCE.

In light of the above, the Appeals Chamber, Judge Nyanse dissenting, rejects Mladic’s contention that his failure to punish crimes is insufficient evidence of his significant contribution to the Srebrenica JCE.

(f) Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the Appeals Chamber, Judge Nyanse dissenting, dismisses Ground 5.B of Mladic’s appeal.

3. Alleged Errors in Reversing the Burden of Proof and Violating In Dubio Pro Reo (Ground 5.D)

In finding that Mladic shared the intent to achieve the common objective of the Srebrenica JCE, the Trial Chamber rejected Mladic’s argument that his personal actions and behaviour did not support his criminal intent. In this respect, the Trial Chamber found that the only reasonable inference was that Mladic had the specific intent to commit genocide and that he intended to eliminate the Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica by killing the men and boys and forcibly removing the women, young children, and some elderly men.

Mladic submits that the Trial Chamber relied on statements he made at the Hotel Fontana meetings, statements he made to the media, and his knowledge of crimes to establish that he shared a common state of mind with other members of the Srebrenica JCE. Mladic contends that the Trial Chamber erred in giving insufficient weight to exculpatory evidence, thereby incorrectly finding the requisite mens rea beyond a reasonable doubt and violating the principle of in dubio pro reo. In particular, Mladic submits that the Trial Chamber failed to give sufficient weight to: (i) his statements and actions to adhere to international law by evacuating civilians and ensuring the welfare of prisoners of war; and (ii) the orders he and his subordinates gave in Srebrenica. According to Mladic, the Trial Chamber given sufficient weight to this evidence and viewed it in its totality, it would not have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that he shared the necessary mens rea to achieve the common objective of the Srebrenica JCE and the specific intent to kill Bosnian Muslim men and boys. Mladic therefore requests that the Appeals Chamber reverse his conviction for the crimes committed under the Srebrenica JCE or, alternatively, reverse the findings to the extent of any errors.

(a) Statements and Affirmative Actions Taken by Mladic to Adhere to International Law

Mladic submits that the Trial Chamber erred in relying on statements that he made during the Hotel Fontana meetings on 11 and 12 July 1995 to establish that he shared the common criminal intent for both objectives of the Srebrenica JCE. In particular, he argues that the Trial Chamber placed insufficient weight on the context in which these statements were made and contends that the language used in these statements was consistent with legitimate military language. He further submits that the Trial Chamber failed to give sufficient, if any, weight to his subsequent statements and actions, including: (i) his involvement with the UN in coordinating humanitarian evacuations; (ii) his statements that civilians had a choice to leave for Yugoslavia or the Federation or stay in Republika Srpska; (iii) his assurances to captured prisoners of war that they would be treated in accordance with the law; and (iv) his cooperation during the Belgrade discussions on 14 and 15 July 1995 with the UN, European Union, and...
UNPROFOR ("Belgrade Discussions"), which culminated in a signed assurance that the ICRC would be granted access to prisoners of war and that the Geneva Conventions would be adhered to.\footnote{1470} Finally, in relation to the Trial Chamber’s consideration that he misled the media about the conditions in Srebrenica, Mladić contends that the Trial Chamber failed to give sufficient weight to information that was reported to him, to his reliance on the information available to him at the time, and the fact that he repeated it to the media.\footnote{1471}

421. The Prosecution responds that the Trial Chamber reasonably found that Mladić shared the intent to further the common purpose of the Srebrenica JCE.\footnote{1472} It contends that Mladić fails to identify any relevant evidence which the Trial Chamber disregarded and that his challenges reflect mere disagreement with the weighing of the evidence, without showing error.\footnote{1473} The Prosecution argues that Mladić fails to explain how the Trial Chamber gave insufficient weight to the context of his statements\footnote{1474} and submits that: (i) Mladić improperly extrapolates the testimony of two expert witnesses commenting on a certain order to claim that his statements at the second Hotel Fontana meeting were also legitimate;\footnote{1475} (ii) Mladić fails to explain how some of his statements could have been interpreted positively,\footnote{1476} or as legitimate military language,\footnote{1477} or how they were taken out of context;\footnote{1478} and (iii) Mladić’s subsequent conduct does not refute the criminal meaning of his statements and, on the contrary, his preferred alternative inference ignores findings clearly showing otherwise.\footnote{1479} The Prosecution further submits that Mladić’s claim that the Trial Chamber failed to consider the totality of the evidence ignores a multitude of statements and acts it relied on to conclude that he shared the intent for the Srebrenica JCE,\footnote{1480} and that his claim that the Trial Chamber gave insufficient weight to his reliance on information available to him when talking to the media reflects mere disagreement with the Trial Chamber’s assessment of the evidence.\footnote{1481}

422. With respect to Mladić’s argument that the language used in his statements at the Hotel Fontana meetings was consistent with “legitimate military language”,\footnote{1482} the Appeals Chamber recalls that it has already addressed and dismissed this argument.\footnote{1483} Furthermore, the Trial Chamber’s finding that Mladić shared the intent to achieve the common objective of the Srebrenica JCE is only partly based on his statements calling for revenge on the Bosnian Muslims from Srebrenica,\footnote{1484} and, in any event, Mladić does not show that the Trial Chamber erred in assessing these statements.

423. Turning to Mladić’s argument that the Trial Chamber failed to give sufficient weight to his speeches and actions after his statements at the Hotel Fontana meetings, the Appeals Chamber recalls that, as a result of the VRS attack on the Srebrenica enclave in July 1995, thousands of Bosnian Muslims fled to Potočari seeking refuge within the UNPROFOR compound before being transferred to Bosnian controlled territory under the auspices of the VRS and the MUP and, for the first convoy only, under the supervision and escort of UNPROFOR.\footnote{1485} The Appeals Chamber further notes that the Trial Chamber found that the Bosnian Muslims who left Potočari to go to Bosnian Muslim controlled territory “did not have a genuine choice but to leave”.\footnote{1486} Against this background, Mladić submits that the Trial Chamber gave insufficient weight to evidence that he and the UN coordinated humanitarian evacuations\footnote{1487} and to statements where he made it clear that civilians in Potočari had a choice to stay or leave.\footnote{1488} The Appeals Chamber recalls that it has already considered and rejected Mladić’s submissions that he was “acting in coordination with high-level DutchBat/UNPROFOR officials to evacuate civilians” for humanitarian reasons and that the Trial Chamber gave no or insufficient weight to evidence that he evacuated civilians pursuant to UN requests to coordinate humanitarian evacuations.\footnote{1489} The Appeals Chamber has also already determined that Mladić’s submission that he gave civilians a choice to stay or leave and that he was acting to evacuate civilians for humanitarian reasons was unconvincing, especially since the Trial Chamber found such statements to be “deliberately misleading”.\footnote{1490} In this respect, the Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber considered the evidence to which Mladić points on appeal, in particular his statement in Potočari that everyone who wanted to leave had been evacuated safely.\footnote{1491} Specifically, the Trial Chamber considered the evidence of Witness Milovan Milutinović that “Mladić gave the Muslim delegation his word that everyone gathered at Potočari who had surrendered their weapons could choose whether to go to ‘Yugoslavia, the Federation’ or to stay in the Bosnian-Serb Republic, and guaranteed them full rights and freedoms”.\footnote{1492} While the Trial Chamber did not discuss Exhibit P1147 when assessing Mladić’s criminal intent, it addressed this evidence elsewhere in the Trial Judgement. In particular, the Trial Chamber considered that while in Potočari, Mladić said that Bosnian Serb authority had been established in Srebrenica and the entire enclave was under the control of the VRS and everyone who wanted to leave had been evacuated safely.\footnote{1493} In this
respect, the Appeals Chamber recalls that a trial chamber is not required to articulate every step of its reasoning, that a trial judgement must be read as a whole, and that there is a presumption that the trial chamber has evaluated all the relevant evidence as long as there is no indication that it completely disregarded any particular piece of evidence. Mladić ignores the Trial Chamber’s extensive review of the evidence in support of its finding that the Bosnian Muslims who left Potočari to go to Bosnian Muslim controlled territory did not have a genuine choice but to leave. Mladić’s argument that the Trial Chamber afforded insufficient weight to evidence that he gave civilians a choice to stay or leave is therefore without merit.

424. In relation to Mladić’s contention that the Trial Chamber failed to give sufficient, if any, weight to statements he made to prisoners of war, Mladić refers to evidence of Witnesses RM-292, RM-253, and RM-364, that, while they were being held prisoner, Mladić assured them that they would be exchanged and returned to their families. While the Trial Chamber did not expressly discuss this particular evidence in the Trial Judgement, it considered and made findings on other evidence that Mladić addressed Bosnian Muslim soldiers and assured them that they would be exchanged. The Appeals Chamber notes, however, that the Trial Chamber ultimately found such statements to be “misleading assurances.” The Appeals Chamber therefore finds that Mladić’s arguments in this respect reflect mere disagreement with the Trial Chamber’s assessment of the evidence without demonstrating an error. In this regard, the Appeals Chamber recalls that the mere assertion that the Trial Chamber failed to give proper weight to evidence or that it should have interpreted evidence in a particular manner is liable to be summarily dismissed.

425. In support of his argument that the Trial Chamber did not give sufficient weight to evidence demonstrating his cooperation during the Belgrade Discussions, Mladić points to one exhibit about an informal agreement to allow the ICRC access to assess the welfare of prisoners of war and register them in accordance with the Geneva Conventions. Mladić ignores that the Trial Chamber considered and made findings on similar orders he gave to the VRS and other subordinated forces, in relation to the Overarching JCE, to grant freedom of movement to international humanitarian organizations and to respect the Geneva Conventions. The Appeals Chamber observes that the Trial Chamber found this evidence inconsistent with Mladić’s other conduct and directly contradicted by his other contemporaneous statements. In particular, the Trial Chamber found, in its assessment of the Overarching JCE, that Mladić’s orders to respect the Geneva Conventions were not indicative of his true state of mind. Recalling that the Trial Judgement must be read as a whole, the Appeals Chamber therefore finds that Mladić fails to demonstrate how the exhibit he points to on appeal could undermine the Trial Chamber’s finding in this respect.

426. Mladić also submits that, in finding that he misled the media about the conditions in Srebrenica, the Trial Chamber failed to give sufficient weight to information that was reported to him, to his reliance on the information available to him at the time, and to the fact that he repeated this information to the media. Mladić, however, provides no support for any of these contentions, and the Appeals Chamber recalls that the mere assertion that the Trial Chamber failed to give sufficient weight to evidence or that it should have interpreted evidence in a particular manner is liable to be summarily dismissed. Moreover, the Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber’s findings are based on the totality of the evidence, including on the actions Mladić took to prevent the media and public from knowing what was happening in Srebrenica. The Appeals Chamber therefore finds, Judge Nyambe dissenting, that Mladić’s unsupported arguments in this respect reflect mere disagreement with the Trial Chamber’s assessment of the evidence without demonstrating an error.

(b) Orders Made by Mladić and His Subordinates

427. Mladić submits that the Trial Chamber erred in its assessment of the Krivaja-95 operation and other related orders, and that it gave insufficient weight to the military context of these orders. Mladić further submits that the Trial Chamber did not afford sufficient weight to the language of his 13 July 1995 order preventing the media from entering the combat zone in the general sector of Srebrenica and Żepa, which he argues were prohibitions consistent with combat operations, as shown by other orders in other areas.

428. The Prosecution responds that Mladić repeats arguments made under another subsection regarding the Krivaja-95 operation while showing no error. The Prosecution further submits that Mladić fails to show any error in the Trial Chamber’s finding that his 13 July 1995 order was intended to keep the media and international
community from knowing what was happening in Srebrenica. In this regard, the Prosecution submits that Mladić ignores relevant evidence, and that, contrary to his claim, the language in other orders does not make the Trial Chamber’s assessment of the 13 July 1995 order unreasonable.

429. The Appeals Chamber recalls that it has already rejected Mladić’s argument that his orders were consistent with legitimate military operations in light of the military context of Srebrenica and found that they cannot serve to demonstrate any error in the Trial Chamber’s conclusion that Mladić significantly contributed to achieving the common objective. The Appeals Chamber therefore finds no merit in Mladić’s contention that the Trial Chamber failed to give sufficient weight to the military context of his orders in Srebrenica when finding his mens rea for the Srebrenica JCE.

430. Turning to the 13 July 1995 order, the Trial Chamber found that Mladić gave this order, which called for the prevention of the entry of local and foreign journalists into the zones of combat operations in Srebrenica and Žepa, as well as a ban on giving any information to the media about operations in Srebrenica, particularly on prisoners of war, evacuated civilians, and escapees. The Trial Chamber further found that Mladić’s aim was to keep the media and international community from knowing what was happening in Srebrenica. The Appeals Chamber recalls that it has already rejected Mladić’s argument that the Trial Chamber did not properly consider the language and context of the 13 July 1995 order. Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber notes that while Mladić attempts to show that this order was aimed at prohibiting access to Srebrenica for the media’s own protection and to prevent the spreading of rumours, he ignores that the Trial Chamber’s finding is based on a number of other findings regarding Mladić’s position, his presence on the ground in Potočari and involvement in the Hotel Fontana meetings, his proposal to mislead the international public about the truth at the 16th Assembly Session, and the reburials of the Bosnian Muslim men and boys murdered in Srebrenica. The Appeals Chamber finds, Judge Nyambe dissenting, that Mladić therefore fails to demonstrate that the Trial Chamber gave insufficient weight to his arguments regarding the Krivaja-95 operation and other orders as well as to the language of his 13 July 1995 order.

(c) Conclusion

431. Based on the foregoing, the Appeals Chamber, Judge Nyambe dissenting, dismisses Ground 5.D of Mladić’s appeal.

4. Alleged Errors in Failing to Provide a Reasoned Opinion or Evaluate the Military Status of Victims (Genocide and Extermination in Srebrenica) (Ground 5.E)

432. The Trial Chamber found that in relation to scheduled and unscheduled incidents concerning Srebrenica, the victims of the killings were either civilians or “at least detained at the time of killing” and thus hors de combat, and concluded that “in all Srebrenica incidents, the victims were not actively participating in the hostilities at the time of the killings”. With respect to the number of victims and the overall situation in the Srebrenica enclave, the Trial Chamber took judicial notice of Adjudicated Fact 1476 stating that between 7,000 and 8,000 Bosnian Muslim men were systematically murdered.

433. Mladić submits that the Trial Chamber failed to provide a reasoned opinion on the use of Adjudicated Fact 1476 in its findings and to consider the potential military status of the victims and/or the extent of combat casualties. He argues that “as a consequence of the error, [he] is unable to determine the extent to which the Trial Chamber relied upon the adjudicated fact and the impact this may have had [on] his conviction”. Mladić specifically argues that the Trial Chamber failed to give a reasoned opinion that, based on Adjudicated Fact 1476, “all of the 7,000–8,000 victims of the killings in Srebrenica were not actively taking part in the hostilities”. He contends that the Trial Chamber did not consider whether the men killed in Srebrenica were civilians or combatants and that this omission impacts the basis for its findings and his convictions. Mladić further submits that, at a minimum, the Trial Chamber erroneously considered Adjudicated Fact 1476 as evidence of his intent to further the Srebrenica JCE. In addition, Mladić submits that the Trial Chamber erred in applying a heightened standard to his disproving Adjudicated Fact 1476. According to Mladić, the Trial Chamber failed to consider any of the evidence he presented to rebut this fact, and this evidence was sufficient to rebut Adjudicated Fact 1476 on the military status of
the victims. The Prosecution requests the Appeals Chamber to articulate the basis of his liability and, to the extent of any error, review the sentence imposed on him.

434. The Prosecution responds that the Trial Chamber did not rely on Adjudicated Fact 1476 to determine the circumstances of the victims’ deaths, nor did it find that all victims were civilians, and submits that Mladić’s attempt to appeal a non-existent finding should be summarily dismissed. The Prosecution further responds that the Trial Chamber: (i) gave a reasoned opinion regarding the status of victims through an incident-by-incident analysis, which Mladić has ignored in his submissions; (ii) clearly articulated the basis of his liability, and (iii) applied the correct legal standard to rebut Adjudicated Fact 1476.

435. Mladić replies, inter alia, that the Appeals Chamber should reject the Prosecution’s contention that the Trial Chamber limited its analysis of his responsibility to the victims established on the basis of the Prosecution’s evidence. According to Mladić, contrary to the Prosecution’s submission, the Trial Chamber relied on the number of victims contained in Adjudicated Fact 1476 to determine, among others, his intent to achieve the common purpose of the Srebrenica JCE, his specific intent to commit genocide, his significant contribution to the Srebrenica JCE, and his sentence. He further replies that the Prosecution does not engage with his argument regarding the Trial Chamber’s failure to provide a reasoned opinion on the status of the victims, and that Adjudicated Fact 1476 should have been rebutted.

436. The Appeals Chamber will address in turn whether the Trial Chamber erred in: (i) failing to provide a reasoned opinion on the military status of the victims; (ii) articulating the basis of Mladić’s liability, namely its alleged use of Adjudicated Fact 1476 to determine his mens rea and significant contribution to the Srebrenica JCE as well as his sentence; and (iii) failing to consider evidence presented by Mladić to rebut Adjudicated Fact 1476.

(a) Alleged Error in Failing to Provide a Reasoned Opinion on the Military Status of the Victims

437. The Appeals Chamber recalls that trial chambers are required to provide a reasoned opinion pursuant to Article 23(2) of the ICTY Statute and Rule 98 ter (C) of the ICTY Rules. A reasoned opinion in the trial judgement is essential to ensuring that adjudications are fair; it, inter alia, allows for a meaningful exercise of the right of appeal by the parties, and enables the Appeals Chamber to understand and review the findings. Accordingly, a trial chamber should set out in a clear and articulate manner the factual and legal findings on the basis of which it reached the decision to convict or acquit an accused. In particular, a trial chamber is required to provide clear, reasoned findings of fact as to each element of the crime charged.

438. The Appeals Chamber further recalls that in claiming an error of law on the basis of the lack of a reasoned opinion, a party is required to identify the specific issues, factual findings, or arguments that the trial chamber omitted to address and explain why this omission invalidates the decision. The Appeals Chamber understands that, at the core, Mladić submits that the Trial Chamber failed to provide a reasoned opinion that, based on Adjudicated Fact 1476, all of the 7,000 to 8,000 victims of the killings in Srebrenica were not actively taking part in hostilities.

439. The Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber took judicial notice of Adjudicated Fact 1476 stating that “between 7,000 and 8,000 Bosnian-Muslim men were systematically murdered”. On the one hand, the Trial Chamber explicitly referenced this adjudicated fact in sections of the Trial Judgement regarding burial operations and the chapeau elements of crimes against humanity, where it considered the number of victims and the overall situation in Srebrenica. On the other hand, the Trial Chamber found that “at least 3,720 Bosnian-Muslim males were killed” in relation to incidents in Srebrenica. The Appeals Chamber observes that this finding is based on an incident-by-incident analysis in Chapters 7 and 8.3.2 of the Trial Judgement regarding “Schedule E and other incidents” rather than on Adjudicated Fact 1476.

440. Having reviewed the relevant portions of the Trial Judgement, the Appeals Chamber finds Mladić’s submission – “that the Trial Chamber failed to give a reasoned opinion that, based on [Adjudicated Fact] 1476, all of the 7,000–8,000 victims of the killings in Srebrenica were not actively taking part in hostilities” – to be based on a misinterpretation of the Trial Judgement. The Trial Chamber’s finding that “all of the victims of the killings in
Srebrenica were not actively participating in the hostilities at the time of the killings” is explicitly qualified by its findings in Chapter 8.3.2 of the Trial Judgement. Chapter 8.3.2, as elaborated below, sets out an incident-by-incident account of the killings in Srebrenica. Recalling that the Trial Judgement must be read as a whole, the Appeals Chamber considers that the Trial Chamber’s statement about “all of the victims of the killings in Srebrenica” was a reference to those identified in the specific scheduled and unscheduled incidents. Contrary to Mladić’s submission, there is no indication that the Trial Chamber made a finding, on the basis of Adjudicated Fact 1476, that all of the 7,000 to 8,000 victims of the killings in Srebrenica were not actively taking part in hostilities. Accordingly, Mladić’s submission in this respect is dismissed.

The Appeals Chamber also finds no merit in Mladić’s contention that the Trial Chamber failed to evaluate the military status of the victims in Srebrenica. The Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber conducted a detailed incident-by-incident analysis in Chapters 7 and 8.3.2 of the Trial Judgement and evaluated the status of the victims for each incident. Contrary to Mladić’s assertion that the Trial Chamber found that “all of the victims were civilians”, the Trial Chamber rather concluded that “a number of the victims were civilians”. The Trial Chamber further specified that: “For many incidents, [...] it remained unclear whether the victims were civilians or combatants. However, those people were at least detained at the time of killing, thus hors de combat.” Based on these considerations, the Trial Chamber found that the victims were not actively participating in the hostilities at the time of the killings. Such a detailed and comprehensive assessment of the status of the victims in the Srebrenica incidents satisfies, in the Appeals Chamber’s view, the Trial Chamber’s obligation to provide a reasoned opinion.

The Appeals Chamber, Judge Nyambe dissenting, accordingly rejects Mladić’s claim that the Trial Chamber failed to provide a reasoned opinion on the military status of the victims or that it erred in this respect in relation to Adjudicated Fact 1476.

(a) Alleged Error in the Use of Adjudicated Fact 1476 and in Articulating Mladić’s Liability

The Appeals Chamber now turns to Mladić’s allegation that the Trial Chamber erroneously relied on “the number of victims contained in [Adjudicated Fact] 1476” to make findings on his mens rea and significant contribution to the Srebrenica JCE as well as to determine his sentence. As noted above, the Trial Chamber referred to Adjudicated Fact 1476 only with respect to the burial operations and the chapeau elements of crimes against humanity in Srebrenica. This adjudicated fact is thus pertinent in this case to the overall situation in Srebrenica and not to Mladić’s acts, conduct, and mental state. This is further supported by the fact that, as previously elaborated, the Trial Chamber did not rely on Adjudicated Fact 1476 to determine the number of killings for which Mladić was ultimately found responsible in relation to the Srebrenica JCE. Rather, that determination was based on a detailed incident-by-incident analysis of Schedule E incidents and unscheduled events in Chapters 7 and 8.3.2 of the Trial Judgement.

Regarding his intent to participate in the Srebrenica JCE and his genocidal intent, Mladić points to the Trial Chamber’s consideration of his presence at a meeting on 13 July 1995 with the VRS and the MUP during which the task of killing 8,000 Muslim males was discussed. In the Appeals Chamber’s view, Mladić has conflated Adjudicated Fact 1476 with Exhibit P2118, which states that he was present at a meeting that discussed the “[k]illing of about 8,000 Muslim soldiers whom [they] blocked in the woods near Konjević Polje [...] [t]his job is being done solely by MUP units”. There is no indication that Exhibit P2118 or the Trial Chamber’s findings regarding his mens rea to participate in the Srebrenica JCE or to commit genocide were in any way based on Adjudicated Fact 1476. Having reviewed the Trial Chamber’s analysis on Mladić’s significant contribution to the Srebrenica JCE, the Appeals Chamber finds that the same holds true – there is no indication that the Trial Chamber relied on Adjudicated Fact 1476 in this respect.

In relation to his sentence, Mladić argues that “the Trial Chamber relied on its findings in Chapters 7 and 8 where it established that 7,000–8,000 Bosnian-Muslim men were systematically murdered on the basis of [Adjudicated Fact] 1476”. The Appeals Chamber observes that, when assessing the gravity of Mladić’s offences, the Trial Chamber referred to its findings on the crimes in Chapters 7 and 8 as well as his significant contribution to the Srebrenica JCE in Chapter 9.7. As addressed above, there is no indication in the Trial Judgement that the
Trial Chamber relied on Adjudicated Fact 1476 to determine his liability in those sections of the Trial Judgement. Mladić does not demonstrate that the Trial Chamber determined his sentence for crimes committed in Srebrenica on the basis of Adjudicated Fact 1476.

Based on the foregoing, the Appeals Chamber rejects, Judge Nyambe dissenting, Mladić’s submissions that the Trial Chamber erred in using Adjudicated Fact 1476 as a basis for determining his liability or sentence with respect to the Srebrenica JCE.

(c) Alleged Error in Failing to Consider Rebuttal Evidence

With respect to Mladić’s submissions regarding rebuttal evidence, the Appeals Chamber recalls that it has already rejected his blanket submission that the Trial Chamber erred by applying a heightened standard on the burden to rebut adjudicated facts. Mladić’s bare statement to this effect in this part of the appeal is also rejected.

With respect to the alleged error in failing to consider evidence presented by Mladić to rebut Adjudicated Fact 1476, the Appeals Chambers recalls that the Trial Chamber only referenced this fact in sections of the Trial Judgement regarding burial operations and the chapeau elements of crimes against humanity, where it considered the number of victims and the overall situation in Srebrenica. Moreover, as already discussed, Mladić’s responsibility for crimes committed in Srebrenica was based on a detailed incident-by-incident analysis of killings in Chapter 8.3.2 of the Trial Judgement as well as extensive evidence of his participation in the Srebrenica JCE, rather than on Adjudicated Fact 1476. Given that the Trial Chamber did not use Adjudicated Fact 1476 to determine Mladić’s acts, conduct, and mental state, and thus his liability for the Srebrenica JCE, the Appeals Chamber considers that any error on the Trial Chamber’s part regarding the assessment of rebuttal evidence would have little, if any, impact on its findings in the Trial Judgement. The Appeals Chamber recalls that arguments which do not have the potential to cause the impugned decision to be reversed or revised may be immediately dismissed and need not be considered on the merits. As such, the Appeals Chamber, Judge Nyambe dissenting, therefore dismisses Mladić’s argument that the Trial Chamber failed to address evidence rebutting Adjudicated Fact 1476.

(d) Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the Appeals Chamber, Judge Nyambe dissenting, dismisses Ground 5.E of Mladić’s appeal.

5. Alleged Error in Relying on Certain Evidence without Corroboration (Ground 5.I)

Mladić submits that, in reaching its findings in support of his Srebrenica JCE convictions under Counts 2 to 8 of the Indictment, the Trial Chamber erred by giving undue weight to “decisive hearsay” and adjudicated facts. In particular, he argues that the Trial Chamber erred by relying on: (i) uncorroborated hearsay to make findings linked to his significant contribution and intent; and (ii) adjudicated facts to prove the elemental requirements of the crime base. Mladić therefore requests that the Appeals Chamber reverse, to the extent of any error, the findings and the basis of his Srebrenica JCE convictions. The Appeals Chamber will address these contentions in turn.

(a) Alleged Error in Relying on Uncorroborated Hearsay

The Trial Chamber admitted into evidence excerpts of Witness Deronjić’s testimony in the Blagojević and Jokić case pursuant to Rule 92 quarter of the ICTY Rules, excerpts of the testimony of Witness Drinić in the Blagojević and Jokić case, as well as excerpts of Witness Mevludin Orić’s testimony in the Popović et al. case pursuant to Rule 92 bis of the ICTY Rules. Mladić submits that the Trial Chamber erred in law by relying on this untested evidence to make findings related to his significant contribution to and intent for the Srebrenica JCE. According to Mladić, without the Trial Chamber’s erroneous reliance on this evidence, it would not have established the elements of Scheduled Incident E.15, nor the essential elements of the existence of the Srebrenica JCE and his participation in them.
452. The Prosecution responds that Mladić fails to show that the Trial Chamber erred by giving “undue weight to” or “relying on” three witnesses whom he did not cross-examine. In the Prosecution’s view, the Trial Chamber properly relied on the evidence of Witnesses Deronjić, Drinić, and Orić. The Prosecution argues that Mladić’s convictions under Counts 2 to 8 of the Indictment in relation to the Srebrenica JCE rest on numerous sources of evidence and findings set out over two volumes of the Trial Judgement and that his assertion that any of his convictions are based solely or in a decisive manner on “untested” evidence is incorrect.

453. The Appeals Chamber recalls that under Article 21(4)(e) of the ICTY Statute an accused has the right to examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him. In relation to the challenges to a trial chamber’s reliance on evidence admitted pursuant to Rules 92 bis and 92 quater of the ICTY Rules when the defendant did not have an opportunity to cross-examine the witness, the Appeals Chamber has adopted the following statement of the law:

[A] conviction may not rest solely, or in a decisive manner, on the evidence of a witness whom the accused has had no opportunity to examine or to have examined either during the investigation or at trial. This principle applies “to any fact which is indispensable for a conviction”, meaning “the findings that a trier of fact has to reach beyond reasonable doubt”. It is considered to “run counter to the principles of fairness [ . . . ] to allow a conviction based on evidence of this kind without sufficient corroboration”.

(i) Witness Deronjić’s Rule 92 quater Evidence

454. In finding the existence of the Srebrenica JCE and Mladić’s significant contribution to it, the Trial Chamber considered an excerpt of Witness Deronjić’s testimony admitted pursuant to Rule 92 quater of the ICTY Rules, in which he stated that Beara told him that he was about to kill all detainees in Bratunac and that he would do so based on “orders from the top”. Further, with regard to the alleged concealment of crimes during the transportation of Bosnian Muslim civilians out of Potočari, the Trial Chamber, relying on the evidence of Witnesses RM-294 and Deronjić, found that a declaration signed by the Dutchbat Deputy Commander Major Robert Franken, Deronjić, and Nesib Mandžić on 17 July 1995 did not reflect the reality with regard to options the population would have had, as no one was given a choice to remain or be evacuated.

455. Mladić submits that the Trial Chamber erroneously relied on Witness Deronjić’s sole evidence linking Mladić’s subordinate, Beara, to the statement that the orders to kill “came from the top”, as evidence of Mladić’s guilt. In his submission, the Trial Chamber also erred by considering that a declaration, signed by Witness Deronjić regarding the evacuations, concealed that the civilian departures were not voluntary in nature, and it relied on this evidence to find that Mladić was a member of and participated in the Srebrenica JCE and intended to conceal crimes.

456. The Prosecution responds that no conviction rests on Witness Deronjić’s evidence alone. It contends that Witness Deronjić’s testimony that Beara told him that the orders to kill came “from the top” was only a fraction of the evidence considered by the Trial Chamber in finding the existence of the Srebrenica JCE and Mladić’s participation in it. The Prosecution also submits that the Trial Chamber reasonably relied on Witness Deronjić’s evidence that the 17 July 1995 declaration he signed concealed the involuntary nature of the transfers.

457. The Appeals Chamber will now examine whether Mladić’s convictions rest solely, or in a decisive manner, on the untested evidence of Witness Deronjić. In this regard, the Appeals Chamber observes that, in admitting Witness Deronjić’s testimony pursuant to Rule 92 quater of the ICTY Rules, including its “limited references” to matters that go to the proof of Mladić’s acts and conduct as charged in the Indictment, the Trial Chamber considered that this evidence is cumulative of other evidence and emphasized that “it cannot possibly enter a conviction [based] solely on Deronjić’s evidence without other evidence to corroborate it”.

458. In finding the existence of the Srebrenica JCE and Mladić’s participation in it, although the Trial Chamber considered Witness Deronjić’s testimony regarding the orders to kill, the Appeals Chamber observes that the Trial Chamber essentially relied on its other findings, based on extensive evidence, in relation to: (i) the take-
over of the Srebrenica enclave; (ii) the crimes committed in the aftermath of the take-over, including murder, extermination, inhumane acts (forcible transfer), persecution, and genocide; and (iii) the various statements, acts, and meetings of Bosnian Serb individuals around the time of the take-over of the enclave. The Appeals Chamber thus considers that Witness Deronjić’s testimony represents only a small fraction of the evidence considered by the Trial Chamber and Mladić’s convictions would stand even without it. Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber finds that Witness Deronjić’s testimony regarding the orders to kill cannot be classified as evidence which formed the sole or even a decisive basis for any of Mladić’s convictions.

Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber notes that Mladić’s characterization of the excerpt of Witness Deronjić’s testimony regarding the orders to kill as hearsay evidence is correct to the extent that the content of the evidence is what Beara told him. The Appeals Chamber recalls that a trial chamber has the discretion to rely on hearsay evidence, and, accordingly, it is for Mladić to show that no reasonable trier of fact would have taken this evidence into account. However, Mladić’s general contentions concerning the Trial Chamber’s use of this evidence fail to demonstrate that the Trial Chamber erred in this regard.

Turning to the excerpt of Witness Deronjić’s testimony regarding the involuntary nature of the transfers, the Appeals Chamber notes that this evidence was corroborated by the evidence of Witnesses Robert Franken and RM-294, which demonstrated that the declaration did not reflect the reality because no one was given a genuine choice whether to stay or to be evacuated. Further, the Appeals Chamber observes that, in reaching its finding that approximately 25,000 Bosnian Muslims who left Potočari to go to Bosnian Muslim controlled territory did not have a genuine choice but to leave, the Trial Chamber did not only rely on evidence concerning the declaration. The Trial Chamber also recalled:

(i) the circumstances surrounding the movement of population from Srebrenica to Potočari, including the orders by the 10th Sabotage Detachment to Srebrenica Town inhabitant[s] to leave, the shells fired by the VRS at the UNPROFOR Bravo compound in Srebrenica, the mortars fired along the road taken by the Bosnian Muslims fleeing towards Potočari; (ii) the situation in the UNPROFOR compound in Potočari and its surroundings, where the population sought refuge, namely the shots and shell[s] fired around the compound, the dire living conditions, the fear and exhaustion of the Bosnian Muslims who had sought refuge there; and (iii) that the VRS, assisted by MUP units, coordinated the boarding of buses, ultimately forcing women[,] children and elderly onto the buses while some were hit by members of the MUP, and escorted the buses towards Bosnian-Muslim controlled territory.

Therefore, the Appeals Chamber considers that Witness Deronjić’s testimony regarding the involuntary nature of the transfers was corroborated and that the Trial Chamber did not rely solely, or in a decisive manner, on his evidence in support of Mladić’s convictions related to the Srebrenica JCE. Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber finds, Judge Nyambe dissenting, that Mladić fails to show any error in the Trial Chamber’s reliance on Witness Deronjić’s evidence.

(ii) Witness Drinić’s Rule 92 bis Evidence

Relying in part on Witness Drinić’s evidence admitted pursuant to Rule 92 bis of the ICTY Rules, the Trial Chamber found that no investigations were conducted by any Bosnian Serb military or civilian authority in relation to crimes committed in Srebrenica in 1995. Mladić submits that the Trial Chamber erred in law by relying on Witness Drinić’s untested testimony in a decisive manner to make this finding, and that, although he sought to recall Witness Drinić and cross-examine him, the Trial Chamber denied this request.

The Prosecution responds that the Trial Chamber properly relied on Witness Drinić’s evidence to find that no investigations were conducted by Bosnian Serb military or civilian organs. The Prosecution argues that the Rule 92 bis evidence provided by Witness Drinić does not relate to Mladić’s acts or conduct and is cumulative of Witness RM-513’s testimony. It further submits that Mladić did not oppose admission of this evidence at trial or seek to recall Witness Drinić to cross-examine him on the basis of this evidence. The Prosecution
further contends that, in any event, the Trial Chamber did not rely solely on this evidence to find that no investigations were conducted.1619

464. While it is undisputed that Mladić did not cross-examine Witness Drinić, the Appeals Chamber is not convinced by Mladić’s submission that the Trial Chamber relied on Witness Drinić’s evidence in a decisive manner to find that there were no investigations or prosecutions with regard to the Srebrenica killings.1620 The Appeals Chamber notes that, in reaching its finding, the Trial Chamber relied on, in addition to Witness Drinić’s evidence, the witness statement and testimony of Witness RM-513 showing that there were no investigations or prosecutions with regard to the killings of Muslims in Srebrenica or the Zvornik area by members of the Drina Corps, even though information of mass killings was discussed by VRS officers.1621

465. Further, the Appeals Chamber considers that the Trial Chamber’s impugned finding could stand even without Witness Drinić’s untested testimony. Indeed, the witness statement and testimony of Witness RM-513 suffice to support the Trial Chamber’s finding in question. The Appeals Chamber notes that Mladić does not contest the Trial Chamber’s reliance on or evaluation of the evidence of Witness RM-513 on appeal. The Appeals Chamber further recalls that there is no legal requirement that the testimony of a single witness on a material fact be corroborated before it can be accepted as evidence. What matters is the reliability and credibility accorded to the testimony.1622 The Appeals Chamber observes that Mladić was given an opportunity to cross-examine Witness RM-513. However, he did not contest the reliability and credibility of the testimony of Witness RM-513 that there were no investigations or prosecutions with regard to the Srebrenica killings.1623

466. Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber finds, Judge Nyambe dissenting, that Mladić fails to show that the Trial Chamber relied decisively on Witness Drinić’s untested testimony in reaching its finding that there were no civilian or military investigations regarding crimes committed in Srebrenica and dismisses Mladić’s submission in this regard.

(iii) Witness Orić’s Rule 92 bis Evidence

467. Relying in part on Witness Orić’s evidence admitted pursuant to Rule 92 bis of the ICTY Rules,1624 the Trial Chamber found that, in relation to Scheduled Incident E.15.3, on the night of 13 July 1995, VRS military policemen killed a Bosnian Muslim man who was forced off a bus parked in front of Vuk Karadžić Elementary School.1625

468. Mladić submits that the Trial Chamber erred in law by relying on Witness Orić’s Rule 92 bis evidence to establish the crime of murder in Scheduled Incident E.15.3.1626 Mladić argues that Witness Orić’s testimony was uncorroborated by any other evidence and that he was unable to challenge it.1627 Mladić further submits that without erroneously relying on Witness Orić’s Rule 92 bis evidence, the Trial Chamber would not have been able to establish the elements of Scheduled Incident E.15.3, nor the essential elements of the existence of the Srebrenica JCE and his participation in it.1628

469. The Prosecution responds that Mladić fails to identify an error with respect to the Trial Chamber’s reliance on Witness Orić’s evidence in relation to Scheduled Incident E.15.3.1629 According to the Prosecution, while corroboration was not required, Witness Orić’s evidence was, in fact, corroborated by adjudicated facts considered by the Trial Chamber which demonstrated a pattern of conduct.1630 The Prosecution further contends that Mladić’s convictions under Counts 2 to 8 do not rest solely or decisively on Witness Orić’s “untested evidence” because Scheduled Incident E.15.3 is one of many killings underlying Mladić’s conviction for murder and genocide which would stand without the finding that Scheduled Incident E.15.3 took place.1631

470. The Appeals Chamber notes that Witness Orić’s evidence was corroborated. In reaching its finding on the killing of one Bosnian Muslim man on 13 July 1995, the Trial Chamber also considered, inter alia, Adjudicated Facts 1502, 1503, 1505, 1506, 1518, and 1519, which demonstrate a pattern of conduct relating to the detention and killing of Bosnian Muslim men in and around the Vuk Karadžić Elementary School between 12 and 14 July 1995.1632 In this respect, the Appeals Chamber recalls that evidence demonstrating a pattern of conduct relevant to serious violations of international humanitarian law may be used as corroborative evidence.1633 There is also no indication that Mladić rebutted these adjudicated facts by introducing reliable and credible evidence to the contrary. Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber, Judge Nyambe dissenting, rejects Mladić’s submission that the Trial
Chamber erred in law by relying on Witness Orić’s Rule 92 bis evidence when making its finding on Scheduled Incident E.15.3.1634

(b) Alleged Error in Relying on Adjudicated Fact 1612

Pursuant to Rule 94 of the ICTY Rules, the Trial Chamber took judicial notice of Adjudicated Fact 1612 which states that “[b]etween 1,000 and 1,200 men were killed in the course of [16 July 1995] at [the Branjevo Military Farm]”.1635 In relation to Scheduled Incident E.9.2, the Trial Chamber relied in part on Adjudicated Fact 1612 to determine that between 1,000 and 1,200 male Bosnian Muslim detainees were killed by VRS soldiers at the Branjevo Military Farm on 16 July 1995.1636 The Trial Chamber also found that the victims of this incident were buried at the Branjevo Military Farm mass grave, and that bodies from this mass grave were subsequently reburied in the Čančari Road 4, 8, 9, 11, and 12 mass graves.1637

Mladić submits that the Trial Chamber erred in relying on Adjudicated Fact 1612 to find that the number of victims in relation to Scheduled Incident E.9.2 was between 1,000 and 1,200.1638 Mladić argues that the Trial Chamber preferred Adjudicated Fact 1612 while it was rebutted by the Prosecution’s forensic evidence, namely by the evidence of Witness William Haglund and former ICTY Prosecution Investigator Dušan Janc, showing that the number of victims was limited to 132 bodies at the primary burial site and 43 DNA matches to a secondary site.1639

The Prosecution responds that the Trial Chamber properly relied on Adjudicated Fact 1612.1640 Specifically, it argues that: (i) the Trial Chamber correctly concluded that the forensic evidence did not contradict Adjudicated Fact 1612,1641 (ii) Mladić fails to identify an error in the Trial Chamber’s finding that the evidence of Witnesses Haglund and Janc does not contradict the total number of victims established through Adjudicated Fact 1612,1642 and (iii) the Trial Chamber properly exercised its discretion in taking judicial notice of adjudicated facts.1643

The Appeals Chamber recalls that by taking judicial notice of an adjudicated fact, a trial chamber recognizes a well-founded presumption for the accuracy of this fact, which therefore does not have to be proven again at trial.1644 It is well-established that facts judicially noticed pursuant to Rule 94(B) of the ICTY Rules are presumptions that may be rebutted with evidence at trial,1645 and that their use does not shift the ultimate burden of proof or persuasion, which remains on the Prosecution.1646 An accused may rebut the presumption by introducing “reliable and credible” evidence to the contrary.1647 The final evaluation of the reliability and credibility, and hence the probative value of the evidence, will only be made in light of the totality of the evidence in the case, in the course of determining the weight to be attached to it.1648

The Appeals Chamber notes that, although Mladić challenged Adjudicated Fact 1612 at trial, he did not present any evidence to explicitly rebut it.1649 Moreover, it is for a trial chamber to determine what conclusions, if any, are to be drawn from adjudicated facts when considered together with all of the evidence brought at trial.1650 In determining the number of victims in Scheduled Incident E.9.2, the Trial Chamber considered, inter alia: (i) the evidence of Witness Haglund showing that the Pilica grave site, also referred to as the Branjevo Military Farm grave site, contained the remains of at least 132 men;1651 and (ii) Janc’s report on the Srebrenica investigation identifying 43 DNA connections between the remains identified at the Branjevo Military Farm primary mass grave, and the remains identified in the Čančari Road 4, 8, 9, 11, and 12 secondary mass graves.1652 The Trial Chamber considered that this evidence did not establish the total number of victims in relation to Scheduled Incident E.9.2 because the Branjevo Military Farm and Čančari Road mass graves contained bodies from multiple incidents.1653 It thus found that this evidence did not contradict Adjudicated Fact 1612 with respect to the total number of victims.1654

Having reviewed the relevant portions of the Trial Judgement, the Appeals Chamber finds no merit in Mladić’s contention that Adjudicated Fact 1612 is contradicted by the Prosecution evidence with respect to the number of victims. In the Appeals Chamber’s view, Mladić misinterprets the evidence of Witness Haglund and the report of Janc by asserting that this evidence limits the victims to “132 bodies at the primary burial site and 43 DNA matches to a secondary site”.1655 Moreover, in determining whether evidence contradicts an adjudicated fact, the Appeals Chamber recalls that it previously upheld the Trial Chamber’s analysis that considered whether
the evidence was “unambiguous in its meaning”, namely that it must either point to “a specific alternative scenario” or “unambiguously demonstrate[s] that the scenario as found in the Adjudicated Fact must reasonably be excluded as true”. 1656 In respect of Adjudicated Fact 1612, the Prosecution evidence that Mladić refers to on appeal does not point to a specific alternative scenario nor does it unambiguously demonstrate that the scenario as found in Adjudicated Fact 1612, namely that between 1,000 and 1,200 men were killed in the course of 16 July 1995 at the Branjevo Military Farm, 1657 must be reasonably excluded as true. 1658 Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber finds that Mladić fails to identify any error in the Trial Chamber’s finding that the evidence of Witness Haglund and the report of Janc do not contradict Adjudicated Fact 1612 with respect to the total number of victims in relation to Scheduled Incident E.9.2.

477. On the basis of the foregoing, the Appeals Chamber finds, Judge Nyambe dissenting, that Mladić fails to show that the Trial Chamber erred in relying on Adjudicated Fact 1612 to find that the number of victims in relation to Scheduled Incident E.9.2 was between 1,000 and 1,200.

(e) Conclusion

478. In light of the foregoing, the Appeals Chamber, Judge Nyambe dissenting, dismisses Ground 5.I of Mladić’s appeal.

E. Alleged Errors Related to the Hostage-Taking JCE (Ground 6)

479. The Trial Chamber found that, between 25 May and 24 June 1995, VRS soldiers and officers, including members of the military police, and Bosnian Serb police officers and others, detained UNPROFOR and UNMO personnel (“UN Personnel”) in Pale, Banja Luka, Goražde, and in and around Sarajevo, held some of them in strategic military locations which were potential targets of NATO air strikes, and threatened to kill them in order to exert leverage over NATO to end air strikes against Bosnian Serb military targets, recover Serb weapons under UNPROFOR control, and compel UNPROFOR forces to surrender or exchange prisoners. 1659 The Trial Chamber found that these acts constituted the crime of taking of hostages as a violation of the laws or customs of war punishable under Article 3 of the ICTY Statute. 1660

480. The Trial Chamber further concluded that, from around 25 May 1995, when NATO air strikes commenced, until approximately 24 June 1995, when the last of the detained UN Personnel was released, the Hostage-Taking JCE existed with the common objective of capturing UN Personnel deployed in various parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina and detaining them at strategic military locations to prevent NATO from launching air strikes against Bosnian Serb military targets. 1661 The Trial Chamber found that members of the Hostage-Taking JCE, which included Radovan Karadžić, Nikola Koljević, as well as members of the VRS Main Staff and corps commands, implemented the common objective themselves or by using VRS members. 1662 The Trial Chamber further found that Mladić, Commander of the VRS Main Staff, was “closely involved […] throughout every stage of the hostage-taking” and significantly contributed to the Hostage-Taking JCE. 1663 It also found that Mladić, as well as other members of the Hostage-Taking JCE, shared the intent to achieve the common objective of the joint criminal enterprise. 1664 The Trial Chamber convicted Mladić under Count 11 of the Indictment for the crime of taking of hostages as a violation of the laws or customs of war on the basis of his participation in the Hostage-Taking JCE. 1665

481. Mladić submits that the Trial Chamber erred in finding that he intended the objective of the Hostage-Taking JCE and that he committed the actus reus and shared the requisite intent for the crime of hostage-taking. In particular, he submits that the Trial Chamber: (i) applied a wrong legal standard in finding that the detention of UN Personnel constituted the crime of hostage-taking; (ii) made incorrect conclusions from its assessment of evidence relating to the detention of UN Personnel; and (iii) erred by assessing circumstantial evidence in a manner that violated the principle of in dubio pro reo. 1666 The Appeals Chamber will address these contentions in turn.

1. Alleged Error in Applying the Legal Standard to Find that the Detention of UN Personnel Constituted the Crime of Hostage-Taking (Ground 6.A)

482. In concluding that the events between 25 May and 24 June 1995 constituted the crime of hostage-taking as a violation of the laws or customs of war punishable under Article 3 of the ICTY Statute, the Trial Chamber found that
it had jurisdiction over the alleged violation and that the captured UN Personnel fell within the protection guaranteed by Common Article 3 to the four Geneva Conventions (“Common Article 3”). The Trial Chamber held that violations of Common Article 3 fall within the ambit of Article 3 of the ICTY Statute, and that the charge of hostage-taking under Common Article 3(1)(b) meets the jurisdictional requirements and general conditions of Article 3 of the ICTY Statute. In this regard, the Trial Chamber, relying on ICTY Appeals Chamber jurisprudence, held, inter alia, that the rules in Common Article 3 are part of customary international law in international and non-international armed conflicts and that violations of such rules entail individual criminal responsibility. The Trial Chamber also recalled that the protection of Common Article 3 applies to any person taking no active part in the hostilities including combatants placed hors de combat at the time the offence was committed.

Mladić submits that his conviction under Count 11 of the Indictment should be reversed as the Trial Chamber erroneously convicted him for acts which did not constitute a crime under customary international law during the Indictment period. Mladić asserts that the ICTY’s jurisdiction is limited to the ICTY Statute and only the Security Council may “revise and reinterpret the Statute”. He submits that the Trial Chamber in this case erroneously relied on a decision of the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Tadić case in finding that violations of Common Article 3 fall within the ambit of Article 3 of the ICTY Statute. He contends that the Trial Chamber failed to conduct an analysis of its jurisdiction, and that, had it done so, it would have found cogent reasons to depart from the Tadić Decision of 2 October 1995. Mladić submits that, by relying on the Tadić Decision of 2 October 1995, the Trial Chamber violated the principle of nulla poena sine praevia lege, which, according to him, “requires a trier of fact to exercise great caution in finding that an alleged act, not regulated in [Article 3] of the [ICTY] Statute, forms part of a crime.”

Mladić argues that, in May and June 1995, the taking of combatants as hostages entailed only state responsibility and not individual criminal responsibility under customary international law. He contends that the prohibition against taking non-civilians hostage was introduced as a war crime in 2002 with the entry into force of the Statute of the ICC (“ICC Statute”) and that, during the Indictment period, only the killing of hostages was criminalized. Mladić adds that, during the events, individual criminal responsibility extended only to the hostage-taking of civilians and that the UN Personnel could not be considered civilians.

The Prosecution responds that hostage-taking of any detainee was criminalized under customary international law in 1995 and that the ICTY had jurisdiction over this crime. The Prosecution contends that Mladić fails to provide cogent reasons to depart from the well-established jurisprudence that Common Article 3 formed part of customary international law during the relevant events and that its breaches entailed individual criminal responsibility. It asserts that in light of the “clear ICTY case law”, and since Mladić never raised the jurisdictional argument at trial, the Trial Chamber was not required to provide a detailed analysis for hostage-taking as a serious violation of Common Article 3.

Mladić replies that the Prosecution fails to address his submissions and that its reliance on the Karadžić Decision of 11 December 2012 is misguided as the decision does not deal with the issues challenged in his appeal.

The Appeals Chamber observes that Mladić did not raise the issue regarding the Trial Chamber’s alleged lack of jurisdiction over the crime of hostage-taking at trial. The Appeals Chamber recalls that if a party raises no objection to a particular issue before the Trial Chamber when it could have reasonably done so, in the absence of special circumstances, the Appeals Chamber will find that the party has waived its right to adduce the issue as a valid ground of appeal. The Appeals Chamber notes, however, that as discussed below, the matter of the ICTY’s jurisdiction over violations of Common Article 3 and, in particular, the crime of hostage-taking was settled by the ICTY Appeals Chamber and was therefore binding on the Trial Chamber in the present case. Consequently, even if Mladić had raised this jurisdictional challenge at trial, it would not have been open to the Trial Chamber in this case to depart from the jurisprudence of the ICTY Appeals Chamber. In these circumstances, the Appeals Chamber exercises its discretion to examine Mladić’s submissions on appeal in respect of the ICTY’s alleged lack of jurisdiction over the crime of hostage-taking.
488. As to whether cogent reasons exist for the Appeals Chamber to depart from the jurisprudence in this regard, the standards of appellate review require Mladić to demonstrate that the decision to exercise jurisdiction over the crime of hostage-taking was made on the basis of a wrong legal principle or was “wrongly decided, usually because the judge or judges were ill-informed about the applicable law”.

489. Furthermore, the ICTY has exercised its jurisdiction under Article 3 of the ICTY Statute to try individuals for violations of Common Article 3, including on the basis of hostage-taking. In this respect, the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Karadžić case upheld the ICTY Trial Chamber’s determination that the ICTY had jurisdiction over the crime of hostage-taking under Article 3 of the ICTY Statute. The ICTY Appeals Chamber has held that, under Common Article 3, there is an absolute prohibition of hostage-taking of civilians and detained individuals irrespective of their status prior to detention. It has also rejected the submission that the crime of hostage-taking is limited under customary international law to the taking of civilians hostage. In light of this jurisprudence, the Appeals Chamber considers that the matter of the ICTY’s jurisdiction over the crime of hostage-taking was settled by the ICTY Appeals Chamber.

490. In attempting to demonstrate that there are cogent reasons to depart from this well-established jurisprudence, Mladić submits that during the Indictment period, with the exception of the killing of hostages or the taking of civilians hostage, the taking of “non-civilians” hostage was not prohibited and did not entail individual criminal responsibility under customary international law. Mladić’s argument that the laws and norms applicable to the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg only apply to the killing of hostages does not undermine the fact that the prohibition of hostage-taking of any person taking no active part in hostilities as well as detained individuals irrespective of their status prior to detention. It has also rejected the submission that the crime of hostage-taking is limited under customary international law to the taking of civilians hostage. In light of this jurisprudence, the Appeals Chamber considers that the matter of the ICTY’s jurisdiction over the crime of hostage-taking was settled by the ICTY Appeals Chamber.

491. Against this background, the Appeals Chamber finds that Mladić’s reliance on two domestic military manuals in support of his arguments is unpersuasive and fails to undermine well-established law on the prohibition of hostage-taking. In this respect, Mladić’s submission that the military manual of the United States only prohibits the taking of civilians hostage neglects that the same manual restates Common Article 3 and criminalizes “every violation of the law of war” as a war crime. Similarly, his contention that the military manual of the United
Kingdom only prohibits the killing of civilian hostages omits that the same section of the manual provides a non-exhaustive list of acts amounting to war crimes and criminalizes “all other violations of the [Geneva] Conventions”.1705

492. With respect to Mladić’s assertion that hostage-taking did not form part of Article 144 of the Criminal Code of the SFRY,1706 it is worth noting that: (i) Article 142(1) of the same criminal code entitled “War crimes against the civilian population” forbids an attack against persons hors de combat and includes a prohibition against hostage-taking;1707 and (ii) as previously noted by the ICTY Appeals Chamber, the SFRY Parliament enacted a law in 1978 to implement the two Additional Protocols of the Geneva Conventions, which contain the prohibition against hostage-taking, rendering them “directly applicable to the courts of former Yugoslavia”.1708

493. In light of the above considerations, the Appeals Chamber finds that Mladić fails to demonstrate that the decision to exercise jurisdiction over the crime of hostage-taking was made on the basis of a wrong legal principle or has been wrongly decided and that, therefore, there are cogent reasons to depart from well-settled jurisprudence in this respect.

494. The Appeals Chamber notes that in finding that it had jurisdiction over the crime of hostage-taking, the Trial Chamber recalled the four conditions set out in the Tadić Decision of 2 October 1995 to satisfy Article 3 of the ICTY Statute’s “residual jurisdiction”, namely that: (i) the offence charged must violate a rule of international humanitarian law; (ii) the rule must bind the parties at the time of the alleged offence; (iii) the rule must protect important values and its violation must have grave consequences for the victim; and (iv) that such a violation must entail the individual criminal responsibility of the perpetrator.1709 The Trial Chamber relied, inter alia, on the ICTY Appeals Chamber jurisprudence in the Tadić, Ćelebići, and Karadžić cases and concluded that hostage-taking under Article 3(1)(b) common to the Geneva Conventions met these conditions as the rules in Common Article 3 are part of customary international law in international and non-international armed conflicts, the acts prohibited by Common Article 3 breach rules protecting important values and involve grave consequences for the victims, and violations of such rules entail individual criminal responsibility.1710 In light of the established jurisprudence on this matter, the Appeals Chamber finds that the Trial Chamber correctly relied on the Tadić Decision of 2 October 1995 and other consistent ICTY Appeals Chamber jurisprudence in the exercise of its jurisdiction over the crime of hostage-taking and, contrary to Mladić’s argument, it was not required to conduct a more detailed analysis in this respect.1711

495. With respect to Mladić’s submission that the Trial Chamber violated the principle of nullum crimen sine lege, the Appeals Chamber recalls that this principle prescribes that a person may only be found guilty of a crime in respect of acts which constituted a violation of a norm which existed at the time of their commission.1712 In light of the well-established jurisprudence that hostage-taking was a crime under customary international law during the period covered by the Indictment, the Appeals Chamber rejects Mladić’s contention that, by relying on the Tadić Decision of 2 October 1995, the Trial Chamber breached the principle of nullum crimen sine lege.

496. Mladić therefore fails to demonstrate that the Trial Chamber erred in finding that it had jurisdiction over the hostage-taking of the UN Personnel or that there are cogent reasons to depart from well-established jurisprudence on this matter. Based on the foregoing, the Appeals Chamber dismisses Ground 6.A of Mladić’s appeal.


497. Upon considering Mladić’s argument that the UN Personnel were combatants and not entitled to the protection of Common Article 3, the Trial Chamber found their status as combatants or civilians to be irrelevant since the protection of Common Article 3 applies to any person taking no active part in the hostilities at the time the offence was committed, including combatants rendered hors de combat by detention.1713 The Trial Chamber concluded that the captured UN Personnel fell within the protection guaranteed by Common Article 3.1714

498. Mladić submits that the Trial Chamber erred by failing to make a determination of the status of the UN Personnel and in finding that their status as combatants or civilians was irrelevant.1715 He contends that the UN Personnel were combatants and that the detention of combatants as prisoners of war, who become hors de combat, does
not entail any criminal responsibility. Consequently, Mladić submits, the Trial Chamber did not have jurisdiction over the alleged crime of taking the UN Personnel hostage.

The Prosecution responds that the UN Personnel were rendered hors de combat by their detention and, as such, were protected under Common Article 3 regardless of their status prior to detention. It submits that the ICTY had jurisdiction over the crime of hostage-taking relating to all detained individuals and that the determination of the status of the UN Personnel prior to detention was unnecessary.

Mladić replies that the Prosecution does not engage directly with his submission that the status of the UN Personnel was relevant to whether the Trial Chamber had jurisdiction over the alleged crimes.

As discussed above, the Trial Chamber correctly found that the protection of Common Article 3 applies to any person taking no active part in the hostilities including combatants placed hors de combat at the time the offence was committed. The prohibition against hostage-taking in Common Article 3 applies to all detained individuals irrespective of their status prior to detention. Accordingly, the Appeals Chambers of the ICTY and the Mechanism have affirmed that the UN Personnel were entitled to protection under Common Article 3. Mladić therefore fails to demonstrate that the Trial Chamber erred in finding that the status of the UN Personnel, as combatants or civilians, was irrelevant to determining whether they were entitled to the protection against hostage-taking in Common Article 3.

Based on the foregoing, the Appeals Chamber dismisses Ground 6.B of Mladić’s appeal.

### 3. Alleged Errors in Assessing Circumstantial Evidence (Ground 6.C)

As recalled above, the Trial Chamber concluded that, from around 25 May 1995 until approximately 24 June 1995, the Hostage-Taking JCE existed with the common objective of capturing the UN Personnel deployed in various parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina and detaining them at strategic military locations to prevent NATO from launching air strikes against Bosnian Serb military targets. The Trial Chamber also found that Mladić significantly contributed to and, along with other members of the Hostage-Taking JCE, shared the intent to achieve the common objective of this joint criminal enterprise.

Mladić submits that the Trial Chamber gave insufficient weight to exculpatory evidence in relation to the Hostage-Taking JCE, leading it to err in finding that his significant contribution and mens rea were established beyond reasonable doubt. The Appeals Chamber will address these contentions in turn.

#### (a) Alleged Failure to Give Sufficient Weight to “Exculpatory Evidence” Concerning Mladić’s Significant Contribution to the Hostage-Taking JCE

In concluding that Mladić significantly contributed to the Hostage-Taking JCE, the Trial Chamber considered its findings that, inter alia, Mladić ordered VRS units to detain the UN Personnel and to place them at potential NATO air strike targets and, when requested to release them, informed the UNPROFOR Commander that the detainees’ release was contingent on the cessation of air strikes.

Mladić submits that the Trial Chamber erred in fact in making findings on his significant contribution to the Hostage-Taking JCE, namely by: (i) relying on orders not issued by him; (ii) failing to give sufficient weight to other orders issued by him to treat the UN Personnel as prisoners of war in accordance with the Geneva Conventions; and (iii) failing to correctly assess evidence relating to the filming of the UN Personnel.

Specifically, Mladić submits that, in finding that he ordered the placement of the UN Personnel at potential NATO air strike targets and that he significantly contributed to the Hostage-Taking JCE, the Trial Chamber failed to give sufficient weight to the fact that two orders on which it relied were not issued by him. He argues that the order dated 27 May 1995 was not signed by him and originated from the “Supreme Defence Counsel” headed by Karadžić. In addition, he contends that this order and another order, dated 30 May 1995, on which the Trial Chamber relied did not contain his “unique identification number”, and that both were “inconsistent with [his] military notebooks” and orders to his subordinates.
508. Mladić further submits that, in finding that his subordinates made threats against the UN Personnel and that his orders to detain them illustrate his significant contribution to the Hostage-Taking JCE, the Trial Chamber failed to give sufficient weight to orders he gave to subordinates to treat detainees as prisoners of war in accordance with the Geneva Conventions, which were followed. Mladić asserts that his orders to detain and disarm the UN Personnel were lawful under international humanitarian law.

509. Mladić also submits that, in finding that he visited the detainees between 2 and 4 June 1995 and ordered their filming, the Trial Chamber relied on Witness Janusz Kalbarczyk whose evidence was inconsistent and differed from testimonies of other detained UN Personnel who did not confirm seeing Mladić. Mladić asserts that the Trial Chamber found that he ordered the filming of the detainees without referring to evidence. He contends that the Trial Chamber relied on the hearsay evidence of Witness Patrick Rechner that Mladić had ordered the transport of the detainees to be filmed on different dates and locations, and that this evidence was not corroborated by “other UN prisoners present there”. He argues that this evidence was inconsistent with: (i) Witness Kalbarczyk’s testimony affirming Mladić’s absence during the filming on 2 and 3 June 1995 and that the filming was done by a civilian journalist; (ii) the lack of mention of the filming between 2 and 4 June 1995 by Witness Griffiths Evans; and (iii) the evidence of Witness Snježan Lalović, the journalist who conducted the filming, that he was not ordered to film by anyone in the military but by his editors and “who denies any mention of [Mladić]” during the transportation of the detainees on 26 May 1995.

510. The Prosecution responds that none of the evidence cited by Mladić undermines the Trial Chamber’s findings and that he ignores critical evidence establishing his central involvement in the implementation of the common purpose. Specifically, the Prosecution contends that the Trial Chamber did not attribute the order dated 27 May 1995 to Mladić or rely on it in finding that he ordered the placement of the UN Personnel at potential air strike targets. The Prosecution submits that the Trial Chamber did not fail to give sufficient weight to orders to treat detainees as prisoners of war, but points out that those same orders also include instructions to take the UN Personnel as hostages. Consequently, in its submission, the Trial Chamber properly relied on such orders in making its finding that Mladić and the other members of the joint criminal enterprise issued them in furtherance of the common objective of the Hostage-Taking JCE. The Prosecution further submits that the Trial Chamber reviewed the evidence to which Mladić refers with respect to the filming of the detainees and submits that the Trial Chamber reasonably concluded that he ordered the filming. The Prosecution adds that, in any event, the Trial Chamber’s finding of Mladić’s significant contribution does not depend on any finding concerning the filming of the detainees, in light of Mladić’s orders to detain the UN Personnel and place them at potential NATO air strike targets as well as his negotiating about their release.

511. Mladić replies that he demonstrated that the Trial Chamber erred by relying on inconsistent evidence and failing to give sufficient weight to exculpatory evidence regarding his participation in the Hostage-Taking JCE. Mladić contends that the Trial Chamber relied on two orders not issued by him, pointing to orders dated 27 May 1995 and 30 May 1995. With respect to the order dated 27 May 1995, the Appeals Chamber recalls that the Trial Chamber found that it contained an order to various VRS corps and units to place captured and disarmed UNPROFOR forces at potential NATO air strike targets (“Order of 27 May 1995”). With respect to the order dated 30 May 1995, the Trial Chamber found that Mladić informed VRS corps commands and units that NATO was preparing an operation to free the captured UN Personnel and ordered: (i) all units to open fire on the area of airborne assault and of the deployment of UNPROFOR troops in the event NATO launched such an operation; and (ii) the SRK Command to complete the disarming of the detainees and deploy them to potential NATO strike targets (“Order of 30 May 1995”). The Appeals Chamber observes that the Trial Chamber explicitly noted that the Order of 27 May 1995 was signed by Milovanović who was the Chief of Staff and Deputy Commander of the VRS Main Staff. The Trial Chamber therefore did not attribute this order to Mladić personally, but rather to the VRS Main Staff. To the extent that Mladić argues that the Trial Chamber erred in attributing the Order of 30 May 1995 to him, the Appeals Chamber finds this to be without merit as this order bears his signature and Mladić did not claim at trial that the order was not attributable to him. In addition, the Appeals Chamber summarily dismisses Mladić’s undeveloped submissions that the two orders were inconsistent with his military notebooks and
orders to his subordinates. The Appeals Chamber finds that Mladić fails to demonstrate error in the Trial Chamber’s assessment related to the Order of 27 May 1995 and the Order of 30 May 1995.

513. The Appeals Chamber turns to Mladić’s submission that the Trial Chamber failed to give sufficient weight to his orders to subordinates to treat detainees as prisoners of war in accordance with the Geneva Conventions. The Appeals Chamber observes that in support of this argument Mladić refers to paragraphs of the Trial Judgement without pointing to any specific orders or evidence on the record.1755 A review of the Trial Judgement reveals that in some of the paragraphs which Mladić cites, the Trial Chamber discussed evidence concerning orders regarding the treatment of detainees1756 or their actual treatment.1757 In reviewing some of the evidence which Mladić claims concerns the treatment of the detainees as prisoners of war in accordance with the Geneva Conventions, the trial Chamber also considered that: (i) the detainees were beaten, abused, and handcuffed to flagpoles; (ii) Mladić and VRS members issued threats to the UN Personnel or UNPROFOR headquarters on the fate of the detainees with the aim of stopping the air strikes; and (iii) UN Personnel were used as “human shields”.1758 In these circumstances, Mladić does not demonstrate an error on the part of the Trial Chamber in assessing or weighing the evidence.

514. The Appeals Chamber also observes that, in discussing Mladić’s contribution to the Hostage-Taking JCE, the Trial Chamber specifically recalled some of the evidence concerning the alleged treatment of the detained UN Personnel as prisoners of war1759 and found that he: (i) ordered VRS units to detain the UN Personnel and to place them at potential NATO air strike targets; (ii) when requested to release the detained UN Personnel, informed an UNPROFOR representative that such release was contingent on the cessation of air strikes; and (iii) was closely involved throughout every stage of the hostage-taking, including as a negotiator with UNPROFOR representatives.1760 In light of such evidence and findings, Mladić does not show how selective orders to treat the detained UN Personnel as prisoners of war or examples of alleged favourable treatment of the detainees who were threatened, abused, and used as “human shields”, could undermine the Trial Chamber’s conclusion that he significantly contributed to the Hostage-Taking JCE. Similarly, in light of these considerations, the Appeals Chamber finds that Mladić’s arguments that his orders to detain and disarm the UN Personnel, as well as orders forbidding leakage of information regarding the detention and contact with the detainees were lawful, fail to identify any error or undermine the Trial Chamber’s finding that he significantly contributed to the Hostage-Taking JCE.

515. With respect to Mladić’s contention that the Trial Chamber erred in relying on inconsistent evidence in finding that he visited some of the detainees between 2 and 4 June 1995 and ordered to film them, the Appeals Chamber observes that the Trial Chamber did not rely on this evidence in making a finding on Mladić’s significant contribution to the Hostage-Taking JCE.1761 The Trial Chamber mainly relied on the evidence and findings that Mladić ordered VRS units to detain the UN Personnel and place them at potential NATO air strike targets, informed an UNPROFOR representative that their release was contingent on the cessation of air strikes, ordered such release, and was closely involved throughout every stage of the hostage-taking including as a negotiator with UNPROFOR representatives.1762 Therefore, any error on the part of the Trial Chamber relating to Mladić’s visit and order to film the detainees between 2 and 4 June 1995 would not disturb the Trial Chamber’s conclusion that he significantly contributed to the Hostage-Taking JCE. Consequently, as Mladić’s submissions on this point do not have the potential to demonstrate a miscarriage of justice or cause the Trial Judgement to be reversed or revised, the Appeals Chamber dismisses them without further consideration in accordance with the applicable standard of review.1763

516. The Appeals Chamber finds that Mladić therefore fails to demonstrate that the Trial Chamber erred in assessing the evidence concerning his contribution to the Hostage-Taking JCE.

(b) Alleged Failure to Give Sufficient Weight to “Exculpatory Evidence” Concerning Mladić’s Mens Rea

517. In concluding that Mladić shared the intent to achieve the common objective of the Hostage-Taking JCE, the Trial Chamber found that he intended to capture the UN Personnel and detain them in strategic military locations in order to prevent NATO from launching further air strikes on Bosnian Serb military targets.1764 The Trial Chamber particularly considered Mladić’s statements and conduct including: (i) his orders to detain the UN Personnel and place them at potential NATO air strike locations; (ii) his statements on the fate of the UN Personnel; (iii) evidence
that he communicated to UNPROFOR that the release of the detainees was contingent on the cessation of air strikes; and (iv) evidence that his subordinates threatened the UN Personnel with the aim of stopping the air strikes. Mladić submits that in finding that he possessed the mens rea for the Hostage-Taking JCE, the Trial Chamber erred by giving insufficient weight to his “proactive actions and conduct”, which reflected his intent “to bring a peaceful end to the situation”. Mladić namely points to his attempt to open “direct and more efficient” channels of communication and prompt action to end the crisis by: (i) negotiating a possible termination of hostilities to end the captivity of the UN Personnel despite the fact that they “can be detained until the definitive termination of hostilities”; and (ii) instructing his subordinates to release the UN Personnel immediately after such decision was made by the political leadership. Mladić further submits that the Trial Chamber gave insufficient, if any, weight to the evidence of Witness Radoje Vojvodić who, on the orders of the VRS Main Staff, removed the UN Personnel from risk and harm inflicted by others and treated them in accordance with international humanitarian law.

The Prosecution responds that the evidence cited by Mladić incriminates, rather than exculpates him, and does not undermine the fact that the UN Personnel were taken hostage on his orders. It contends that Mladić’s argument that prisoners of war can be detained until the termination of hostilities is “beside the point” given his role in conditioning their release on the cessation of hostilities which amounts to a gross violation of international humanitarian law. The Prosecution submits that Mladić played a central role in the implementation of the Hostage-Taking JCE and fails to show error in the Trial Chamber’s findings in relation to his mens rea.

Mladić replies that the Prosecution mischaracterizes and fails to respond to his submissions that he took proactive actions in order to bring an end to the crisis.

With respect to the alleged failure to give sufficient weight to Mladić’s negotiating a possible termination of hostilities, the Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber took express note of and discussed the evidence cited by Mladić of conversations between him and UNPROFOR Commander General Bernard Janvier concerning such negotiations. The Trial Chamber found that when requested to release the UN Personnel, Mladić informed Commander Janvier that their release was contingent on a guarantee that the air strikes would cease. The Trial Chamber took this evidence into account, among other evidence of Mladić’s acts and conduct, in concluding that Mladić shared the intent to achieve the common objective of the Hostage-Taking JCE. The Appeals Chamber finds that Mladić does not demonstrate error in the Trial Chamber’s assessment of his negotiating efforts.

With respect to the alleged failure to give sufficient weight to his instructions to release the UN Personnel immediately upon the decision of the political leadership to do so, the Trial Chamber reviewed the evidence to which Mladić refers that, on 2 and 6 June 1995, in compliance with the orders from Karadžić, Mladić ordered various VRS units to release 215 of the detained UN Personnel. While the Trial Chamber did not expressly discuss this evidence in assessing their release on the cessation of hostilities which amounts to a gross violation of international humanitarian law. The Prosecution submits that Mladić played a central role in the implementation of the Hostage-Taking JCE and fails to show error in the Trial Chamber’s findings in relation to his mens rea.

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Mladić submits that the Trial Chamber gave insufficient, if any, weight to the evidence of Witness Radoje Vojvodić who, on the orders of the VRS Main Staff, removed the UN Personnel from risk and harm inflicted by others and treated them in accordance with international humanitarian law.
quickly to NATO’s potential targets. In light of this evidence considered by the Trial Chamber, Mladić fails to demonstrate that the alleged selective favourable treatment of the detained UN Personnel by one VRS officer could undermine the Trial Chamber’s conclusion that Mladić shared the intent to achieve the common objective of the Hostage-Taking JCE.

524. In light of the evidence and the Trial Chamber’s findings that Mladić issued orders to detain the UN Personnel and place them at potential NATO air strike locations, made statements on the fate of the detainees, informed UNPROFOR that their release was contingent on the cessation of air strikes, and that his subordinates threatened the UN Personnel with the aim of stopping the air strikes, the Appeals Chamber finds that Mladić fails to demonstrate that the Trial Chamber insufficiently considered his “proactive actions and conduct” or that the Trial Chamber assessed the evidence in an unreasonable manner in finding that he shared the intent to achieve the common purpose of the Hostage-Taking JCE.

(c) Conclusion

525. Based on the foregoing, the Appeals Chamber dismisses Ground 6.C of Mladić’s appeal.

...
period. 1829 The Trial Chamber found that Mladić abused this position and that, inter alia, this “abuse of his superior position” added to the gravity of the offences. 1830

542. Mladić submits that the Trial Chamber did not prove the elements of superior responsibility under Article 7(3) of the ICTY Statute beyond reasonable doubt and thus erred by “aggravating [his] sentence with superior responsibility”. 1831 Mladić requests the Appeals Chamber to revise the sentence accordingly. 1832

543. The Prosecution responds that Mladić’s sentence should stand, as life imprisonment is the only sentence that reflects both the gravity of his crimes and the form and degree of his participation in them and any other sentence would be “unreasonable and plainly unjust”. 1833 The Prosecution submits that the Trial Chamber appropriately considered Mladić’s abuse of authority as an aggravating factor, which did not require a finding of superior responsibility. 1834

544. Mladić replies that the Prosecution fails to undermine the legal and factual grounds of appeal under Ground 9. 1835

545. The Appeals Chamber recalls that the primary goal in sentencing is to ensure that the final or aggregate sentence reflects the totality of the criminal conduct and overall culpability of the offender. 1836 While gravity of the offence is the primary factor in sentencing, the inherent gravity must be determined by reference to the particular circumstances of the case and the form and degree of the accused’s participation in the crime. 1837 In this regard, the Appeals Chamber recalls that while a position of influence or authority, even at a high level, does not automatically warrant a harsher sentence, its abuse may constitute an aggravating factor. 1838

546. The Appeals Chamber notes that, in assessing his liability, the Trial Chamber stated that “Mladić’s conduct and superior position [were] encapsulated within the conduct relied upon to establish his participation in the four [joint criminal enterprises]”. 1839 The Trial Chamber did not enter convictions pursuant to superior responsibility under Article 7(3) of the ICTY Statute but indicated that it would consider Mladić’s superior position for the purposes of sentencing. 1840 The Appeals Chamber is of the view that this legal approach is consistent with settled jurisprudence. 1841 In the sentencing portion of the Trial Judgement, the Trial Chamber considered that Mladić’s participation in all four joint criminal enterprises “was undertaken in his official capacity as Commander of the VRS Main Staff”, and that he held this position throughout the entire Indictment period. 1842 The Trial Chamber then concluded that he therefore “abused his position” and found that “Mladić’s abuse of his superior position” added to the gravity of the offences. 1843

547. Contrary to Mladić’s contention, the Appeals Chamber finds no indication that the Trial Chamber aggravaed his sentence with superior responsibility under Article 7(3) of the ICTY Statute. 1844 Rather, according to the Trial Chamber, it was the abuse of his position as Commander of the VRS Main Staff that aggravated the gravity of his offences. 1845 The Appeals Chamber notes the Trial Chamber’s conclusion that Mladić was “responsible for having committed a wide range of criminal acts through his participation in four [joint criminal enterprises]”, and that he did so while, inter alia: (i) commanding and controlling VRS units and other groups subordinated to the VRS; (ii) having knowledge of crimes committed by those under his command; (iii) placing severe restrictions on humanitarian aid; (iv) providing misleading information about crimes to representatives of the international community; and (v) failing to investigate crimes and/or punish perpetrators of the crimes. 1846 Given the totality of the Trial Chamber’s findings on Mladić’s responsibility, the Appeals Chamber finds no discernible error in the Trial Chamber’s conclusion that Mladić abused his position of authority and that this added to the gravity of the crimes. The Appeals Chamber notes that Mladić appears to also argue that the Trial Chamber “double counted” his superior responsibility. 1847 Given that he provides no argument or other basis to support this submission, his contention in this regard is dismissed.

548. In light of the above, the Appeals Chamber finds, Judge Nyambe dissenting, that Mladić fails to demonstrate any error in the Trial Chamber’s conclusion in determining his sentence that the abuse of his superior position added to the gravity of the offences. The Appeals Chamber, Judge Nyambe dissenting, therefore dismisses Ground 9.A of Mladić’s appeal.

In determining Mladić’s sentence, the Trial Chamber considered whether, *inter alia*, his benevolent treatment of and assistance to victims, diminished mental capacity, poor physical health, and advanced age amounted to mitigating circumstances.\(^\text{1849}\) Owing to the gravity of the offences, the Trial Chamber did not consider his sporadic benevolent acts in mitigation.\(^\text{1850}\) It also observed that the evidence the Defence relied on did not establish that Mladić suffered from diminished mental capacity.\(^\text{1851}\) The Trial Chamber also noted that Mladić suffered from certain health problems, but found that these were not such as to warrant mitigation, and further noted that his general condition was stable, concluding that it would not consider Mladić’s health as a factor in mitigation.\(^\text{1852}\) Finally, the Trial Chamber stated that it gave due consideration to Mladić’s age in sentencing.\(^\text{1853}\)

Mladić submits that the Trial Chamber erred in failing to give sufficient weight to the following mitigating circumstances: (i) his ill health combined with his age; (ii) his daughter’s death; and (iii) his benevolent treatment of and assistance to victims.\(^\text{1854}\) According to Mladić, the Trial Chamber, in noting that his general condition was stable, failed to give sufficient weight to the totality of the medical evidence and his medical history.\(^\text{1855}\) In relation to his daughter’s death, he argues that the Trial Chamber presented it under the heading of diminished mental capacity but did not give weight to this as part of his “family circumstances”.\(^\text{1856}\) As to evidence of his benevolent treatment of and assistance to victims, he challenges the Trial Chamber’s conclusion that his benevolent acts were “sporadic”.\(^\text{1857}\) Mladić asks that the Appeals Chamber give these factors due weight and revise the sentence accordingly.\(^\text{1858}\)

The Prosecution responds that the Trial Chamber considered each of the mitigating factors Mladić presented at trial,\(^\text{1859}\) and that he fails on appeal to show how the Trial Chamber abused its discretion by either not considering certain factors or by giving them insufficient weight.\(^\text{1860}\) The Prosecution contends that the Trial Chamber expressly considered Mladić’s age, health, and benevolent acts in mitigation.\(^\text{1861}\) The Prosecution further argues that Mladić only raised his daughter’s death at trial in relation to his diminished mental capacity and not in relation to his family circumstances, and cannot raise this argument for the first time on appeal.\(^\text{1862}\) The Prosecution argues that, in any event, none of the factors relied on by Mladić, either individually or cumulatively, could outweigh the gravity of the crimes for which he has been convicted to justify a sentence below life imprisonment.\(^\text{1863}\)

The Prosecution replies that the Appeals Chamber should reject the Prosecution’s submission that the mitigating factors are insufficient to reduce his life sentence.\(^\text{1864}\)

The Appeals Chamber recalls that a trial chamber is required to consider any mitigating circumstance when determining the appropriate sentence, and that it enjoys considerable discretion in determining what constitutes a mitigating circumstance and the weight, if any, to be accorded to the factors identified.\(^\text{1865}\) Furthermore, the existence of mitigating factors does not automatically imply a reduction of sentence or preclude the imposition of a particular sentence.\(^\text{1866}\)

In relation to Mladić’s health and age, the Appeals Chamber recalls that the age of the accused may be a mitigating factor\(^\text{1867}\) and that poor health is accepted as a mitigating factor in exceptional cases only.\(^\text{1868}\) The Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber expressly stated that it gave due consideration to Mladić’s age in sentencing.\(^\text{1869}\) The Trial Chamber further noted that Mladić suffered from certain health problems and that his general condition was stable.\(^\text{1870}\) It decided not to consider his health as a factor in mitigation.\(^\text{1871}\) In assessing his health, the Trial Chamber referred to, *inter alia*, five medical reports, showing his general condition as stable.\(^\text{1872}\) Mladić has not identified any evidence that would support a conclusion that his health condition was exceptional and warranted consideration in mitigation. The Appeals Chamber therefore finds that Mladić does not demonstrate any error in the Trial Chamber’s assessment of his age and health as mitigating circumstances.

The Appeals Chamber now turns to Mladić’s submission that the Trial Chamber erred in failing to consider the death of his daughter as part of his “family circumstances”.\(^\text{1873}\) According to Article 24(2) of the ICTY Statute, the Trial Chamber was required to take into account “the individual circumstances of the convicted person” in the course of determining the sentence. The Appeals Chamber recalls that such circumstances could include family circumstances but that little weight is afforded to this factor in the absence of exceptional family circumstances.\(^\text{1874}\) The Appeals Chamber notes that, at trial, Mladić did not rely upon the death of his daughter in relation to family
circumstances as a mitigating factor, but rather pointed to his daughter’s death only in relation to his “diminished mental responsibility”, which the Trial Chamber explicitly considered. The Appeals Chamber recalls that it is an accused’s prerogative to identify any mitigating circumstances before the trial chamber, and if he fails to specifically refer in his final brief or closing arguments to a mitigating circumstance, he cannot raise it for the first time on appeal. In light of this standard, the Appeals Chamber does not consider further Mladić’s submission that the Trial Chamber failed to consider the death of his daughter as “evidence of his family circumstances”.

Regarding Mladić’s submission on his benevolent treatment of and assistance to victims, the Appeals Chamber recalls that an accused’s assistance to victims or detainees can be considered in mitigation of his or her sentence. However, such acts must be weighed against the gravity of the offences. The Trial Chamber considered the Defence’s submissions that Mladić took steps to minimize the number of victims and their suffering to the best of his ability through, inter alia, a demilitarization agreement, ordering troops to protect persons of Bosnian Serb and other nationalities alike, ordering a ceasefire to allow civilians to safely withdraw, insisting that patients not be discriminated against at a military hospital, assisting the daughter of a Bosnian Muslim, and providing kindness and sweets to children throughout the conflict. In relation to the order that troops should protect Bosnian Serb and other nationalities, the Trial Chamber noted that “the order only concerned ‘honest’ members of other nationalities”. The Trial Chamber also noted that the ceasefire ordered for civilians to withdraw related to only the Jewish population in Sarajevo, and did not constitute benevolent treatment of or assistance to Bosnian Muslims or Bosnian Croats. The Trial Chamber concluded that while some of the acts cited by Mladić may have shown “at best some kindness” towards individual Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, they did not affect the achievement of the common objective of the Overarching JCE. It considered that, bearing in mind the gravity of Mladić’s crimes, the assistance he provided “was sporadic”. Noting the central position Mladić held within the leadership of the VRS, the Trial Chamber was of the view that he “had the power to provide assistance to the victimized population on a large scale, had he wished to do so”. The Trial Chamber recalled that “sporadic benevolent acts or ineffective assistance may be disregarded”, and therefore did not consider this factor in mitigation of Mladić’s sentence. The Appeals Chamber considers that in light of the gravity of the offences committed by Mladić and the noted sporadic nature of the benevolent treatment and assistance undertaken by Mladić, he does not demonstrate a discernible error in the Trial Chamber’s assessment of his assistance as a mitigating circumstance.


The Trial Chamber noted that it was required to consider the general practice regarding the prison sentences in the courts of the former Yugoslavia, but recalled that it was not “obliged to conform to that practice”. The Trial Chamber considered the relevant sentencing provisions and practices of the former Yugoslavia during the Indictment period, and noted that the maximum term of imprisonment at the time was 15 years, but that for the most serious crimes the death penalty or a prison sentence of 20 years could have been imposed instead. The Trial Chamber further considered that the ICTY Appeals Chamber had previously upheld sentences of more than 20 years of imprisonment as not infringing the principle of nulla poena sine lege.

Mladić submits that the Trial Chamber erred in sentencing him to life imprisonment based on “oversights in the jurisprudence”. He argues that the jurisprudence of the ICTY has “overlooked the distinction” between Article 24 of the ICTY Statute and Rule 101(A) of the ICTY Rules. To support this argument, Mladić asserts that Article 24 of the ICTY Statute, adopted in 1993, “imported” into the ICTY the domestic sentencing practice of the former Yugoslavia, which had a maximum sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment at the time the crimes were committed. He argues that the “subsequent adoption” of Rule 101(A) of the ICTY Rules in February 1994 “create[d] another penal law” within the same jurisprudence in contradistinction to Article 24 of the ICTY Statute, and “retroactively” established life imprisonment. He contends that life imprisonment was thus not accessible or foreseeable to an accused, including himself, at the ICTY. Relying on a judgement from the ECtHR, Mladić contends that the Trial Chamber’s imposition of a life sentence according to Rule 101(A) of the ICTY Rules therefore breached the principles of nulla poena sine lege and lex mitior. Mladić requests that the
Appeals Chamber articulate the correct legal standard, review the factual findings of the Trial Chamber, reverse the life sentence imposed by the Trial Chamber, and impose a sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment.1899

560. The Prosecution responds, inter alia, that pursuant to Article 24 of the ICTY Statute, the Trial Chamber was not bound by the sentencing practices of the former Yugoslavia but need only have “recourse” to them, and that in such circumstances the Trial Chamber’s imposition of life imprisonment did not violate the principles of *nulla poena sine lege* and *lex mitior*.1900 It also argues that the *Maktouf and Damjanović* Judgement can be distinguished from the present case, as it related to changes in sentencing laws within the same jurisdiction, whereas Mladić was sentenced “under a unified penal scheme with a maximum sentence that was solidly rooted in customary international law in 1992”.1901

561. Mladić replies, *inter alia*, that the Prosecution misunderstands his submissions regarding the legality of imposing a life sentence, and fails to address his argument that the maximum sentence of imprisonment available in the former Yugoslavia was 20 years’ imprisonment.1902

562. The Appeals Chamber recalls that, pursuant to Article 24(1) of the ICTY Statute, trial chambers “shall have recourse to the general practice regarding prison sentences in the courts of the former Yugoslavia”.1903 Furthermore, according to Rule 101(A) of the ICTY Rules, a “convicted person may be sentenced to imprisonment for a term up to and including the remainder of the convicted person’s life”.1904 The Appeals Chamber also recalls that the principle of *nulla poena sine lege* prohibits retroactive punishment.1905 The principle of *lex mitior* prescribes that if the law relevant to the offence of the accused has been amended, the less severe law should be applied;1906 however, the relevant law must be binding upon the court.1907

563. The Appeals Chamber considers that Mladić’s submission regarding “oversights in the jurisprudence” is based on the erroneous foundation that, having “recourse” to the sentencing practices of the former Yugoslavia meant that Article 24 of the ICTY Statute “incorporated” or “import[ed]” domestic sentencing practices into international law and the sentencing practice of the ICTY.1908 It is settled jurisprudence that the ICTY was not in any way bound by the laws or sentencing practices of the former Yugoslavia; rather, trial chambers were only obliged to take such practice into consideration.1909

564. There is also no merit in Mladić’s submissions that the introduction of Rule 101(A) of the ICTY Rules created another sentencing regime within the jurisdiction of the ICTY and “retroactively” provided for life imprisonment.1910 or that life imprisonment was not “accessible or foreseeable” to accused, including himself, at the ICTY.1911 His contention that Rule 101(A) of the ICTY Rules, which was adopted subsequent to the ICTY Statute, established a different sentencing regime is misguided. The Appeals Chamber recalls that judicial power to adopt rules of procedure and evidence at the ICTY was subject to the principles and parameters set out in the ICTY Statute and international law.1912 Given that Article 24 of the ICTY Statute does not adopt or incorporate the sentencing practices of the former Yugoslavia into the ICTY’s sentencing practices, Mladić fails to establish that the creation of Rule 101(A) of the ICTY Rules deviates from the principle set out in the ICTY Statute.1913 Regarding the foreseeability of life imprisonment, Mladić ignores jurisprudence that the imposition of life imprisonment has been available for the most serious violations of international humanitarian law since at least the tribunals established after World War II.1914 Additionally, the Appeals Chamber finds no merit in Mladić’s submission that the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Čelebicija case conflated issues of liability (*nullum crimen sine lege*) and punishment (*nulla poena sine lege*).1915 The ICTY Appeals Chamber specifically considered the question of penalty independent of liability, concluding that there could be no doubt that the accused must have been aware that the crimes for which they were indicted were the most serious violations of international humanitarian law, punishable by the most severe penalties.1916 Furthermore, since the establishment of the ICTY, convicted persons before it have received sentences of life imprisonment pursuant to the ICTY Statute and Rules.1917 Most recently, the Appeals Chamber imposed a sentence of life imprisonment in the Karadžić case before the Mechanism.1918 The Appeals Chamber thus finds that Rule 101(A) of the ICTY Rules did not create another sentencing regime inconsistent with Article 24(1) of the ICTY Statute,1919 and Mladić fails to demonstrate that life imprisonment was not an accessible or foreseeable punishment.
In light of the foregoing, and recalling that determinations of other courts—domestic, international, or hybrid—are not binding upon it, the Appeals Chamber further considers that Mladić’s reliance on the Maktouf and Damjanović Judgement is misguided. The ECtHR in the Maktouf and Damjanović Judgement held, *inter alia*, that a retrospective change to the domestic sentencing frameworks of the former Yugoslavia in relation to war crimes offences violated Article 7 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. As discussed above, given that there was no change in the ICTY’s sentencing regime, such analysis is not applicable to the ICTY.

Turning to the circumstances in this case, the Appeals Chamber observes that the Trial Chamber set out the applicable ICTY law and reviewed the pertinent sentencing provisions in the former Yugoslavia, noting that the range of penalties included fines, confiscation of property, imprisonment, and the death penalty. The Trial Chamber considered, *inter alia*, that, at the time of the crimes, the maximum sentence applicable in the former Yugoslavia had been 15 years of imprisonment and that, for the most serious crimes, the death penalty or a prison sentence of 20 years could be imposed in lieu. Given the foregoing, the Appeals Chamber considers that the Trial Chamber properly took into account the general sentencing practice in the former Yugoslavia, and correctly stated that sentences imposed by the ICTY can exceed those in the former Yugoslavia. Mladić’s submissions that the principles of *nulla poena sine lege* and *lex mitior* were violated are thus without merit.

In light of the above, the Appeals Chamber finds, Judge Nyambe dissenting, that Mladić fails to demonstrate that the Trial Chamber erred in imposing a life sentence. The Appeals Chamber, Judge Nyambe dissenting, therefore dismisses Ground 9.D of Mladić’s appeal.

IV. THE APPEAL OF THE PROSECUTION

Under Count 1 of the Indictment, the Prosecution alleged that, between 31 March 1992 and 31 December 1992, Mladić committed in concert with others, planned, instigated, ordered, and/or aided and abetted genocide against a part of the Bosnian Muslim and/or Bosnian Croat groups, as such, in some municipalities of Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly Foča, Ključ, Kotor Varoš, Prijedor, Sanski Most, and Vlasenica.

The Trial Chamber found that a large number of Bosnian Muslims and/or Bosnian Croats in Foča, Ključ, Kotor Varoš, Prijedor, Sanski Most, and Vlasenica were the victims of prohibited acts, such as killings or serious bodily or mental harm, which contributed to the destruction of their groups. The Trial Chamber further found, by majority, that certain physical perpetrators of these prohibited acts had the intent to destroy a part of the Bosnian Muslim group when carrying out the prohibited acts, except in relation to Bosnian Muslims in Ključ. The Trial Chamber was not, however, convinced beyond reasonable doubt that those perpetrators intended to destroy the Bosnian Muslims in Sanski Most, Foča, Kotor Varoš, Prijedor, and Vlasenica (“Count 1 Municipalities”) “as a substantial part of the protected group”. The Trial Chamber was also not convinced beyond reasonable doubt that the Bosnian Serb leadership possessed genocidal intent or that the crime of genocide formed part of the objective of the Overarching JCE. The Trial Chamber accordingly acquitted Mladić of genocide under Count 1 of the Indictment.

The Prosecution submits that the Trial Chamber erred in finding that: (i) the Bosnian Muslim communities of the Count 1 Municipalities (“Count 1 Communities”) did not each constitute a substantial part of the Bosnian Muslim group in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Ground 1); and (ii) Mladić and other members of the Overarching JCE did not possess “destructive intent” (Ground 2). The Prosecution requests that the Appeals Chamber correct these errors and convict Mladić of genocide under Count 1 of the Indictment pursuant to the first, or alternatively the third, category of joint criminal enterprise, or alternatively, as a superior under Article 7(3) of the ICTY Statute.

Mladić responds that the Prosecution demonstrates no error in the Trial Chamber’s findings and invites the Appeals Chamber to dismiss Grounds 1 and 2 of the Prosecution’s appeal.
A. Alleged Errors in Finding that the Count 1 Communities Did Not Constitute a Substantial Part of the Protected Group (Ground 1)

572. In concluding that it could not find that the physical perpetrators intended to destroy each of the Count 1 Communities “as a substantial part of the protected group”, the Trial Chamber found that: (i) the physical perpetrators had limited geographical control or authority to carry out activities; (ii) the Bosnian Muslims targeted in each of the Count 1 Municipalities formed a relatively small part of the Bosnian Muslim population in the Bosnian Serb-claimed territory or in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a whole; and (iii) there was insufficient evidence indicating why the Count 1 Communities or the Count 1 Municipalities had a special significance or were emblematic in relation to the Bosnian Muslim group as a whole.

573. The Prosecution submits that the Trial Chamber erroneously concluded that the Count 1 Communities did not each constitute a substantial part of the Bosnian Muslim group. Drawing parallels with findings in relation to the Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica, the Prosecution argues that each of the Count 1 Communities was substantial not only in size, consisting of many thousands of Bosnian Muslims, but also in nature, with a unique historic and cultural identity that made them prominent and emblematic of the Bosnian Muslim group as a whole. The Prosecution also argues that the Count 1 Municipalities held immense strategic importance for the Bosnian Serb leadership and that the territories of the Count 1 Municipalities represented the full extent of the perpetrators’ respective areas of activity and control. The Prosecution contends that, in light of these factors, no reasonable trier of fact could have failed to conclude that the destruction of the Count 1 Communities would in each case have been significant enough to have an impact on the Bosnian Muslim group as a whole.

574. Mladić responds that the Prosecution repeats arguments made at trial and fails to demonstrate that the evidence was so unambiguous that a reasonable trial chamber was obliged to infer that each of the Count 1 Communities constituted a substantial part of the overall Bosnian Muslim group. He contends that the Trial Chamber correctly concluded that the numerical size of the targeted part of the Bosnian Muslim group, when considered with the physical perpetrators’ control in each of the Count 1 Municipalities, was not substantial. He further argues that the Prosecution’s claims that the Count 1 Municipalities held immense strategic importance for the Bosnian Serb leadership and that the Count 1 Communities had a unique historic and cultural identity to evidence their prominence and emblematic nature, including through the eyes of the Bosnian Muslim group as a whole, are unsubstantiated. Mladić also submits that none of the Count 1 Communities is comparable to Srebrenica in size or in qualitative importance.

575. The Prosecution replies that Mladić misconstrues the Trial Chamber’s findings on the numeric size of the targeted parts in that his arguments are premised on the misconception that the parts of the Bosnian Muslim group targeted for destruction comprised subsets of the Bosnian Muslim population within each of the Count 1 Municipalities. The Prosecution also argues that Mladić’s arguments on the prominent and emblematic nature of the Count 1 Communities are permeated by a false theory that this factor must be assessed solely “through the eyes” of the protected group, and that his remaining arguments mischaracterize the Prosecution’s submissions.

576. The Appeals Chamber recalls that, where a conviction for genocide relies on the intent to destroy a protected group “in part”, the targeted part must be a substantial part of that group. The ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Krstić case identified the following non-exhaustive and non-dispositive guidelines that may be considered when determining whether the part of the group targeted is substantial enough to meet this requirement: (i) the numeric size of the targeted part as the necessary starting point, evaluated not only in absolute terms, but also in relation to the overall size of the entire group; (ii) the targeted part’s prominence within the group; (iii) whether the targeted part is emblematic of the overall group or essential to its survival; and/or (iv) the perpetrators’ areas of activity and control, as well as the possible extent of their reach. The applicability of these factors, together with their relative weight, will vary depending on the circumstances of the particular case.

577. In relation to the numeric size of the targeted part, the Trial Chamber noted that the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1991 was approximately 4.4 million people, 43.7 per cent of whom were Bosnian Muslims. The Prosecution argues that the Count 1 Communities, which the Trial Chamber noted ranged from 11,090 people in Kotor Varoš to 49,700 people in Prijedor, were sufficiently sizeable to satisfy the substantiality requirement.
Considering, however, that the Count 1 Communities effectively comprised between approximately 0.6 and 2.6 per cent of the overall Bosnian Muslim group in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Appeals Chamber finds that the Prosecution does not demonstrate error in the Trial Chamber’s conclusion that the Count 1 Communities each formed “a relatively small part” of the group.

The Appeals Chamber recalls that, because the intent to destroy formed by perpetrators of genocide will always be limited by the opportunity presented to them, the perpetrators’ areas of activity and control, as well as the possible extent of their reach, should be considered when determining whether the part of the protected group they intended to destroy was substantial. In this respect, the Trial Chamber determined that, from the perspective of the physical perpetrators, the Count 1 Communities were the only parts of the Bosnian Muslim group within their respective areas of control, and that the perpetrators’ authority did not extend beyond each of the Count 1 Municipalities in which they committed prohibited acts. The Appeals Chamber considers that these conclusions, when viewed in the light of the Trial Chamber’s finding that the perpetrators intended to destroy the Count 1 Communities, evince that the perpetrators targeted as substantial a part of the overall Bosnian Muslim group for destruction as they could. While this factor alone will not indicate whether the targeted group is substantial, it can – in combination with other factors – inform the analysis. The Trial Chamber in the present case considered this factor, among others, in its analysis concluding that the physical perpetrators did not have the intent to destroy the Count 1 Communities as a substantial part of the Bosnian Muslim group.

The Trial Chamber also considered that it had “received insufficient evidence indicating why [...] [each of the Count 1 Communities or the Count 1 Municipalities] themselves had a special significance or were emblematic in relation to the protected group as a whole”. However, the Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber identified several factors which reflected the strategic and/or symbolic importance of the Count 1 Municipalities to Bosnian Serbs and/or Bosnian Muslims. The Appeals Chamber further notes that such factors were considered to support findings that the Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica constituted a substantial part of the Bosnian Muslim group, not only in previous cases, but also by the Trial Chamber in the present case. The core of the Prosecution’s argument is that the similarities in the Trial Chamber’s predicate findings about the importance of the Count 1 Communities and the Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica underscore the unreasonableness of its contradictory conclusions about their substantiality. The Prosecution contends that the Trial Chamber was therefore obliged to infer that the destruction of the Count 1 Communities, like that of the Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica, would in each case have been significant enough “to have an impact on the Bosnian Muslim [g]roup as a whole”.

The Appeals Chamber recalls that it is not just any impact on a protected group that supports a finding of genocidal intent; rather, it is the impact that the destruction of the targeted part will have on the overall survival of that group which indicates whether there is intent to destroy a substantial part thereof. In this respect, the Appeals Chamber notes that, in upholding the conclusion that the Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica constituted a substantial part of the Bosnian Muslim group, the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Krstić case considered, inter alia, that: (i) “[t]he capture and ethnic purification of Srebrenica would [...] severely undermine the military efforts of the Bosnian Muslim state to ensure its viability”; (ii) “[c]ontrol over the Sребrenica region was consequently essential to [...] the continued survival of the Bosnian Muslim people”; (iii) [b]ecause most of the Muslim inhabitants of the region had, by 1995, sought refuge within the Srebrenica enclave, the elimination of that enclave would have accomplished the goal of purifying the entire region of its Muslim population”; and (iv) “[t]he elimination of the Muslim population of Srebrenica, despite the assurances given by the international community, would serve as a potent example to all Bosnian Muslims of their vulnerability and defenselessness in the face of Serb military forces”. In reaching the same conclusion, the Trial Chamber in the present case similarly considered such factors as, inter alia: (i) Srebrenica having become a refuge to Bosnian Muslims in the region; (ii) the symbolic impact of the murder of Bosnian Muslims in a designated UN safe area; and (iii) Srebrenica being one of the few remaining predominantly Bosnian Muslim populated territories in the area claimed as Republika Srpska.

With respect to the Count 1 Communities, however, neither the Trial Chamber’s findings nor the evidence referred to by the Prosecution reflects a similar threat to the viability or survival of the Bosnian Muslim group. In addition, the Appeals Chamber notes that the events in the Count 1 Municipalities occurred in 1992, closer to the outset of the war. By contrast, the events in Srebrenica took place three years later in July 1995, by which
time tens of thousands of Bosnian Muslims seeking refuge, many of whom were “injured [. . .] exhausted, lethargic, and frightened”,1981 and only “five percent of whom were able-bodied men”,1982 had gathered in Srebrenica in dire living conditions.1983 Thus, although the destruction directed against each of the Count 1 Communities may have “represented powerful, early steps in the Bosnian Serb campaign towards an ethnically homogeneous state”,1984 it was open to the Trial Chamber to infer that such destruction was not significant enough to have an impact on the overall survival of the Bosnian Muslim group at the relevant time.

582. In light of the foregoing, the Appeals Chamber finds that the Prosecution fails to demonstrate that the Trial Chamber erred in concluding that the Count 1 Communities did not each constitute a substantial part of the Bosnian Muslim group in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

583. The Appeals Chamber, Judges N’gum and Panton dissenting, therefore dismisses Ground 1 of the Prosecution’s appeal.

B. ALLEGED ERRORS IN FINDING THAT MLADIĆ AND OTHER OVERARCHING JCE MEMBERS DID NOT POSSESS “DESTRUCTIVE INTENT” (GROUND 2)

584. In determining that the crime of genocide did not form part of the objective of the Overarching JCE,1985 the Trial Chamber recalled its finding that the physical perpetrators in the Count 1 Municipalities did not have the intent to destroy a substantial part of the Bosnian Muslim group.1986 The Trial Chamber considered that, while the speeches and statements of Mladić and other Overarching JCE members were inflammatory, caused fear, and incited hatred, they “could have been directed to the military enemy and have been used as propaganda, rather than to demonstrate an expression of a genocidal intent.”1987 The Trial Chamber also considered that “frequent references to ‘ethnic cleansing’ and other similar expressions [. . .] do not necessarily indicate intent to physically destroy the protected group”,1988 and that “[t]he rhetorical speeches and statements assisted in the task of ethnic separation and division rather than the physical destruction of the protected groups.”1989

585. In addition, the Trial Chamber recalled the majority’s finding that certain physical perpetrators had the intent to destroy a part of the Bosnian Muslim group, but considered that “[a]n inference that the Bosnian-Serb leadership sought to destroy the protected groups in the Count 1 Municipalities through the use of a number of physical perpetrators as tools requires more.”1990 The Trial Chamber concluded that, “[i]n the absence of other evidence which would unambiguously support a finding of genocidal intent, drawing an inference on the basis of prohibited acts of physical perpetrators alone is insufficient.”1991

586. The Prosecution submits that the Trial Chamber erred in concluding that genocide did not form part of the common purpose of the Overarching JCE by failing to infer the “destructive intent” of Mladić and other Overarching JCE members, and by applying a heightened evidentiary threshold in its assessment thereof.1992 It contends that no reasonable trier of fact could have found, on the one hand, that the local perpetrators in the Count 1 Municipalities intended to destroy a part of the Bosnian Muslim group, while, on the other hand, that Mladić and other Overarching JCE members, who orchestrated and controlled the overall criminal campaign, and exercised greater authority than any of the local perpetrators they used as tools, did not.1993 The Prosecution further contends that Mladić and other Overarching JCE members made public statements reflecting an intent to destroy the Bosnian Muslim group, and that the Trial Chamber unreasonably concluded that such statements were aimed only at ethnic separation and division.1994 The Prosecution argues that, in contrast to local perpetrators found to have “destructive intent” in their respective municipalities, Mladić and other Overarching JCE members intended to destroy all five Count 1 Communities, which cumulatively formed a substantial part of the Bosnian Muslim group.1995 It requests that the Appeals Chamber find that Mladić and other Overarching JCE members possessed and shared genocidal intent in relation to the Count 1 Communities, conclude that genocide formed part of the Overarching JCE’s common purpose, and convict Mladić of genocide under Count 1 of the Indictment pursuant to the first category of joint criminal enterprise.1996

587. Mladić responds that the Trial Chamber applied the correct evidentiary standard to conclude that it could not be satisfied that the only reasonable conclusion that could be drawn from the evidence was that he and other Overarching JCE members possessed the requisite intent and that genocide formed part of the common plan.1997 He
submits that the Prosecution fails to demonstrate that the evidence of his and other Overarching JCE members’ intent is such that a reasonable trier of fact was obliged to infer that all reasonable doubt of their guilt had been eliminated, thereby failing to meet the appellate standard. Mladić accordingly requests that the Appeals Chamber dismiss the Prosecution’s appeal and requested remedies entirely.

588. As recalled above, where a conviction for genocide relies on the intent to destroy a protected group “in part”, the targeted part must be a substantial part of that group. As such, the Prosecution’s contention that the Trial Chamber was compelled to find that Mladić intended to destroy the Count 1 Communities has no potential to invalidate its decision to acquit him of genocide unless the Prosecution demonstrates that the Trial Chamber was also compelled to find that the Count 1 Communities formed a substantial part of the Bosnian Muslim group. In this respect, the Prosecution submits that, when aggregating the Count 1 Communities, “the correspondingly larger numerical part of the Bosnian Muslim [g]roup unquestionably comprised a substantial part [thereof],” and reiterates that the key consideration in assessing substantiality is whether the part is significant enough “to have an impact on the group as a whole.”

589. The Appeals Chamber recalls, however, that a substantiality assessment considers the impact that the destruction of the targeted part will have on the overall survival of that group. Noting that the Count 1 Communities collectively comprised approximately 6.7 per cent of the Bosnian Muslim group, the Appeals Chamber considers that a reasonable trier of fact could reasonably have concluded that the Count 1 Communities, individually as well as cumulatively, formed “a relatively small part” thereof. The Appeals Chamber therefore concludes that a reasonable trier of fact could also have found that the destruction of the Count 1 Communities, individually as well as cumulatively, was not sufficiently substantial to have an impact on the group’s overall survival at the relevant time.

590. Recalling that the Appeals Chamber will only review alleged errors that have the potential to affect the outcome of an appeal, the Appeals Chamber need not address the Prosecution’s remaining arguments and remedial requests in relation to the Trial Chamber’s alleged failure to infer Mladić’s “destructive intent” and convict him of genocide under Count 1 of the Indictment.

591. Based on the foregoing, the Appeals Chamber, Judges N’gum and Panton dissenting, dismisses Ground 2 of the Prosecution’s appeal.

V. DISPOSITION

592. For the foregoing reasons, THE APPEALS CHAMBER,

PURSUANT to Article 23 of the Statute and Rule 144 of the Rules;

NOTING the written submissions of the parties and their oral arguments presented at the appeal hearing on 25 and 26 August 2020;

SITTING in open session;

DISMISSES Mladić’s appeal in its entirety, Judge Nyambe dissenting as to Grounds 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, and 9 of Mladić’s appeal;

DISMISSES, Judges N’gum and Panton dissenting, the Prosecution’s appeal in its entirety;

AFFIRMS, Judges N’gum and Panton dissenting, the disposition of the Trial Chamber finding Mladić not guilty of genocide under Count 1 of the Indictment;

AFFIRMS the disposition of the Trial Chamber finding Mladić guilty of taking of hostages as a violation of the laws or customs of war under Count 11 of the Indictment, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute, and FURTHER AFFIRMS, Judge Nyambe dissenting, the disposition of the Trial Chamber finding Mladić guilty of genocide under Count 2 of the Indictment, persecution as a crime against humanity under Count 3 of the Indictment, extermination as a crime against humanity under Count 4 of the Indictment, murder as a crime against humanity under Count 5 of the Indictment, murder as a violation of the laws or customs of war under Count 6 of the Indictment, deportation as a crime against humanity under Count 7 of the Indictment, inhumane acts (forcible transfer) as a crime against
humanity under Count 8 of the Indictment, terror as a violation of the laws or customs of war under Count 9 of the Indictment, and unlawful attacks on civilians as a violation of the laws or customs of war under Count 10 of the Indictment, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute;

AFFIRMS, Judge Nyambe dissenting, the sentence of life imprisonment imposed on Mladić by the Trial Chamber;

RULES that this Judgement shall be enforced immediately pursuant to Rule 145(A) of the Rules; and

ORDERS that, in accordance with Rules 127(C) and 131 of the Rules, Mladić shall remain in the custody of the Mechanism pending the finalization of the arrangements for his transfer to the State where he will serve his sentence.

Done in English and French, the English text being authoritative.

[Signatures]
Judge Prisca Matimba Nyambe, Judge Aminatta Lois Runeni N’gum, and Judge Seymour Panton append partially dissenting opinions.

Done this 8th day of June 2021 at The Hague, the Netherlands.

[Seal of the Mechanism]

ENDNOTES

1 Trial Judgement, para. 272.
2 Trial Judgement, paras. 272–274.
3 Trial Judgement, paras. 275, 276. Prior to 12 August 1992, Republika Srpska was known as the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. See Trial Judgement, p. 13.
4 Trial Judgement, paras. 275, 276.
5 Trial Judgement, paras. 4, 5229–5234, referring to, inter alia, Prosecutor v. Ratko Mladić, Case No. IT-09-92-PT, Prosecution Submission of the Fourth Amended Indictment and Schedules of Incidents, 16 December 2011, Annex A (“Indictment”).
6 Indictment, paras. 4–86. See also Trial Judgement, paras. 2–10.
7 See Indictment, paras. 8, 13, 14, 18, 19, 23, 24, 28, 35–86, Schedules A–G. See also Trial Judgement, para. 2.
8 Trial Judgement, para. 5214.
9 Trial Judgement, para. 5214. See also Trial Judgement, paras. 3065, 3116, 3183, 3206, 3212, 3226, 3286, 3312, 3324, 3359, 3380, 3387, 3405, 3418, 3431, 3555, 4232, 4612, 4688, 4740, 4893, 4921, 4987, 5098, 5128, 5130, 5131, 5141, 5156, 5163, 5168, 5188–5192. Where the Trial Chamber found Mladić guilty of murder and extermination as crimes against humanity based on the same incidents, it only entered convictions for extermination, in line with the law on cumulative convictions. See Trial Judgement, p. 5179. See also Trial Judgement, paras. 5168–5178.
10 Trial Judgement, para. 5165. See also Trial Judgement, paras. 4232, 4612, 4688, 4740, 4892, 4893, 4921, 4987, 5096–5098, 5128, 5130, 5131, 5141, 5156, 5163, 5188–5193.
12 Trial Judgement, para. 5214. See also Trial Judgement, para. 5189.
13 Trial Judgement, paras. 4740, 4892, 4893, 4921, 5190.
14 Trial Judgement, paras. 4893, 4921, 5190, 5214.
15 Trial Judgement, paras. 4987, 4988, 5096–5098, 5128, 5130, 5131. The Trial Chamber determined that in the days immediately preceding 11 July 1995, the objective of the Sребенска JCE involved the commission of the crimes of persecution and inhuman acts (forcible transfer), but that by the early morning of 12 July 1995, the crimes of genocide, extermination, and murder became part of the means to achieve that objective. See Trial Judgement, paras. 4987, 5096, 5108.
16 Trial Judgement, paras. 5098, 5128, 5130, 5131, 5191, 5214.
17 Trial Judgement, paras. 5141, 5142, 5156, 5163, 5192.
18 Trial Judgement, paras. 5192, 5214.
19 Trial Judgement, para. 5215.
20 See Mladić Notice of Appeal, paras. 5, 7, 12–91; Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 10–19, 41–958. In his notice of appeal, Mladić raised nine grounds of appeal comprising a total of 40 subgrounds. In his appellant’s brief, Mladić withdrew five subgrounds, did not address one subground (Ground 5(J)), and subsumed eight subgrounds into other subgrounds, leaving nine grounds of appeal with a total of 26 subgrounds to be addressed by the Appeals Chamber. See Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 61, 565–569, 644, 678–680, 760, 761, 876.
22 Mladić Notice of Appeal, para. 10, p. 32; Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 21, 885, 916, 959.
23 Mladić Notice of Appeal, para. 11, p. 32; Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 22, 60, 677, 780, 920, 926, 930, 931, 958, 960.
24 Prosecution Response Brief, para. 4.
396 Karadžić
25 Prosecution Notice of Appeal, paras. 3–9; Prosecution Appeal Brief, paras. 1–3, 5–50.
26 Prosecution Appeal Brief, paras. 1, 4, 17, 43.
27 Prosecution Appeal Brief, paras. 1, 4, 18, 44, 47–50.
28 See Mladić Response Brief, paras. 9–343.


376 Trial Judgement, paras. 4232, 4610. See also Trial Judgement, paras. 4218–4231. The Trial Chamber found that crimes related to the overarchign JCE were committed in the following municipalities: Banja Luka, Bijeljina, Poča, Ilidža, Kalinovik, Klijuc, Kotor Varoš, Novi Grad, Pale, Prijedor, Rogatica, Sanski Most, Sokolac, and Vlasenica (“Municipalities”). See Trial Judgement, paras. 4218, 4225, 4227, 4229–4231. See also Trial Judgement, pp. 176–948.

377 See, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 4238, 4610, 4612, 4688, 5188, 5189. See also, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 3578–3742, 3784–3827.

378 See, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 4225–4231, 4239. See also, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 108–271, 3784–3985.

379 Trial Judgement, paras. 275, 276, 4383.

380 See, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 4611, 4612, 4685. See also Trial Judgement, paras. 4241–4610.

381 Trial Judgement, paras. 4685, 4686, 4688.


383 Trial Judgement, paras. 4232, 4610. See also Trial Judgement, paras. 4218–4231.

384 See, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 4611, 4612, 4685–4688, 5188, 5189.

385 See Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 118, 156, 158–185, 207. See also T. 25 August 2020 p. 46.

386 See Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 186, 194–202, 208; Mladić Reply Brief, paras. 41, 42.

387 See Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 203–206.


389 Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 158, 159, 180.


391 Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 161–179.

392 Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 160, 182.

393 Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 183, referring to Trial Judgement, paras. 4216, 4232. See also Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 118.


396 Karadžić Appeal Judgement, para. 452, n. 1194 and references cited therein.

397 Trial Judgement, para. 1773. See also Trial Judgement, paras. 3051 (Schedule B (ri)), 4190. According to the Trial Chamber, Đurić was Head of SJB Vlasenica as of 20 May 1992. See, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 51, 520.

398 Trial Judgement, paras. 1771–1773.

399 Trial Judgement, paras. 3051 (Schedule B (ri)), 3065.

400 Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 164.

401 Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 164, 165.

402 Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 167.

403 Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 165, 168.

404 See Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 118, 167, 169.

405 Prosecution Response Brief, paras. 46, 49, 50.

408 Trial Judgement, para. 1772, 7433, 7435. See also Trial Decision on Adjudicated Facts, para. 51(1); Prosecution Motion on Adjudicated Facts, Annex A, p. 271, 3784, 413 Trial Judgement, para. 1772, n. 7431, 7434, referring to Exhibit P182 (confidential), para. 126.

410 Trial Judgement, para. 1772, n. 7432, referring to Exhibit P182 (confidential), para. 126.

411 Trial Judgement, para. 1772, n. 7434, referring to Exhibit P182 (confidential), para. 128, T. 18 September 2012 pp. 2528, 2529 (closed session).

412 Trial Judgement, para. 1772, nn. 7436–7438, referring to Exhibits P182 (confidential), paras. 132, 134, P197.

413 Trial Judgement, para. 1772, n. 7439, referring to Exhibit P182 (confidential), para. 133.

414 Trial Judgement, para. 1772, n. 7441, referring to Exhibit P182 (confidential), paras. 135, 136, T. 17 September 2012 pp. 2430, 2431, 2456 (closed session).

415 See supra para. 126.

416 See Exhibit P182 (confidential), paras. 120, 128–136; T. 17 September 2012 pp. 2428–2432, 2455–2457 (closed session); T. 18 September 2012 pp. 2528, 2529 (closed session).

417 See Trial Judgement, para. 1771, n. 7430.

418 See Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 166, 167, 181.

419 See T. 17 September 2012 pp. 2455–2457 (closed session); T. 18 September 2012 paras. 2528, 2529 (closed session).

420 See supra Section III.A.2 (a)(ii); Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 118, 167, 169.


422 See Mladić Final Trial Brief, paras. 61, 122, 123, 125, 130, 1669, 1671–1674, nn. 179, 180, 182, 183, 186, 187, 193, 205–207.

423 Trial Judgement, para. 974. See also Trial Judgement, paras. 3051 (Schedule B (i)).

424 Trial Judgement, paras. 969–974.
References cited therein. Taking judicial notice of adjudicated facts of facts related to, inter alia, the conduct of physical perpetrators of crimes for which an accused is alleged to be responsible. See Karadjic Appeal Judgement, para. 452, n. 1193; Appeal Decision on Adjudicated Facts, para. 85; Karemera et al. Decision of 16 June 2006, paras. 52, 53.

Prosecutor v. Ratko Mladic, Case No. IT-09–92-T, Decision on Prosecution’s Twenty-Eighth Motion to Admit Evidence Pursuant to Rule 92 bis, 2 December 2013, p. 8.


Mladic Final Trial Brief, paras. 1372–1377.

Mladic Final Trial Brief, paras. 1372, 1377.

See supra Section III.A.2(a); Mladic Appeal Brief, paras. 118, 167, 169.


Mladic Appeal Brief, paras. 160, 182.

Mladic Appeal Brief, para. 160.

Mladic Appeal Brief, para. 182.

Prosecution Response Brief, para. 48.


See supra Section II.

See Mladic Appeal Brief, paras. 136, 186, 197–202, 208. See also Mladic Reply Brief, para. 42.

Mladic Appeal Brief, para. 198.

Mladic Appeal Brief, paras. 198, 200, nn. 280, 289, 290.

Mladic Appeal Brief, paras. 198, 199, nn. 281, 282, 284, 285.


Mladic Appeal Brief, para. 199, n. 286.


Mladic Appeal Brief, paras. 198, 200.

Mladic Appeal Brief, para. 198, n. 280, referring to, inter alia, Trial Judgement, para. 1014, Exhibit P3972.
registered to leave because conditions were unbearable for them to stay”, “some were forcibly removed from their houses”, and others “were pressured into leaving by hearing only Serb songs on the radio, having only Serb stamps on documents, and managers being dismissed and sent to do cleaning jobs”. See Trial Judgement, para. 959, referring to Exhibit P439 (under seal), para. 32.

Trial Judgement, para. 1560, n. 6605, referring to Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 198, 200, n. 290, referring to Exhibit D770, paras. 16, 17. The Appeals Chamber notes that paragraph 17 of Exhibit D770 concerns the role of the Serb Democratic Party during the war rather than assistance to refugees.

Trial Judgement, para. 1016. See also Trial Judgement, paras. 1004–1015.

Trial Judgement, paras. 1625, 1723, n. 7288. See also, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 1691–1717.

Trial Judgement, para. 1754. See also Trial Judgement, paras. 1752, 1753.

See, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 1554–1585, 3122(g), 3147, exhibiting e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 948–959. The Appeals Chamber considers that Mladić’s selective use of Exhibit P439 ignores aspects substantiating the Trial Chamber’s finding that non-Serb civilians in Kotor Varnoš Municipality were expelled by Serb forces. See Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 200, n. 289, referring to Exhibit P439 (under seal), para. 64. As noted above, Exhibit P439, Witness RM-802’s statement, provided that non-Serbs were physically forced or felt pressured to leave due to the unbearable conditions. See Trial Judgement, paras. 959, referring to Exhibit P439 (under seal), para. 32.

See, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 1554–1585, 3122(k), 3151, 3183.

A review of the relevant portions of Exhibit D770 reveals, inter alia, that: (i) in May 1992, due to growing insecurity in Rogatica Municipality and shooting in the streets, both Serbs and Muslims left town and moved into suburbs and further away; and (ii) Serb municipal authorities organized the transport of Serb families to Serbia to keep them safe, received Serb refugees arriving from other areas, and accommodated the refugees in abandoned Muslim and Serb homes in a controlled and organized manner. See Exhibit D770, paras. 15, 16.

Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 198–200.

See Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 198, nn. 281–283, referring to, inter alia, Exhibit D799, para. 6, Trial Judgement, paras. 746, 748.

Trial Judgement, para. 746, referring to, inter alia, Exhibit D799, para. 6.

The Trial Chamber ultimately found, based on the evidence of Witness RM-104, that one Bosnian Muslim family left Ilidža Municipality to Sarajevo after a member of the “White Eagles” threatened the family members’ lives if they were to refuse to comply with the ultimatum to leave the municipality or to take up arms and become loyal to the Serb authorities. The Trial Chamber found that this one incident in Ilidža Municipality constituted forcible transfer as charged in Count 8 of the Indictment. See Trial Judgement, paras. 747–749, 3122(d), 3144, 3183.

Trial Judgement, para. 748.
Trial Judgement, para. 955, n. 3944, referring to T. 4 February 2013 pp. 8030, 8031 (closed session).

See Trial Judgement, para. 3147. See also Trial Judgement, paras. 955, 960.

See Exhibit P843 (under seal), para. 61.

See Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 200, nn. 291, 292, referring to, inter alia, Exhibit D942, para. 15.

See Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 200, n. 292, referring to Trial Judgement, paras. 960 (Kotor Varoš), 1720 (Sanski Most).

Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 198, 199, n. 286. See also Mladić Reply Brief, paras. 40–42.

Prosecution Response Brief, para. 59.

Prosecution Response Brief, para. 59.

Prosecution Response Brief, para. 59.

Mladić Reply Brief, paras. 40–42.

Exhibit D1503, pp. 1, 2.

See Trial Judgement, paras. 4238, 4396, n. 15357. See also Trial Judgement, para. 4401.

Exhibit D1503, para. 1.

Exhibit D1503, para. 2.

Exhibit D1503, paras. 2, 7.

Exhibit D1503, paras. 3–5.

Exhibit D1503, para. 5.

Exhibit D1503, para. 6.

Exhibit D1503, p. 2.

Trial Judgement, para. 3853.

Exhibit P3095, pp. 1, 2.

Exhibit P3095, pp. 2, 3.

See Exhibits D1503, P3095.

See Trial Judgement, paras. 4419, 4522.

Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 202, n. 293, referring to Exhibits P353, pp. 163, 179, 180, 192, 260, 299, P356, paras. 179, 180. See also Mladić Reply Brief, paras. 40–42.

Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 202, n. 294, referring to Exhibits P353, p. 330, P356, paras. 218, D1514, D187. See also Mladić Reply Brief, paras. 40–42.


See Prosecution Response Brief, paras. 61–63. See also T. 25 August 2020 pp. 96, 97.


See Exhibit P253, p. 163. A review of pages 179 and 180 of Exhibit P253 to which Mladić refers shows no relevance to the alleged constraints he faced during the war. The Appeals Chamber therefore dismisses any contention of error in this regard without further consideration.

See, e.g., Trial Judgement, para. 4658.

See, e.g., Trial Judgement, para. 3877.

See, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 4422, 4423, 4798.

See, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 4443–4445. See also Trial Judgement, paras. 4446–4448.

See Trial Judgement, paras. 4425, 4527, 4528, nn. 15777, 16090, 16094, referring to Exhibits P358 (Mladić’s notebook, dated 2 April to 24 October 1993), P5059 (an order from the VRS Main Staff regarding discipline in commands, units, and institutions, dated 11 August 1994), P5064 (an order from Mladić regarding military discipline in the VRS, dated 13 March 1995).

See, e.g., Trial Judgement, para. 4522.

See Trial Judgement, para. 4522, nn. 16072–16075, referring to Exhibit P1966 (a VRS Main Staff report from Mladić dated September 1992). See also, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 3831, 3834, 3838, 3839, 3842, 3844, 3847, 3853–3855. Observing that the relationship between paramilitary formations and the VRS or the MUP differed from group to group, the Trial Chamber found that some operated outside the command of the VRS while others cooperated and coordinated with the VRS while committing crimes in municipalities such as Prijedor, Sanski Most, and Trnovo. See Trial Judgement, para. 4419. The Trial Chamber nevertheless found that, since it did not receive evidence indicating that Mladić directed, monitored, or authorized the VRS’s cooperation and coordination with paramilitary formations, it did not consider this allegation further. See Trial Judgement, para. 4419.

See Trial Judgement, para. 4392. See also, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 4296–4380, 4383–4391.

See, e.g., Karadžić Appeal Judgement, paras. 403, 530; Šainović et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 490.

Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 202, n. 294, referring to Exhibits P353, p. 330, P356, p. 218, D1514, D187. With respect to Exhibit P356, a review of the excerpt to which Mladić refers shows no relevance to the alleged protection he intended to provide to non-Serbs. See Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 202, n. 294, referring to, inter alia, Exhibit P356, p. 218. The Appeals Chamber, in any event, observes that page 219 of Exhibit P356 contains language to the effect of “[p]rotection in the population/especially in the towns”. However, without further submissions from Mladić in relation to this statement, it is unclear how this could demonstrate an error in the Trial Judgement. Given the vague references and obvious deficiencies in Mladić’s submissions in this regard, the Appeals Chamber dismisses any contention of error on this basis without further consideration.

Exhibit P353, p. 330.

Exhibit P353, p. 330.

See, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 4548–4600.

See, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 4552, 4554–4556.

See Trial Judgement, paras. 4602–4608.

See Trial Judgement, paras. 4611, 4612.

Exhibit D1514, pp. 1, 2.

Exhibit D1514, p. 1.

See Trial Judgement, para. 4524, nn. 16080, 16081.

Exhibit D187, pp. 1, 2.


See, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 4518–4520, 4524, 4525.

See, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 4515, 4517–4528, 4545. See also Trial Judgement, para. 4687.

See also Trial Judgement, para. 4529–4543.

See, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 4510–4512, 4546. See also Trial Judgement, paras. 4502–4509, 4687.

Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 203; T. 25 August 2020 pp. 41, 43–46. Mladić contends that the Trial Chamber never cited evidence that he was aware of the content of these meetings, conversations, as well as speeches and statements from politicians. See Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 203.


Prosecution Response Brief, paras. 64, 65. See also T. 25 August 2020 pp. 89–97. The Prosecution submits that Mladić conflates the date that the Overarching JCE came into existence and the date he was found to be a member, and that, therefore, arguments about his lack of involvement in 1991 are irrelevant. See Prosecution Response Brief, para. 64; T. 25 August 2020 p. 93.

Prosecution Response Brief, paras. 66, 67. See also T. 25 August 2020 pp. 91, 92, 95–97. The Prosecution further asserts that Mladić does not challenge the Trial Chamber’s conclusion that he contributed to the Overarching JCE by, inter alia, establishing and maintaining the VRS. T. 25 August 2020 p. 98.

See, e.g., Stanišić and Simatović Appeal Judgement, para. 77; Brdanin Appeal Judgement, paras. 364; 430; Stakić Appeal Judgement, para. 64; Tadić Appeal Judgement, para. 227. See also Nizeyimana Appeal Judgement, para. 325; Gotovina and Markači Appeal Judgement, para. 89.

See, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 4232, 4610.

See Trial Judgement, paras. 4238, 4610, 4612 (these members included Karadžić, Krajišnik, Plavšić, Koljević, Subotić, Mandić, and Stanišić).

See, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 4611, 4685, 4686, 4688.

See, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 4218–4221.

See Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 204, referring to Trial Judgement, paras. 4374–4395, 4466, 4472–4474.

See Trial Judgement, paras. 4374–4395.

See Trial Judgement, paras. 4466, 4472–4474.

The Trial Chamber found that the Supreme Command was created on 30 November 1992 and that the Commander of the VRS Main Staff, Mladić, was not its member and could not attend meetings on invitation only. Trial Judgement, paras. 31, 4476.

Trial Judgement, paras. 4476, 4478.

Trial Judgement, paras. 4477, 4478.

Trial Judgement, para. 4477.

Trial Judgement, para. 4478.


See, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 4224, 4225. The Trial Chamber found that crimes were committed by the VRS in the following municipalities: (i) Banja Luka (see, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 374, 454–456, 469–472, 487–494, 502); (ii) Bijeljina (see, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 505, 510, 511, 513, 516, 551–555, 559–567, 582–587); (iii) Poča (see, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 603–629, 631–655, 657–667, 669–673, 675–684, 686–690, 696, 697, 702, 704, 706–723); (iv) Kalinovik (see, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 750–752, 760–774, 776–780, 782–784, 790, 791); (v) Ključ (see, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 800–832, 840–851, 854–859, 883, 884); (vi) Kotor Varaš (see, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 887–892, 894–902, 905–918, 920–928, 931–934, 937–943, 947–960); (vii) Novi Grad (see, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 969–974); (viii) Prijedor (see, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 1017–1040, 1050–1062, 1064–1074, 1076–1087, 1089–1100, 1101–1121 1142, 1159–1170, 1236, 1238–1269, 1271–1325, 1330–1380, 1384–1401, 1403, 1407, 1408, 1411–1413, 1417, 1419, 1420, 1430–1449); (ix) Rogatica (see, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 1456–1462, 1464–1471, 1490–1506, 1511–1529, 1532, 1553–1556, 1553–1585); (x) Sanski Most (see, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 1589–1602, 1604–1625, 1627–1637, 1649, 1650, 1663, 1677–1679, 1681–1686, 1689–1735); (xi) Sokolac (see, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 1739–1742, 1744–1746, 1752–1756); and (xii) Vlasenica (see, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 1758, 1760, 1763, 1766, 1774–1795, 1803–1815, 1841–1846).


See Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 206.

Trial Judgement, para. 4612. See also, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 4241–4611, 4615, 4685, 5189.

Trial Judgement, para. 4688. See also, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 4613–4687.

See Mladić Notice of Appeal, paras. 36–38; Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 211–335. See also Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 136.

Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 224, 237, 335.

Trial Judgement, paras. 4611, 4612. See also, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 4241–4610, 4615, 4685, 5189.

Trial Judgement, para. 4611. See also Trial Judgement, paras. 4242–4291.

Trial Judgement, para. 4611. See also Trial Judgement, paras. 4293–4394, 4396–4404.

Trial Judgement, para. 4611. See also Trial Judgement, paras. 3817, 4408, 4409, 4414.

Trial Judgement, para. 4611. See also Trial Judgement, paras. 4420–4456.

Trial Judgement, para. 4611. See also Trial Judgement, paras. 4458–4478.

Trial Judgement, para. 4611. See also Trial Judgement, paras. 4480–4500.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3962920
See also ć
Appeal Brief, paras. 218, 221, Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 3794, n. 14173, referring to Adjudicated Fact 1354.

See Trial Judgement, paras. 3794, nn. 14174, 14175, referring to Adjudicated Fact 1355.

See also Prosecution Response Brief, paras. 222; T. 25 August 2020 pp. 54, 55.
report containing no information relevant to the issues at hand. Mladic’s contention that the Trial Chamber conflated coordination and subordination with respect to the MUP is discussed below in the section addressing Ground 5.B of his appeal. See infra Section III.D.2(b).


See, e.g., Trial Judgement, para. 4239.

See, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 4238, 4610.

See, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 341, 342, 3824, 3825, 4227.


Trial Judgement, paras. 4611, 4612. See also Trial Judgement, paras. 4242–4291, 4293–4394.

Trial Judgement, paras. 4383–4389. See also Trial Judgement, paras. 246–2476, 4224–4291, 4293–4382, 4611.

Trial Judgement, para. 4387. See also, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 114–120, 152, 159, 160, 164, 181, 186, 193, 199, 200, 203, 205, 213, 214, 218, 263, 4296–4310, 4375, 4380, 4383.

Trial Judgement, para. 4390, 4391. See also, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 4375–4380.

Trial Judgement, para. 4392. See also, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 151, 237.

Mladic Appeal Brief, para. 227. See also Mladic Appeal Brief paras. 228–236.


Mladic Appeal Brief, para. 233.


Mladic Appeal Brief, para. 236. See also Mladic Reply Brief, para. 47.

Prosecution Response Brief, para. 74. See also T. 25 August 2020 pp. 97, 100.

Prosecution Response Brief, para. 75; T. 25 August 2020 p. 100.

Prosecution Response Brief, paras. 76–78. See also T. 25 August 2020 p. 100.


See, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 210, 4313, n. 15539 (where the Trial Chamber considered that, on 5 March 1993, Mladic sent an assessment report of the VRS Drina Corps units’ state of combat readiness to the Drina Corps command and recommended that it study the report, draw up a plan to eliminate shortcomings, and incorporate the designated assignments into its working plan).

See, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 233, 237, nn. 894, 897–899 (where the Trial Chamber considered that the VRS Sarajevo Romanija Corps (“SRK”) brigades had very few professional officers, were understaffed, only rarely provided training, and faced disciplinary problems, all of which led to problems of indiscipline, disobedience, and inefficient command and control).

See, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 221, 224, 230, nn. 820, 845, 882–884, 886 (where the Trial Chamber considered, inter alia, that 15 to 20 per cent of the SRK were professional soldiers, that there was a lack of discipline in the SRK due to fatigue and the lack of soldiers, and that there was a lack of training).

See, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 4322, 4473, nn. 15559–15562, 15932 (where the Trial Chamber considered the VRS Main Staff analysis of the combat readiness and activities of the VRS in 1992, and noted, inter alia, that the VRS had been under a single command and control structure in 1992, despite being initially composed of a large number of different armies and paramilitary formations, and that the VRS Main Staff was performing the function of the Staff of the VRS Supreme Command and at the same time the function of the superior command for operational and some joint tactical formations).

See, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 221, 233, 236, nn. 818, 894, 899, 921, 922 (where the Trial Chamber considered that the SRK brigades had very few professional officers, faced disciplinary problems, and did not have specially organized sniper units).

See, e.g., Karadžić Appeal Judgement, para. 396; Prlić et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 187; Kvočka et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 23. See also Nyiramabahiko et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 3100; Đorđević Appeal Judgement, para. 864. See also Trial Judgement, para. 16 (stating that “[d]ue to the vast quantity of evidence, it was not possible to reference and discuss every piece of evidence in the [Trial] Judgment, even though the Trial Chamber considered all evidence carefully.”).

See, e.g., Karadžić Appeal Judgement, para. 396; Prlić et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 187; Kvočka et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 16, stating that “[d]ue to the vast quantity of evidence, it was not possible to reference and discuss every piece of evidence in the [Trial] Judgment, even though the Trial Chamber considered all evidence carefully.”).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3962920
Outside of the Sarajevo JCE, the Trial Chamber found that the VRS First Krajina Corps units “lacked discipline” and were “untrained and unprofessional”), 144 (where the Trial Chamber considered evidence that the 30th Division of the VRS First Krajina Corps was comprised of soldiers who lacked military rank), 151 (where the Trial Chamber considered and assessed evidence that several brigades of the VRS First Krajina Corps lacked professional personnel and discipline), 187 (where the Trial Chamber considered Defence argument that the Drina Corps squads lacked qualified officers at all command levels and lacked organizational unity), 196 (where the Trial Chamber considered evidence that the Bratunac Brigade of the Drina Corps lacked, inter alia, suitably trained officers at all levels), 221 (where the Trial Chamber considered Defence arguments that the SRK lacked appropriately qualified soldiers, officers, and commanders; that orders were not always followed; and that the SRK could not exercise effective command and control), 230 (where the Trial Chamber considered evidence that 15 to 20 per cent of the SRK were professional soldiers, and that there was a lack of discipline and training), 233 (where the Trial Chamber summarized various witness evidence that the SRK brigades had very few professional officers, only rarely provided training, were understaffed, and faced disciplinary problems), 237–239 (where the Trial Chamber considered and assessed evidence about the lack of command and control in the SRK brigades), 800 (where the Trial Chamber considered argument that a battalion of the 17th Light Infantry Brigade of the Second Krajina Corps operating in Ključ Municipality was untrained and ill-disciplined).

The Appeals Chamber observes that Exhibit P347 is Mladić's argument that the SRK lacked appropriately qualified soldiers, officers, and commanders; that orders were not always followed; and that the SRK could not exercise effective command and control, 230 (where the Trial Chamber considered evidence that 15 to 20 per cent of the SRK were professional soldiers, and that there was a lack of discipline and training), 233 (where the Trial Chamber summarized various witness evidence that the SRK brigades had very few professional officers, only rarely provided training, were understaffed, and faced disciplinary problems), 237–239 (where the Trial Chamber considered and assessed evidence about the lack of command and control in the SRK brigades), 800 (where the Trial Chamber considered argument that a battalion of the 17th Light Infantry Brigade of the Second Krajina Corps operating in Ključ Municipality was untrained and ill-disciplined).

The Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber also considered evidence of a large-scale inspection of VRS commands and units that Mladić ordered to be carried out between 16 June 1994 and 2 July 1994. The purpose of this inspection was to obtain information on, inter alia, the situation in commands and units, and the levels and readiness of VRS units. See Trial Judgement, para. 4316.

The Appeals Chamber recalls that arguments which do not have the potential to cause the impugned decision to be reversed or revised may be immediately dismissed and need not be considered on the merits. See supra para. 20. See also, e.g., Karadžić Appeal Judgement, para. 19; Sešelj Appeal Judgement, para. 17; Ngirabatware Appeal Judgement, para. 11. Mladić also refers to exhibits to support his claim that reports he received from Manjača camp did not provide any information about the commission of crimes by the VRS. Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 246, n. 364, referring to Exhibits P92, P215 (under seal), P218 (under seal), P219 (under seal), P220 (under seal), P221 (under seal), P222 (under seal), P225 (under seal), P226 (under seal), P227 (under seal), P228, P229 (under seal), P231 (under seal), P233 (under seal), P234 (under seal), P235 (under seal), P237 (under seal), P241 (under seal), D1536, D1827, D2030, D2071. A review of these exhibits reveals that, contrary to Mladić’s contention, they explicitly indicate that crimes were committed at or during the prisoners’ transportation to Manjača camp. See Exhibits P220 (under seal), p. 1 (during transportation from Sanski Most, prisoners of war were “not being treated in line with the Geneva Conventions: they were maltreated, beaten, and humiliated to the extreme”, and 24 prisoners died due to thirst and lack of oxygen) (see also Exhibit P227, p. 1 (under seal)), P222 (under seal), pp. 1, 2 (prisoners were beaten, kicked, maltreated, and killed by military policemen; “Military Police in ‘Manjača’ camp […] think they can do whatever they want with the prisoners”), P229 (under seal), pp. 1, 2 (“two prisoners who are in isolation today […] have been beaten and […] there is a fresh human blood on the walls of the cell”; “military policemen, together with the Security commander, Staff Sergeant MESAR, just don’t understand that prisoners are humans and that they are protected by international regulations while in the camp”; the team leader of the ICRC stated that “they established infliction of multiple injuries to the prisoners created by beating (bruises)”; “it is a fact that the soldiers – policemen are sometimes taking [o]ut prisoners whom they ‘don’t like’ or who they ‘like less’ by their own will and that they beat them as they please”), P233 (under seal), p. 1 (“eight prisoners died during transportation from ‘Omarska’ to ‘Manjača’, three of which have most probably been killed because they bore visible traces of violence”; “behaviour of people who participated in securing transportation of the prisoners Fwaš very incorrect, inhuman and bullying”).

Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 246, referring to Mladić Final Trial Brief, para. 940.

See Trial Judgement, paras. 1064–1075.

Trial Judgement, paras. 1065, 1066, 1072, 1073.

See Trial Judgement, para. 1024. The Trial Chamber found that Talic was Commander of the VRS First Krajina Corps. See, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 57, 97, 109, 147.

Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 247.

See Trial Judgement, para. 1024, referring to T. 25 September 2012 pp. 2988, 2989, Exhibit P253, pp. 1, 2.

Trial Judgement, para. 1024, referring to Exhibit P247. The Trial Chamber found that, as a result of the VRS attack on Kozarac from 24 to 27 May 1992, more than 800 inhabitants were killed and that this constituted murder as charged under Counts 5 and 6 of the Indictment. See Trial Judgement, paras. 1037, 3051 (Scheduled Incident A.6.5).

Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 248, referring to Trial Judgement, para. 4040.

See Trial Judgement, paras. 4038, 4040, referring to, inter alia, Exhibits P441, P442, P3745.

See Trial Judgement, para. 4038 (emphasis added), referring to, inter alia, Adjudicated Fact 807; Exhibit P441.

Trial Judgement, paras. 4546, 4611.

Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 249.

Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 250.

Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 251.

Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 252.

Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 253.

Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 250, referring to Trial Judgement, paras. 1614, 4180. According to the Trial Chamber, Basara was Commander of the 6th Krajina Brigade from 29 October 1991 to mid-December 1992, and Bralić commanded battalions within this brigade. See, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 108, 133, 1614.

Trial Judgement, para. 1614, referring to, inter alia, Exhibit D1031, paras. 39, 46.
Trial Judgement, paras. 827, n. 3423, referring to 100 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 747 Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 251, referring to Mladić Final Trial Brief, para. 1305.

See, e.g., T. 28 August 2014 pp. 24955, 24971; Exhibit P6705, p. 3. The Appeals Chamber notes that Mrčetić was the Deputy Commander of the SRK in 1993. See, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 4718, 4853.

According to Dunjić, he was removed from his role as a consequence of a physical confrontation with Galić, his corps commander. See T. 28 August 2014 pp. 24956, 24957, 24968.

See Exhibit P6705, pp. 2, 3.

Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 252, referring to Mladić Final Trial Brief, para. 1202.

See Mladić Final Trial Brief, paras. 1195–1202; Trial Judgement, paras. 1589–1602.

See, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 3497–3502, 3513.

Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 252, n. 378, referring to Mladić Final Trial Brief, para. 1273. Based on evidence and findings in the Trial Judgement, in June 1992, Colonel Galić was Commander of the 30th Division, which operated under the VRS First Krajina Corps. See Trial Judgement, paras. 145, 148, 150.


Trial Judgement, para. 827, n. 3424, referring to Adjudicated Fact 774.

Trial Judgement, para. 827, n. 3427, referring to Adjudicated Fact 774.

Trial Judgement, para. 4143. See also Trial Judgement, paras. 4135–4142.

Trial Judgement, para. 4143.

Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 253.

Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 253, referring to Trial Judgement, paras. 366, 367.

Mladić further submits that he ordered the improvement of conditions in Manjača camp. See Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 253, referring to, inter alia, Exhibit P2881, p. 1. The Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber expressly referred to Exhibit P2881, an order from Mladić dated 12 August 1992, and summarized Mladić’s orders to improve conditions in the camp. See Trial Judgement, para. 395. In the Appeals Chamber’s view, not only does Mladić fail to demonstrate that the Trial Chamber failed to give sufficient weight to this evidence, he also ignores findings in the Trial Judgement that the VRS First Krajina Corps, the VRS Main Staff, and the Bosnian Serb leadership made efforts to conceal the unlawful detention and cruel and inhumane treatment of detainees at Manjača camp. See, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 3989–4018. The Appeals Chamber further observes that Mladić’s orders, issued on 12 August 1992, came after killings had occurred at the camp and after intense international scrutiny. See, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 3994, 3996–4000. In any event, Mladić’s claim that he ordered the improvement of conditions at the camp does not relate to investigations or prosecutions and, as such, does not support his contention that the Trial Chamber gave insufficient weight to evidence that he or his subordinates ordered investigation and prosecution of crimes committed by the VRS.

Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 256.

Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 254, See also Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 259.

Trial Judgement, paras. 4094–4197.

Trial Judgement, paras. 4114, 4195, 4545. See also Trial Judgement, paras. 4095–4113, 4116–4194.

Trial Judgement, paras. 4514–4547.

Trial Judgement, paras. 4544–4546.

Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 254, 256.

Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 4517–4528, 4535, 4537.

Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 254–257.

Trial Judgement, para. 4546.

Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 258.

Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 258.

Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 244.

Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 258, referring to, inter alia, Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, para. 19.


Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 244, 258–260.

Trial Judgement, para. 4546.

Trial Judgement, paras. 4544, 4546. See also Trial Judgement, paras. 424–4291, 4293–4394.

Trial Judgement, para. 4545. See, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 4529–4533, 4536, 4539–4543. The Trial Chamber considered evidence that Mladić on two specific occasions ordered investigations for crimes committed against non-Serbs or UN personnel. See Trial Judgement, paras. 4535, 4537, 4546, 4635. However, there is no further evidence considered by the Trial Chamber that prosecutions resulted from these investigations he ordered. See, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 4545, 4546.

See, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 4546, 4630–4642, 4685.

Trial Judgement, paras. 4502–4512, 4546. See also Trial Judgement, paras. 3986–4093.

Trial Judgement, para. 4545.

Trial Judgement, para. 4545.

Trial Judgement, para. 4094–4196, 4545.

Trial Judgement, para. 4546.


See, e.g., Stanislić and Župljanin Appeal Judgement, para. 110; Krajšnik Appeal Judgement, para. 696.
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793 See Stanišić and Župljanin Appeal Judgement, para. 110. See also, e.g., Šainović et al. Appeal Judgement, paras. 1233, 1242.


796 Trial Judgement, para. 4544.

797 Trial Judgement, paras. 4546, 4611, 4612.


799 See Mladic Appeal Brief, para. 258.

800 See Kordić and Ćerkez Appeal Judgement, para. 19.

801 See, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 4544–4546.


803 See, e.g., Karadžić Appeal Judgement, para. 434; Stanišić and Župljanin Appeal Judgement, para. 598; Popović et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 1674; Đorđević Appeal Judgement, para. 83.

804 See, e.g., Bemba Appeal Judgement, paras. 171–182.

805 See Trial Judgement, paras. 4545, 4546.

806 See Trial Judgement, paras. 4545, 4546.

807 Trial Judgement, para. 4111. See also Trial Judgement, paras. 4099, 4101, 4103, 4105, 4107.

808 Trial Judgement, para. 4111. See also Trial Judgement, para. 4101.

809 Trial Judgement, para. 4114. See also Trial Judgement, paras. 4103, 4105–4107, 4109, 4110.

810 Trial Judgement, para. 4114. See also Trial Judgement, paras. 4106, 4107, 4110.

811 Trial Judgement, para. 4114. See also Trial Judgement, paras. 4104 (where the Trial Chamber considered evidence that the atmosphere in 1995 was such that it was not realistic for anyone to file a criminal complaint against a high-ranking VRS officer or for a prosecutor to initiate an investigation against the security organ of the VRS Main Staff as doing so would have risked the safety and lives of his or her family), 4106 (where the Trial Chamber considered evidence that no VRS soldier was prosecuted for killing non-Serbs in Sanski Most where the 6th Krajina Brigade of the VRS First Krajina Corp was based, and that, according to Witness Slobodan Radulj, the Banja Luka Military Prosecutor had received instructions not to bring charges of war crimes for crimes committed by VRS soldiers against non-Serbs), 4107 (where the Trial Chamber considered evidence that, after the Bijeljina Military Court began functioning in August 1992, the justice system was not prosecuting Serbs for committing crimes against non-Serbs, with the exception of a few cases wherein the sentences were not carried out, and that, according to Witness RM-513, there were no prosecutions by the military court of VRS soldiers for crimes committed against non-Serb civilian populations).

812 Trial Judgement, paras. 4195, 4545. See also Trial Judgement, paras. 4106, 4107, 4110, 4123, 4128, 4134, 4143, 4148, 4152, 4165, 4178, 4189, 4194.

813 Mladic Appeal Brief, paras. 261, 262. See also Mladic Reply Brief, para. 45.

814 Mladic Appeal Brief, para. 263.

815 Mladic Appeal Brief, para. 264.

816 Mladic Appeal Brief, para. 244.

817 Mladic Appeal Brief, para. 261, n. 392, referring to, inter alia, Mladic Final Trial Brief, paras. 732, 733. Mladic also refers to Exhibit P360. See Mladic Appeal Brief, para. 261, n. 392, referring to, inter alia, Exhibit P360, p. 296. The Appeals Chamber notes, however, that the page number indicated in the appellant’s brief, page 296, does not exist in Exhibit P360. The Appeals Chamber further notes that Mladic relies on the Bemba Appeal Judgement as well as the Popović et al. Appeal Judgement to support his submission. See Mladic Appeal Brief, paras. 261, 263. With regard to his reliance on the Bemba Appeal Judgement, the Appeals Chamber recalls that it is not bound by jurisprudence from other courts. See, e.g., Karadžić Appeal Judgement, para. 434; Stanišić and Župljanin Appeal Judgement, para. 598; Popović et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 1674; Đorđević Appeal Judgement, para. 83. Furthermore, Mladic’s references to the Bemba Appeal Judgement do not support his argument as that case concerned different factual circumstances – namely, the Appeals Chamber of the ICC found that the Trial Chamber of the ICC had failed to properly appreciate, inter alia, that the accused faced limitations in investigating and prosecuting crimes as a “remote commander sending troops to a foreign country”. See Mladic Appeal Brief, paras. 261–263, nn. 392, 399, 400, referring to, inter alia, Bemba Appeal Judgement, paras. 138, 144–146, 166–171, 173, 189. See also Bemba Appeal Judgement, paras. 171–173, 189. The Appeals Chamber also finds Mladic’s references to the Popović et al. Appeal Judgement, relating to superior responsibility under Article 7(3) of the ICTY Statute, to be distinguishable from Mladic’s case, which involves joint criminal enterprise liability under Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute. See Mladic Appeal Brief, paras. 261, 263, nn. 392, 400, referring to, inter alia, Popović et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 1931.

818 See Mladic Final Trial Brief, paras. 732, 733, referring to Exhibits P3560, P1092 (under seal), D1026.

819 See Trial Judgement, para. 4114. See also Trial Judgement, paras. 4106, 4108.

820 See Trial Judgement, para. 4114. See also Trial Judgement, paras. 4099, 4101, 4103–4111.


822 See Mladic Appeal Brief, para. 264. In this regard, Mladic ignores the Trial Chamber’s findings that, while the military judicial system of Republika Srpska was formally autonomous and independent, “in many instances, decisions to release suspects were made after VRS officers […] exerted pressure on the military courts to drop cases or release perpetrators of crimes”. Trial Judgement, para. 4196. The Appeals Chamber further notes the Trial Chamber’s consideration of Witness RM-513’s evidence that a military prosecutor “obstructed the work of the Bijeljina military court and put pressure on his subordinates to drop cases involving Bosnian-Serb perpetrators and Bosnian-Muslim victims”. See Trial Judgement, para. 4132, referring to Exhibit P1054 (under seal), paras. 58, 62. The Trial Chamber considered the evidence of Witness RM-016, who stated that the Banja Luka military court released perpetrators of a massacre at Velagići School.
under the pressure of the Ključ Brigade and with the approval of the VRS Main Staff. See Trial Judgement, paras. 828, 4139, 4141, referring to Exhibit P2375 (under seal). The Trial Chamber also considered evidence that the atmosphere in 1995 was such that, although it was possible for an individual to file a criminal complaint against high-ranking VRS officers, it was not realistic as those who did would have risked the safety and lives of family members, and that, while it was also possible for a prosecutor to initiate investigations against the security organ of the VRS Main Staff, no prosecutor would have done so for the same reason. See Trial Judgement, para. 4104, referring to Exhibit P3351, pp. 10856, 10861, 10862.

823 See Trial Judgement, paras. 4195, 4545. See also, e.g., Trial Judgement, para. 4106 (where the Trial Chamber considered evidence showing that: “no VRS soldier was prosecuted for killing non-Serbs in Sanski Most, where the 6th Krajina Brigade was based”, “cases concerning non-Serb victims were delayed”; “[p]riority [...] was given to cases concerning the evasion of military service by Serbs”); 4107 (where the Trial Chamber considered evidence from Witness RM-513 that “after the Bijeljina Military Court began functioning in August 1992, the justice system, including the court, prosecutors, and police, was not prosecuting Serbs for committing crimes against non-Serbs, with the exception of a few cases, even though it was common knowledge that Serbs were killing non-Serbs in 1992” while “in cases where the victims were Bosnian Serbs, perpetrators were punished according to the law” as “[p]ressure from families influenced the courts”); 4110 (where the Trial Chamber considered evidence that criminal proceedings in the military justice system “were primarily initiated and completed with the aim of assisting the armed struggle and thus contributing to the creation of the new Serbian state”).

824 Trial Judgement, paras. 4544, 4545. See also Trial Judgement, paras. 4383–4394, 4529–4543.

825 Trial Judgement, paras. 4545, 4546.

826 Trial Judgement, para. 4685. See also Trial Judgement, paras. 4623, 4630–4643, 5352 (confidential). In finding that Mladić knew of crimes being committed against non-Serbs in the Municipalities, the Trial Chamber relied on the following considerations: his position as Commander of the VRS Main Staff (see, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 4374–4394, 4544, 4611, 4612, 4623, 4685); (ii) the VRS Main Staff’s receipt of detailed reports (see, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 4297–4299, 4383–4385, 4387, 4631, 4638, 4685); (iii) Mladić’s personal receipt of regular updates (see, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 4296–4310, 4385, 4685); (iv) his involvement in VRS units’ activities (see, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 4293–4394, 4611, 4612, 4615, 4685); and (v) the fact that the commission of crimes was widely acknowledged (see, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 4632, 4633, 4685).

827 Trial Judgement, para. 4686.

828 Trial Judgement, para. 4686. See also, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 4332, 4342, 4460, 4461, 4483, 4499, 4644, 4645, 4647, 4650, 4667–4669.

829 Trial Judgement, para. 4686. See also, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 4483, 4486, 4499, 4647–4650, 4667.

830 Trial Judgement, para. 4686. See also, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 4617–4619, 4670, 4671.

831 Trial Judgement, para. 4686. See also, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 4620, 4629.
See Article 23 of the ICTY Statute; Rule 98 ter (C) of the ICTY Rules.


See Trial Judgement, paras. 4458–4478.

See Trial Judgement, paras. 4459 (where the Trial Chamber summarized the evidence of Witness Robert Donia that, inter alia, Mladić did not have a right to vote or make proposals at assembly sessions but served as an influential voice and was able to make suggestions, advocate policies, and engage in discussions about such policies), 4460 (where the Trial Chamber summarized the minutes of a Bosnian Serb Assembly session on 12 May 1992, including Mladić’s statements), 4471 (where the Trial Chamber summarized the minutes of a Bosnian Serb Assembly session on 15 and 16 April 1995, including Mladić’s statements), 4472 (where the Trial Chamber summarized the evidence of Witnesses Michael Rose, Husein Aly Abdel-Razek, and Anthony Banbury on Mladić’s authority in relation to Karadžić and others), 4473 (where the Trial Chamber summarized the evidence of Witnesses Rupert Smith and John Wilson on the relationship between military and political structures, and between Mladić and Karadžić).

See Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 281.

Trial Judgement, paras. 4477, 4478.

Trial Judgement, paras. 4477, 4478.


See Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 273, 286, nn. 412, 427, referring to Stanišić and Simatović Appeal Judgement, paras. 82, 87; T. 25 August 2020 pp. 48, 50.

See Stanišić and Simatović Appeal Judgement, paras. 79–90.

Stanišić and Simatović Appeal Judgement, para. 88. See also Stanišić and Simatović Appeal Judgement, paras. 81, 82.

See Stanišić and Simatović Appeal Judgement, para. 89.

See Trial Judgement, paras. 3573–4240.

See Trial Judgement, paras. 4241–4612.

See Trial Judgement, paras. 4613–4688.


Mladić alleges that the Trial Chamber erred in paragraphs 4298, 4386, 4465, and 4546 of the Trial Judgement. See Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 287, 289, 290, nn. 428, 432, 433. The Appeals Chamber observes that, in paragraph 4465 of the Trial Judgement, while assessing Mladić’s participation in the development of Bosnian Serb governmental policies, the Trial Chamber cross-referenced evidence reviewed in Chapter 9.3.13 (mens rea) that Mladić demonstrated his opposition to the Vance-Owen plan. See Trial Judgement, paras. 4465, 4628. In paragraph 4298 of the Trial Judgement, when discussing Mladić’s command and control of the VRS, the Trial Chamber cross-referenced the evidence of Witness RM-802, which it considered in Chapter 9.3.13 (mens rea), that daily reports were sent and that Mladić was a “hands-on” commander. See Trial Judgement, paras. 4298, 4631. In paragraph 4386 of the Trial Judgement, the Trial Chamber made findings relevant to Mladić’s visits to and inspections of VRS units but did not refer to any evidence or assessment in the mens rea section of the Trial Judgement. See Trial Judgement, para. 4386. In paragraph 4546 of the Trial Judgement, the Trial Chamber found that Mladić did not take appropriate or further steps to investigate or punish perpetrators of crimes, referring to, inter alia, its findings in Chapter 9.3.13 (mens rea) that Mladić knew that crimes were committed. See Trial Judgement, paras. 4546, 4623, 4630–4643, 5352 (confidential).

See, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 3051, 3068, 3122, 3133, 3210, 3217–3220, 3222, 3224–3226, 3230, 3241, 3267, 3287, 3325, 3360, 3381, 3388, 3406, 3419, 3556, 3577, 3665, 3676, 3690, 3691, 3704, 3708, 3722, 4614, 4615, 4623, 4624, 4630, 4631, 4635–4639, 4644, 4646, 4685.

See Karadžić Appeal Judgement, para. 721; Stakić Appeal Judgement, para. 47.


Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 299.


Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 314, 315. See also T. 25 August 2020 p. 59.


Prosecution Response Brief, paras. 104, 108, 109. See also T. 25 August 2020 p. 105. In response to Mladić’s specific examples of where the Trial Chamber erred in relation to circumstantial evidence, the Prosecution submits, inter alia, that: (i) he misrepresents the Trial Chamber’s findings regarding statements made in Croatia in 1991; and (ii) the evidence of his attendance at both meetings does not simply demonstrate his tacit agreement but rather reflects his explicit agreement with the common purpose of the Overarching JCE. See Prosecution Response Brief, paras. 107, 108.

Prosecution Response Brief, paras. 98, 110–115. In response to Mladić’s specific examples where the Trial Chamber ignored direct evidence, the Prosecution submits, inter alia, that: (i) the Trial Chamber considered his orders regarding paramilitary groups and that Mladić “simply cherry-picks his preferred evidence and ignores the rest”; (ii) Mladić misrepresents findings in the Trial Judgement regarding his orders to follow the Geneva Conventions; and (iii) the Trial Chamber explicitly discussed his orders to observe ceasefire agreements and Mladić fails to explain how these orders constitute direct evidence. See Prosecution Response Brief, paras. 113–115; T. 25 August 2020 pp. 105, 106.

Mladić Reply Brief, paras. 64, 65.

Mladić Reply Brief, para. 65.

Mladić further replies that the Prosecution has failed to undermine his submission that statements he made prior to his membership in the Overarching JCE should not have been included as a factor in determining his mens rea. See Mladić Reply Brief, para. 66.


Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 304, n. 445, referring to Trial Judgement, para. 4686. See also T. 25 August 2020 p. 43.

See Mladić Reply Brief, para. 66. See also T. 25 August 2020 pp. 43–45.

Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 304, nn. 446, 447, referring to Trial Judgement, paras. 3556, 4232, 4610.

See Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 304, n. 445.

See Trial Judgement, para. 4686.


See Trial Judgement, para. 4670, referring to Exhibit P2750, pp. 3–6.

See Trial Judgement, para. 4671, referring to Exhibit P2244 (under seal), p. 1.

See Trial Judgement, para. 4686.

Trial Judgement, para. 4688. See also, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 3708, 4222, 4378, 4383, 4477, 4623–4650, 4666–4687. The Trial Chamber found that Mladić was appointed Commander of the VRS Main Staff on 12 May 1992. See, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 275, 276, 4623.


See Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 304, nn. 446, 447, referring to Trial Judgement, paras. 3556, 4232, 4610.

See Trial Judgement, para. 4238. See also, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 3828, 4197.

See Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 305–307, referring to Trial Judgement, paras. 4621, 4626. The Appeals Chamber observes that the first of the Pale Meetings challenged by Mladić took place on 10 or 11 May 1992, thus occurring before 12 May 1992, the date on which the Trial Chamber found that his shared intention to further the Overarching JCE began. See Trial Judgement, paras. 4621, 4688. Nevertheless, given the Trial Chamber’s finding that Mladić held the intent to contribute to the Overarching JCE by 12 May 1992 “at the latest” and that this meeting took place immediately before the specified date, the Appeals Chamber will address Mladić’s submissions in this regard.

Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 307.

See Trial Judgement, para. 4621, referring to Chapter 9.2.2. See also Trial Judgement, para. 3663, referring to Exhibit P3566, para. 106.

Trial Judgement, paras. 3663, 4621, referring to Exhibit P3566, para. 106.

Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 304, nn. 446, 447, referring to Trial Judgement, paras. 3556, 4232, 4610.

See also, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 4621, 4688, referring to Exhibit P3566, para. 106.


See Mladić Reply Brief, para. 66. See also T. 25 August 2020 pp. 43–45.

See Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 304, n. 445, referring to Trial Judgement, para. 4686. See also T. 25 August 2020 p. 43.

See Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 304, n. 445.

See Trial Judgement, para. 4686.


See Trial Judgement, para. 4670, referring to Exhibit P2750, pp. 3–6.

See Trial Judgement, para. 4671, referring to Exhibit P2244 (under seal), p. 1.

See Trial Judgement, para. 4686.

See Trial Judgement, para. 4688. See also, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 3708, 4222, 4378, 4383, 4477, 4623–4650, 4666–4687. The Trial Chamber found that Mladić was appointed Commander of the VRS Main Staff on 12 May 1992. See, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 275, 276, 4623.


See Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 304, nn. 446, 447, referring to Trial Judgement, paras. 3556, 4232, 4610.

See Trial Judgement, para. 4238. See also, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 3828, 4197.

See Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 305–307, referring to Trial Judgement, paras. 4621, 4626. The Appeals Chamber observes that the first of the Pale Meetings challenged by Mladić took place on 10 or 11 May 1992, thus occurring before 12 May 1992, the date on which the Trial Chamber found that his shared intention to further the Overarching JCE began. See Trial Judgement, paras. 4621, 4688. Nevertheless, given the Trial Chamber’s finding that Mladić held the intent to contribute to the Overarching JCE by 12 May 1992 “at the latest” and that this meeting took place immediately before the specified date, the Appeals Chamber will address Mladić’s submissions in this regard.

Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 307.

See Trial Judgement, para. 4621, referring to Chapter 9.2.2. See also Trial Judgement, para. 3663, referring to Exhibit P3566, para. 106.

Trial Judgement, paras. 3663, 4621, referring to Exhibit P3566, para. 106.
See Exhibits P5112 (order dated 30 July 1992 and signed by Mladić to bring paramilitary formations under the control of the VRS or to disarm by 15 August 1992); P5113 (order dated 30 July 1992 from the VRS First Krajina Corps Command to subordinate units to bring paramilitary formations under VRS control or to disarm by 15 August 1992 with similar language to Mladić’s order from 30 July 1992); P1966, p. 8 (report dated September 1992 from Mladić stating that all self-organizing units should be deployed in VRS units or prosecuted); P5151, pp. 1, 3, 5 (document dated 14 September 1992 from the VRS First Krajina Corps Command summarizing discussions at a military roundtable from 13 September 1992 that was chaired by the VRS Main Staff and Mladić and stating that the use of common military uniforms and insignia was considered as a way to ban paramilitary formations that deviate from the regulations on uniforms); P5119, p. 1 (document dated 19 February 1993 from the VRS Main Staff to all subordinate units to place military units under VRS command or to disband); D99, p. 1 (directive dated 22 July 1992 from Mladić noting that special assistance be given to internal units tasked with discovering, exposing, or breaking up paramilitary units); D792, p. 4 (a report dated 20 August 1992 from the VRS First Krajina Corps Command that by an order of the VRS Main Staff major activities lay ahead to abolish all paramilitary formations so as to establish firm military control and discipline). Other exhibits referenced by Mladić, including his notebooks, only discuss problems with paramilitary formations or actions taken by individuals other than Mladić personally. See Exhibits P352, pp. 48, 207, 331, 338; P353, pp. 59, 164, 308; P354, pp. 48, 133, 336, pp. 178, 180, 234; P7390, p. 2; P2873, p. 3; P4038, p. 1; P5133; P7208, p. 3; D891, para. 5; D921, paras. 26, 27; D1996, pp. 1, 2. As to Exhibit P360, the Appeals Chamber has reviewed the page referenced in the Mladić Appeal Brief (p. 150) and observes no discussion on paramilitary units.

See, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 4363, 4515, 4517, 4518, 4520, 4526, 4545, 4555, 4687.

See Trial Judgement, para. 4687.

See Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 321. According to Mladić, this evidence indicates that he ordered his soldiers to abide by international humanitarian law rather than further the common criminal purpose of the Overarching JCE. See Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 313.

Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 312.

See, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 4325–4328, 4340, 4388, 4677.

Trial Judgement, para. 4687. See also Trial Judgement, paras. 4502–4512, 4546, 4646, 4676–4684.

Trial Judgement, para. 4687.

Trial Judgement, para. 3708. See also Trial Judgement, paras. 3694–3702, 3706, 4222, 4460, 4625, referring to, inter alia, Exhibit P431.

Trial Judgement, paras. 3703–3706, 3708, 4222, 4460, 4461, 4625, referring to, inter alia, Exhibit P431, pp. 31–35, 39, 41.

Trial Judgement, para. 4627, referring to, inter alia, Exhibit P6921, pp. 14, 15 (while the Trial Judgement references pages 96 and 97 of recorded minutes of the 24th Assembly Session, the Appeals Chamber notes that these correspond to pages 14 and 15 of Exhibit P6921).

See Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 317, 320–333.
956 See Trial Judgement, para. 4625.
957 See Trial Judgement, para. 4686.
958 See Trial Judgement, para. 4688.
959 See Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 321–323.
960 See Trial Judgement, paras. 4685–4688. See also Trial Judgement, paras. 4614–4684.
961 See Trial Judgement, paras. 3704, 3705, 3708, 4460, 4461, 4625.
962 See Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 321.
963 See Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 328.
964 See Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 328, n. 480, referring to Exhibit P6921, pp. 11, 12.
965 See Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 328, n. 481, referring to Exhibit P6921, p. 12.
966 See Trial Judgement, para. 4627.
967 See Exhibit P6921, p. 11.
968 See Exhibit P6921, p. 12.
969 See Exhibit P6921, p. 12.
970 See Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 329, referring to Trial Judgement, para. 4627.
971 See Trial Judgement, para. 4627; Exhibit P6921, p. 11.
972 See Trial Judgement, para. 4627; Exhibit P6921, pp. 14, 15.
974 Mladić distinguishes the exhibits he refers to as those concerning protection of civilians (see Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 325, n. 476, referring to, inter alia, Exhibits D1514, D187, D540, P3483, P794, P358) and those concerning “warnings in combat” or ceasefire (see Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 325, n. 476, referring to, inter alia, Exhibits D962, P5040, D1982 (under seal)). See also T. 25 August 2020 p. 59.
975 See Mrkić and Šljivančanin Appeal Judgement, para. 220.
976 See Prlić et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 967. See also Karadić Appeal Judgement, para. 599; Mrkić and Šljivančanin Appeal Judgement, para. 220.
977 See Trial Judgement, para. 4613, referring to Mladić Final Trial Brief, para. 115.
978 See Trial Judgement, paras. 3704, 3705, 3708, 4460, 4461, 4625.
979 See Trial Judgement, paras. 4686, 4688.
980 See, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 4517–4520, 4524–4526, 4677, 4687.
981 See, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 4325–4328, 4340, 4388, 4677, 4687.
982 Trial Judgement, para. 4687.
983 See Trial Judgement, paras. 4617–4619, 4647–4650, 4666–4675, 4686.
984 Trial Judgement, paras. 4740, 4892.
985 Trial Judgement, paras. 4740, 4892, 4893, 4921.
986 Trial Judgement, paras. 4893, 4921.
987 Trial Judgement, paras. 3065, 3202, 3206, 3212.
988 Trial Judgement, paras. 4893, 4921, 5190, 5214.
989 See Mladić Notice of Appeal, paras. 39–50; Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 336–569. See also Mladić Reply Brief, paras. 67–77.
990 See Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 336–458.
992 See Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 373–397.
993 See Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 398–442.
994 See Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 443–458.
995 See Trial Judgement, paras. 3011, 3184, 3185.
996 See Trial Judgement, para. 3185, referring to Galić Appeal Judgement, paras. 87–90, D. Milošević Appeal Judgement, paras. 30.
997 See Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 336–372; T. 25 August 2020 pp. 60–64. See also T. 26 August 2020 pp. 66–68. The Appeals Chamber notes that Mladić does not raise the allegation that the Trial Chamber erred in exercising jurisdiction over the crime of terror in his notice of appeal, thus failing to meet the requirements of Rule 133 of the Rules. However, considering that the Prosecution does not object to Mladic’s failure and responds to his arguments, and in light of the importance of the issues raised, the Appeals Chamber chooses to exercise its discretion to consider Mladic’s arguments in order to ensure the fairness of the proceedings. Cf. Bikindi Appeal Judgement, para. 96; Simba Appeal Judgement, para. 12.
999 See Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 350, 352–371; T. 25 August 2020 p. 64. See also Mladic Reply Brief, paras. 70, 71.
1000 Prosecution Response Brief, paras. 128, 131–133; T. 25 August 2020 pp. 106–109. According to the Prosecution, Mladic simply complains that there was insufficient state practice but he ignores that the Galić Appeals Chamber did not rely on national laws. See T. 25 August 2020 p. 107.
1002 Prosecution Response Brief, para. 137.
1004 Mladic Reply Brief, paras. 67–71. See also T. 26 August 2020 p. 68.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3962920
See supra para. 14 and references cited therein.


Galić Appeal Judgement, para. 91; Galić Appeal Judgement, Separate and Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schomburg, para. 5; D. Milošević Appeal Judgement, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Liu Daqun, para. 2. See also Tadić Decision of 2 October 1995, para. 94.

Galić Appeal Judgement, para. 92; Galić Appeal Judgement, Separate and Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schomburg, para. 7; D. Milošević Appeal Judgement, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Liu Daqun, paras. 6, 10. See also Tadić Decision of 2 October 1995, para. 128.

See Galić Appeal Judgement, para. 93 and references cited therein.

See Galić Appeal Judgement, paras. 94–96 and references cited therein.

See Galić Appeal Judgement, para. 97 and references cited therein.

D. Milošević Appeal Judgement, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Liu Daqun, paras. 6–8; Galić Appeal Judgement, Separate and Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schomburg, paras. 8–10.

See D. Milošević Appeal Judgement, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Liu Daqun, paras. 6–8; Galić Appeal Judgement, paras. 94, 95; Galić Appeal Judgement, Separate and Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schomburg, paras. 7–11.
Mladić’s contention that the definition of the crime of terror adopted by the ICTY provided an unclear gravity threshold, creating an unclear gravity threshold, meaning that the crime of terror victim group remains the same: “the civilian population or individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities”, but that the ICTY could only exercise its jurisdiction over the crime where the grave consequences requirement is met. See Trial Judgement, para. 3186. See also D. Milošević Appeal Judgement, paras. 31–33.

Trial Judgement, para. 4740. See also Trial Judgement, paras. 1855–1913, 1915–2215, 4734–4739.

See Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 372–388. See also Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 425, 467, 487.

Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 380.


Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 375, 396, 397.

See Prosecution Response Brief, paras. 140–143.

Prosecution Response Brief, paras. 140–142.

Prosecution Response Brief, para. 142.

Mladić Reply Brief, para. 72.

Mladić Reply Brief, para. 72.

Article 3(c) of the ICTY Statute.


Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 378.

Prosecutor v. Ratko Mladić, Case No. IT-09–92-PT, Prosecution Pre-Trial Brief, 24 February 2012.

Article 59 of Additional Protocol I, which prohibits parties to a conflict to attack, by any means whatsoever, non-defended localities, defines the concept of a non-defended locality as an “inhabited place near or in a zone where armed forces are in contact which is open for occupation by an adverse [p] arty”. Article 52 of Additional Protocol I, by contrast, prohibits attacks against civilian objects and provides that attacks shall be strictly limited to military objectives, which it defines as “those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage”.


Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 379–386. See also D. Milošević Appeal Judgement, para. 54.

Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 380, 388.

See Trial Judgement, paras. 3201, 4740.
Prosecution further argues that the Trial Chamber’s conclusion on Mladić’s shared intent was based on evidence of, *inter alia*, Mladić personally directing the SRK to shell Sarajevo and cut its utilities to force inhabitants outside as well as his contemporaneous statements. See *Prosecution Response Brief*, paras. 159, 160.

*See, e.g.*, *Rutaganda Appeal Judgement*, paras. 525, 528; *Kayishema and Rozindana Appeal Judgement*, paras. 159, 198. See also *Munyakazi Appeal Judgement*, para. 142.


1084 Mladić *Appeal Brief*, paras. 413–417, *referring to Gotovina and Markač Appeal Judgement*, paras. 81, 82, 87, 91, 93.

*See* *Gotovina and Markač Appeal Judgement*, paras. 77–98.

1086 *Compare* *Trial Judgement*, paras. 3704, 4736, 4739, 4897 *with Exhibit P431*, pp. 34–36, 38, 39.

*See* *Trial Judgement*, para. 4736, *referring to Exhibit P431*.

1088 Mladić *Appeal Brief*, para. 418 (internal citations omitted).

*See also supra* paras. 269, 273.

1090 *See Mladić Appeal Brief*, paras. 429–437.

1091 *See* *Trial Judgement*, paras. 4737–4739, *referring to, inter alia*, Exhibits P812, P4424, D66, D726, D2022, D2039, D2045, D2081. *See also Trial Judgement*, paras. 4704, 4714, 4715, 4717, 4718, 4720–4722, 4738.

1092 *Trial Judgement*, para. 4737.

1093 *Trial Judgement*, para. 4739.


1095 *See* *Trial Judgement*, paras. 4739, 4919. *See also Trial Judgement*, paras. 4718, 4835.

1096 *See* *Trial Judgement*, para. 4738. *See also Trial Judgement*, paras. 4714–4732.

1097 *See Trial Judgement*, para. 4739.

1098 In particular, in making this finding, the Trial Chamber considered that Mladić: (i) […] personally direct[ed] the 28 May 1992 shelling of Sarajevo, select[ed] targets, and direct[ed] fire away from Serb-populated areas; (ii) […] formulat[ed] and issu[ed] directives and command[ed] the SRK; (iii) […] propos[ed] in the spring of 1995 that Sarajevo be bombarded with explicit disregard for the safety of civilians; and (iv) […] ordered the SRK Command to cut utilities supplying Sarajevo on 6 September 1995, thereby forcing the inhabitants of Sarajevo to go outside and be exposed to sniping and shelling […] *Trial Judgement*, para. 4921.

1099 *Trial Judgement*, para. 3202. As a sole exception, the Trial Chamber excluded the Unscheduled Sniping Incident of 9 November 1994 from constituting the crime of terror on the basis that it could not determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the sniping was directed at civilians. *See Trial Judgement*, paras. 3190, 3199, 3200, 3202.

1100 *Trial Judgement*, paras. 3200, 3201. *See also Trial Judgement*, paras. 3184–3199, 4740, 4921.

1101 *See Mladić Appeal Brief*, paras. 443, 446–456. *See also Mladić Reply Brief*, para. 77.

1102 *Mladić Appeal Brief*, para. 455.


1104 *Prosecution Response Brief*, para. 169 and references cited therein.


1107 *D. Milošević Appeal Judgement*, para. 37; *Galić Appeal Judgement*, para. 104.

1108 *See* *Mladić Appeal Brief*, para. 448.

1109 *See* *Trial Judgement*, para. 3201. *See also supra* para. 301.

1110 *See Mladić Appeal Brief*, para. 452.

1111 *See supra* Section III.C.1(b).

1112 *Mladić Appeal Brief*, para. 453.

1113 *See Mladić Appeal Brief*, para. 454, *referring to Mladić Appeal Brief*, para. 548.

1114 *See* *Galić Appeal Judgement*, n. 320.

1115 *See* *Trial Judgement*, para. 3201.


1117 *See also infra* Section III.C.2(d).

1118 *Trial Judgement*, paras. 3065, 3202, 3206, 3212.

1119 *Trial Judgement*, paras. 4740, 4893, 4921, 5214.


1121 *See Mladić Appeal Brief*, paras. 555–562.

1122 *See Mladić Appeal Brief*, paras. 465, 496, 527, 529, 541, 544, 554, 563, 564.

1123 *See Mladić Appeal Brief*, paras. 460(a), 464, 466–495.

1124 *See Mladić Appeal Brief*, paras. 460(b), 497–526.

1125 *See Mladić Appeal Brief*, paras. 530–540. *See also* Mladić *Appeal Brief*, para. 460(c).

1126 *See Mladić Appeal Brief*, paras. 542–553. *See also* Mladić *Appeal Brief*, para. 460(d).

1127 *Trial Judgement*, paras. 2022, 3191(a), 4758. *See also Indictment, Schedule G.1.*

1128 *Trial Judgement*, paras. 2022, 4758.

1129 *See Mladić Appeal Brief*, paras. 464, 466–495.

1130 *See* Mladić *Appeal Brief*, paras. 469–475.

1131 *See Mladić Appeal Brief*, paras. 476–493; Mladić *Reply Brief*, paras. 78, 79, *referring to, inter alia*, *Gotovina and Markač Appeal Judgement*, paras. 62, 63, 65, 70–73, 77, 78, 81. In support of his arguments, Mladić also recalls his submissions regarding Sarajevo as a “defended city” (see *Mladić Appeal Brief*, paras. 467, 473, 487), which the Appeals Chamber has dismissed above. *See supra* Section III.C.1(b). In addition, Mladić contends that “targets of opportunity operated...
extensively in and around Sarajevo throughout the indictment period”, and argues that “[t]he Trial Chamber did not exclude the possibility that shells were fired at these targets of opportunity during the bombardment”. Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 489. The Appeals Chamber notes, however, that Mladić does not develop this argument any further, and a review of the evidence to which he points in support of his argument (see Mladić Appeal Brief, n. 610) shows that it does not relate to the scope of Scheduled Incident G.1 and/or does not refer to such “targets of opportunity”. The Appeals Chamber accordingly dismisses Mladić’s argument in this respect.

1132 See Prosecution Response Brief, paras. 176–197.
1133 See Prosecution Response Brief, paras. 180–184.
1134 See Prosecution Response Brief, paras. 187–197.
1135 Gotochina and Markać Appeal Judgement, paras. 81–83.
1137 See, e.g., Karadžić Appeal Judgement, para. 598 and references cited therein.
1138 See, e.g., Šešelj Appeal Judgement, para. 63 and references cited therein.
1142 Trial Judgement, para. 2019, n. 8590, referring to Exhibit PS 49, p. 72.
1143 Trial Judgement, para. 2022. See also Trial Judgement, para. 275.
1144 Trial Judgement, para. 105.
1148 Trial Judgement, para. 4700, referring to T. 13 November 2012 pp. 5049–5054 (closed session).
1149 Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 477.
1150 T. 13 November 2012 p. 5050 (closed session).
1151 T. 13 November 2012 p. 5050 (closed session). Witness RM-511 did not specify, however, whether the purpose of ordering artillery fire into Veležići and Pofalići was to harass the civilian population. See T. 13 November 2012 pp. 5050, 5051 (closed session).
1152 T. 13 November 2012 pp. 5051, 5052 (closed session).
1153 Trial Judgement, paras. 1953, 3051 (Schedule F and other sniping incidents (b)). See also Indictment, Schedule F.11.
1154 Trial Judgement, paras. 2097, 3051 (Schedule G and other shelling incidents (d)). See also Indictment, Schedule G.8.
1156 See Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 502–507.
1157 See Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 512–525.
1158 See Prosecution Response Brief, paras. 198–205. The Prosecution also contends that Mladić’s allegations on other incidents are unsupported, since he only develops his submissions on Scheduled Incidents F.11 and G.8. Prosecution Response Brief, para. 199.
1160 Karemera et al. Decision of 29 May 2009, para. 15. See also Karadžić Appeal Judgement, para. 452.
1161 See supra para. 21.
1162 See Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 503, 513, 521.
1164 Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 505. Mladić also recalls his submissions that judicially noticed facts should not be relied upon to establish the acts or conduct of an accused’s proximate subordinates. Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 507. The Appeals Chamber has already dismissed Mladić’s submissions in this respect. See supra Section III.A.2(a)(i).
1165 Trial Judgement, para. 1949.
1167 Cf. Nizeyimana Appeal Judgement, para. 54 (recalling that the mere presentation of alibi evidence does not necessarily raise the reasonable possibility that it is true and that it is within the discretion of the trial chamber to assess it).
1169 Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 513, 521, referring to Trial Judgement, para. 2084.
1170 See Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 520–525.
1171 See Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 512–525, referring to, inter alia, Trial Judgement, para. 2084.
1172 See, e.g., Karadžić Appeal Judgement, para. 452 and references cited therein.
1173 See Todic Appeal Judgement, para. 25.
1174 Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 516.
1175 See Trial Judgement, paras. 2087–2094.
1176 See Trial Judgement, paras. 2095–2097.
1177 Trial Judgement, paras. 2050, 3051 (Schedule G and other shelling incidents (b)). See also Indictment, Schedule G.6.
1178 Trial Judgement, paras. 2057, 3051 (Schedule G and other shelling incidents (c)). See also Indictment, Schedule G.7.
1179 See Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 528–540. See also Mladić Reply Brief, paras. 83, 84.
1180 Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 532.
1181 See Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 533, 534, 536–538.
1182 See Prosecution Response Brief, paras. 206–211.
1183 See supra para. 313.
1184 See Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 533; Trial Judgement, para. 2043, n. 2434.
1185 See, e.g., Karadžić Appeal Judgement, paras. 563, 702 and references cited therein.
1186 See Trial Judgement, paras. 3057, 3200, 3211.
1187 Trial Judgement, para. 3196.
See Trial Judgement, para. 3199. See also Trial Judgement, para. 3201, referring to, inter alia, Scheduled Incidents G.6 and G.7.

See Trial Judgement, para. 1937, 3190(c). See also Indictment, Schedule F.5.

See Trial Judgement, para. 1937.


See Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 542–552, referring to, inter alia, Trial Judgement, para. 1937.

Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 548.


See Prosecution Response Brief, paras. 212–216.

See Prosecution Response Brief, paras. 214–216. The Prosecution also contends that Mladić did not challenge the finding that the fire came from SRK-held territory. Prosecution Response Brief, para. 215. Mladić replies that this does not relieve the Prosecution of its burden to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. See Mladić Reply Brief, para. 85.

See, e.g., Šešelj Appeal Judgement, para. 63 and references cited therein.

Mladić merely points to the evidence of Witness Edin Gamljia that the Sevic unit of the ABiH shot a French soldier in such a way as to make it appear that the Serbs were responsible for it, and to a newspaper article which significantly predates all of the incidents that Mladić contests. See Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 548, referring to T. 31 March 2015 p. 33909, Exhibit D1425.

See, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 1917–1921 (Scheduled Incident F.1), 1932–1936 (Scheduled Incident F.5), 1940–1942 (Scheduled Incident F.9), 2121–2139, 2144–2149 (Scheduled Incident G.18).

Trial Judgement, paras. 1932–1934.

See Trial Judgement, paras. 1933–1937.

Trial Judgement, n. 8220.

See, e.g., Trial Judgement, nn. 8411, 8428, 8438, 8452, 8472, 8483, 8500, 9313.

In view of the Appeals Chamber’s conclusions that Mladić failed to demonstrate any error in Ground 4.B of his appeal, Mladić’s submissions related to the cumulative effect of these alleged errors are dismissed. See Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 555–564.

Trial Judgement, paras. 4987, 5096.

Trial Judgement, paras. 4987, 5096.

Trial Judgement, paras. 4987, 5096, 5098, 5131.

Trial Judgement, paras. 5097, 5098.

Trial Judgement, paras. 5128, 5130, 5131.

Trial Judgement, paras. 5098, 5128, 5130, 5191, 5214.


Trial Judgement, paras. 2443, 2968.

Trial Judgement, paras. 2446, 2968.

Trial Judgement, para. 3159.

Trial Judgement, para. 3159.

Trial Judgement, para. 3159.

Trial Judgement, paras. 5052, 5067, 5097.

Trial Judgement, paras. 2972, 2982.

See Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 575, 580–582; T. 25 August 2020 pp. 65–71; T. 26 August 2020 pp. 45, 47–51. Mladić further submits that the Trial Chamber did not abide by ICTY jurisprudence to the effect that the forced character of the displacement is determined by the absence of a genuine choice by the victim in his or her displacement. T. 25 August 2020 pp. 70, 71.


Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 583.


Prosecution Response Brief, paras. 222, 223; T. 26 August 2020 pp. 7–14.

Mladić Reply Brief, paras. 87, 88.

See Šešelj Appeal Judgement, para. 150, nn. 538, 541 and references cited therein; Krajišnik Appeal Judgement, para. 308.

See Stanisavljević and Župljanin Appeal Judgement, para. 918 and references cited therein (internal citations omitted).

See Krajišnik Appeal Judgement, para. 308; Stakić Appeal Judgement, para. 284.

See Blagojević and Jokić Trial Judgement, para. 597, referring to Article 49(2) of Geneva Convention IV.

See Blagojević and Jokić Trial Judgement, para. 599, referring to Article 49(3) of Geneva Convention IV, Article 17(1) of Additional Protocol II.

Stakić Appeal Judgement, para. 287.

Sićuč Affidavit, para. 180; Stakić Appeal Judgement, para. 286.


Trial Judgement, para. 3159.

Trial Judgement, para. 2981. Mladić erroneously submits that the Trial Chamber found that he had given civilians a choice to leave or remain and that evidence of statements made by him supports the inference that he was acting to evacuate the civilians for humanitarian reasons. See Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 579, referring to Trial Judgement, para. 2472. The Trial Chamber did not accept that Mladić had given civilians such a choice and found that Mladić’s statements were “deliberately misleading”. See Trial Judgement, paras. 4965, 5082, 5083. Mladić fails to demonstrate any error in this assessment.

Trial Judgement, para. 3164.

Trial Judgement, para. 3164.

Trial Judgement, paras. 4987, 5096.

Trial Judgement, para. 4987.

Trial Judgement, paras. 5052, 5066, 5067, 5097.

Trial Judgement, para. 5098.

Trial Judgement, paras. 5128, 5130.

Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 584, 587, 593; T. 25 August 2020 pp. 78–82.

Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 585, 587, 589; T. 25 August 2020 pp. 79–82. Mladić argues that the Trial Chamber erred by relying on Witness Momir Nikolić’s evidence because: (i) his evidence of a meeting occurring between 11 and 12 July 1995 did not establish a link with Mladić; and (ii) it failed to account for the evidence of Witness Bruce Bursik, a prosecution investigator, and its own determination that Witness Momir Nikolić lacked credibility. See Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 585, 587–589, 593, 594; T. 25 August 2020 pp. 79–82. He further argues that the Trial Chamber erred in relying on Exhibit D1228, an unsworn out of court statement of Witness Momir Nikolić as summarized by Witness Bursik, for the truth of its contents to establish the occurrence of this meeting: (i) without having admitted it pursuant to Rule 92 bis or 92 ter of the ICTY Rules; (ii) because the statement had not been recorded as required under Rule 43 of the ICTY Rules; and (iii) because the Prosecution did not rely on it in its closing submissions to support the position that a meeting involving Mladić occurred between 11 and 12 July 1995 and concerned a common criminal plan for genocide or extermination. See Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 590–592; T. 25 August 2020 pp. 79, 80.

Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 593.
a meeting where the crimes were discussed. See Trial Judgement, para. 4972.

1269 TrialJudgement, para. 4987.
1270 TrialJudgement, para. 4987.


1272 TrialJudgement, paras. 5128, 5130.

1274 T. 16 September 2013 pp. 16832, 16833. Specifically, Witness Butler only testified that it was “technically proper” from a military standpoint for Mladić to seek the surrender of the 28th Division of the ABiH following the capture of the Srebrenica enclave and to make arrangements to negotiate such surrender. T. 16 September 2013 pp. 16829–16831. See also T. 12 September 2013 p. 16653.

1275 T. 16 November 2015 pp. 41395, 41396.

1276 MladićAppeal Brief, para. 596, referring to TrialJudgement, paras. 5098, 5088, 5129–5131. See also T. 25 August 2020 pp. 74, 78. 

1277 TrialJudgement, paras. 5052, 5066, 5067, 5097. The Trial Chamber found, inter alia, that Mladić ordered the mobilization of buses and the transportation of Bosnian Muslim civilians out of Potočari. See TrialJudgement, para. 5052. On 11 July 1995, he ordered Borovčanin to launch an attack in the early morning of 12 July 1995. See TrialJudgement, para. 5066. On 12 July 1995, he then ordered that part of Borovčanin’s unit provide security for the transport of the civilians, while the other part was to go to Žvornik. See TrialJudgement, para. 5067. Between at least 11 July and 11 October 1995, Mladić issued several orders concerning the operation in and around Srebrenica. See TrialJudgement, para. 5097.

1278 TrialJudgement, paras. 5096, 5098. See also TrialJudgement, paras. 2676, 2684, 2707, 2723, 2732, 2759, 2766, 2776, 2791, 2820, 2825, 2859, 2861, 2862, 2876, 2882, 2886, 2894, 2917, 2920, 2921, 2924, 2926, 2935, 3051, 4984, 4986.

1279 TrialJudgement, paras. 5097, 5098. See also TrialJudgement, paras. 5046–5053, 5066–5069.

1280 TrialJudgement, paras. 5097, 5098. See also TrialJudgement, paras. 5091–5094.

1281 TrialJudgement, para. 5098.


1284 See MladićAppeal Brief, paras. 624–628.

1285 See MladićAppeal Brief, paras. 630–641; MladićReply Brief, para. 97. See also T. 25 August 2020 p. 71; T. 26 August 2020 p. 56.

1286 MladićAppeal Brief, paras. 601, 641, 642, See also T. 25 August 2020 pp. 71, 72, 74, 83, 84; T. 26 August 2020 pp. 44, 46.

1287 MladićNotice of Appeal, paras. 57, 58, 63–65; MladićAppeal Brief, paras. 641–643.

1288 See MladićAppeal Brief, paras. 607–615; MladićReply Brief, para. 94; T. 25 August 2020 pp. 83, 84. See also T. 25 August 2020 pp. 71, 74.

1289 MladićAppeal Brief, para. 610, referring to Exhibits P2122 (concerning an order dated 14 July 1995 from Mladić to the Supreme Commander, the VJ General Staff, the Serbian Army of Krajina Main Staff, and various VRS Corps instructing that any information the recipients had for the VRS Main Staff should be prepared and exchanged during certain hours), P2123 (concerning an order from the VRS Main Staff to the Command of the Drina Corps, dated 14 July 1995 and signed by Mladić, pertaining to the transport of DutchBat members), P2124 (concerning an order from the VRS Main Staff to the Command of the SRK and the Drina Corps, dated 14 July 1995 and signed by Mladić, with respect to the passage of UNPROFOR Commander Rupert Smith), and P2125 (concerning an order from the VRS Main Staff to the Command of the VRS East Bosnia Corps, dated 15 July 1995 and signed by Mladić, to maintain duty service for the Forward Command Post-2 communications system).


1291 MladićAppeal Brief, para. 611.

1292 MladićAppeal Brief, para. 611.

1293 MladićAppeal Brief, paras. 610, 612, referring to TrialJudgement, para. 4997.


1295 With respect to the four intercept communications, Mladić submits that: (i) Exhibit P1298 merely confirms his intention to leave the front line and that he did not issue any order to be implemented in his absence; (ii) Exhibit P1655 (under seal) demonstrates that he was informed that Karadžić was issuing orders and that Pandurević had made arrangements for Muslims to pass through Tuzla, but was not provided with any further information about what was occurring on the ground; (iii) Exhibit P1656 (under seal) demonstrates that, where the conversation extended to him informing a man that he would see him that night, no orders were given, and there is no evidence of who the man was, or his rank or role; and (iv) Exhibit P1657 (under seal) demonstrates that he spoke to Milovanović briefly, but did not give any orders or mention Srebrenica. See MladićAppeal Brief, para. 614.

1296 MladićAppeal Brief, para. 615, referring to MladićAppeal Brief, paras. 624–628. The Appeals Chamber will address Mladić’s arguments in relation to the authenticity of the intercepts in Section III.D.2(d).

1297 See MladićAppeal Brief, paras. 613–615.

1298 ProsecutionResponseBrief, para. 236; T. 26 August 2020 pp. 18, 19. The Prosecution adds that Mladić’s responsibility
for the crimes in Srebrenica was not premised on his presence at the crime site. See T. 26 August 2020 p. 19.

1302 Prosecution Response Brief, paras. 236–238, 

referring to,

inter alia, Trial Judgement, para. 5053; T. 26 August 2020 p. 19. Specifically, the Prosecution argues that: (i) Witness Stevanović’s evidence, which comprises only one piece of the evidentiary record considered by the Trial Chamber, does not undercut the Trial Chamber’s finding that orders bearing Mladić’s name, with or without “s.r.”, are attributable to him; (ii) the Four Orders pertaining to the “day-to-day operation of the army” support rather than undermine the Trial Chamber’s conclusion that Mladić exercised command while in Belgrade; (iii) the Four Orders relate to the Srebrenica operation or are evidence of Mladić’s continued command on 14 and 15 July 1995; and (iv) Mladić fails to show any error in the Trial Chamber’s reliance on orders numerically designated “04/” or “06/”, especially since the Defence tendered documents it attributed to Mladić bearing the numerical designation “06/” and other numerical designations. See Prosecution Response Brief, paras. 237, 238.

1303 Prosecution Response Brief, para. 239, 

referring to, 

inter alia, Mladić Final Trial Brief, paras. 670, 3299, Trial Judgement, para. 5046. The Prosecution further argues that Mladić merely repeats his unsuccessful submissions at trial claiming communication problems. See Prosecution Response Brief, para. 239.

1304 Prosecution Response Brief, para. 240. The Prosecution argues that Mladić’s alternative interpretation of Exhibits P1655 (under seal) and P1657 (under seal) fails to show any error and that the totality of the evidence, which shows his familiarity with on-going operations and his issuance of related orders, supports the Trial Chamber’s finding that Mladić exercised command and control of the VRS while in Belgrade. See Prosecution Response Brief, para. 240. See also T. 26 August 2020 p. 19.

1305 See Trial Judgement, para. 5053.

1306 See Trial Judgement, para. 5053. See also Trial Judgement, paras. 5046–5052, 

referring to, 

inter alia, Trial Judgement, Chapters 3.1.4, 7.1.2, and 9.3.3. In Chapter 3.1.4, the Trial Chamber found that from his initial appointment as Commander on 12 May 1992 until at least 8 November 1996, Mladić remained in command of the VRS Main Staff. See Trial Judgement, para. 276. In Chapter 7.1.2, the Trial Chamber found that Mladić effectively issued orders to VRS forces to implement Directives no. 7 and no. 7/1, which were created in March 1995 in relation to the priorities of the VRS (“Directive 7” and “Directive 7/1”, respectively). See Trial Judgement, paras. 2382–2386. See also Trial Judgement, paras. 2379–2381. In Chapter 9.3.3, the Trial Chamber found that Mladić issued several orders and directives to VRS units, was respected as a leader by his subordinates, and possessed a very high level of command and control over them in spite of the lack of a declared state of war and occasional indifference in the VRS. See Trial Judgement, paras. 4388–4391. Furthermore, the Trial Chamber found that the VRS had a well-functioning communication system, which allowed Mladić to effectively and quickly communicate with his subordinates. See Trial Judgement, para. 4387. The Trial Chamber also found that from May 1992 until 1995, Mladić was stationed at the VRS Main Staff command post from where he had daily telephone communication with corps commanders, usually in the mornings and in the evenings, and that Mladić was kept up to date on the main issues by Milovanović. See Trial Judgement, para. 4385.

1307 In Chapter 9.7.2 of the Trial Judgement, entitled “Commanding and Controlling the VRS”, the Trial Chamber considered: (i) communication and orders by Mladić on 14 July 1995 (see Trial Judgement, paras. 5022–5024); and (ii) communication and orders by Mladić on 15 and 16 July 1995 (see Trial Judgement, paras. 5025–5032, 5046–5050, referring to Trial Judgement, Chapter 9.3.3). In Chapter 9.7.3, entitled “Commanding and Controlling Elements of the Serb Forces Integrated into, or Subordinated to, the VRS”, the Trial Chamber recalled its finding in Chapter 9.7.2 about Mladić’s command and control of VRS forces in the Srebrenica operation (see Trial Judgement, para. 5066).

1308 Karadžić Appeal Judgement, para. 376; Krajišnik Appeal Judgement, para. 27; Karemera and Ngirumpatse Appeal Judgement, para. 179.


1310 See Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 611; T. 25 August 2020 p. 83.

1311 See Trial Judgement, paras. 4310, 5022, 5024, 5025. The Trial Chamber noted that: (i) in one order given by Mladić on 14 July 1995, admitted as Exhibit P2122, Mladić informed, inter alios, the Supreme Commander, the VJ General Staff, the Serbian Army of Krajina Main Staff, and various VRS Corps that due to failure of the power supply during the Srebrenica operation, the VRS Main Staff communications centre would operate only during limited hours the next day (see Trial Judgement, para. 5024); (ii) two orders from the VRS Main Staff to the Command of the Drina Corps and the SRK signed by Mladić and given on 14 July 1995, admitted as Exhibits P2123 and P2124, respectively, concerned the transfer of Dutch soldiers from Bratunac (see Trial Judgement, para. 5022); and (iii) one order from the VRS Main Staff to the VRS East Bosnia Corps Command and the VRS Main Staff Forward Command Post dated 15 July 1995 and signed by Mladić, admitted as Exhibit P2125, instructed the VRS East Bosnia Corps to send an officer to the Forward Command Post to report to Milovanović (see Trial Judgement, para. 5025).

1312 See Exhibits P2122, P2123, P2124, and P2125. See also Trial Judgement, paras. 4310, 5022, 5024, 5025.

1313 In this respect, the Appeals Chamber notes that at trial the Defence tendered documents it attributed to Mladić bearing the same designation, namely “06/” (or “6/”), that Mladić now argues is not attributable to him. See, e.g., Exhibits D140, D1471, D1501, D1616, D1665, D1753, and D2167.

1314 See Trial Judgement, paras. 4992, 4997, 5049. In relation to the VRS Main Staff Order of 11 July 1995, the Trial Chamber explicitly considered Witness Stevanović’s evidence that “s.r/signed” on a document did not always mean that the individual whose signature appeared on the document was aware of it or had actually signed it. See Trial Judgement, para. 4997.


1316 See Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 613; T. 25 August 2020 p. 84. See also Mladić Final Trial Brief, para. 670 (wherein Mladić argued that, while in Belgrade, he was not in command of the army in accordance with VRS regulations and that he could not exercise command of the VRS as he was unable...
to communicate with them). In this respect, the Appeals Chamber recalls that the Trial Chamber found that the VRS had a well-functioning communication system which allowed Mladić to effectively and quickly communicate with his subordinates. See Trial judgement, paras. 4383, 4387. The Trial Chamber noted that witness Milovanović testified that he always sought Mladić’s approval before proceeding. See Trial judgement, para. 4297.

See Karadžić Appeal judgement, paras. 19, 305, 598; Šešelj Appeal judgement, paras. 17, 28; Prlć et al. Appeal judgement, paras. 25, 128; Ndirabatware Appeal judgement, para. 11; Karemara and Ngirumapase Appeal judgement, para. 17; Ndindilinymana et al. Appeal judgement, para. 12; Đorđević Appeal judgement, para. 20; Šainović et al. Appeal judgement, para. 27.


See also T. 25 August 2020 p. 84.

See T. 18 September 2013 pp. 16972, 16973. See also Trial judgement, para. 4297.


See supra para. 379.

See Trial judgement, paras. 5022–5032.

Exhibit P1298 (concerning Intercept of Mladić and a man, 14 July 1995 at 8.05 a.m.) reflects that the man told Mladić that he was just “here” with a narrow circle of friends and that now something would depend on Mladić. See Trial judgement, para. 5023. Exhibit P1655 (concerning Intercept no. 664, 16 July 1995) (under seal) shows that [REDACTED]. See Trial judgement, paras. 5028, 5112, n. 17684. Exhibit P1656 (concerning Intercept no. 648, 16 July 1995) (under seal) indicates that [REDACTED]. See Trial judgement, para. 5027. Exhibit P1657 (concerning Intercepts no. 671 and no. 672, 16 July 1995) (under seal) shows that [REDACTED]. See Trial judgement, paras. 5032, 5113, n. 17688.

See Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 614.

For instance, Exhibit P1657 (concerning Intercepts no. 671 and no. 672, 16 July 1995) (under seal) wherein FREDAC-TEDG. See Trial judgement, paras. 5032, 5113, n. 17688.

See supra para. 379.

See Karadžić Appeal judgement, para. 376; Krajšišnik Appeal judgement, para. 27; Karemara and Ngirumapase Appeal judgement, para. 179.


See Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 616, 617, 619, referring to, inter alia, T. 10 December 2013 pp. 20615–20625; T. 22 January 2015 pp. 30537–30545, T. 25 November 2015 p. 41921 (private session). See also Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 617 (in which Mladić argues that his 13 July 1995 order relating to the combat zone was not sent to any MUP units and that a report from Borovčanin, which contained information on VRS orders of 13 July 1995, did not mention MUP forces being sent to Zepa); T. 26 August 2020 p. 56.

See Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 616–618, referring to Trial judgement, paras. 2878, 2882, 4989, T. 5 September 2013 pp. 16285–16288, 16290. To the extent that Mladić refers to paragraphs 218 to 224 of his appellant’s brief, the Appeals Chamber has addressed his arguments in this regard. See supra Section III.B.2(a)(i).

Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 618.

Prosecution Response Brief, paras. 241, 242, referring to Trial judgement, paras. 2443, 2642, 4957, 5059, 5067. According to the Prosecution, Mladić’s arguments that the Trial Chamber placed insufficient weight on certain pieces of evidence should be summarily dismissed. See Prosecution Response Brief, para. 241.

See Prosecution Response Brief, paras. 243–245.

See Trial judgement, para. 4957.


See Trial judgement, paras. 2443, 5059. See also Trial judgement, para. 4957, referring to Chapters 7.1.6 (The Column), 7.2 (Jadar River (Schedule E.1.1)), 7.4 (Kravica Warehouse (Schedule E.3.1)), 7.5 (Sandić Meadow (Schedule E.4.1)), 7.14 (Bratunac Town (Schedule E.15)), 7.17 (Forcible Transfer and Deportation); and 8 (Legal Findings on Crimes) of the Trial judgement.

See Trial judgement, paras. 2642, 4957, 5059, 5066, 5067. See also Exhibit P724, pp. 2; 3; Exhibit P2117.

See Trial judgement, para. 4957.

See Karadžić Appeal judgement, paras. 363, 530; Šainović et al. Appeal judgement, para. 490. See also Ndirabatware Appeal judgement, para. 69.

See Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 616, 617, 619. See also T. 26 August 2020 p. 56.

See Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 617.

Compare Trial judgement, paras. 2882, 3863 (“[Between mid–July and mid-August 1995] the Skorpions worked in coordination with VRS units in an area under the responsibility of the SRK”) with Trial judgement, para. 4989 (“With regard to Scheduled Incident E.13.1 and the ill–treatment of the two victims prior to them being killed, there is insufficient evidence to suggest that members of the Skorpions unit were members of the Srebrenica JCE. Further, the Trial Chamber found that members of the Skorpions unit committed the killings set out in Scheduled Incident E.13.1 in coordination with VRS units. There is insufficient evidence to suggest that the Skorpions unit was subordinated to the VRS or that JCE members had other ways to use them as tools”). See also Trial judgement, paras. 3794, 3796, 3826.

See Trial judgement, para. 3794. See also Trial judgement, para. 3826.

See Trial judgement, paras. 3784–3819, 3824, 3825.

The definition provided by Witness Theunens was that the Commander of an MUP unit re–subordinated to the VRS receives operational orders from the VRS Commander and not from his MUP Commander, which is consistent with the Trial Chamber’s analysis. Similarly, neither Witness Velimir Kovač’s nor Witness Kovace’s definition of re–subordination and coordination undermines the Trial Chamber’s finding. In particular, Witness Kovac testified that re–subordination means taking over command and jurisdiction, whereas coordinated action is between two neighbors, and the chains of command are separate. See Trial judgement, paras. 3794, 3796, 3824, 3826; T. 10 December 2013 pp. 20620, 20621; T. 22 January 2015 pp. 30497, 30498; T. 23 January 2015
pp. 30510, 30545; T. 25 November 2015 p. 41921 (private session).

1346 See Trial Judgement, paras. 3784–3819, 3824–3826.


1348 See Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 617, referring to Exhibit P724, p. 3.

1349 See Trial Judgement, para. 5068.

1350 Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 620, 623, referring to, inter alia, Trial Judgement, paras. 2323, 2374, 2376–2378, 2380, 2578, 2616, 2775, 2896, 2929, 2992. Mladić cites the following examples: (i) Directive no. 4 (“Directive 4”), which he argues ordered the adherence to the laws of war, including the Geneva Conventions (see Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 620, referring to, inter alia, Trial Judgement, paras. 2323, 2359, 5160); (ii) “a series of other orders issued up to 1995, including those to the Drina Corps” (see Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 620, referring to Trial Judgement, paras. 4329–4371); and (iii) other orders he argues required civilians to be removed from combat zones and harm (see Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 620, referring to Exhibits D302, D303). See also T. 25 August 2020 pp. 71, 72, 82, 83; T. 26 August 2020 pp. 45, 46.

1351 Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 621. See also T. 25 August 2020 p. 72.


1353 Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 622, referring to Trial Judgement, paras. 5081, 5082, 5117, 5128.

1354 Prosecution Response Brief, paras. 246, 247, referring to, inter alia, Trial Judgement, paras. 5097, 5098.

1355 Prosecution Response Brief, para. 246.

1356 See Prosecution Response Brief, paras. 246, 248 (wherein the Prosecution contends that Directive 4 is an illegal order to expel the ABiH and “the Muslim population” from Srebrenica and other areas). See also T. 26 August 2020 p. 8.

1357 See Prosecution Response Brief, paras. 246, 250 (wherein the Prosecution argues that the language of Directive Krivaja-95 calling for adherence to the Geneva Conventions does not negate its illegal objective to forcibly remove the population and that the VRS did not act in accordance with the Geneva Conventions). See also T. 26 August 2020 pp. 9, 10.

1358 See Prosecution Response Brief, paras. 246, 251 (wherein the Prosecution contends that the Trial Chamber carefully analyzed the content and context of Directive 7 and that, while the Trial Chamber did not refer to Krivaja-95 in concluding that Directive 7/1 did not rescind Directive 7, Krivaja-95 supports that conclusion, and that Mladić erroneously relied on Witness Butler’s evidence in that regard). See also T. 26 August 2020 pp. 9, 10.

1359 Prosecution Response Brief, para. 247.

1360 Prosecution Response Brief, para. 252. See also T. 26 August 2020 pp. 6, 17, 18, 22.

1361 See Trial Judgement, paras. 5097, 5098. See also Trial Judgement, paras. 5048, 5049, 5052, 5053, 5066, 5067.

1362 Between 11 July and 11 October 1995, Mladić issued a number of orders in relation to the Srebrenica operation, including: (i) on 11 July 1995, ordering Borovčanin to go to Potočari and Mlačevići with all available manpower and equipment to launch an attack in the early morning of 12 July 1995 (see Trial Judgement, paras. 5059, 5066, 5115); (ii) on the evening of 11 July 1995, ordering Petar Škrbić to mobilize buses and by 12 July 1995, ordering the transportation of Bosnian Muslims out of Potočari (see Trial Judgement, para. 5052); (iii) ordering the separation of Bosnian Muslim men from women, children and elderly in Potočari from 12 to 14 July 1995 (see Trial Judgement, paras. 5052, 5059, 5130); (iv) around 12 July 1995, ordering VRS units and MUP units to block the area and fight the column of Muslim men around the Konjević Polje-Cerska axis (see Trial Judgement, paras. 2641, 2642); (v) on 13 July 1995, ordering Zoran Marlinić and Bojan Subotić to secure the transfer of detainees to the Vuk Karadžić Elementary School in Bratunac (see Trial Judgement, para. 5052); (vi) before 15 July 1995, ordering Radomir Furtula to provide Beara with troops to carry out his work in Srebrenica (see Trial Judgement, paras. 4945, 5001, 5002, 5049); (vii) on 17 July 1995, ordering military units to comb the Bratunac-Drinjača-Milići-Bešići area to find and destroy Muslim groups (see Trial Judgement, para. 5033, referring to Exhibit P1579); (viii) in late July 1995, ordering to kill ten detainees held at the Standard Barracks at the Zvornik Brigade (see Trial Judgement paras. 2929, 5039, referring to Exhibit P1494 (under seal)); and (ix) on 11 October 1995, ordering, inter alia, the Corps Commands and the MUP to carry out combat security “as per Directive no. 7” (see Trial Judgement, para. 5043).

1363 See Trial Judgement, paras. 5097, 5098.


1365 See, e.g., Krajiniškić Appeal Judgement, para. 696; Brdanin Appeal Judgement, paras. 430, 431.

1366 See Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 623. See also T. 25 August 2020 pp. 71, 72, 82, 83; T. 26 August 2020 pp. 45, 46.

1367 See Popović et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 1615 (in which the ICTY Appeals Chamber held that the fact that the participation of an accused amounted to no more than his or her “routine duties” will not exculpate the accused).

1368 See Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 620, referring to Trial Judgement, paras. 2232, 2359, 5100. See also T. 25 August 2020 pp. 82, 83.

1369 See Exhibit P1968. It merely calls for providing the best possible living conditions for the army and civilian population during the winter and commanding the soldiers to try to disarm enemy groups and resort to killing them only if they refuse. See Exhibit P1968, pp. 4, 5.

1370 See Trial Judgement, para. 5100. See also Trial Judgement, paras. 2323, 2359.

1371 See Trial Judgement, para. 4687.

1372 See Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 621. See also T. 25 August 2020 p. 72.


1374 Karadžić Appeal Judgement, para. 376; Krajiniškić Appeal Judgement, para. 27; Karemera and Ngirumpase Appeal Judgement, para. 179.
In this regard: (i) Exhibits P4332, P4383, P5161, P5173, P6549, and P6641 include general instructions to keep military operations confidential (see Exhibit P4332, p. 5; Exhibit P4383, p. 12; Exhibit P5161, p. 8; Exhibit P5173, p. 6; Exhibit P6549, p. 8; Exhibit P6641, p. 3); (ii) Exhibits P5068, P5069 relate to reporting within the chain of command (see Exhibit P5068, p. 1; Exhibit P5069, p. 1); (iii) Exhibit P5224 includes Mladić’s 13 April 1994 order to isolate and restrict the movement of, inter alia, UNPROFOR, UN Military Observers (“UNMOs”), and foreign journalists, which the Trial Chamber found was issued in retaliation to NATO providing air support to UN safe areas (see Exhibit P5224, pp. 2, 3; see also Trial Judgement, para. 4604); and (iv) in relation to Exhibit P6646, a 19 November 1994 order from the VRS Main Staff’s Sector for Moral Guidance, Religious and Legal Affairs on directions on some current issues regarding public information, the Trial Chamber found it to be one measure taken by that sector implementing Mladić’s order “to conceal the real intent of the VRS forces and to gain support for their actions” (see Trial Judgement, paras. 4488, 4494, 4497–4500, referring to Exhibit P6646, pp. 1, 2).

See Karadžić Appeal Judgement, para. 376; Krajišnik Appeal Judgement, para. 27; Koremera and Ngiropumse Appeal Judgement, para. 179.

See Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 624–628. In support of his submission, Mladić references specific paragraphs of the Trial Judgement where the Trial Chamber addressed the following intercepts: (i) Exhibit P1235 [REDACTED] (under seal), see Trial Judgement, para. 2480; (ii) Exhibit P4222 (concerning an intercept of Božidar Popović and Nido Milić, 22 September 1995 at 6.44 p.m.) and Exhibit P4223 [REDACTED] (under seal), see Trial Judgement, paras. 2992, 2996; (iii) Exhibit P2126 [REDACTED] (under seal) and Exhibit P1322 (concerning an intercept of conversation between Bera and Krstić), see Trial Judgement, para. 4945; (iv) Exhibit P7397 [REDACTED] (under seal), p. 1, see Trial Judgement, para. 4950; (v) Exhibit P1320 [REDACTED] (under seal), p. 1, and Exhibit P1321 [REDACTED] (under seal), p. 1, see Trial Judgement, para. 5001; (vi) Exhibit P2126 [REDACTED] (under seal), see Trial Judgement, para. 5002; (vii) Exhibit P1297 [REDACTED] (under seal), see Trial Judgement, para. 5008; (viii) Exhibits P1338 and P1655 [REDACTED] (under seal), see Trial Judgement, paras. 5028, 5112; (ix) Exhibits P1657 and P1658 [REDACTED] (under seal), see Trial Judgement, paras. 5032, 5114 (collectively, “Intercepts”).

Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 625, referring to Trial Judgement, para. 5046.

Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 626, referring to T. 28 June 2013 pp. 13575, 13576 (private session), Exhibit D316 (under seal).

Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 626, referring to T. 13 September 2013 pp. 16701, 16702, T. 1 November 2013 pp. 18643, 18644 (closed session).


Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 626, referring to T. 3 September 2013 pp. 16115–16117.

Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 627, referring to Trial Judgement, paras. 4945, 5001, 5002, 5032, 5114, Exhibits P1320/P1321 (under seal), P2126 (under seal), P1332 (under seal), P1645/P1657 (under seal).

See Prosecution Response Brief, paras. 253–255, referring to, inter alia, Trial Judgement, paras. 5046, 5305–5308.

Prosecution Response Brief, para. 255, referring to, inter alia, Trial Judgement, paras. 5305–5308, nn. 18087, 18089.

Prosecution Response Brief, paras. 256–258, referring to, inter alia, Trial Judgement, paras. 2792–2863, 4945, 5001, 5002, 5032, 5049, 5114.

See Trial Judgement, paras. 5046, 5307.

See Trial Judgement, paras. 5046, 5307, 5308. In considering the Intercepts, the Trial Chamber assessed their reliability as...
as evidence supporting the identification of Mladić as a participant in the conversations. See Trial Judgement, para. 5046.  
Mladić argues that Witness Nikolić’s report to the VRS Main Staff supports his statement that he concealed the crimes as it only contained information that wounded Muslim prisoners and Muslim UN staff were being evacuated. See Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 632, n. 773, referring to Exhibit P1515.  
Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 633, referring to Trial Judgement, paras. 3002–3005. To the extent that Mladić refers to paragraphs 611 and 612 of his appellant’s brief, the Appeals Chamber recalls that it has rejected his arguments in this regard. See supra para. 380.  
Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 635–639, 641, referring to Trial Judgement, paras. 5086, 5094, 5098. See also T. 26 August 2020 p. 56. Mladić also takes issue with the Trial Chamber’s reliance on Witness Predrag Drinić in finding that no investigations were conducted by Bosnian Serb military or civilian organs. To the extent that Mladić develops this argument in Ground 51 of his appeal, it will be evaluated in connection with the submissions made in support of that sub-ground of appeal. See Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 634, referring to Trial Judgement, para. 4963.  
Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 637. Mladić alleges that, following this, his key subordinates were removed in October 1995 and subsequently replaced. See Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 637.  
Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 637, referring to Trial Judgement, para. 4963, Exhibit P3353 (under seal).  
Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 637, 639.  
Prosecution Response Brief, para. 259, referring to Trial Judgement, paras. 4987, 5093, 5094, 5097, 5098. See also T. 26 August 2020 pp. 19–22. The Prosecution further submits that the Defence’s alleged “hypothetical conspiracy”, involving a breakdown of command and rogue elements of the VRS and civilian police without Mladić’s knowledge, cannot explain: (i) the extensive and coordinated involvement of many different military units and resources under Mladić’s overall command, (ii) that Mladić did nothing to punish direct perpetrators and their superiors who, under his control, conducted the operation, and (iii) his praise for his soldiers in the conduct of the operation in Srebrenica. See T. 26 August 2020 pp. 21, 22.  
Prosecution Response Brief, para. 260, referring to, under alia, Trial Judgement, paras. 213, 2902, 3002, 4989, 5042, 5050, 5052, 5053, 5069, 5080, 5092, 5093, 5096, 5098, Exhibit P1500. See also T. 26 August 2020 pp. 21, 22. The Prosecution argues that: (i) Mladić fails to explain how the Trial Chamber placed undue emphasis on Witness Bojanović’s evidence that the crimes that would have been reported up the chain of command in the Zvornik Brigade Report when the Trial Chamber expressly stated that it did not rely on this aspect of his evidence (see Prosecution Response Brief, para. 261, referring to, under alia, Trial Judgement, n. 12063); (ii) Mladić fails to show how the absence of explicit mention of crimes in the Zvornik Brigade Report undercuts the Trial Chamber’s finding that VRS officers, including Mladić, were aware of the killings (see Prosecution Response Brief, para. 262, referring to, under alia, Trial Judgement, paras. 4961, 5093); and (iii) Witness Momir Nikolić’s evidence confirms Mladić’s active participation in and knowledge of the murder operation (see Prosecution Response Brief, para. 263; see also T. 26 August 2020 pp. 19, 20).

The Zvornik Brigade was a VRS unit subordinate to the Drina Corps. See Trial Judgement, paras. 212, 215–218.  
Mladić fails to show how the absence of explicit mention of crimes in the Zvornik Brigade Report undercuts the Trial Chamber’s finding that VRS officers, including Mladić, were aware of the killings (see Prosecution Response Brief, para. 262, referring to, under alia, Trial Judgement, paras. 4961, 5093); and (iii) Witness Momir Nikolić’s evidence confirms Mladić’s active participation in and knowledge of the murder operation (see Prosecution Response Brief, para. 263; see also T. 26 August 2020 pp. 19, 20).
The Appeals Chamber has previously examined the Trial Chamber’s determination of Mladić’s knowledge of the crimes. See supra paras. 407, 408. See also Trial Judgement, para. 5093, referring to Trial Judgement, paras. 152, 213, 4968. Having reviewed relevant portions of the Trial Judgement, the Appeals Chamber observes that the Trial Chamber did not make a specific finding about Mladić’s knowledge of the reburial operation. See Trial Judgement, paras. 2989–3007, 4959–4969, 5086–5095.

With respect to evidence of the institutional limitations of the military justice system, Mladić recalls his arguments in relation to Ground 3 of his appeal. To the extent that Mladić develops these arguments in Ground 3, they are evaluated in connection with the submissions made in support of that ground. See Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 638. See supra Section III.B.2(a)(iii).

See Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 635, referring to Trial Judgement, para. 5086, Mladić Final Trial Brief, paras. 3273–3292.

See Trial Judgement, paras. 5086, 5091.


See T. 10 December 2013 pp. 20618–20625. Witness Theunens further testified that Mladić had the authority to order investigations within the military justice system, but only used it selectively, focusing on acts which had a negative impact on the combat readiness of the VRS. See Trial Judgement, para. 4531, referring to T. 6 December 2013 pp. 20388–20392. See also T. 6 December 2013 p. 20388.


Compare Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 636, 637 with Mladić Final Trial Brief, paras. 3284–3289.

See Trial Judgement, para. 5091, referring to Trial Judgement, para. 4545.

See Karadžić Appeal Judgement, paras. 19, 305, 598 and references cited therein.

The ultimatums instead relate to activities of Arkan’s paramilitary unit in Sanski Most Municipality. See Exhibits D1503, P3095. Mladić’s submissions regarding Exhibits D1503 and P3095 have been dismissed above in relation to the Overarching JCE. See supra Section III.B.1(b)(ii).

See Trial Judgement, para. 4963 (wherein Witness Drnić stated that he attended a meeting on 25 or 26 March 1996 to discuss an order from Karadžić of 23 March 1996 requesting the VRS and MUP to immediately form a mixed expert commission to investigate the alleged discovery of two decomposed bodies in the Posilica area in Zvornik Municipality). See also Exhibit P3351, pp. 10879, 10880; Exhibit P3353 (under seal), pp. 3, 6, 8.

See Trial Judgement, paras. 4963, 4968.

See supra paras. 383, 389.

Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 636, 640.


Prosecution Response Brief, para. 270.

Stanišić and Čolaković Appeal Judgement, para. 110; Krajišnik Appeal Judgement, para. 696. In relation to Mladić’s reliance on the Bemba Appeal Judgement, the Appeals Chamber reiterates that it is not bound by the findings of other courts – domestic, international, or hybrid – and that, even though it may consider such jurisprudence, it may nonetheless come to a different conclusion on a matter than that reached by another judicial body. See, e.g., Karadžić Appeal Judgement, para. 434; Stanišić and Čolaković Appeal Judgement, para. 598; Popović et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 1674. See also Đorđević Appeal Judgement, para. 83.

Stanišić and Čolaković Appeal Judgement, para. 110; Popović et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 1653; Krajišnik Appeal Judgement, para. 695. See also Brdanin Appeal Judgement, para. 427.
See Appeal Brief, para. 657.

See Appeal Brief, paras. 655, 656; T. 25 August 2020 pp. 1466

See Appeal Brief, paras. 595, 655; T. 25 August 2020 pp. 1467


See Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 659–661. See also T. 25 August 2020 pp. 71, 72, 82, 83; T. 26 August 2020 pp. 45, 46.

See Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 662–664.

Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 651, 653, 654.


Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 655, 656; T. 25 August 2020 pp. 65–70, 72, 82–84; T. 26 August 2020 pp. 47, 48.

Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 657.

Prosecution Response Brief, para. 272. See also T. 26 August 2020 p. 3.

Prosecution Response Brief, paras. 272, 277, 278.

 Prosecution Response Brief, para. 273. The Prosecution contends that the statements made by Mladić were correctly assessed by the Trial Chamber in their context, which included the plan to remove the Bosnian Muslim population from Eastern Bosnia and the systematic forcible transfer and murder of the Bosnian Muslim population in Srebrenica by Mladić’s forces. See Prosecution Response Brief, para. 273, referring to, inter alia, Trial Judgement, paras. 2358–2362, 5096–5098.


Prosecution Response Brief, para. 274, referring to, inter alia, Trial Judgement, paras. 2467, 2477, 5130; Exhibit P1147, pp. 41, 42.

Prosecution Response Brief, para. 274, referring to, inter alia, Trial Judgement, para. 5106.

Prosecution Response Brief, para. 274, referring to, inter alia, Trial Judgement, para. 2476, Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 658, n. 800.
Muslims fleeing towards Potočari; (ii) the situation in the UNPROFOR compound in Potočari and its surroundings, in particular the shots and shells fired around the compound, the dire living conditions, the fear and exhaustion of the Bosnian Muslims who had sought refuge there; and (iii) that the VRS, assisted by MUP units, coordinated the boarding of buses, ultimately forcing women, children, and the elderly onto the buses while some were hit by members of the MUP, and escorted the buses towards Bosnian-Muslim controlled territory).

T. 13 June 2013 pp. 12659, 12662 (wherein Mladić told prisoners that “[they] do not need to be afraid because they would return to their houses and be exchanged”, after which “he was applauded by the prisoners”); T. 11 June 2013 p. 12532 (wherein Mladić told prisoners “[y]ou do not have to worry. You will be exchanged and join your families in Tuzla. Now you’ll be transported by trucks to Bratunac or Kravica where you will spend the night and get some food.”); Exhibit P1118, p. 3024 (wherein Mladić told prisoners “that [they] would all be exchanged and that they were not criminals.”). See also T. 25 August 2020 pp. 82, 83.

In finding Mladić’s intent for genocide, the Trial Chamber considered, in part, Mladić’s presence at Nova Kasaba football field and Sandić Meadow on 13 July 1995, where several thousand Bosnian Muslim males were detained, and his misleading assurances that they would be taken to Bratunac to be exchanged. The Trial Chamber further considered Mladić’s command and control over VRS and MUP units operating in and around Srebrenica from at least 11 July to 11 October 1995, his orders to separate the Bosnian Muslim men from the women, children, and elderly in Potočari from 12 July 1995, his statements and speeches between 11 July and August 1995, in which he articulated that it was time to take revenge, and threatened that the Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica could either “live or vanish”, “survive or disappear”, that only the people who could secure the surrender of weapons would save the Bosnian Muslims from “destruction” as well as his presence at a meeting on 13 July 1995 with MUP and VRS officers during which the VRS tasked the MUP with the killing of about 8,000 Bosnian Muslim males near Konjević Polje. Trial Judgement, paras. 5052, 5130.

See Karadžić Appeal Judgement, para. 376; Krajišnik Appeal Judgement, para. 27; Karemera and Ngirumpatse Appeal Judgement, para. 179.

Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 656, referring to Exhibit D410. See also T. 25 August 2020 p. 84.

See also T. 25 August 2020 pp. 71, 72, 82–84; T. 26 August 2020 pp. 45, 46.

Prosecution Response Brief, para. 279. According to the Prosecution, while the Krivaja-95 operation had legitimate purposes, it also had a criminal objective, namely to create conditions for the elimination of the enclaves by targeting the civilian population, and legitimate military objectives do not negate criminal ones. See Prosecution Response Brief, para. 279; T. 26 August 2020 pp. 9, 10.

Prosecution Response Brief, para. 280. See also T. 26 August 2020 pp. 6, 17, 18, 22.

Prosecution Response Brief, para. 280. Specifically, the Prosecution argues that Mladić ignores that: (i) journalists from the VRS Main Staff were allowed entry; (ii) the take-over of Srebrenica and the removal of the Bosnian Muslims was complete before Mladić issued the 13 July 1995 order; (iii) he had previously proposed misleading the international public about the truth; and (iv) on 13 July 1995, hundreds of Bosnian Muslim men had been executed with thousands more in VRS custody awaiting transfer to Zvornik for execution. See Prosecution Response Brief, para. 280, referring to Trial Judgement, para. 5080.

Prosecution Response Brief, para. 280.

See supra paras. 393, 395 (wherein the Appeals Chamber rejects Mladić’s argument that the Trial Chamber gave insufficient weight to evidence that Krivaja-95 was a legitimate military operation).

T. 13 June 2013 pp. 12659, 12662.

See supra paras. 259, 260.


Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 657.

Krajišnik Appeal Judgement, para. 376; Karemera and Ngirumpatse Appeal Judgement, para. 179.

Prosecution Response Brief, para. 59; Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 659. See also T. 25 August 2020 pp. 71, 72, 82–84; T. 26 August 2020 pp. 45, 46.

Prosecution Response Brief, paras. 660, 661. See also T. 26 August 2020 p. 45.

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T. 13 June 2013 pp. 12659, 12662.

See supra paras. 259, 260.


Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 657.

Krajišnik Appeal Judgement, para. 376; Karemera and Ngirumpatse Appeal Judgement, para. 179.

Prosecution Response Brief, para. 59; Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 659. See also T. 25 August 2020 pp. 71, 72, 82–84; T. 26 August 2020 pp. 45, 46.

Prosecution Response Brief, paras. 660, 661. See also T. 26 August 2020 p. 45.

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Prosecution Response Brief, para. 280. See also T. 26 August 2020 pp. 6, 17, 18, 22.

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Prosecution Response Brief, para. 280.

See supra paras. 393, 395 (wherein the Appeals Chamber rejects Mladić’s argument that the Trial Chamber gave insufficient weight to evidence that Krivaja-95 was a legitimate military operation).

T. 13 June 2013 pp. 12659, 12662.

See supra paras. 259, 260.
In this regard, Mladić points to: (i) evidence that bodies in the mass graves were killed at other times in combat; (ii) combat casualties from “kamikaze” attacks and combat in Zvornik; (iii) alternative explanations for deaths in the column other than VRS criminal activity; and (iv) forensic expert evidence relating to the alleged blindfolds on bodies potentially being bandannas worn by combatants. See Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 674, nn. 825–829, referring to Trial Judgement, paras. 3007, 5309, Mladić Final Trial Brief, paras. 2689–2698, 2707, 2708, 2738–2751, T. 23 July 2014 pp. 24601, 24602, T. 31 May 2013 pp. 11896–11899 (closed session). See also T. 25 August 2020 p. 85.

1532 Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 675; Mladić Reply Brief, para. 34. See also T. 25 August 2020 p. 85.

1533 Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 677.


1535 Prosecution Response Brief, paras. 282, 283; T. 26 August 2020 pp. 21, 38.

1536 Prosecution Response Brief, paras. 285, 286. In the Prosecution’s view, Mladić’s claim that he is unable to determine the extent to which the Trial Chamber relied on Adjudicated Fact 1476 ignores the clear articulation in the Trial Judgement of the basis of his liability. See Prosecution Response Brief, para. 285. The Prosecution argues that the conclusions on Mladić’s intent, significant contribution to the Srebrenica JCE, and sentence are all based on factual and legal findings in Chapters 7 and 8 of the Trial Judgement, in which the Trial Chamber listed the numbers of victims per incident. See Prosecution Response Brief, para. 286. The Prosecution adds that the Trial Chamber did not rely on Adjudicated Fact 1476 to find Mladić’s criminal responsibility for killings in Srebrenica or in determining his sentence. See T. 26 August 2020 pp. 38, 39.

1537 Prosecution Response Brief, para. 284. The Prosecution argues that the Trial Chamber considered evidence that some victims who died in Srebrenica were not victims of executions, and that where the manner of death or the victims’ status was unclear, it did not count them in the total number of victims of killings. Additionally, the Prosecution contends that the Trial Chamber considered and rejected the alternative explanation that blindfolds on victims could have been bandannas worn by fighters. See Prosecution Response Brief, para. 283. The Prosecution reiterates that the Trial Chamber relied on Adjudicated Fact 1476 for a general finding and did not rely on this fact to determine the number and status of victims for whose killing Mladić was ultimately found responsible. See Prosecution Response Brief, para. 284.

1538 Mladić Reply Brief, para. 37. See also T. 26 August 2020 p. 64.

1539 Mladić Reply Brief, paras. 35, 36, nn. 62, 65, 67, referring to Trial Judgement, paras. 3007, 5191, Chapter 9.7. See also T. 26 August 2020 p. 64.

1540 Mladić Reply Brief, paras. 33, 34. See also T. 26 August 2020 p. 64.


1546 See Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 666, 669–672; Mladić Reply Brief, para. 33. See also T. 25 August 2020 pp. 84, 85.

1547 Trial Judgement, paras. 3007, 3042; Second Decision on Adjudicated Facts, para. 36. See also Prosecution Motion on Adjudicated Facts, Annex B, RP. 31130.

1548 Trial Judgement, paras. 3007, 3042. See also Trial Judgement, para. 3032.

1549 See Trial Judgement, para. 5129.


1551 See Mladić Reply Brief, para. 33. See also Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 669–672; T. 25 August 2020 pp. 84, 85.

1552 Trial Judgement, paras. 3115, 3546.


1555 Trial Judgement, paras. 3051, 3062, 3115, 3546.

1556 See Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 672.

1557 Trial Judgement, paras. 2662–2935, 3051, 3062. Of the incidents that supported Mladić’s liability in relation to the Srebrenica JCE, the Trial Chamber found that, between 12 and 23 July 1995, the following people, almost all of whom were Bosnian Muslim men, were killed: (a) 15 male detainees, including a 14-year-old boy and one man wearing civilian clothing (Scheduled Incident E.1.1) (see Trial Judgement, paras. 2676, 3051); (b) approximately 150 non-Serb males, including minors, 147 of whom were wearing civilian clothes (Scheduled Incident E.2.1) (see Trial Judgement, paras. 2682, 2684, 3051); (c) approximately 1,000 male
detainees (Scheduled Incident E.3.1) (see Trial Judgement, paras. 2707, 3051); (d) 10 to 15 unarmed men, who had surrendered, and one wounded man (Scheduled Incident E.4.1) (see Trial Judgement, paras. 2723, 3051); (e) approximately 21 male detainees dressed in civilian clothes (Scheduled Incident E.5.1) (see Trial Judgement, paras. 2732, 3051); (f) two male detainees (Scheduled Incident E.6.1) (see Trial Judgement, paras. 2759, 3051); (g) at least 819 male detainees, many of whom were dressed in civilian clothing (Scheduled Incident Scheduled Incident E.6.2) (see Trial Judgement, paras. 2766, 3051); (h) about 20 male detainees (Scheduled Incident E.7.1) (see Trial Judgement, paras. 2776, 3051); (i) about 401 male detainees, including minors (Scheduled Incident E.7.2) (see Trial Judgement, paras. 2791, 3051); (j) at least 12 male detainees (Scheduled Incident E.8.1) (see Trial Judgement, paras. 2820, 3051); (k) at least 575 male detainees (Scheduled Incident E.8.2) (see Trial Judgement, paras. 2825, 3051); (l) at least eight men who wore civilian clothing (Scheduled Incident E.9.1) (see Trial Judgement, paras. 2859, 3051); (m) between 1,000 and 1,200 male detainees (Scheduled Incident E.9.2) (see Trial Judgement, paras. 2861, 3051); (n) approximately 500 men and two women, some of whom were wearing civilian clothes (Scheduled Incident E.10.1) (see Trial Judgement, paras. 2862, 3051); (o) 39 detained men and boys (Scheduled Incident E.12.1) (see Trial Judgement, paras. 2864–2876, 3051); (p) nine men who were wearing civilian clothes (Scheduled Incident E.14.1) (see Trial Judgement, paras. 2886, 3051); (q) an unarmed man wearing civilian clothing (Scheduled Incident E.14.2) (see Trial Judgement, paras. 2894, 3051); (r) more than 50 male detainees (Scheduled Incident E.15.1) (see Trial Judgement, paras. 2917, 3051); (s) an unarmed man (Scheduled Incident E.15.3) (see Trial Judgement, paras. 2920, 2921, 3051); (t) 15 detainees (unscheduled) (see Trial Judgement, paras. 2924, 3051); (u) four captured people, including a 15-year-old boy (unscheduled) (see Trial Judgement, paras. 2926, 3051); and (w) ten injured detainees (unscheduled) (see Trial Judgement, paras. 2935, 3051). The Trial Chamber, in Chapters 7 and 8.3.2 of the Trial Judgement, also found that, between mid-July and mid-August 1995, members of the Skorpions Unit killed six Bosnian Muslim men and boys from Srebrenica near the town of Tmovo (Scheduled Incident E.13.1 listed under letter “(p)” See Trial Judgement, paras. 2882, 3051. The Trial Chamber found, however, that this scheduled incident was not part of Mladić’s ultimate responsibility as the perpetrators were not considered members of the Srebrenica JCE, or subordinated to the VRS, or otherwise used as tools of members of this joint criminal enterprise. See Trial Judgement, para. 2935.

See also Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 2935. The Trial Chamber, in Chapters 7 and 8.3.2 of the Trial Judgement, also found that, between mid-July and mid-August 1995, members of the Skorpions Unit killed six Bosnian Muslim men and boys from Srebrenica near the town of Tmovo (Scheduled Incident E.13.1 listed under letter “(p)” See Trial Judgement, paras. 2882, 3051. The Trial Chamber found, however, that this scheduled incident was not part of Mladić’s ultimate responsibility as the perpetrators were not considered members of the Srebrenica JCE, or subordinated to the VRS, or otherwise used as tools of members of this joint criminal enterprise. See Trial Judgement, para. 2935.

1558 Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 672. See also T. 25 August 2020 p. 85.

1559 Trial Judgement, para. 3062.

1560 Trial Judgement, para. 3062, referring to Scheduled Incidents E.1.1, E.2.1, E.4.1, E.6.1, E.6.2, E.7.1, E.7.2, E.8.1, E.8.2, E.9.2, E.10.1, E.12.1, E.13.1, E.15.1. While the chapeau elements of crimes against humanity require the attack to be committed against a civilian population, it is well-established jurisprudence that victims of the underlying acts of crimes against humanity need not be civilians and can be individuals hors de combat. See Tolimir Appeal Judgement, paras. 141, 142; Popović et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 569; Mrkić and Stjićančin Appeal Judgement, para. 29; Martić Appeal Judgement, para. 307. Incidents of murder were considered by the Trial Chamber to fall under crimes against humanity as well as violations of the laws or customs of war pursuant to Counts 5 and 6 of the Indictment. See Trial Judgement, para. 3065; Indictment, para. 66.

1561 Trial Judgement, para. 3062. See also Trial Judgement, paras. 3051, 3115, 3546.

1562 Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 676; Mladić Reply Brief, paras. 35, 36.

1563 Trial Judgement, paras. 3007, 3042. See also Trial Judgement, para. 3032.

1564 See Trial Judgement, para. 3051, pp. 1608–1610.

1565 See Trial Judgement, paras. 2662–2935, 3051, pp. 1608–1610. Additionally, the Trial Chamber relied upon extensive evidence to make findings on Mladić’s mens rea and significant contribution to the Srebrenica JCE. See, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 4990–5131.

1566 Mladić Reply Brief, para. 35, nn. 63, 64, referring to Trial Judgement, paras. 5128, 5130 (referring to, inter alia, Exhibit P2118).

1567 See Exhibit P2118, para. 2; Trial Judgement, paras. 5063, 5128, nn. 17623, 17706.

1568 See Trial Judgement, paras. 4990–5098. In assessing Mladić’s significant contribution, the Trial Chamber similarly referred to Exhibit P2118. See Trial Judgement, para. 5068.

1569 Mladić Reply Brief, para. 36.

1570 Trial Judgement, para. 5191.

1571 See supra paras. 443, 444.

1572 See supra Section III.A.2(a)(ii).

1573 See Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 673. See also T. 25 August 2020 p. 85.

1574 Trial Judgement, paras. 3007, 3042. See also Trial Judgement, para. 3032.


1576 See Trial Judgement, paras. 4990–5131.

1577 Karadžić Appeal Judgement, para. 19; Šešelj Appeal Judgement, para. 17; Ngirabatware Appeal Judgement, para. 11.

1578 See Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 681, 694.

1579 See Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 684, 686–690.

1580 See Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 685, 691–693.

1581 Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 694.

1582 Prosecutor v. Ratko Mladić, Case No. IT-09–92-T, Decision on Prosecution Motion to Admit the Evidence of Ljubomir Bojanović and Miroslav Deronjić Pursuant to Rule 92 quarter, 13 January 2014 (“Decision of 13 January 2014”), para. 13. See also Exhibit P3567.

1583 Prosecutor v. Ratko Mladić, Case No. IT-09–92-T, Decision on Prosecution Twenty-Fifth Motion to Admit Evidence Pursuant to Rule 92 bis, 20 December 2013 (“Decision of 20 December 2013”), para. 19. See also Prosecutor v. Ratko Mladić, Case No. IT-09–92-T, Prosecution Twenty-Fifth Motion to Admit Evidence Pursuant to Rule 92 bis: Srebrenica (Various), 3 April 2013 (confidential) (“Motion of 3 April 2013”). See also Exhibit P3351.

1584 Prosecutor v. Ratko Mladić, Case No. IT-09–92-T, Decision on Prosecution Motion to Admit Evidence of Mevludin Orić Pursuant to Rule 92 bis, 8 July 2013 (“Decision of 8 July 2013”), para. 10. See Exhibit P1757.
Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 684, 690. See also Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 686–688.

While Mladić points to Sched-

uled Incident E.15 in his appellant’s brief, the Appeals Chamber notes that, in support of his argument, he refers to paragraph 2921 of the Trial Judgement, which is only pertinent to Sched-

uled Incident E.15.3. See Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 688, n. 835.

Prosecution Response Brief, para. 287.

Prosecution Response Brief, paras. 288–293.


See Decision of 13 January 2014, para. 13. See also Exhibit P3567.

See Trial Judgement, paras. 4940, 4973, 4987, 4992, 5096–5098.

See Trial Judgement, paras. 4962, 4967, 4981. See also Trial Judgement, paras. 2549 (wherein the Trial Chamber noted that “Witness RM-294 testified that the declaration did not reflect the reality in that no one was given a choice either to remain or be evacuated”), 2550 (wherein the Trial Chamber noted that “[Witness] Deronjić stated that certain portions of the declaration were not a truthful reflection of the situation on the ground between 12 and 17 July 1995”), referring to Exhibit P3567, pp. 6216, 6217, 6219.

Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 686, referring to Trial Judgement, para. 4940.

Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 686, referring to Trial Judgement, para. 4967.

Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 686, referring to Trial Judgement, paras. 4968, 4969, 5092, 5094.

Prosecution Response Brief, para. 289.

Prosecution Response Brief, para. 289.

Prosecution Response Brief, para. 290, referring to Trial Judgement, paras. 2559, 4967.

See Decision of 13 January 2014, para. 8.

See Trial Judgement, paras. 4940, 4973, 4987, 4992, 5096–5098.

See Trial Judgement, paras. 2319–2661, 4973–4983.


See Trial Judgement, paras. 4926–4968, 4973.


See Trial Judgement, para. 2548, referring to T. 7 May 2013 pp. 10743, 10744, Exhibit P1417, para. 105.


See Trial Judgement, paras. 2548, 2549, 4962.

See Trial Judgement, para. 3159.

Trial Judgement, para. 3159.

See Decision of 20 December 2013, para. 19, referring to Motion of 3 April 2013, Annex A. See also Exhibit P3531.

Trial Judgement, paras. 4963 (wherein the Trial Chamber noted that “[a]ccording to [Witness Drinić], no investigations were conducted by any Bosnian-Serb military or civilian authority regarding crimes committed in Srebrenica in 1995”), 4968.

See Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 634, 681, 687, 690, referring to Trial Judgement, para. 4963. In identifying the Trial Cham-

ber’s finding in question, Mladić makes a broader statement that “no investigations were conducted by Bosnian Serb mili-

tary or civilian organs”. Mladić supports this statement with reference to paragraph 4963 of the Trial Judgement, which addresses evidence pertinent to the investigation and punish-

ment of the perpetrators of the Srebrenica killings and that he makes this statement in the context of Srebrenica ICE. See Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 634, 687, referring to Trial Judgement, para. 4963.

Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 634, referring to T. 18 September 2014 p. 25771. See also Mladić Reply Brief, para. 97.

Prosecution Response Brief, paras. 265, 291, referring to Trial Judgement, paras. 4963, 4968, 4985, 5093.

Prosecution Response Brief, para. 291, referring to Decision of 20 December 2013, paras. 11, 15.

Prosecution Response Brief, para. 291, referring to Decision of 20 December 2013, para. 2.

Prosecution Response Brief, para. 266. The Prosecution contends that, contrary to Mladić’s assertion, he sought to reintroduce Witness Drinić’s evidence pursuant to Rule 92 ter of the ICTY Rules and proposed a statement that confirmed Witness Drinić’s evidence that Mladić now challenges, namely that no investigation of war crimes committed by members of the VRS was conducted. See Prosecution Response Brief, para. 266, referring to T. 18 September 2014 p. 25771, Prosecutor v. Ratko Mladić, Case No. IT-09–92–T, Defence Motion to Amend Witness List, 10 July 2014 (confidential with confidential Annexes A, B, and C).

Prosecution Response Brief, paras. 265, 291.

See Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 634, 681, 687, 690. Although evidence admitted pursuant to Rule 92 bis of the ICTY Rules must not relate to the acts and conduct of the accused as charged in the indictment, Mladić does not argue on appeal that Witness Drinić’s Rule 92 bis evidence went to his acts or conduct as charged in the Indictment. In view of the analy-

sis and conclusion in this subsection, the Appeals Chamber will not examine this matter proprio motu as it could not impact the outcome.

See Trial Judgement, paras. 4963, 4968, referring to, inter alia, Exhibits P1054 (under seal), paras. 82, 83, P3351, P3354, T. 27 February 2013 pp. 9267, 9268 (closed session).

See Ćelebijači Appeal Judgement, para. 506.

See T. 27 February 2013 pp. 9267, 9268 (closed session).

See Decision of 8 July 2013, para. 10. See also Exhibit P1757.

Trial Judgement, paras. 2918–2921, referring to Exhibit P1757.

Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 688, 690, referring to Trial Judgement, para. 2921.

Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 688.

Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 690.
1639 Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 692, referring to Trial Judgement, paras. 2846, 2849. Mladić additionally recalls his previous submission that the Trial Chamber erred in: (i) taking judicial notice of adjudicated facts relating to the conduct of his proximate subordinates (see Mladić Notice of Appeal, para. 21; Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 62–95, 691); and (ii) applying a heightened standard of the burden to produce rebuttal evidence (see Mladić Notice of Appeal, para. 26; Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 96–113, 691), and consequently submits that the Trial Chamber’s error of law resulted in a defective evidentiary approach to the adjudicated facts (see Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 693). The Appeals Chamber has already rejected Mladić’s blanket submission that the Trial Chamber erred in taking judicial notice of adjudicated facts relating to the conduct of his proximate subordinates, and applying a heightened standard of the burden to produce rebuttal evidence (see supra Section III.A.2(a)(ii)). Considering the foregoing, Mladić’s statement to this effect in this part of the appeal (see Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 691) is also rejected.

1640 See Prosecution Response Brief, paras. 287, 294.

1641 Prosecution Response Brief, para. 294, referring to Trial Judgement, para. 2860.

1642 Prosecution Response Brief, para. 294, referring to Trial Judgement, paras. 2846, 2849, 5300.

1643 Prosecution Response Brief, para. 294.


1645 Karadžić Appeal Judgement, paras. 120, 128, 219 and references cited therein.

1646 Karadžić Appeal Judgement, paras. 120, 219 and references cited therein.

1647 Karadžić Appeal Judgement, para. 128 and references cited therein.

1648 Karadžić Appeal Judgement, para. 128 and references cited therein.

1649 See Defense Interlocutory Appeal Brief of 4 July 2012, Annex B, RP. 1013 (wherein Mladić challenged Adjudicated Fact 1612 at trial on the grounds that: (i) the interests of justice and right to a fair and public trial support leading evidence on the fact; (ii) the proposed fact goes directly or indirectly towards acts and conduct or responsibility of the Accused or to alleged acts/convictions of alleged subordinates of the Accused; and (iii) the proposed fact bears upon the responsibility of the Accused or relates to the objective and members of the joint criminal enterprise, as well as to facts relating to a fundamental issue raised in the operative indictment).


1651 See Trial Judgement, para. 2846, referring to Exhibits P1828, pp. 3751, 3752, 3754, P1833, pp. 10, 11, 17, 55.

1652 See Trial Judgement, para. 2849, referring to Exhibit P1987.

1653 See Trial Judgement, para. 2860.

1654 See Trial Judgement, para. 2860.

1655 See Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 692, n. 838, referring to Trial Judgement, paras. 2846, 2849.

1656 See supra para. 56. See also Trial Judgement, para. 5273.

1657 See Adjudicated Facts 1612. See also Trial Judgement, paras. 2843, 2860, n. 12494.

1658 See Trial Judgement, paras. 2860, 5273.

1659 Trial Judgement, paras. 2315, 2316. See also Trial Judgement, paras. 3218–3220, 5136.

1660 Trial Judgement, paras. 3221, 3226. See also Trial Judgement, paras. 2315–3220, 3222–3225.

1661 Trial Judgement, para. 5141.

1662 Trial Judgement, para. 5142.

1663 Trial Judgement, paras. 5146, 5156. See also Trial Judgement, paras. 5147–5155, 5157.

1664 Trial Judgement, paras. 5142, 5163. See also Trial Judgement, paras. 5157–5162.
1665 Trial Judgement, para. 5214. See also Trial Judgement, paras. 3226, 5141, 5142, 5156, 5163, 5168.

1666 See Mladić Notice of Appeal, paras. 67–69; Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 695–759.

1667 Trial Judgement, paras. 3010, 3224.


1669 See Trial Judgement, paras. 3009, 3010, 3012, 3020, 3222–3226. See also Trial Judgement, paras. 3013–3017.


1671 Trial Judgement, paras. 3012, 3017, 3224.

1672 See Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 695–697, 702–710.

1673 Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 701.

1674 See Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 698–701, referring to, inter alia, Tadići Decision of 2 October 1995.

1675 Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 699.

1676 Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 700.


1679 Ćelebija Appellate Brief, paras. 702, 703, referring to Article 147 of Geneva Convention IV. Mladić asserts that the prohibition against hostage-taking is not evinced in the 1899 and 1907 Hague Regulations or the “grave breaches provisions” of the three Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I. Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 704, referring to Geneva Convention I, Geneva Convention II, Geneva Convention III. He further claims that reference to hostage-taking in the first draft of Article 3 of the ICTY Statute was not carried through to the final version endorsed by the UN Secretary General to the Security Council in 1993. Ćelebija Appellate Brief, para. 704.


1681 Prosecution Response Brief, para. 304, referring to, inter alia, Ćelebija Appellate Judgement, paras. 167, 173, 174, Tadići Decision of 2 October 1995, para. 134. The Prosecution adds that the lack of express mention of hostage-taking in Article 3 of the ICTY Statute and the grave breaches system of the Geneva Conventions is of “no significance” and does not imply that it attracts no criminal responsibility. It further contends that Mladić’s reliance on the Hague Regulations and the norms applicable during the Nuremberg trials ignores subsequent developments in customary international law. See Prosecution Response Brief, para. 305.

1682 Prosecution Response Brief, para. 306.

1683 Mladić Reply Brief, para. 101.

1684 See Mladić Pre-Trial Brief, paras. 107–111; Mladić Final Trial Brief, paras. 165–181, 3308–3386; T. 9 December 2016 pp. 44609, 44610; T. 13 December 2016 pp. 44808–44810, 44812–44818. The Appeals Chamber observes that in the decision concerning Mladić’s request for acquittal pursuant to Rule 98 bis of the ICTY Rules, the Trial Chamber noted that Mladić did not specifically challenge Count 11 of the Indictment or the general elements and jurisdictional requirements that must be proven under Article 3 of the ICTY Statute. See T. 15 April 2014 p. 20955.


1686 See infra paras. 488–494; Aleksovski Appeal Judgement, para. 113. See also Gotovina et al. Decision of 1 July 2010, para. 24.

1687 Karadžić Appellate Judgement, para. 13; Šešelj Appeal Judgement, para. 11. See also Stanišić and Ćuljušan Appeal Judgement, para. 968; Ngrbatwarev Appeal Judgement, para. 6; Bizimungu Appeal Judgement, para. 370; Munyarugarama Decision of 5 October 2012, para. 6.

1688 Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 68; Ćelebija Appeal Judgement, para. 125; Tadići Decision of 2 October 1995, paras. 87, 89. See also Boškoski and Tarčulovski Appeal Judgement, para. 47.

1689 Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 68; Ćelebija Appeal Judgement, paras. 125, 136; Tadići Decision of 2 October 1995, paras. 87, 89, 91. See also Boškoski and Tarčulovski Appeal Judgement, para. 47.

1690 Common Article 3 provides, in relevant part, that:

(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. To this end the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:

(a) […]
(b) taking of hostages; […]


1692 See Ćelebija Appeal Judgement, paras. 129–136. The ICTY Appeals Chamber rejected the submissions that violations of Common Article 3 are not within the jurisdiction of the ICTY on the basis, inter alia, that: (i) the Security Council
See Čelebići Appeal Judgement, paras. 157–174. The ICTY Appeals Chamber rejected, inter alia, the submissions that: (i) the evidence presented in the Tadić Decision of 2 October 1995 did not establish that Common Article 3 is customary international law; (ii) the exclusion of Common Article 3 from the Geneva Conventions grave breaches system demonstrates that it entails no individual criminal responsibility; (iii) Common Article 3 imposes duties on states only and is meant to be enforced by domestic legal systems; and (iv) there is evidence demonstrating that Common Article 3 is not a rule of customary law which imposes liability on individuals. See Čelebići Appeal Judgement, paras. 157, 158, 163, 167–170, 174. Similarly, the Appeals Chamber finds that Mladić’s assertion that the lack of mention of the prohibition against hostage-taking in the ICTY Statute, the 1899 and 1907 Hague Regulations, and the “grave breaches provisions” of the three 1949 Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I does not undermine that hostage-taking entailed individual criminal responsibility in customary international law at the time of the events in question. As discussed by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Čelebići case, the Geneva Conventions impose an obligation on State Parties to implement the conventions in their domestic legislation, including by taking measures necessary for the suppression of all breaches of the Geneva Conventions, including those outside the grave breaches provisions. See Article 49 of Geneva Convention I, Article 50 of Geneva Convention II, Article 129 of Geneva Convention III, Article 146 of Geneva Convention IV (“Each High Contracting Party shall take measures necessary for the suppression of all acts contrary to the provisions of the present Convention other than the grave breaches defined in the following Article.”). See also ICRC. Commentary of 1958 on Article 146(3) of Geneva Convention IV, p. 594 (“This shows that all breaches of the Convention should be repressed by national legislation. […] [T]he authorities of the Contracting Parties […] should institute judicial or disciplinary punishment for breaches of the Convention.”). See Čelebići Appeal Judgement, paras. 164–166.

See Čelebići Appeal Judgement, para. 163.


See, e.g., Karadžić Trial Judgement, paras. 5951, 5993, 6010. See also Karadžić Appeal Judgement, paras. 654, 659–661, 775, 777.


Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 704.

See Čelebići Appeal Judgement, paras. 170, 178.

See, e.g., Ireland, Geneva Conventions Act as amended (1962), Sections 4(1) and 4(4) (providing that, in addition to grave breaches, any “minor breaches” of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, including violations of Common Article 3, are punishable offences); Belgium, Loi du 16 juin 1993 relative à la répression des infractions graves aux Conventions internationales de Genève du 12 août 1949 et aux Protocoles I et II du 8 juin 1977 additionnels à ces Conventions (1993), Article 1(7) (implementing the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the two Additional Protocols and providing that Belgian courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate crimes under international law such as hostage-taking); France, Décret nº75–675 du 28 juillet 1975 portant règlement de discipline générale dans les armées (1975), as amended in 1982, Article 9(1) (prohibiting hostage-taking of persons placed hors de combat and providing that they be treated humanely); Germany, Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts – Manual (1992), para. 1209 (qualifying as an “indictable offence” hostage-taking of persons protected by Common Article 3); The Netherlands, Military Manual (1993), pp. VIII-3, XI-1, XI-4 (restating the prohibition of hostage-taking found in Common Article 3 and Article 4 of Additional Protocol II).

Additional Protocol II, Articles 4(1), 4(2)(c). See also ICRC, Commentary of 1987 on Additional Protocol II, paras. 4417, 4418 (“[…] Protocol II was adopted as a whole by consensus on 8 June 1977.”).

Sections 11, 499 of the United States Military Manual. See also Tadić Decision of 2 October 1995, para. 131.

Section 626 of the United Kingdom Military Manual. See also Tadić Decision of 2 October 1995, para. 131.

Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 706.

Article 142(1) of the Criminal Code of the SFRY (“Whoever, in violation of international law in time of war, armed conflict or occupation, orders an attack on the civilian population, settlement, individual civilians or persons hors de combat, which results in death or serious injury to body or health; […] use of measures of intimidation and terror, taking of hostages, collective punishment, unlawful taking to concentration camps and other unlawful confinements, deprivation of rights to a fair and impartial trial; […] shall be punished by no less than five years in prison, or by the death penalty.”).

Tadić Decision of 2 October 1995, para. 132, referring to the SFRY Law on the Ratification of the Additional Protocol to the Geneva Convention from 12 August 1949 on the Protection of Victims of International Organized Conflicts (Protocol I) and the Additional Protocol with the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 on the Protection of Victims of International Organized Conflicts (Protocol II), 26 December 1978, Article 210 of the Constitution of SFRY, 1974. See also Additional Protocol I, Article 75(1) (“[…] [P]ersons who are in the power of a Party to the conflict and who do not benefit from more favourable treatment under the Conventions or under this Protocol shall be treated humanely in all circumstances and shall enjoy, as a minimum, the protection provided by this Article […]”), Article 75(2)(c) (“The following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any
place whatsoever […] the taking of hostages’); Additional Protocol II. See also SFRY Military Manual, Article 17 (recognizing applicable “basic rules of humanity” contained in Common Article 3), Article 31 (prohibiting the taking hostage of, inter alia, civilians and prisoners of war “even as a reprisal”).

1709 Trial Judgement, para. 3009, referring to Tadić Decision of 2 October 1995, paras. 94, 143.


1711 The Appeals Chamber finds without merit Mladić’s argument that the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Celebić and Kunarac et al. cases “implicitly” affirmed the need for a trial chamber to conduct a detailed analysis of its jurisdiction where jurisdiction may be in issue. See Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 699, referring to Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement, paras. 67, 68, Celebić Appeal Judgement, paras. 167, 168. The relevant jurisprudence to which he refers shows that the ICTY Appeals Chamber relied on the Tadić jurisprudence and reaffirmed that Article 3 of the ICTY Statute encompasses violations of Common Article 3. See Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 68, nn. 60–62; Celebić Appeal Judgement, paras. 168, 169.


1713 Trial Judgement, para. 3224.

1714 Trial Judgement, para. 3224.

1715 Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 711, 722, 724, 731. See also Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 712, 713.


1717 Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 732, 733. See also Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 712, 713, 734.

1718 Prosecution Response Brief, paras. 300, 303.


1720 Mladić Reply Brief, para. 102.

1721 See supra Section III.E.1.


1724 Trial Judgement, para. 5141.

1725 Trial Judgement, paras. 5142, 5156, 5163. See also Trial Judgement, paras. 5146–5155, 5157–5162.

1726 Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 741, 751.

1727 Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 752, 758.

1728 Mladić Notice of Appeal, para. 69; Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 751, 758.

1729 Trial Judgement, para. 5156. See also Trial Judgement, para. 5157.

1730 Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 741, 751. See also Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 742–750.

1731 Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 743, 744, referring to Exhibits P789, P5230.

1732 Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 744.

1733 See Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 743–745, referring to, inter alia, Exhibit P5230.

1734 Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 746, 750.

1735 Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 749, referring to Exhibits P6611, para. 68, P2558, para. 3. Mladić adds that orders forbidding leakage of information regarding the detention and contact with the detainees were legitimate to ensure the security of VRS soldiers and the detainees in the eventuality of rescue operations. See Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 749, referring to Exhibits P6716, paras. 7–11, P5230, p. 1.

1736 Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 742, referring to Exhibits P396, p. 9, P397, p. 8, D393, pp. 12, 13. Mladić also asserts that Witness Kalbarczyk’s evidence had “a number of inconsistencies” and was inconsistent with his military notebooks. See Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 742.

1737 Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 747, referring to Trial Judgement, para. 5153.


1739 Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 747, referring to Exhibit P2801, p. 5.

1740 Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 747, referring to Exhibit P396, p. 9.

1741 Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 747, 748, referring to Exhibit D858, paras. 3, 15, T. 16 December 2014 p. 29887.

1742 Prosecution Response Brief, para. 308.

1743 Prosecution Response Brief, para. 310, referring to Trial Judgement, paras. 5137, 5141, 5142. The Prosecution adds that the Trial Chamber reasonably attributed the order dated 30 May 1995 to Mladić as the order contains his signature and, at trial, he did not challenge its admissibility or deny that he signed this order, and tendered other documents with different identification numbers as “his”. See Prosecution Response Brief, para. 309.

1744 Prosecution Response Brief, para. 311. The Prosecution adds that the argument that the orders to block, detain, and disarm the UN Personnel were lawful does not undermine the finding that Mladić significantly contributed to the Hostage-Taking JCE. See Prosecution Response Brief, para. 314.

1745 Prosecution Response Brief, para. 311.

1746 Prosecution Response Brief, paras. 312, 313.

1747 Prosecution Response Brief, para. 313, referring to Trial Judgement, para. 5156.

1748 Mladić Reply Brief, para. 103.

1749 Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 743, 744, referring to Exhibits P789, P5230.
1750 Trial Judgement, paras. 2219, 5137, referring to Exhibit P789.
1751 Trial Judgement, paras. 2223, 5151, 5152.
1752 Trial Judgement, para. 2219. See also Trial Judgement, para. 240.
1753 Mladić’s argument that the Order of 27 May 1995 was not signed by him and did not contain his “unique identification number” does not identify any error on the part of the Trial Chamber. See Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 744.
1755 See Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 746, 750, referring to, inter alia, Trial Judgement, paras. 2219, 2220, 2227, 2228, 2235, 2240, 2241, 2253, 2256, 2262, 2268, 2279, 2316.
1756 See Trial Judgement, para. 2219 (“On 25 May 1995, Mladić […] ordered the Iliđa Brigade to block and disarm the UNPROFOR members and put them under its control as [prisoners of war]. On 27 May 1995, Mano[ž]o Milovanović ordered […] UN [P]ersonnel were to be treated with military respect and as [prisoners of war].”) referring to Exhibits P6611, para. 68, P789, pp. 1, 2, P1849, T. 26 June 2014 pp. 23056, 23057, 23069, 23070. See Trial Judgement, para. 2220 (“Milenko Indić […] received an order from the VRS Main Staff to place under control, disarm, and seize the communication devices of UNPROFOR members in the SRK territory, but not to harm them in any manner.”), referring to Exhibit D614, para. 27, T. 2 September 2014 pp. 25112, 25113. See Trial Judgement, para. 2253 (“Milorad Šehovac testified that […] the SRK 2nd Sarajevo Light Infantry Brigade declared five to seven UNMOS […] as [prisoners of war]. […] The SRK unit acted in execution of an order from the SRK to capture ‘everything’ in their defence zone and treat them as [prisoners of war]. […] [T]he SRK unit did not mistreat the detainees nor used any kind of restraint or force against them. The UNMOS were allowed to make phone calls, provided three meals per day, and allowed to see a doctor.”), referring to T. 15 July 2014 pp. 24052, 24053. See Trial Judgement, para. 22316 (“Živanović ordered that the UNPROFOR soldiers […] be treated as [prisoners of war].”) See also Trial Judgement, para. 2283 (“Živanović ordered that the UN soldiers be treated as [prisoners of war] in a correct manner throughout their capture and detention.”), referring to Exhibit P2545, para. 5.
1757 See Trial Judgement, para. 2227 (stating that on 25 May 1995, two soldiers arrested Gunnar Westlund and his team and “[…] allowed [them] to keep their IDs, wallets and cigarettes.”), referring to Exhibit P400, pp. 3, 4. See Trial Judgement, para. 2236 (stating that VRS soldiers were threatening detained UNMOS and that “[…] Captain Vojvodić, sent back these soldiers.”), referring to Exhibit P397, p. 4. See Trial Judgement, para. 2240 (stating that on 26 May 1995 “Kozusnik was selected to leave and collect some personal items for the team.”), referring to Exhibit P396, p. 4. See Trial Judgement, para. 2241 (stating that on 26 May 1995, UNMO personnel put under house arrest were told “[…] that it was for their own safety, as NATO air strikes had hit a school and a hospital.”), referring to Exhibit P3581, p. 2. See Trial Judgement, para. 2256 (stating that on 27 May 1995, the Serb military police declared the detainees prisoners of war), referring to Exhibit P399, p. 3. See Trial Judgement, para. 2268 (stating that on 26 May 1995, Indić informed UNPROFOR personnel that they were VRS prisoners of war), referring to Exhibits P3586, paras. 28, 30, 31, P5234, p. 2. The Appeals Chamber observes that the remaining paragraphs of the Trial Judgement to which Mladić refers do not contain any order or evidence relevant to the alleged humane treatment of the detainees as prisoners of war. See Trial Judgement, paras. 2228, 2235, 2262, 2279. To the contrary, some of these paragraphs reveal that the UN Personnel were mistreated. See, e.g., Trial Judgement paras. 2262 (“Several of the UNPROFOR soldiers were kicked and punched by Serb soldiers to speed up their surrender.”), 2279 (“A man […] struck the head of [a French soldier] on the temple with his dagger, and kicked the other French soldier who was in the room in the face.”). The Appeals Chamber will therefore not examine further Mladić’s allegation of error pertaining to these paragraphs of the Trial Judgement.
1758 See Trial Judgement, para. 2227 (“[…] [a VRS soldier] ordered the witness to contact UNMO headquarters and tell them that the team would be shot one by one unless the NATO air strikes stopped. […] [D]runken VRS soldiers beat and abused the Norwegian and the Pakistani UNMOS by hitting them with the butt of their rifles.”), referring to Exhibit P400, paras. 3, 4. See Trial Judgement, para. 2236 (“Gelissen testified that [UNMO personnel] Golubev was also handcuffed to a flagpole in front of the barracks. […] [O]nce a VRS soldier was making gestures of shooting the [NATO] plane and cutting throats towards the UNMOS while others were shouting.”), referring to Exhibit P397, pp. 2–4. See Trial Judgement, para. 2236 (“After 4 p.m., two UNMOS, Alves and Gelissen, were brought to join [Romero and Evans] and were handcuffed to another flagpole for approximately four hours.”), referring to Exhibit P396, p. 3. See Trial Judgement, paras. 2241 (“A young Bosnian-Serb soldier told the witness’s group that they were VRS hostages and that they would be taken to the Jahorina radar station and used as ‘human shields’.”), referring to, inter alia, Exhibit P3581, p. 2. See also Trial Judgement, para. 2256 (“The conditions at the compound in Banja Luka were bad: the detainees barely received any food, the mattresses were unusable, and there was no soap, bed linen, or hot water. One of the military police commanders in Banja Luka explained that the purpose of splitting them into groups was to stop NATO air strikes by using them as ‘human shields’ at particularly important facilities which were possible targets of NATO attacks.”), referring to Exhibit P399, p. 3. See also Trial Judgement, paras. 2264 (“The soldiers transported to Doboj were then held at various positions and ‘very likely’ used as ‘human shields’ against eventual air attacks.”), 2266 (“The second group composed of UNMO and UNPROFOR personnel was […] split up and detained at different military positions.”), 2270 (“Serb soldiers threatened and beat the [French Battalion] Commander during his detention.”). 2274 (“A French platoon leader was then compelled at gunpoint to assemble his soldiers and forced to kneel and used as a ‘human shield’.”), 2305 (“They further heard that they had all been held at military sites, including hospitals, command posts, artillery firing positions, and ammunition depots.”), referring to, inter alia, Exhibit P5234, p. 1; Exhibit P3586, paras. 35, 36 (“the captain said that we were not prisoners of war but hostages.”).
Similarly, to the extent that Mladić is alleging that the Trial Chamber erred in assessing the evidence concerning his continuing diplomatic efforts to negotiate the release of VRS prisoners after the release of some of the detained UN Personnel, Mladić does not demonstrate how such evidence could undermine the conclusion that he shared the intent to achieve the common objective of the Hostage-Taking JCE.

Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 5, referring to Exhibit D1224, paras. 5–16, T. 8 September 2015 pp. 38790–38801. Witness Vojvodić testified that the detainees were not abused, were fed, and were allowed to contact relatives, to go out, as well as be visited by a medical team and the ICRC. He also claimed that one detainee was released for medical reasons. See Exhibit D1224, paras. 9, 10, 12; T. 8 September 2015 pp. 38799–38801.

See, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 2236 (“[O]ne VRS soldier was making gestures of shooting the plane and cutting throats towards the UNMOs while others were shouting. One commander, […] Captain Vojvodić, sent back these soldiers.”), 2247 (“[T]he detainees were held in a room for 24 hours a day, under constant guard. They had no radio and food was brought to them. Vojvodić visited them daily and Evans and his team would request medical attention due to the unsatisfactory hygiene conditions. Their demands were not met until later. The UNMOs requested to know their status and Vojvodić answered that they were detained as [prisoners of war]. The UNMOs then requested to have the same rights as FPRsinos of war. Vojvodić responded that he would contact Major Batinić but the UNMOs never heard anything from him.”), 2309 (“Later on, Captain Vojvodić drove the detainees to their respective accommodations and offices so that they could retrieve some of their belongings and call their relatives. […] [A]t the Koran Military Barracks, the detained UNMOs were provided food and water, but not permitted to meet with a doctor until 5 June 1995; on 8 June 1995 the UNMOs were finally visited by delegates of the ICRC, following which they received clothing and toiletries, and on 10 June they could call home. […] [T]hey were also allowed to write messages, which were checked by Vojvodić’s superiors, to their next of kin.”).

Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 755, referring to Exhibit D1224, paras. 2297 (“In a meeting held on 4 June 1995, General Janvier informed Mladić that all UN personnel held as hostages by the VRS should be liberated immediately […] [i]n response, Mladić stated that the liberation of the FPRsinos of war was directly linked to a guarantee that air strikes will not take place again in the future. Mladić requested the immediate ratification of an agreement with UNPROFOR stating that (i) the VRS would no longer threaten the life and security of UNPROFOR members; (ii) UNPROFOR would not engage any of its forces or air strikes against Serb objectives or territory; and (iii) upon signing of the agreement, all FPRsinos of war would be liberated.”), referring to Exhibit P2196 (concerning a meeting between Mladić and Commander Janvier on 4 June 1995). See also Trial Judgement, paras. 2297, referring to Exhibit P2198 (concerning a meeting between Mladić and Commander Janvier on 17 June 1995), 5160, 5163.

Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 755, referring to Exhibits P2196, P2198, Article 118 of Geneva Convention III. Mladić adds that Witness Vojvodić’s testimony was corroborated by a report from the ICRC which confirms adequate accommodation, meals, and medical attention. See Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 755, referring to Exhibits D1224, para. 12, D1226, D1227.

Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 756, referring to, inter alia, Exhibits P2480, P2481. Mladić adds that, after liberating 231 of the captured UN Personnel, he continued his diplomatic efforts with UNPROFOR to negotiate the release of four VRS prisoners. See Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 754.


1826 See Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 917–920.

1827 See Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 921–931. See also Mladić Reply Brief, paras. 130, 131.

1828 See Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 932–958. See also Mladić Reply Brief, paras. 132, 133, 135.

1829 Trial Judgement, para. 5193.

1830 Trial Judgement, para. 5193.

1831 Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 917, 919; Mladić Reply Brief, para. 129. Mladić recalls his arguments set forth in paragraphs 771 to 780 (Ground 7) of his appellant’s brief. See Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 919.

1832 Mladić Appeal Brief, para. 920.

1833 Prosecution Response Brief, para. 376; T. 26 August 2020 pp. 40–42. The Prosecution contends that the crimes committed in this case are some of the gravest and the crime base is one of the largest attributed to an accused at the ICTY, comparable with the Karadžić case where the Appeals Chamber of the Mechanism found that a 40-year sentence was so unreasonable and plainly unjust that it constituted an abuse of the Trial Chamber’s discretion and increased Karadžić’s sentence to life imprisonment. See T. 26 August 2020 pp. 41, 42, referring to Karadžić Appeal Judgement, paras. 773, 776. The Prosecution adds that other cases involving Mladić’s subordinates, such as Popović, Beara, Tolimir, and Galić, whose conduct was attributable to Mladić and which dealt with only parts of the crime base for which Mladić is responsible, have also resulted in life sentences. See T. 26 August 2020 p. 42.

1834 Prosecution Response Brief, para. 378.

1835 Mladić Reply Brief, para. 128. See also T. 26 August 2020 p. 68.

1836 See Martić Appeal Judgement, para. 350; Ćelebići Appeal Judgement, para. 430.


1839 Trial Judgement, para. 5166.

1840 Trial Judgement, para. 5166.

1841 Where liability under both Articles 7(1) and 7(3) of the ICTY Statute is alleged, and where the legal requirements for both are met, a trial chamber should enter a conviction on the basis of Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute alone and consider the superior position in sentencing. See, mutatis mutandis, Articles 6(1) and 6(3) of the ICTR Statute. See also Nyiramasuhuko et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 3359; Đorđević Appeal Judgement, para. 939; Setako Appeal Judgement, para. 266; Korić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, para. 34. The Trial Chamber correctly recalled this principle. See Trial Judgement, para. 5166.

1842 Trial Judgement, para. 5193.

1843 Trial Judgement, para. 5193.

1844 See Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 917, 919.

1845 See Trial Judgement, para. 5193.

1846 Trial Judgement, paras. 5188–5192. See also, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 4612, 4688, 4893, 4921, 5098, 5131, 5156, 5163.

1847 See, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 4612, 4893, 5097, 5098, 5146, 5156.

1848 See Mladić Notice of Appeal, p. 30.

1849 Trial Judgement, paras. 5195–5204.

1850 Trial Judgement, para. 5198.

1851 Trial Judgement, paras. 5200, 5201.

1852 Trial Judgement, para. 5203.

1853 Trial Judgement, para. 5204.

1854 See Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 921, 923–925, 927, 929. See also Mladić Reply Brief, paras. 130, 131.

1855 Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 923, 925.

1856 Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 924, 925.

1857 Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 927, 929.

1858 Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 926, 930, 931.

1859 Prosecution Response Brief, para. 379.

1860 See Prosecution Response Brief, paras. 379–385.

1861 Prosecution Response Brief, paras. 380–383.

1862 Prosecution Response Brief, paras. 384, 385.

1863 Prosecution Response Brief, para. 386.

1864 Mladić Reply Brief, para. 131. See also Mladić Reply Brief, para. 128.


1867 See, e.g., Stanišić and Čuljanin Appeal Judgement, para. 170; Đorđević Appeal Judgement, paras. 974, 980; Babić Sentencing Appeal Judgement, para. 43; Blažič Appeal Judgement, para. 696. The ICTY Appeals Chamber has noted the limited weight given to advanced age as a mitigating factor in the jurisprudence of the ICTY. See Stanišić and...

Trial Judgement, para. 5204.

Trial Judgement, paras. 5202, 5203. The Appeals Chamber observes that the Trial Chamber cited and considered regular medical reports submitted by the Deputy Registrar. See Trial Judgement, para. 5203, n. 17806.

See Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 924, 925.


See Mladić Final Trial Brief, paras. 3403–3406.

Trial Judgement, paras. 5200, 5201.

See Rule 86(C) of the ICTY Rules; Tolimir Appeal Judgement, para. 644; Đorđević Appeal Judgement, para. 945. See, mutatis mutandis, Rule 86(C) of the ICTR Rules; Nzarobima Appeal Judgement, para. 459; Kanyaruciga Appeal Judgement, para. 274; Bikindi Appeal Judgement, para. 165.


See, e.g., Prlić et al. Appeal Judgement, paras. 3301, 3302; Krajišnik Appeal Judgement, para. 817; Babić Sentencing Appeal Judgement, para. 43; Blaškic Appeal Judgement, para. 696; Celebići Appeal Judgement, para. 776.


Trial Judgement, para. 5196, nn. 17793, 17794, referring to Mladić Final Trial Brief, paras. 3393–3397.

Trial Judgement, para. 5197, n. 17795, referring to Exhibit P3032, p. 1.

Trial Judgement, para. 5197, n. 17796, referring to Exhibit P4264, paras. 1, 2.

Trial Judgement, para. 5198.

Trial Judgement, para. 5198.
1905 See Čelebići Appeal Judgement, n. 1382, referring to, *inter alia*, Article 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, General Assembly Resolution 2200 A (XXI), UN Doc. A/RES/21/2200, 16 December 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (“ICCPR”). Article 15(1) of the ICCPR stipulates, *inter alia*, that a heavier penalty shall not be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time when the criminal offence was committed. See also Krajišnik Appeal Judgement, para. 750; Stađišća Appeal Judgement, para. 398.

1906 See Deronjić Sentencing Appeal Judgement, para. 96; D. Nikolić Sentencing Appeal Judgement, para. 81. Article 15(1) of the ICCPR states, in part, that if, subsequent to the commission of the offence, a provision is made by law for the imposition of a lighter penalty, the offender shall benefit thereby.


1908 See Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 951, 953, 955; Mladić Reply Brief, para. 133.


1910 See Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 932, 938, 945, 946, 952, 954; Mladić Reply Brief, para. 133.

1911 See Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 951, 953, 956.

1912 See Article 15 of the ICTY Statute; Prosecutor v. Vidoje Blagojević et al., Case Nos. IT–02–60–AR73, IT–02–60–AR73.2 & IT–02–60–AR73.3, Decision, 8 April 2003, para. 15.

1913 See also D. Nikolić Sentencing Appeal Judgement, para. 82.

1914 Čelebići Appeal Judgement, para. 817, n. 1401 (where the ICTY Appeals Chamber noted that judgements rendered at Nuremberg, Tokyo, and other successor tribunals provide clear authority for custodial sentences up to and including life imprisonment, and that individuals convicted before the Nuremberg Tribunal were given life sentences). See also Čelebići Appeal Judgement, n. 1382, referring to, *inter alia*, Article 15(2) of the ICCPR (stating that “[n]othing in [Article 15] shall prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to the general principles of law recognised by the community of nations”).

1915 See Mladić Appeal Brief, paras. 947–949.

1916 See Čelebići Appeal Judgement, para. 817.


1918 See Karadžić Appeal Judgement, paras. 776, 777.

1919 See D. Nikolić Sentencing Appeal Judgement, para. 82.

1920 See, e.g., Karadžić Appeal Judgement, para. 434; Stanisilić and Župljanin Appeal Judgement, para. 598; Popović et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 1674; Đorđević Appeal Judgement, para. 83.


1922 Trial Judgement, paras. 5180, 5205–5209.

1923 Trial Judgement, paras. 5206, 5208. The Trial Chamber further noted that, following amendments in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the maximum sentence that may currently be imposed in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Republika Srpska is 45 years’ imprisonment for the gravest forms of serious criminal offences perpetrated with intent. See Trial Judgement, para. 5208.

1924 See Trial Judgement, para. 5205.

1925 Indictment, paras. 35–39.

1926 Trial Judgement, paras. 3446, 3451. In particular, the Trial Chamber determined that a large number of Bosnian Muslims in Foča, Ključ, Kotor Varoš, Prijedor, Sanski Most, and Vlasenica, as well as Bosnian Croats in Prijedor and Sanski Most, were murdered, and that Bosnian Muslims in Foča, Prijedor, and Vlasenica, as well as Bosnian Croats in Prijedor, were subjected to serious bodily or mental harm which contributed to the destruction of their groups. See also Trial Judgement, paras. 3458, 3464, 3469, 3473, 3479, 3496, 3502, 3503. The Trial Chamber also determined that Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats are protected groups within the meaning of Article 4 of the ICTY Statute. See Trial Judgement, para. 3442.

1927 Trial Judgement, paras. 3504, 3511, 3513, 3515, 3519, 3524, 4236. The Trial Chamber considered that, for Bosnian Muslims in Ključ, and for Bosnian Croats in Prijedor and Sanski Most, the evidence did not allow an inference that the physical perpetrators of murders and/or serious bodily or mental harm shared the intent to destroy, in part, their respective groups. See Trial Judgement, para. 3504.

1928 Trial Judgement, para. 3535 (emphasis added). See also Trial Judgement, para. 3536.

1929 Trial Judgement, paras. 4236, 4237.

1930 Trial Judgement, para. 5214.

1931 See Prosecution Notice of Appeal, para. 3; Prosecution Appeal Brief, paras. 2, 5–16; Prosecution Reply Brief, para. 1; T. 26 August 2020 pp. 74, 82–85, 99–101.

1932 See Prosecution Notice of Appeal, paras. 5–8; Prosecution Appeal Brief, paras. 1, 3, 19–41; Prosecution Reply Brief, paras. 1, 19; T. 26 August 2020 pp. 74–82, 101–103.

1933 Prosecution Notice of Appeal, paras. 4, 9; Prosecution Appeal Brief, paras. 1, 4, 17, 18, 42–50. See also T. 26 August 2020 pp. 74, 85, 102, 103.

1934 See Mladić Response Brief, paras. 9–343; T. 26 August 2020 pp. 86–97.

1935 Trial Judgement, para. 3535 (emphasis added). See also Trial Judgement, para. 3536.

1936 Trial Judgement, para. 3535. See also Trial Judgement, paras. 3530–3534.

1937 Trial Judgement, paras. 3530–3534.

1938 Trial Judgement, paras. 3530–3535.

1939 See Prosecution Notice of Appeal, para. 3; Prosecution Appeal Brief, paras. 2, 5–16; T. 26 August 2020 pp. 74, 82–85.

1940 Prosecution Appeal Brief, paras. 7, 9, 11–15.

1941 Prosecution Appeal Brief, paras. 2, 6–10; T. 26 August 2020 pp. 84, 85, 99, 100, 102. The Prosecution contends that the evaluation of substantiality is only about intention rather than about how many people were harmed by the genocidal acts in each place. It states that the smallest numeric size of
the targeted group in Kotor Varoš consisted of 11,000 group members and the largest, in Prijedor, consisted of 50,000 group members. Furthermore, it adds that Mladić’s subordinates and other “tools of the joint criminal enterprise” targeted over 128,000 men, women, and children on the basis of their ethnic characteristics and group identity across all five municipalities. This included Colonel Basara, one of Mladić’s VRS subordinates, who targeted close to 80,000 group members across two municipalities. See T. 26 August 2020 pp. 84, 85, 99, 100.

1946 Mladić Response Brief, paras. 15–86; T. 26 August 2020 pp. 86–90.


1948 Mladić Response Brief, paras. 61–72, 82–85; T. 26 August 2020 pp. 88–90.

1949 Mladić Response Brief, paras. 49, 55–58. In this respect, Mladić submits that, unlike in respect of the Count 1 Municipalities, the Trial Chamber found that the physical perpetrators possessed exclusive and total geographical control and authority to carry out activities in Srebrenica. See Mladić Response Brief, para. 57.

1950 Mladić Response Brief, paras. 60, 73–81. In this respect, Mladić submits that, unlike in respect of the Count 1 Municipalities, the Trial Chamber found that Srebrenica: (i) was one of the few remaining predominantly Bosnian Muslim populated territories in the area claimed as Republika Srpska; (ii) had become a refuge for Bosnian Muslims from across Bosnia and Herzegovina; (iii) was a designated UN safe area; (iv) suffered other simultaneous crimes in the area; and (v) had symbolic impact given the extent of Bosnian Serb control over the area. See Mladić Response Brief, para. 75.

1951 Prosecution Reply Brief, paras. 1, 3–12.

1952 Prosecution Reply Brief, paras. 13–18.

1953 See Krstić Appeal Judgement, para. 8. See also 18 U.S.C. § 1093(b) (2006) (“the term ‘substantial part’ means a part of a group of such numerical significance that the destruction or loss of that part would cause the destruction or loss of that part would cause the destruction of the group as a viable entity within the nation of which such group is a part”).

1954 See Krstić Appeal Judgement, paras. 12–14. See also Karadžić Appeal Judgement, para. 727 and references cited therein; Revised and Updated Report on the Question of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide Prepared by Mr. B. Whitaker U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/6, 2 July 1985, para. 29 (“In part” would seem to imply a reasonably significant number, relative to the total of the group as a whole, or else a significant section of a group, such as its leadership.”).

1955 See Krstić Appeal Judgement, para. 14. The ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Popović et al. case noted that “it is the objective, contextual characteristics of the targeted part of the group, […] that form the basis for determining whether the targeted part of the group is substantial”. Popović et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 422.

1956 Trial Judgement, para. 3529. The overall size of the Bosnian Muslim group in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1991 was therefore approximately 1.9 million people, noting that 43.7 per cent of 4.4 million is 1,922,800.

1957 Trial Judgement, paras. 3530–3534.


1959 See Trial Judgement, paras. 3530–3534. The Prosecution points out that the Trial Chamber incorrectly found that the Bosnian Muslims of Prijedor comprised 2.2 per cent, rather than approximately 2.6 per cent, of the overall Bosnian Muslim group. See Prosecution Appeal Brief, n. 14, referring to Trial Judgement, paras. 38, 3534. The Appeals Chamber does not consider that the Trial Chamber’s mathematical error in this respect impacted its decision.

1960 See Trial Judgement, para. 3535.


1962 See Trial Judgement, paras. 3530–3534. See also Trial Judgement, para. 3535.

1963 Trial Judgement, para. 3526.

1964 See Krstić Appeal Judgement, para. 13. In this respect, the Appeals Chamber notes that a relevant factor in the determination of the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Krstić case that the Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica formed a substantial part of the Bosnian Muslim group was that the authority of the Bosnian Serb forces charged with the take-over of Srebrenica did not extend beyond the Central Podrinje region, and that the Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica were the only part of the Bosnian Muslim group within the perpetrators’ area of control. See Krstić Appeal Judgement, para. 17.

1965 Trial Judgement, para. 3535.

1966 Trial Judgement, para. 3535.

1967 See Trial Judgement, paras. 3530–3534. In particular, the Trial Chamber noted, inter alia, that: (i) Karadžić and Krajšišnik stressed the strategic significance of Sanski Most and the need to retain it (see Trial Judgement, para. 3530); (ii) Mladić was informed that “Foča ‘was supposed to be the Second Islamic Centre for Muslims in Europe’ but was now 99 per cent Serb”, and Karadžić explained that “Foča ‘is extremely important to’ the Muslims, ‘but it will never be theirs again’” (see Trial Judgement, para. 3531); (iii) Mladić was warned that “Foča ‘is extremely important to’ the Muslims, ‘but it will never be theirs again’” (see Trial Judgement, para. 3531); (iv) Mladić noted that “whoever controls Vlasenica, controls eastern Bosnia” (see Trial Judgement, para. 3533); and (v) Prijedor was “significant
to the Bosnian Serbs because of its location as part of the land corridor that linked the Serb-dominated area in the Croatian Krajina in the west with Serbia and Montenegro in the east and south. For example, Sandžak, a symbol throughout the region of Yugoslavia of ‘brotherhood and unity’, to the extent that Bosnian Muslims thought it was ‘the last town where ethnic conflict was possible’ (see Trial Judgement, para. 3534).

1968 See, e.g., Popović et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 422 (affirming that the strategic importance of Srebrenica is a relevant factor in determining whether the substantiality requirement is met); Krstić Appeal Judgement, paras. 15 (“Srebrenica (and the surrounding Central Podrinje region) were of immense strategic importance to the Bosnian Serb leadership. Without Srebrenica, the ethnically Serb state of Republika Srpska they sought to create would remain divided into two disconnected parts, and its access to Serbia proper would be disrupted.”), 16 (“In addition, Srebrenica was important due to its prominence in the eyes of both the Bosnian Muslims and the international community. […] In its resolution declaring Srebrenica a safe area, the Security Council announced that it ‘should be free from armed attack or any other hostile act.’”). See also, inter alia, Karadžić Appeal Judgement, para. 5672; Popović et al. Trial Judgement, para. 865.

1969 See Trial Judgement, para. 3554 (“[T]he Trial Chamber finds that the enclave of Srebrenica was of significant strategic importance to the Bosnian-Serb leadership during the conflict because the majority Bosnian-Muslim population of this region made it difficult for them to claim the land as inherently Serb. The Bosnian-Serb leadership, in particular, accorded Srebrenica importance as it was in close geographical proximity to Serbia and, therefore, was required for maintaining a Serb-populated border area contiguous with Serbia. During the war, Srebrenica also became a refuge to Bosnian Muslims from the region especially when it was designated a UN safe area. The Trial Chamber is, therefore, satisfied that the Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica constituted a substantial part of the Bosnian Muslim population of Bosnia-Herzegovina.”).


1971 Prosecution Appeal Brief, para. 16. See also Prosecution Appeal Brief, paras. 5, 6, 8, 46; Prosecution Reply Brief, paras. 4, 39.

1972 See Krstić Appeal Judgement, para. 8 (“the substantiality requirement both captures genocide’s defining character as a crime of massive proportions and reflects the Convention’s concern with the impact the destruction of the targeted part will have on the overall survival of the group”). See also Tolić Appeal Judgement, para. 261 and references cited therein.

1973 Krstić Appeal Judgement, para. 15.

1974 Krstić Appeal Judgement, para. 15.

1975 Krstić Appeal Judgement, para. 15.

1976 Krstić Appeal Judgement, para. 16.

1977 Trial Judgement, para. 3554.

1978 Trial Judgement, paras. 3553, 3554.

1979 Trial Judgement, para. 3553.

1980 See, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 3464, 3473, 3479, 3496, 3502, 3510, 3513–3523, 3525.

1981 Trial Judgement, para. 2450.

1982 Trial Judgement, para. 2453.

1983 See, e.g., Trial Judgement, paras. 2445–2454.
2001 Prosecution Appeal Brief, para. 45.

2002 Prosecution Appeal Brief, para. 46. See also Prosecution Appeal Brief, paras. 5, 6, 8, 16; Prosecution Reply Brief, paras. 4, 39.

2003 See supra para. 580, referring to, inter alia, Krstić Appeal Judgement, para. 8 (“the substantiality requirement both captures genocide’s defining character as a crime of massive proportions and reflects the Convention’s concern with the impact the destruction of the targeted part will have on the overall survival of the group”).

2004 The Count 1 Communities collectively comprised 128,443 Bosnian Muslims, whereas the overall size of the Bosnian Muslim group in 1991 was approximately 1.9 million people, noting that 43.7 per cent of 4.4 million is 1,922,800. See Trial Judgement, paras. 3529–3534. See also supra para. 577; Prosecution Appeal Brief, n. 122.

2005 See Trial Judgement, para. 3535. See also supra para. 577.

2006 See supra Section IV.A.

2007 See supra Section II.