Trafficking to the Rescue?

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Since before the dawn of the #MeToo Movement, civil litigators have been confronted with imperfect legal responses to gender-based harms. Some have sought to envision innovative legal strategies. One new, increasingly successful tactic has been the deployment of federal anti-trafficking law in certain cases of domestic violence and sexual assault. In 2017, for example, victims of sexual assault filed federal civil suits under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act ("TVPRA") against Hollywood producer Harvey Weinstein. Plaintiffs argued that the alleged sexual assault conduct amounted to "commercial sex acts" and sex trafficking. Other plaintiffs' attorneys have similarly invoked federal trafficking law against a range of defendants, such as Olympic Tae kwondo coach Jean Lopez, well-known photographer Bruce Weber, and fundamentalist leader Warren Jeffs.
These efforts have largely succeeded, as federal district courts have signaled broader judicial acceptance of such federal trafficking claims. This Article traces federal human trafficking law from its origins to these recent innovative cases. It demonstrates how civil litigators are turning to human trafficking statutes to overcome decades-old systemic problems with legal responses to gender-based violence. The Article then explores how the TVPRA offers unique, pragmatic advantages for a broad range of plaintiffs. Yet, it argues that this trend also involves risks, as the expanding deployment of trafficking statutes in civil cases may lead by example to constitutional challenges, disproportionate criminal penalties in certain cases, and confusion about the meaning of trafficking as a legal concept. This Article examines what these efforts may signal about the future of human trafficking law as well as the broader field of gender-based violence.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ................................................................. 3
I. TRAFFICKING AS A REMEDY FOR GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE...... 12
   A. Human Trafficking as a Form of Gender-Based Violence .... 12
      1. Early Efforts to Craft a Definition .......................... 13
      2. Domestic Definitions of Trafficking ...................... 17
   B. Federal Definition(s) of Sex Trafficking ..................... 19
   C. Federal Definition(s) of Labor Trafficking .................. 22
   D. Incentives to Reframe Crimes as Trafficking .............. 24
II. THE IMPULSE TO “RESCUE” .............................................. 28
   A. Criminal Legal Reform of Responses to Gender-Based
      Violence .............................................................. 29
   B. Deficiencies in Criminal and Civil Mechanisms .......... 33
   C. Generative Trend .................................................... 38
      1. Defamation Claims ............................................. 42
      2. RICO Claims .................................................... 45
      3. Anti-Trafficking Claims ....................................... 47
III. COURTS SEEK TO RESOLVE TENSIONS ........................... 48
   A. United States v. Marcus ............................................. 49
   B. United States v. Kaufman ......................................... 51
   C. Civil Litigators Test the Boundaries .......................... 52
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE GENERATIVE TREND ......................... 59
   A. New Remedies for Victims ........................................ 59
      1. A New Federal Civil Remedy .................................. 59
      2. New Federal Criminal Responses .......................... 60
      3. New Energy Aimed at Gender-Based Harms .............. 62
   B. Risks of the “New World” ...................................... 62
      1. Constitutional Questions ..................................... 63
INTRODUCTION

Harvey Weinstein’s conduct was an important catalyst for the #MeToo Movement and the emergence of innovative responses, like #TimesUp.1 But, few expected Weinstein’s conduct to redefine the contours of human trafficking law. Yet, in 2017, victims2 of sexual

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2 This Article uses the term “victim” rather than “survivor” because the term “victim” has legal significance. Qualifying as a “victim” under state or federal anti-trafficking law can confer important protections, including immigration status, public benefits, civil damages, and criminal restitution. See Amanda Peters, Reconsidering Federal and State Obstacles to Human Trafficking Victim Status and Entitlements, 2016 UTAH L. REV. 535, 539 (“In the human trafficking context, victims receive much more than mere attention by wearing the label [of victim]; they earn legal rights, services, benefits, and freedom from criminal charges.”); see also infra Part I.D. Some scholars have critiqued the term “victim” as too simplistically defining individuals based on their experiences of victimization. See, e.g., Martha Minow, Surviving Victim Talk, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1411, 1432 (1993) (“Victimhood is a cramped identity, depending upon and reinforcing the faulty idea that a person can be reduced to a trait. The victim is helpless, decimated, pathetic, weak, and ignorant. Departing from this script may mean losing whatever entitlements and compassion victim status may afford.”); Jayashri Srikantiah, Perfect Victims and Real Survivors: The Iconic Victim in Domestic Human Trafficking Law, 87 B.U. L REV. 157, 160 (2007) (discussing the “iconic” trafficking victim as “meek, passive objects of sexual exploitation . . . exercising no free will during their illegal entry” and suggesting that this problematic rhetoric leads to poor outcomes for
assault sued Weinstein under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (“TVPRA”). In federal court pleadings, the plaintiffs asserted a novel argument: that Weinstein’s alleged conduct amounted to “sex trafficking” because his promises of job advancement in exchange for sex were “commercial sex act[s].” As a result, plaintiffs argued, Weinstein and his corporate backers should be found civilly liable for human trafficking.

Some heralded these developments as the kickstart to a new kind of justice for victims of gender-based violence. Catharine MacKinnon, immigrant victims). Throughout the Article, the term “victim of trafficking,” unless otherwise specified, refers to a victim of federal human trafficking conduct, as defined as sex trafficking under 18 U.S.C. § 1591, forced labor under 18 U.S.C. § 1589, and involuntary servitude under 18 U.S.C. § 1584. This Article also refers to “federal trafficking crimes” or “federal trafficking violations” to encompass all three statutes, unless otherwise specified. For a greater discussion of federal trafficking crimes, see infra Parts I.B and I.C.


5 See id. at Introduction.

6 See, e.g., Corinne Ramey, Judge Greenlights Use of Sex-Trafficking Law in Suit Against Harvey Weinstein, WALL. ST. J. (Aug. 14, 2018, 5:56 PM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/judge-greenlights-use-of-sex-trafficking-law-in-suit-against-harvey-weinstein-1534283784 [https://perma.cc/J9M8-GWZK] (quoting Rebecca Ricigliano, a defense attorney at Crowell & Moring LLP, who noted, “I think this particular action brings light to a relatively underutilized statute that victims may employ more in the future”). In this Article, “gender-based violence” is defined as acts of violence or abuse motivated by gender directed against cisgender women, lesbian,
who famously pioneered legal approaches to sexual harassment, stated simply that, “This is a whole new world,”7 pointing to the potential of the TVPRA to provide new legal remedies to victims of gender-based harms. Weinstein’s attorneys, however, vehemently disagreed.8 They argued that his conduct was “light years away” from sex trafficking and interpreting it as such is an “utter perversion of the legislative intent behind the statute.”9 They further contended that the plaintiffs threatened to “conflate everything” and to redefine a wide swath of gender-based violence — from sexual assault to domestic abuse — as trafficking.10 This, they asserted, would have dramatic implications.11

The U.S. Congress passed the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (“TVPA”) of 2000 with a specific focus on the transnational crime of human trafficking.12 In particular, Congress aimed to address the growing “international sex trade” that impacted “predominantly gay, bisexual, trans, queer, and gender non-conforming (“LGBTQ+”) individuals. This Article uses the terms “gender-based violence,” “gender-based harms,” “interpersonal violence,” and “intimate partner violence” interchangeably.


9 Id.; Harvey Weinstein Lawyers Argue Against Sex Trafficking Claim, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2019, 12:10 PM), https://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-harvey-weinstein-lawsuit-20190129-story.html [https://perma.cc/EJW5-MEWS]; see also Defendant’s Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss at II, Noble, 335 F. Supp. 3d 504 (No. 17-cv-09260), 2018 WL 7377109 (arguing that the federal trafficking statute was meant to “prevent slavery, involuntary servitude, and human trafficking for commercial gain,” not “a single, gender-based sexual incident that was not connected to a sex trafficking scheme”).


11 See Adam Klasfeld, Weinstein Painted as Tuxedo-Clad Pimp for Sex-Trafficking Case, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (May 2, 2018), https://www.courthousenews.com/weinstein-Cpainted-as-tuxedo-clad-pimp-for-sex-trafficking-case/ [https://perma.cc/79CP-A24Y] (quoting Phyllis Kupferstein, Harvey Weinstein’s attorney, asserting: “[i]t cannot be the case that every time a woman has sex with a more powerful man in an effort to advance her career, and it doesn’t go the way that she likes, that she somehow becomes a sex-trafficking victim”).

12 TVPA, supra note 3, § 102(a); see also infra Part I.B, for a discussion of the federal definition of sex trafficking.
women and girls” in the context of “prostitution, pornography, sex tourism, and other commercial sexual services.” The TVPA also provided new tools to combat forced labor. Congress focused on labor exploitation, involving “false promises of decent working conditions at relatively good pay as nannies, maids, dancers, factory workers, restaurant workers, sales clerks, or models.” Despite this twofold concern with labor and sex trafficking, Congress used textually broad language, such as “commercial sex act” and “labor” or “services,” leaving it to federal courts to decide the precise scope of trafficking.

The Weinstein case was the first of its kind and unique in many respects. Yet, it is illustrative of an emerging trend that has marked both civil and criminal cases. Civil litigators, in particular, have turned to trafficking statutes to improve outcomes for victims of gender-based violence. Federal courts have signaled receptivity to these new arguments and endorsed broad judicial interpretations of federal trafficking violations, including forced labor, involuntary servitude, and sex trafficking. This trend, while still nascent, has deep implications

13 TVPA, supra note 3, § 102(b)(2).
14 See infra Part I.C.
15 TVPA, supra note 3, § 102(b)(4).
16 See id. § 102(b).
19 For a detailed discussion of incentives for civil litigators to frame conduct as trafficking, see infra Part I.D. This Article uses the term “civil litigation” to refer to civil claims, including tort, contract, and other claims brought in federal district court or state courts. Civil tort claims based on domestic violence and sexual assault often proceed as claims prohibiting intentional and negligent harm as well as negligent torts. See, e.g., Ellen M. Bublick, Tort Suits Filed by Rape and Sexual Assault Victims in Civil Courts: Lessons for Courts, Classrooms and Constituencies, 59 SMU L. REV. 55, 71-72 (2006). Contract claims also may be possible in some cases. Id. at 72. Victims of gender-based violence may qualify for other civil benefits, including housing, employment, education, immigration, public benefits, and family law benefits, but these are not the focus of this Article.
20 For example, in 2019, one federal court judge took note of the increasing TVPA claims “since the rise of the #MeToo movement,” especially those involving the “casting couch.” See Ardolf v. Weber, 332 F.R.D. 467, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (finding that “victims of ‘casting couch’ sexual abuse and assault increasingly rely on the TVPA to prosecute
for the evolving meaning of trafficking as well as for the broader field of gender-based violence.21

This Article considers the factors motivating this shift in both public discourse and in legal theory.22 It demonstrates how recent federal civil litigation efforts have been successful in inspiring broad judicial interpretation of trafficking violations. Through interviews with civil litigators, it provides a rich, layered account of how plaintiffs’ attorneys view the potential gains of new civil suits under the TVPRA.23

21 Although this Article focuses on litigation efforts to deploy the TVPRA in the context of gender-based violence, legislators have also redefined gender-based crimes as trafficking to mobilize greater public condemnation and specialized prosecutorial responses. For example, in 2015, Congress redefined the purchase of sex from a child as sex trafficking under 18 U.S.C. § 1591, despite the fact that many states already criminalized the conduct as statutory rape, child sexual abuse, and related crimes. See Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act, Pub. L. No. 114-22, § 109, 129 Stat. 227 (2015).

22 This Article builds upon the work of scholars who have explored how trafficking law has been applied expansively to new actors and conduct. See, e.g., Janie A. Chuang, Exploitation Creep and the Unmaking of Human Trafficking Law, 108 AM. J. INT’L’L. 609, 610-13 (2014) [hereinafter Exploitation Creep] (describing the broader use of trafficking discourse in policy, rhetoric, and law to address more varied harms, such as forced labor); Dahlstrom, supra note 18, at 386-88 (examining the application of federal anti-trafficking law expansively to new actors and conduct, including certain domestic violence and sexual assault conduct). Many scholars have explored the benefits, more generally, of a federal civil remedy for victims of trafficking. See, e.g., Briana Beltran, The Hidden “Benefits” of the Trafficking Victim Protection Act’s Expanded Provisions for Temporary Foreign Workers, 41 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 2 (forthcoming 2020) (exploring the ability of temporary workers to bring TVPRA civil suits against employers, recruiters, and other third parties); Gallant Fish, No Rest for the Wicked: Civil Liability Against Hotels in Cases of Sex Trafficking, 23 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 119, 122 (2017) (examining TVPRA claims against hotels that knowingly benefit from sex trafficking); Kathleen Kim & Kusia Hreshchyshyn, Human Trafficking Private Right of Action: Civil Rights for Trafficked Persons in the United States, 16 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L. J. 1, 1 (2004) (examining how civil trafficking suits can be a “powerful tool in the United States for addressing the growing problem of modern-day slavery, both at national and at global levels”).

23 The author interviewed fifteen plaintiffs’ attorneys, who represent victims of sexual assault and intimate partner violence in civil matters and, either personally or within their firms, have litigated civil trafficking claims. The author also interviewed two criminal attorneys involved in United States v. Marcus, 487 F. Supp. 2d 289 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). Marcus was one of the first federal district court cases to apply the TVPA to intimate, domestic relationships. See infra Part III.A, for a detailed discussion of Marcus.
It is true, of course, that gender-based torts and crimes often co-occur.\textsuperscript{24} Trafficking can often involve intimate partner relationships.\textsuperscript{25} A perpetrator of trafficking may engage in sexual, emotional, or physical abuse to instill fear and induce commercial sex or forced labor.\textsuperscript{26} Trafficking, thus, can (and often does) involve overlapping crimes like assault and battery, sexual assault, and sex trafficking. This is neither unusual nor especially noteworthy.

However, this Article addresses a distinct phenomenon: the evolutionary expansion of a legal category — in this case human trafficking — in reaction to the perceived deficiencies of other existing civil and criminal legal mechanisms. Ultimately, this Article asks whether trafficking law can or should supply answers to questions raised by the real and perceived failures of existing responses to sexual assault and domestic violence.\textsuperscript{27}

\textsuperscript{24} See generally DEP'T OF JUSTICE, HUM. TRAFFICKING TASK FORCE E-GUIDE, https://www.ovcttac.gov/taskforceguide/eguide/1-understanding-human-trafficking/12-recognizing-the-crime/ (last visited July 25, 2020) [https://perma.cc/DTX2-UCCB] (noting that conduct “may involve human trafficking” and other crimes, including domestic violence and sexual assault); HUM. TRAFFICKING LEGAL CTR., HUM. TRAFFICKING AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE FACT SHEET 2 (Feb. 27, 2018), http://www.htlegalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/Human-Trafficking-and-Domestic-Violence-Fact-Sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/MPG8-X2HK] (hereinafter FACT SHEET) (remarking how the federal government “has acknowledged the link between these two crimes, recognizing that cases that initially appear to be domestic violence may mask sex or labor trafficking”).

\textsuperscript{25} See, e.g., Affidavit of Karsten D. Anderson at 3, United States v. Knight, No. 1:17-cr-00166 (D.N.D. July 7, 2017) (involving a defendant who forced his girlfriend, whom he “hit,” “choked,” and “threatened to kill,” into commercial sex); Amended Complaint ¶ 43, Shuvalova v. Cunningham, No. 10CV02159 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2011), 2011 WL 914086 (seeking civil damages from a defendant who recruited the plaintiff from an online dating site and allegedly forced her and her daughter into forced labor); FACT SHEET, supra note 24, at 4 (citing Sex Trafficker Terrence “T-Rex” Yarbrough Sentenced to Serve 536 Months in Prison, DEP’T OF JUST. (Oct. 29, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/sex-trafficker-terrence-t-rex-yarbrough-sentenced-serve536-months-prison [https://perma.cc/XQ3S-6YZE]) (describing a defendant, who was charged with sex trafficking, and targeted victims by telling them that he was “in love” with them).

\textsuperscript{26} See, e.g., Affidavit of Karsten D. Anderson, supra note 25, at 3 (describing a defendant who used physical violence to force victims to engage in commercial sex); Amended Complaint, supra note 25, at ¶ 43 (seeking civil damages from defendant who used physical violence and emotional abuse to make her and her daughter work); FACT SHEET, supra note 24, at 4 (citing Sex Trafficker Terrence “T-Rex” Yarbrough Sentenced to Serve 536 Months in Prison, DEP’T OF JUST. (Oct. 29, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/sex-trafficker-terrence-t-rex-yarbrough-sentenced-serve536-months-prison [https://perma.cc/XQ3S-6YZE]) (charging a defendant with sex trafficking who used physical violence to compel commercial sex).

\textsuperscript{27} See infra Part II.B, for an examination of perceived deficiencies in existing legal responses to sexual assault and domestic violence.
It is clear that the creative deployment of trafficking statutes offers considerable gains to victims of gender-based violence, as it opens up new and important avenues for protection and prosecution. Federal trafficking law allows victims to take advantage of more generous statutes of limitations, expansive third party liability, substantial damages, and widening federal criminal and civil jurisdiction. In addition, civil litigators and prosecutors may benefit by deploying the moral condemnation associated with trafficking in these new contexts.

The invocation of trafficking statutes can mobilize political will. It can prompt action to hold perpetrators and institutions accountable, sway jurors and judges, and encourage civil settlements. In addition, moves to invoke trafficking law can have powerful expressive value by offering new frames within which we can recognize gender-based harms that have historically been ignored, under prosecuted, or insufficiently recognized.

28 See infra Part I.B.
29 See infra Part I.D.
30 See Chuang, Exploitation Creep, supra note 22, at 611 (describing the phenomenon of "exploitation creep" wherein new phenomena are labeled trafficking "enabl[ing] . . . rebranding, heightened moral condemnation and commitment to its cause"). Weinstein and his attorneys have argued that the plaintiffs' trafficking claims are an "opportunity" to "grab more headlines." See Priscilla DeGregory & Ruth Brown, Weinstein Lawyers: Sex Assault Suit Is Just a 'Headline Grab,' PAGE SIX (Jan. 29, 2019, 1:10 PM), https://pagesix.com/2019/01/29/weinstein-lawyers-sex-assault-suit-is-just-a-headline-grab [https://perma.cc/P2YX-TCX6].
31 See, e.g., Chuang, Exploitation Creep, supra note 22, at 629 ("The creep toward slavery is thus rationalized as the strategic deployment of crucial and rare political will in the service of trafficked and forced laborers who have long suffered from inadequate protections under the law."); Ramey, supra note 6 (quoting an attorney, who describes how creative uses of trafficking law could have a "ripple effect" in other cases).
Even so, the collapsing of legal definitions — or as Weinstein’s attorneys phrased it, efforts to “conflate everything” — comes with potential risks. The trafficking framework, itself a work-in-progress, may ultimately be ill-suited to encompass myriad new meanings. Its invocation in either the criminal or the civil realm may be a temporary, imperfect salve for the complex challenges that have traditionally imperiled sexual assault and domestic violence cases.

Worse, such expansion may deflect attention from more basic, needed reforms of state civil and criminal responses to gender-based violence. In certain cases, trafficking law will trigger heightened criminal sentences and assertions of federal jurisdiction regarding gender-based crime. This may be permissible — even a welcome development — in certain cases, especially involving serial offenders such as Weinstein and financier Jeffrey Epstein, but as trafficking encompasses a wider range of conduct, it may raise new concerns about proportionality and the appropriateness of federal jurisdiction across a broad range of cases. Moreover, the use of trafficking law in new civil and criminal cases risks creating judicial skepticism and sowing confusion among judges and juries that could ultimately undermine its effectiveness.


34 See Russell, supra note 10.
35 See infra Part II.B.
36 For example, a defendant who is convicted of sex trafficking under federal law is subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years in prison without parole and could receive up to life in prison. See 18 U.S.C. § 1591(b)(1) (2018); Sarah Crocker, Stripping Agency from Top to Bottom: The Need for a Sentencing Guideline Safety Valve for Bottoms Prosecuted Under the Federal Sex Trafficking Statute, 11 NW. U. L. REV. 753, 765 (2017) (“[T]he statutes’ base offense levels combined with the typical enhancements that accompany sex trafficking convictions often put defendants into Guidelines ranges well above the mandatory minimums.”).
37 The term, “traditional,” refers to archetypal trafficking cases involving forced or coerced commercial sex and forced labor for which Congress sought to address in enacting federal trafficking law. See TVPA pmbl.; see also Zoom Interview with Maurice H. Sercarz, Attorney, Sercarz & Riopelle, LLP (June 1, 2020) (notes on file with author) (“I gather that when the [sex trafficking] law was enacted it was meant to ... provide the strength of federal prosecution ... in order to outlaw or to punish or prevent certain conduct, and the core of conduct would be to punish the individual who sells a woman into submission in exchange for money or profit. That’s the ... archetypal [sex trafficking crime].”). Many scholars have eschewed the concept of the “iconic” or “traditional” victim as overly limiting the scope of protections for victim. See, e.g., Dina Francesca Haynes, (Not) Found Chained to a Bed in a Brothel: Conceptual, Legal, and
Although there are substantial benefits to having trafficking law come to the “rescue,” this Article argues that there too are consequences of deploying trafficking more broadly that should be better understood and considered when invoking trafficking law expansively. It also asserts that while trafficking may not be the perfect answer to such challenges, its invocation can provide a roadmap to fine-tune existing civil legal responses to domestic violence and sexual assault.

This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I outlines how Congress crafted federal trafficking law using expansive statutory language, which has left the door open to arguments to broaden its application. It examines how generous civil provisions in the TVPRA have provided powerful incentives to civil litigators to reframe certain conduct as trafficking.

Part II examines the historic evolution of legal responses to sexual assault and domestic violence, and the deficiencies that have compelled victims to look elsewhere for answers. It then describes generative trends, wherein civil litigators have creatively invoked other causes of action, including defamation claims, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), and the TVPRA to craft new avenues for civil damages.

Scholars have criticized the use of the term, “rescue,” in the context of gender-based violence because it portrays the victim as “passive” or lacking in agency. See, e.g., Janie A. Chuang, Rescuing Trafficking from Ideological Capture: Prostitution Reform and Anti-Trafficking Law and Policy, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1655, 1712 (2010) [hereinafter Rescuing Trafficking] (“Purported concern for vulnerable women provides a convenient excuse for restricting women’s migration — motivated at best by paternalism, at worst by a deeper antimigration agenda.”); Srikantiah, supra note 2, at 205 (describing how “[i]mperfect [immigrant] trafficking victims who fail to meet the restrictive legal (and cultural) definition” are seen as “non-victims” and become vulnerable to deportation). Scholars also have remarked that the discourse of “rescue” promotes paternalism, as benevolent privileged actors move to “save” victims instead of promoting greater discussion about long-term, structural change. See Elizabeth Bernstein, The Sexual Politics of the “New Abolitionism,” 18 DIFFERENCES 128, 137 (2007) (arguing that “rescue” narratives about “the beneficence of the privileged rather than the empowerment of the oppressed” contribute to the prevalence of “criminal justice interventions” rather than policies to promote sustained social change).

See infra Part II, for a discussion of how civil litigators have invoked defamation, RICO, and TVPRA claims.
Part III explores how civil litigators have asked federal courts to adopt expansive interpretations of trafficking violations under the TVPRA. It analyzes how, in turn, federal judges have begun to interpret anti-trafficking law broadly to include new gender-based harms.

Part IV concludes by examining the strategic and normative implications of this trend. It recognizes that these creative tactics by lawyers can play a powerful role in bolstering victim recovery. This trend may also have significant expressive value. Nonetheless, it warns of certain risks, including new constitutional challenges, backlash, and potentially inappropriate expansions of federal jurisdiction.

I. TRAFFICKING AS A REMEDY FOR GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE

A. Human Trafficking as a Form of Gender-Based Violence

Trafficking evolved internationally and domestically largely as a discrete form of gender-based violence.\(^4\) This was not inevitable.\(^4\) Human trafficking historically has been deeply intertwined with concepts of border control, migration, smuggling, workers’ rights, and economic rights.\(^4\) Yet, trafficking developed in the twentieth century as

\(^4\) See infra Part IV.

\(^4\) See, e.g., ALICIA PETERS, RESPONDING TO HUMAN TRAFFICKING: SEX, GENDER, AND CULTURE IN THE LAW 3 (University of Pennsylvania Press 2015) (“Although the lens of gender and sexuality has most profoundly shaped views on trafficking, it is not the only possible approach, and assumptions about violence, crime, and victimization also frame how the phenomenon is commonly understood.”); Erin Corcoran, The Construction of The Ultimate Other: Nationalism and Manifestations of Misogyny and Patriarchy in U.S. Immigration Law and Policy, 20 Geo. J. Gender & L. 541, 546 (2019) (remarking how U.S. legislation, including anti-trafficking law, recognized the problem of violence against women as a “structural manifestation of the historical unequal power distribution between men and women”); Sofija Voronova & Anja Radjenovic, The Gender Dimension of Human Trafficking, EUR. PARLIAMENTARY RES. SERV., 1, 8 (Feb. 2016), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIP/2016/577950/EPRS_BRI %282016%29577950_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/PD9G-322R] (noting how policy in the European Union “identifies violence against women as a root cause of trafficking” and recognizing that the “vulnerability to trafficking for different forms of exploitation is shaped by gender”).

\(^4\) See Chuang, Exploitation Creep, supra note 22, at 613 (describing how human rights advocates with alternatives approaches were sidelined as the international community moved towards a “crime-control framework”).

\(^4\) In the early twentieth century, trafficking was closely connected to international movement of persons and inextricably related to borders and sovereignty. Movement, thus, was a key component, as economic factors “[c]ombined with increased border controls in the countries of destination . . . created a desperate stream of migration from which traffickers could ‘fish.’” See id. at 614 (citing MIKE KAY, THE MIGRATION-TRAFFICKING NEXUS: COMBATING TRAFFICKING THROUGH THE PROTECTION OF MIGRANTS’
an international phenomenon deeply — although not exclusively — connected to gender, typically to cisgender women and girls, and most commonly conceptualized as a form of violence. This framing inevitably gave rise to criminal legal responses to address it. International and domestic U.S. law incentivized state actors to penalize perpetrators and to protect or, in some cases, “rescue” victims from this egregious crime. Furthermore, these actors situated trafficking law as largely a criminal enforcement matter destined to evolve alongside and in response to other forms of gender-based crime, like domestic violence and sexual assault.

1. Early Efforts to Craft a Definition

Internationally, early twentieth century efforts to combat trafficking were inextricably intertwined with sex, gender, and victimization. They were principally driven by “moral panic” about “white slavery,” defined as the forced prostitution of white European women. This discourse conceived the problem as “largely constructed around the


45 For a discussion of the use of the term “rescue,” see discussion supra note 38.

46 Many scholars have argued, instead, in favor of a labor approach to trafficking that aims to bring structural changes to the labor market rather than promote criminal legal interventions. See, e.g., Hila Shamir, A Labor Paradigm for Human Trafficking, 60 UCLA L. REV. 76, 80 (2012) (arguing that a “labor approach” is “better suited than the traditional human rights tools for addressing the institutional aspects of the labor market exploitation on which trafficking is structured”).


48 Early twentieth century efforts, rather than defining human trafficking, focused on “white slavery” and efforts to eradicate it. See generally GALLAGHER, supra note 47, at 13 (describing how the term “trafficking” first came into use “in the early twentieth century in connection with white slavery: a term that was initially used to refer to forcible or fraudulent recruitment to prostitution”).
crude juxtaposition of dangerous, foreign men and innocent, white women.”

Absent from these early discussions was a more nuanced discussion of labor trafficking or the economic circumstances that might propel women (and men) to be vulnerable to exploitation. In the 1970s, a growing feminist movement began to demand greater attention to women’s rights and sought to solidify a vision of trafficking as largely an issue of “violence against women.” This movement was supported by diverse groups, including certain feminist advocates and anti-domestic violence proponents, who sought to strengthen criminal legal responses to gender-based violence.


51 See Sabrina Balgamwalla, Trafficking in Narratives: Conceptualizing and Recasting Victims, Offenders, and Rescuers in the War on Human Trafficking, 94 DENVER L. REV. 1, 9 (2016) (“The concept of ‘female sexual slavery’ began gaining traction in the 1970s as prostitution and pornography emerged as key issues in the mainstream feminist movement.”).

52 Certain feminists, sometimes referred to as “second wave” or “dominant” feminists, viewed legal institutions, including the international human rights regime, as embodying paternalistic attitudes and believed that gender neutrality operated to exclude and subordinate women. See, e.g., Natalie H. Kaufman & Stefanie A. Lindquist, Critiquing Gender-Neutral Treaty Language: The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, in WOMEN’S RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 114 (Julie Peters & Andrea Wolper eds., 1995) (addressing how gender-neutral laws should be analyzed); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW (Harvard Univ. Press 1987) (exploring dominant feminist theories related to sexuality and the law); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (Harvard Univ. Press 1989) (discussing the role of the state in connection to feminist theory related to sexual subordination); Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender [1988], in FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: READINGS IN LAW AND GENDER 201 (Katherine T. Bartlett & Roseanne Kennedy eds., 1991) (examining rights discourse in modern feminist theory and barriers to feminist jurisprudence). Some scholars have critiqued these approaches as responsible for “terrible mistakes” with “unintended consequences that are or should be contested within feminist political life.” See JANET HALLEY, PRABHA KOTISWARAN, RACHEL REBOUCHE & HILA SHAMIR, GOVERNANCE FEMINISM: NOTES FROM THE FIELD xiii (2019).
These efforts culminated in 2000, when the United Nations General Assembly adopted by resolution the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children ("Trafficking Protocol").\textsuperscript{53} The Trafficking Protocol defined "trafficking in persons" for the first time under international law.\textsuperscript{54} Located within the Organized Crime Convention, it also solidified trafficking as an issue of organized crime and crime control, rather than human rights. In effect, the Trafficking Protocol functioned very much as an instrument of criminal law and left it to countries "[i]n appropriate cases and to the extent possible" to provide protections to victims.\textsuperscript{55}

The definition of trafficking was notably broad and gender neutral in approach. In particular, Article 3(a) of the Trafficking Protocol defines "trafficking in persons" as:

The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation.\textsuperscript{56}

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\textsuperscript{54} See id. at art. 3(a).

\textsuperscript{55} See id. at art. 6(1).

\textsuperscript{56} Id. at art. 3(a). By ratifying the Trafficking Protocol, countries were obligated to criminalize the "human trafficking" conduct and adopt national laws consistent with the Convention's goals. See id. at art. 5.
The definition included three separate elements: (1) an action,\(^{57}\) (2) a means,\(^{58}\) and (3) a purpose.\(^{59}\) Each of these components was fairly broadly defined.\(^{60}\) As a result, the Protocol definition departed significantly from prior international conventions on “white slavery” and criminal “traffic,” in that it was quite expansive — some even called it a “rigor-free zone.”\(^{61}\)

No longer was the international community concerned only with forced prostitution, which had been a central feature of prior international efforts. Rather, the definition of trafficking applied to

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\(^{57}\) The “action” element involved the “recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons.” See id. at art. 3(a). Here, this requirement deviated from earlier Conventions by failing to require transportation. See United Nations Office of Drugs & Crimes, United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto 42 (2004), https://www.unodc.org/documents/middleeastandnorthafrica/organised-crime/UNITED_NATIONS_CONVENTION_AGAINST_TRANSNATIONAL_ORGANIZED_CRIME_AND_THE_PROTOCOLS_THERETO.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z8B3-MFXA]; see also Jean Allain, No Effective Trafficking Definition Exists: Domestic Implementation of the Palermo Protocol, 7 Alb. Gov’t L. Rev. 111, 114 (2014) (“[T]his Protocol is not exclusively applicable to situations where a person is trafficked across an international border, but in fact can be trafficked internally — that is to say: the victim may be moved solely within one State, while the crime by contrast would be ‘transnational in nature’ if, for instance, it ‘involves an organized criminal group that engages in criminal activities in more than one State.’”).

\(^{58}\) The “means” element was notably expansive, ranging from the “threat or use of force” to such abstract concepts as the “abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability.” See Trafficking Protocol, supra note 53, at art. 3(a). This breadth responded to a desire by the drafters to recognize the diverse means that perpetrators may employ in trafficking cases. See U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, Issue Paper: Abuse of a Position of Vulnerability and Other “Means” Within the Definition of Trafficking in Persons 2 (2013), https://www.unodc.org/documents/human-trafficking/2012/UNODC_2012_Issue_Paper_-_Abuse_of_a_Position_of_Vulnerability.pdf [https://perma.cc/V3FR-PKMX] [hereinafter UNODC Issue Paper] (“Informal information indicates that the inclusion of a wide range of overlapping means in the definition was motivated by an intention to ensure that all the different and subtle ways by which an individual can be moved, placed or maintained in a situation of exploitation were captured.”).

\(^{59}\) “[F]or the purpose of exploitation” was also not meticulously defined. “Exploitation” was described as: “at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.” See Trafficking Protocol, supra note 53, at art. 3(a).

\(^{60}\) See supra notes 57-59.

diverse — at times not fully defined and likely not fully appreciated — forms of exploitation. Many scholars considered this expansive vision a positive development, in that it marked a departure from the outwardly gendered, narrow framework of the early twentieth century. Even so, the broadened concept of trafficking injected some uncertainty into the development of international and domestic criminal law, as States Parties struggled to implement the Trafficking Protocol.

Now, two decades after the Protocol was enacted, “the parameters around what constitutes ‘trafficking’ are not yet firmly established.” One of the many questions left open by the Trafficking Protocol was whether the definition of “trafficking in persons” could potentially encompass other forms of gender-based violence, like sexual assault or domestic violence. Although this question was not explicitly addressed in the Trafficking Protocol, it too was not definitively ruled out. As a result, the Trafficking Protocol left States Parties to grapple with and resolve it.

2. Domestic Definitions of Trafficking

The drafting of the Trafficking Protocol was closely intertwined with U.S. Congressional efforts to craft domestic legislation. In 2000, the Congress passed the TVPA, marking the first U.S. comprehensive anti-trafficking legislation. Congress sought to combat trafficking through the “Three Ps”: (1) prosecution of perpetrators; (2) protections of victims; and (3) prevention of trafficking globally. The goal of the

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62 Anne Gallagher, Understanding Exploitation, 33 HARV. INT’L REV. 4, 4 (2011), https://works.bepress.com/anne_gallagher/40/ (https://perma.cc/5KVE-DCU8) (“I have no doubt that initial enthusiasm for a global agreement on trafficking would have been much less if states had fully understood that its tentacles would eventually reach directly into their factories, farms, fishing boats, and private households.”).

63 See Allain, supra note 57, at 120 (“As a result, it was left to each country to determine what type of exploitation it would seek to suppress in the context where the very term ‘exploitation’ was ill-understood and nowhere defined in law.”).

64 See UNODC ISSUE PAPER, supra note 58, at 1 (noting that certain questions “emerged regarding those aspects of the definition that are not elsewhere defined in international law or commonly known to the major legal systems of the world”).

65 See id. at 1-2 (acknowledging that concepts in the Protocol were both “not clearly understood” and “not being consistently implemented and applied”).

66 TVPA, supra note 3. Similar to the Trafficking Protocol, it remained “gender-neutral” but also gendered in its focus on “women and children.” See id.

legislation was to “combat trafficking in persons, a contemporary manifestation of slavery whose victims are predominantly women and children.”\(^{68}\)

Still, the vision of trafficking was not limited to traditional forms of sex slavery or forced labor. Rather, Congress apparently espoused a wide vision of the crime, which was endorsed by subsequent federal court decisions. In *United States v. Townsend*, for example, the Eleventh Circuit took note of the broad scope of the TVPA. The court found that “[b]y its plain terms” the sex trafficking statute “criminalizes trafficking in ‘person[s],’ not just in slaves or women from other countries.”\(^{69}\)

Similarly, in *United States v. Estrada-Tepal*, the federal district court wrote that the TVPA “criminalizes a broad spectrum of conduct” with “expansiveness . . . a legislative goal in enacting the statute.”\(^{70}\)

Scholars have argued that the TVPA, thus, incorporated a degree of “messiness and ambiguity into the law, as opposed to clarity,” which “left space to envision trafficking in varying, even contradictory, ways.”\(^{71}\) These concerns have been borne out as courts have interpreted the TVPA to apply to new actors and conduct.\(^{72}\) Some scholars, however, have argued that this flexibility has been a positive feature, as it has allowed the TVPA and subsequent anti-trafficking legislation to take into account the contemporary nature of human trafficking.\(^{73}\) Nonetheless, others have worried that broadening the scope of human trafficking, or “exploitation creep,” will endanger the trafficking concept by sowing confusion and diluting the moral condemnation associated with the concept.\(^{74}\)

paradigm — prosecution, protection, and prevention — continues to serve as the fundamental framework used around the world to combat human trafficking.”). The United States has added a fourth “P” of partnership to complement other efforts. See id. (“[A] fourth “P” — for partnership — serves as a complementary means to achieve progress across the 3Ps and enlist all segments of society in the fight against modern slavery.”).


\(^{69}\) See United States v. Townsend, 521 F. App’x. 904, 906 (11th Cir. 2013).


\(^{71}\) See Peters, supra note 41, at 70.

\(^{72}\) See Dahlstrom, supra note 18, at 399-414 (arguing that the TVPA and subsequent reauthorizations have been interpreted to apply to new actors, such as websites, hotels, and certain buyers of sex).

\(^{73}\) See id. at 384 (“Many anti-trafficking advocates have viewed the expansion of human trafficking law as a welcome development that recognizes the complex, contemporary nature of the crime in applying the concept to more subtle, nuanced forms of exploitation.”).

\(^{74}\) See, e.g., Chuang, Exploitation Creep, supra note 22, at 611; see also Aziza Ahmed, “Exploitation Creep” and Development: A Response to Janie Chuang, 108 Am. J. Int’l. L.
B. Federal Definition(s) of Sex Trafficking

While the legislative history is replete with evidence that Congress was largely focused on “international sex slavery,” Congress defined sex trafficking broadly. This was due, in part, to divisive ideological battles between neo-abolitionist feminist advocates, evangelicals, and sex work proponents — each group with distinct views about the contours of “sex trafficking.” The resulting compromise was, no doubt, a considerable achievement in terms of building legislative consensus, but it also raised new questions.

In the TVPA, Congress defined sex trafficking to include “the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, obtaining, patronizing, or soliciting of a person for the purpose of a commercial

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75 Anette Sikka, Trafficking in Persons: How America Exploited the Narrative of Exploitation, 55 Tex. Int’L L.J. 1, 15 (2019) (“Framing prostitution in terms of human rights on the international stage provided a way to draw attention to the issue without occupying the traditional field of debate these groups had held.”).

76 Since 2000, courts have found that the statutory language of 18 U.S.C. § 1591 is broader than the purpose of eradicating international sex slavery. See, e.g., United States v. Townsend, 521 F. App’x. 904 (11th Cir. 2013) (noting that the statutory language of the federal sex trafficking statute is broader than the purpose of addressing “international sex slavery and women disproportionately affected by poverty and lack of economic opportunity in their home countries”); United States v. Estrada-Tepal, 57 F. Supp. 3d 164 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (remarking that “expansiveness was a legislative goal in enacting the [sex trafficking] statute”).

77 Neo-abolitionist and sex work proponents have different ideological approaches to sex trafficking, and these views have animated anti-trafficking scholarship. See, e.g., Chuang, Rescuing Trafficking, supra note 38, at 1657-58 (describing how ideological debates regarding prostitution reform have shaped policy and legislative responses in the United States). Neo-abolitionist proponents view commercial sex as inherently harmful, as “the quintessential expression of patriarchal gender relations and male domination,” whereas sex work proponents argue that consensual sex work should not be criminalized and must be distinguished from trafficking. See, e.g., Prabha Kotiswaran, Dangerous Sex, Invisible Labor: Sex Work and the Law in India 10 (2011) (“Sex work advocates ... are agnostic to the commodification of sex per se and ... [thus, their emphasis is on protecting and promoting the rights of sex workers.”); Ronald Weitzer, Legalizing Prostitution: From Illicit Vice to Lawful Business 10 (2011) (examining competing feminist viewpoints about commercial sex and describing how proponents of the sex work position perceive commercial sex as a means to “empower” marginalized populations).

78 See Peters, Trafficking in Meaning, supra note 47, at 78-79 (noting that the domestic legal definition of trafficking was “functional yet value laden, prescriptive yet ambiguous, comprehensive yet bifurcated, and gender-neutral yet gendered and sexually-marked”).

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sex act.”79 By comparison, Congress separately defined the federal crime of sex trafficking more restrictively under 18 U.S.C. § 1591 to include:

(a) Whoever knowingly —

(1) in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce . . . recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides, obtains, advertises, maintains, patronizes, or solicits by any means a person;

(2) knowing, or . . . in reckless disregard of the fact, that means of force, threats of force, fraud, coercion described in subsection (e)(2), or any combination of such means will be used to cause the person to engage in a commercial sex act, . . . .

The elements below, while not exhaustive, remain some of the most salient in the emerging relationship between trafficking violations and other gender-based harms.

Interstate commerce. It is surprising, given popular conceptions of trafficking, that the federal sex trafficking crime does not require transportation.81 Rather, the prohibited conduct must simply be “in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce.”82 Federal courts have interpreted this standard to require only a de minimis effect on interstate commerce.83 For example, it may include as little as the use of hotels, cell phones, and condoms.84

82 See id. § 1591(a)(1); 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(12) (2018) (finding that, in the aggregate, sex trafficking “substantially affects interstate and foreign commerce” and “has an impact on the nationwide employment network and labor market”); see also United States v. Walls, 784 F.3d 543, 547 (2015) (“We therefore hold that when Congress used the language ‘in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce’ in the TVPA, it intended to exercise its full powers under the Commerce Clause.”).
83 See Walls, 784 F.3d at 548 (“Congress’s power to regulate . . . activities that substantially affect interstate commerce — extends to individual instances of conduct with only a de minimis effect on interstate commerce so long as the class of activity regulated is economic or commercial in nature.”). Thus, the conduct need only cross state lines or be “[a]n act or transaction that is economic in nature” that “affects the flow of money in the stream of commerce to any degree.” See id. at 546.
84 According to the United States Attorney’s Bulletin, the “requisite interstate commerce nexus” can be quite easily demonstrated through a range of methods, including “the use of facilities and instrumentalities of interstate commerce such as
Prohibited acts. The statute also refers to one of ten prohibited actions — “recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides, obtains, advertises, maintains, patronizes, or solicits.”85 None of these actions were explicitly defined, and many are susceptible to expansive interpretations.86 For example, “entic[ing]” a victim could apply to a potentially wide range of conduct.

Commercial sex act. The defendant’s conduct also must amount to a “commercial sex act.”87 While this term may bring to mind the exchange of sex for money, Congress defined the term “commercial sex act” very broadly.88 It includes “any sex act, on account of which anything of value is given to or received by any person,” including both tangible and intangible items.89 While the term “intangible” was not explicitly defined, it has been construed quite expansively by federal district courts in other contexts to include power, reputational benefits, and job advancement.90


86 Indeed, the Eighth Circuit noted that “the expansive language of § 1591 ‘criminalizes a broad spectrum’ of conduct relating to the sex trafficking of children,” and this dicta has been used in other cases to argue in favor of expansive interpretations of the prohibited acts. See United States v. Jungers, 702 F.3d 1066, 1070 (8th Cir. 2013); see, e.g., Canosa v. Ziff, No. 18 Civ. 4115, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13263, at *60 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2019) (interpreting terms in the federal trafficking statute broadly and referencing the federal district court analysis in Noble, wherein Judge Robert Sweet found “Weinstein’s attempt to cabin Section 1591 to ‘child prostitution, torture, and child pornography’ [was] unpersuasive”); Noble v. Weinstein, 335 F. Supp. 3d 504, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (describing how “[b]road, expansive language is employed in Sections 1591 [sex trafficking of children or by force, fraud or coercion] and 1595 [peonage, slavery and trafficking in persons]”); United States v. Estrada-Tepal, 57 F. Supp. 3d 164, 169 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (noting that “expansiveness was a legislative goal in enacting the [sex trafficking] statute”).


88 See id. § 1591(c)(3).

89 See id.

90 The terms “thing of value” or “anything of value” commonly appear in federal criminal law and mean both tangible and intangible remuneration. See, e.g., United States v. Townsend, 630 F.3d 1003, 1010 (11th Cir. 2011) (“The four other courts of appeals that have addressed this issue have all held that intangibles can be things of
Thus, the federal sex trafficking statute, through its broad statutory language and potentially expansive legislative intent, has invited civil litigators to craft new arguments. Subsequent litigation efforts have further encouraged judges to interpret terms like “commercial sex act” and the prohibited actions broadly.

C. Federal Definition(s) of Labor Trafficking

Similar questions have emerged about the scope of labor trafficking crimes. Unlike in the sex trafficking context, Congress in the TVPA did not create a federal crime called “labor trafficking.” Rather, Congress established the new federal crime of forced labor to supplement the then-existing crime of involuntary servitude. Prior to the enactment of the TVPA, the Thirteenth Amendment established the right to be free from involuntary servitude, and in 1948, the U.S. Congress passed 18 U.S.C. § 1584 to enforce the Amendment. The involuntary servitude statute, thus, established a new criminal offense for “knowingly and willfully hold[ing] to involuntary servitude or sell[ing] into any condition of involuntary servitude, any other person for any term.”

While courts have consistently interpreted the Thirteenth Amendment and its enforcing statutes to apply to diverse conduct — not limited to the historical American forms of slavery — federal courts in the mid-twentieth century struggled to determine what contemporary conduct could constitute “servitude.” In early cases, for example, federal courts diverged as to whether “servitude” included value for this purpose.”; United States v. Marmolejo, 89 F.3d 1185, 1191-92 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that the “plain meaning of the statute compels our conclusion that the term ‘anything of value’ in § 666(a)(1)(B) includes transactions involving intangible items, such as the conjugal visits at issue in this case”).

91 See infra Part III.C.
92 See id.
94 The Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits involuntary servitude in any jurisdiction whether at the hands of an individual or the United States government, unless as punishment for a crime, U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”). 18 U.S.C. § 241 prohibits conspiracy to interfere with an individual’s Thirteenth Amendment right to be free from “involuntary servitude,” and 18 U.S.C. § 1584 makes it a federal crime to knowingly and willfully hold another person “to involuntary servitude.” See Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 772, 62 Stat. 683 (“An act to revise, codify, and enact into positive law, Title 18 of the United States Code, entitled ‘Crimes and Criminal Procedure.’”).
purely psychological coercion. A circuit split, however, led to the U.S. Supreme Court decision in 1988 in United States v. Kozminski. In Kozminski, the Court limited the reach of involuntary servitude to the “use or threat of physical restraint or physical injury, or by the use or threat of coercion through law or the legal process.”

Congress then responded to Kozminski in 2000 by creating the new federal crime of forced labor to reach psychological coercion. The forced labor statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1589, provided that:

[w]hoever knowingly provides or obtains the labor or services of a person—

(1) by threats of serious harm to, or physical restraint against, that person or another person;

(2) by means of any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause the person to believe that, if the person did not perform such labor or services, that person or another person would suffer serious harm or physical restraint; or

(3) by means of the abuse or threatened abuse of law or the legal process, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.

The statute, thus, criminalized both “labor” and “services” connected to psychological coercion.

Congress, however, failed to define “labor” or “services,” leaving open whether the forced labor and involuntary servitude statutes could apply to certain types of interpersonal violence. Some scholars argued that conduct like sexual and interpersonal violence — so intrinsically

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98 Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 952.

99 See 18 U.S.C. § 1589 (2018); see, e.g., United States v. Dann, 652 F.3d 1160, 1169 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Legislative history suggests that Congress passed this act to correct what they viewed as the Supreme Court’s mistaken holding in [Kozminski].”).

connected to African slavery — should be interpreted as within the reach of the Thirteenth Amendment and implementing statutes.\textsuperscript{101} Still, Congress did not clarify if “labor” or “services” meant “work in an economic sense” or “work involving mental or physical exertion.”\textsuperscript{102} While a seemingly small distinction, interpreting “labor” or “services” to include “mental or physical exertion” could transform diverse acts — ranging from sexual assault to certain forms of domestic abuse — into forced labor.

D. Incentives to Reframe Crimes as Trafficking

The TVPRA also embodied new, generous civil remedies for victims. Victims in federal civil TVPRA matters became eligible to receive expansive civil damages, file within a ten-year statute of limitations, and recover from a broad scope of third parties. These provisions were unlike existing civil remedies for victims of sexual assault and domestic violence, which often had short statutes of limitations, insurance exclusions for intentional acts, and caps on damage awards.\textsuperscript{103} These

\textsuperscript{101} Congress intended the phrase “involuntary servitude” to reach beyond state action “to cover those forms of compulsory labor akin to African slavery,” and many scholars have argued that sexual violence had a deep history connecting it to African slavery. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. Scholars have argued that the reach of the Thirteenth Amendment, thus, should include a broad range of gender-based harms, including sexual assault, sexual harassment in housing, violence against women, and “mail order brides.” See, e.g., Jane Kim, \textit{Taking Rape Seriously: Rape as Slavery}, 35 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 263, 289 (2012) (“The Thirteenth Amendment is ‘a powerful tool that enables us to see [rape] in a new light,’ affording Congress with the constitutional authority to criminalize rape as a federal crime.”); Aric K. Short, \textit{Slaves for Rent: Sexual Harassment in Housing as Involuntary Servitude}, 86 NEB. L. REV. 838, 893 (2008) (“Sexual harassment in the rental context reasonably constitutes involuntary servitude under the Thirteenth Amendment.”). Akhil Reed Amar and Daniel Widawsky, for example, have described how abolitionists sought to abolish sexual violence and child abuse — practices closely tied to slavery. See Akhil Reed Amar & Daniel Widawsky, \textit{Child Abuse as Slavery: A Thirteenth Amendment Response to Deshaney}, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1369 (1992) (“This definition [of involuntary servitude] rightly transcends mere economics; although forced labor for economic gain was one characteristic of slavery as practiced in the antebellum South, forced labor itself does not exhaust the meaning of slavery.”); see also Neal Kumar Katyal, \textit{Men Who Own Women: A Thirteenth Amendment Critique of Forced Prostitution}, 103 YALE L.J. 791, 792 n.7 (1993) (arguing that involuntary servitude should be interpreted to include forced prostitution).

\textsuperscript{102} See, e.g., United States v. Marcus, 487 F. Supp. 2d 289, 303-04 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (articulating the diverse definitions of “labor” and “services” advanced by the government and the defense).

\textsuperscript{103} See infra Part II.B, regarding barriers to civil recovery for victims of sexual assault and domestic violence.
generous protections, thus, encouraged litigators to bring new suits under the TVPRA.\footnote{104 See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Brian Kent, Attorney, Laffey, Bucci & Kent (June 8, 2020) (“[T]he remedies that are available under the Federal Trafficking Act . . . are very favorable . . . ”).}

In 2003, Congress established a new civil remedy for victims of sex trafficking, forced labor, and involuntary servitude through the TVPRA.\footnote{105 18 U.S.C. § 1595 (2018). The 2003 TVPRA permitted civil claims for violations of sections 1589, 1590, and 1591 only. See id.} This legislation allowed victims to file federal civil trafficking suits directly against the perpetrator.\footnote{106 18 U.S.C. § 1595; ALEXANDRA F. LEVY, HUM. TRAFFICKING LEGAL CTR., FEDERAL HUMAN TRAFFICKING CIVIL LITIGATION 7 (2018). Plaintiffs also often file other related claims, including claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act, state wage and hour laws, common law theories of intentional infliction of emotional distress, false imprisonment, conversion, and breach of contract. See 29 U.S.C. § 201 (2018); see also LEVY, supra, at 24. For a complete list of claims that may be asserted in federal trafficking cases, see id. at 32.} Potential damages were quite extensive, including compensatory damages, reasonable attorney’s fees, and punitive damages.\footnote{107 See 18 U.S.C. § 1595; see also LEVY, supra note 106, at 7.} The TVPRA further authorized a floor of $150,000 in liquidated damages.\footnote{108 See 18 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (2018) (“Any person who . . . may sue in any appropriate United States District Court and shall recover the actual damages such person sustains or liquidated damages in the amount of $150,000, and the cost of the action, including reasonable attorney’s fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred.”).}

Attorneys have confirmed that extensive damages, including liquidated damages and attorney’s fees, have been a strong motivation to bring new cases under federal trafficking law.\footnote{109 See, e.g., Zoom Interview with Ryan Hudson, Attorney, Sharp Law (May 21, 2020) (“You have a floor of 150,000 dollars [in liquidated damages] per [TVPRA] violation. And attorney’s fees under Section 1595. Those don’t exist under state law claims, and they’re powerful incentives to bring these claims, which is what Congress intended.”); Zoom Interview with Steven Hurbis, Attorney, McKeen & Associates, P.C. (May 29, 2020) (describing that one rationale for including federal TVPRA claims was to have access to “different and more kinds of damages,” including punitive damages).} One plaintiff’s attorney commented that: “The damages that can be sought [under the TVPRA] and by whom they may be sought are broader than any contained in any other federal civil, constitutional, labor, or employment law statute ever.”\footnote{110 E-mail from David Frank, Civil Rights Attorney, Neighborhood Christian Legal Clinic, to author (May 22, 2020) (on file with author).} Another plaintiff’s attorney remarked that: “[T]he benefit of the TVPA . . . [is] there are no artificial state tort reform caps. There’s no caps at all.”\footnote{111 Zoom Interview with Daniel Lipman, Attorney, Parker Lipman LLP (May 29, 2020); see also Zoom Interview with Jonathan Little, Attorney, Saeed & Little, LLP (May 2020).} A third plaintiff’s attorney
explained that: “[I]f we win, we get attorney’s fees and costs, and as long as you have a good faith case, . . . you can get over the motion to dismiss. I mean, they’re in real trouble.”  

In 2008, Congress further established broad third party liability for trafficking violations, allowing victims to file civil claims against individuals or entities that “knowingly benefit[]” from a “venture” with a perpetrator of trafficking. This development substantially broadened the number of potential defendants in a TVPRA civil claim, allowing plaintiffs to target new parties, including board members, sports associations, attorneys, hotels, and psychiatrists, who knew or should have known about the underlying trafficking conduct.

The ability to take aim at new third parties under the TVPRA has opened up new avenues for victims to recover civil damages. One plaintiff’s attorney commented: “I will say at least in the [TVPRA] cases we are pursuing, the perpetrators are judgment proof. Institutions, if you have the right institution, they have assets or they have significant

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112 Zoom Interview with John Manly, Partner, Manly, Stewart & Finaldi (May 28, 2020).
113 See TVPRA of 2008, supra note 3, § 221.
114 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589, 1593A, 1595(a) (2018) (“An individual who is a victim of a violation of this chapter may bring a civil action against the perpetrator (or whoever knowingly benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value from participation in a venture in which that person knew or should have known has engaged in an act in violation of this chapter) in an appropriate district court of the United States and may recover damages and reasonable attorneys [sic] fees.”); see also Kathleen Kim, The Trafficked Worker as Private Attorney General: A Model for Enforcing the Civil Rights of Undocumented Workers, 2009 U. Chic. Legal F. 247, 283 (2009) (“The 2008 amendments also expand the pool of potential defendants to include not just the direct perpetrators of the trafficking crime, but also those who “knowingly” benefited, financially or otherwise, from the trafficking activity.”). Section 1595 includes three separate provisions about third party liability that have slightly different requirements, but this Article will refer to them collectively as the “knowingly benefits” provision for simplicity. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589(b), 1593A, 1595(a).
115 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589(b), 1593A, 1595(a); see, e.g., Max Mitchell, Sex Trafficking Awareness Is Increasing and So Are Civil Claims, LEGAL INTELLIGENCE (July 22, 2019) (“[L]awsuits are now being lodged against a range of entities, including hotels, motels, taxis, massage parlors, truck stops and, in one case outlined in the Human Trafficking Legal Center’s report, a doctor who prescribed drugs to a trafficker who then used those drugs to control a trafficking victim.”).
insurance.” Another plaintiff’s attorney described the significance of being able to bring third party TVPRA claims:  

[I]t’s about justice. But the only way we can get civil justice is through monetary compensation. And so, you have to think about . . . what other entities are responsible . . . Because if you . . . aren’t able to include the institutions in the lawsuit, you haven’t really done any good.  

Federal district courts also have begun to signal that insurance carriers, unlike in the intentional tort setting, may have a duty to defend in TVPRA claims. This trend, if sustained, provides plaintiffs with greater likelihood of recovery. It also incentivizes plaintiffs’ attorneys to take on TVPRA cases. One plaintiff's attorney commented about the role of insurance coverage in TVPRA cases: “I tell clients . . . get a copy of the policy, look at it, and figure out how I am going to get coverage here. That’s what it all boils down to.”  

The TVPRA also established a ten-year statute of limitations for victims to file civil claims under the TVPRA. This window is significantly longer than most relevant state civil claims, particularly in the intentional torts setting. Thus, the TVPRA allowed victims to file claims in federal court against perpetrators and third parties that would

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116 Zoom Interview with Larkin Walsh, Partner, Sharp Law (May 21, 2020).
117 Zoom Interview with Steven Hurbis, Attorney, McKeen & Associates, P.C. (May 29, 2020) (“[Y]ou need to be able to hold the . . . employers and the institutions, you know, accountable with . . . more traditional . . . methods, which you can’t necessarily do now.”).
118 While very few TVPRA cases have moved forward involving insurance carriers, in 2019, the Federal District Court for the District of Massachusetts found that an insurance company, Peerless Indemnity Insurance Co., a Liberty Mutual Unit, had a duty to defend against TVPRA civil claims. See Ricchio v. Bijal, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 3d 182, 195 (D. Mass. 2019). Therein, Peerless Indemnity Insurance Co. argued that it did not have a duty to defend against the civil suit because the TVPA offenses are intentional torts and not defined as personal injuries sufficient to trigger insurance coverage. See id. U.S. District Court Judge F. Dennis Saylor IV disagreed, finding that: “[b]ecause the definition of personal injury under the policy includes injuries arising out of false imprisonment, and because Ricchio’s injuries at least in part arose out of her false imprisonment, the answer to that question is yes.” Id. at 192. Ricchio ended in a civil settlement agreement without establishing clear precedent, but the federal district court’s analysis signaled that insurance carriers may have a duty to defend in TVPRA claims. See id.
119 Zoom Interview with Jonathan Little, Attorney, Saeed & Little LLP (May 21, 2020).
120 18 U.S.C. § 1595(c). The statute of limitations for trafficking claims is ten years, unless the plaintiff was a minor when the offense occurred, in which case it is ten years after the victim turned eighteen. See id.
otherwise be time-barred. One plaintiff’s attorney noted that “statutes of limitations are a major problem — in fact, the number one problem — for a plaintiff trying to proceed under state law claims” for sexual assault victims. Another plaintiff’s attorney commented that the TVPRA’s longer statute of limitations was exactly what “opened the door” for certain victims to bring federal civil claims against Weinstein.

Also, for some litigators, the TVPRA allows victims to bring claims in federal court, a venue that may be more sympathetic than state courts for victims of gender-based violence in certain jurisdictions. One plaintiff’s attorney observed how often “blue states are good, red states aren’t good” for victims of sexual abuse in state civil claims. For that reason, he noted, “We are always looking at federal law.” Another plaintiff’s lawyer explained that finding a federal cause of action “just seems to open up a lot of doors.”

II. THE IMPULSE TO “RESCUE”

More than two decades after the passage of federal anti-trafficking law, civil litigators have invoked human trafficking law in claims against Harvey Weinstein and other alleged perpetrators of sexual assault and domestic violence. This Part examines why. It suggests that continuing inadequacies in legal remedies have propelled victims of sexual assault and domestic violence to look elsewhere for solutions. In response, creative litigators have sought to push federal trafficking law in new, and perhaps unexpected, directions.

121 See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Arick Fudali, Managing Attorney, The Bloom Firm (June 11, 2020) (“[T]he major benefit of the TVPRA . . . is the ten-year statute of limitations. . . . [T]hat's the appeal.”).
122 Zoom Interview with Ryan Hudson, Attorney, Sharp Law LLP (May 21, 2020) (“We would probably rather proceed under state law negligence claims. . . . But unfortunately, they are typically time-barred because statute[s] of limitations for state law claims typically are two to four years.”); see also Zoom Interview with Daniel Lipman, Attorney, Parker Lipman LLP (May 29, 2020) (describing how judges can perceive that plaintiffs’ attorneys are filing TVPRA claims to get around the two year statute of limitations but using the TVPRA is not an “end run” or “trickery” because “we're using a law that's been made available to us”).
123 Zoom Interview with Stuart Mermelstein, Senior Attorney, Herman Law LLP (May 29, 2020) (explaining how “the primary benefit for us in bringing the civil [TVPRA] case [against Weinstein] was the . . . statute of limitations”).
124 Zoom Interview with Jonathan Little, Attorney, Saeed & Little LLP (May 21, 2020).
125 Id.
126 Zoom Interview with Larkin Walsh, Partner, Sharp Law (May 21, 2020).
A. Criminal Legal Reform of Responses to Gender-Based Violence

In 2017, The New York Times and The New Yorker published shocking reports about pervasive sexual abuse by media mogul Harvey Weinstein over a thirty-year period. Subsequently, over eighty women emerged with allegations of sexual misconduct, including eighteen allegations of rape. This sparked an online movement, popularized by the #MeToo hashtag. Tarana Burke first used the term “Me Too” in 2006 to show solidarity with victims of sexual assault and harassment, primarily young women of color. Then, in 2017, actress Alyssa Milano adopted the #MeToo hashtag in response to chronic sexual abuse by Harvey Weinstein. Among many other transformative

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128 This Article uses the term “sexual misconduct” to refer to a variety of unwanted sexual behaviors, including but not limited to sexual assault.


132 See, e.g., Scott, supra note 131 (“The #MeToo movement gained global attention when actress Alyssa Milano tweeted #MeToo after reading about influential Hollywood producer Harvey Weinstein’s history of abuse of women.”).
features, the #MeToo Movement illuminated long-standing deficiencies within criminal and civil legal responses to gender-based violence, and provided new momentum to combat them.\textsuperscript{133} #MeToo came on the heels of decades of legal reform aimed at improving criminal legal responses to sexual assault and domestic violence.\textsuperscript{135} A range of advocates, growing out of the women's rights movement of the 1960s and 1970s, sought to broaden criminal liability and provide new tools to criminal prosecutors.\textsuperscript{136} In response, many states added new domestic violence crimes and revised then-existing state statutes.\textsuperscript{137} Feminist activists also pushed for civil protection orders for victims of domestic abuse. Then, in the 1980s and 1990s, many states moved to criminalize violations of these orders, making it easier for law enforcement to take swift action.\textsuperscript{138} As a whole, these efforts communicated broad condemnation of domestic violence and


\textsuperscript{134} MacKinnon, \textit{Where #MeToo Came From}, supra note 7 (“As #MeToo moves the culture beneath the law of sexual abuse, early indications are that some conventional systemic legal processes may be shifting too.”).

\textsuperscript{135} \textit{See} LEIGH GOODMAN, A TROUBLED MARRIAGE: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 12 (New York Univ. Press 2012) [hereinafter A TROUBLED MARRIAGE].

\textsuperscript{136} \textit{See}, e.g., JAN L. HAGAN & JUDY L. POSTMUS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, No. 199760, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: SYNTHESIS OF RESEARCH FOR ADVOCACY ORGANIZATIONS 1 (2003) (“Since the early 1970s, advocacy organizations have worked on behalf of these [victims of domestic violence and sexual assault] . . . [and] [a]s a result of their efforts, significant changes have occurred in the availability of services, the responsiveness of service systems, and the scope of legal protections.”); SUSAN SCHECHTER, THE ROOTS OF THE BATTERED WOMEN’S MOVEMENT: PERSONAL AND POLITICAL RAISED CONSCIOUSNESS, in WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE 36 (1982) (“Recognizing victims’ needs for emotional and legal support and the movement’s need to document and change sexist abuses in police stations and courts, rape crisis centers trained women to become legal advocates.”); Deborah Epstein, \textit{Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases: Rethinking the Roles of Prosecutors, Judges, and the Court System}, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 3, 13 (1999) (“Since the early 1970s, battered women’s advocates have called upon police and prosecutors to treat domestic violence ‘like any other crime.’”).

\textsuperscript{137} \textit{See} D. KELLY WEISBERG, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LAW 206 (2019) (describing how the crimes, carrying diverse labels, like “domestic abuse,” “domestic assault,” “spouse abuse,” and “family violence,” sought to more appropriately label the crime and assign heightened criminal penalties).

\textsuperscript{138} \textit{See id.} at 209 (“The rise in arrests resulted from the fact that proof of a violation of a protection orders is relatively straightforward.”).
encouraged actors in the criminal legal system to take the conduct seriously.\textsuperscript{139}

Feminist advocates also made strides in reforming criminal rape statutes.\textsuperscript{140} Among many changes, state and federal legislatures passed rape shield laws, provided privilege to rape counseling records, and eliminated marital rape exceptions.\textsuperscript{141} They also removed burdensome evidentiary corroboration requirements and the “reasonable mistake of fact” defense.\textsuperscript{142} Meanwhile, prosecutorial responses to sexual assault evolved to encourage reluctant victims to participate in the criminal legal process.\textsuperscript{143}

Still, these new criminal laws remained unevenly enforced. In 1984, the United States Attorney General's Task Force on Domestic Violence thus called for “toughening” criminal legal responses to intimate partner violence.\textsuperscript{144} The Task Force urged state actors to treat interpersonal violence with an equal measure of seriousness as other crimes.\textsuperscript{145} What followed were vigorous new policies aimed at domestic violence, including mandatory arrest policies and no-drop rules for prosecutors.\textsuperscript{146} While controversial, these efforts were hailed by some

\textsuperscript{139} See id. ("[T]he enactment of domestic violence-specific offenses symbolized the recognition that the public was serious about addressing violence against women.").

\textsuperscript{140} See, e.g., Ilene Seidman & Susan Vickers, The Second Wave: An Agenda for the Next Thirty Years of Rape Law Reform, 38 SUFFOLK UNIV. L. REV. 467, 467-68 (2005) (“The rape reform movement has succeeded in lobbying for significant revisions in antiquated and gender-biased rape statutes.").

\textsuperscript{141} See id. at 467.

\textsuperscript{142} See id.

\textsuperscript{143} See, e.g., Aya Gruber, A “Neo-Feminist Assessment” of Rape and Domestic Violence Law Reform, 15 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 583, 593-94 (2012) (“Making the criminal process a kinder and gentler experience for rape complainants was feminists’ preferred solution to the problem of victims’ participatory reluctance.").


\textsuperscript{145} See HART ET AL., FAMILY VIOLENCE REPORT, supra note 144, at 8 (“A victim of family violence is no less a victim than one set upon by strangers.”); Brozan, supra note 144 (“The legal response to family violence must be guided primarily by the nature of the abusive act, not the relationship between the victim and the abuser.” (internal quotes omitted)).

\textsuperscript{146} See, e.g., LEIGH GOODMARK, DECRIMINALIZING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE iv (2018) (“Those policies were driven by research (later questioned) on the impact of arrest on intimate partner violence, lawsuits brought by antiviolence advocates, funding
advocates as important to establish serious, uniform responses to
remedy allowed victims of gender-motivated crime to bring new civil claims in federal court.\textsuperscript{152}

At the same time, civil litigation by victims of sexual assault — mostly in the form of tort actions against third parties in state courts — saw “exponential growth.”\textsuperscript{153} Civil liability, primarily in the sexual assault context, broadened to include third party defendants, such as schools, employers, nursing homes, and other entities, and third party civil claims proliferated.\textsuperscript{154} This move sought to expand potential options for civil recovery and expose new parties to greater civil liability and public scrutiny.\textsuperscript{155}

B. Deficiencies in Criminal and Civil Mechanisms

Despite such promising developments, the results of criminal and civil legal reforms have been mixed. Outcomes in criminal sexual assault cases have not dramatically improved.\textsuperscript{156} Annually, thousands of criminal sexual assault cases fail to proceed for diverse reasons, including poor law enforcement investigations, insufficient evidence,
lack of political will, and challenges in securing victim cooperation. Many prosecutors remain reluctant to prosecute “difficult” cases. Both judges and juries are often slow to believe victims. While domestic violence cases have been more frequently charged criminally, defendants often enter plea deals leading to milder criminal sentences, even in aggravated assault cases. Moreover, critical race and feminist scholars have described the myriad ways that racism and heteronormativity — both explicit and implicit — intersect and shape who receives protection and who faces punishment.


Deborah Tuerkheimer coined the term “credibility discount” to address how diverse actors — the public, gatekeepers, and perpetrators — “face a persistent skepticism regarding both their accounts of abuse and their recitations of harm.” See Deborah Epstein & Lisa A. Goodman, Discounting Women: Doubting Domestic Violence Survivors’ Credibility and Dismissing Their Experiences, 167 U. PENN. L. REV. 399, 402 (2019) (citing Deborah Tuerkheimer, Incredible Women: Sexual Violence and the Credibility Discount, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 3 (2017)).

See id. at 405.

See, e.g., Nick Keppler, In Allegheny County, Domestic Violence Offenders Often Avoid the Most Serious Punishment, PUBLIC SOURCE (Feb. 18, 2019), https://www.publicsource.org/allegheny-county-domestic-violence-offenders-avoid-most-serious-punishment/ (showing that 773 out of 785 cases in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, involving the domestic violence unit in 2017 ended in a plea agreement, and 80% of aggravated assault cases resulted in plea agreements to misdemeanor charges).

Critical race scholars have written extensively about how individuals at the intersections of poverty, racism, and/or heterosexism face significant barriers when engaging with law enforcement and also may be disproportionately subject to arrest and punishment. See, e.g., PAUL BUTLER, CHOKETHOLD: POLICING BLACK MEN (2017) (describing the role of structural racism in policing and how it disproportionately negatively impacts African American communities); Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 31-38 (1998) (examining how the exercise of prosecutorial discretion is shaped by implicit bias); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1274-76 (2004) (documenting the mass incarceration of African Americans in the United States). Feminist scholars too have highlighted how criminal legal interventions often failed to deliver for victims of color and LGBTQ+ individuals. See, e.g., Leigh Goodmark, Reframing Domestic Violence Law
Civil remedies too have also often remained insufficient. The Morrison decision struck down the VAWA civil remedy, radically circumscribing federal jurisdiction over gender-motivated claims. While victims still filed civil suits in state and federal courts, these claims remained rare relative to high rates of gender-based violence. Poor outcomes were common, due to both doctrinal and institutional

Many thanks to Martha Chamallas for her excellent insights and guidance to understand the complex, nuanced challenges faced by victims of domestic abuse and sexual assault in the tort context.

162 Julie Goldscheid, United States v. Morrison and the Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act: A Civil Rights Law Struck Down in the Name of Federalism, 86 Cornell L. Rev. 109, 109-112 (2000). The U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Morrison found the VAWA civil remedy unconstitutional, blocking victims of gender-motivated violence from bringing such in federal court. Many scholars have viewed this decision a considerable setback for the women's rights movement. See, e.g., Goldscheid, The Civil Rights Remedy, supra note 148, at 139 (“That decision was heavily criticized by civil rights advocates and others as a setback to women’s rights and as one of a line of cases in which the Supreme Court set newly restrictive limits on Congress’ power.”).

163 See Camille Carey, Domestic Violence Torts: Righting a Civil Wrong, 62 Kan. L. Rev. 695 (2014) (“Pain and suffering, physical injuries, and even death arising out of abusive relationships are compensable through tort law, but these claims are rarely filed or discussed.”); Martha Chamallas, Will Tort Law Have its #MeToo Moment?, 11 J. Tort L. 39, 45 (2018) (citing Email from Camille Carey, Professor of Law at Univ. of N.M. Sch. of Law, to Martha Chamallas, Robert J. Lynn Chair in Law at the Ohio State Univ., Moritz Coll. of Law (Dec. 24, 2017)) (noting that while on average more than one-third of women in the United States have experienced violence by an intimate partner in their lifetime, only 165 domestic violence tort cases were filed from 1985 to 2017, according to Professor Camille Carey).
barriers to civil recovery, especially against alleged perpetrators. In the domestic violence context, victims often were unable to recover from perpetrators due to short statutes of limitations, intentional acts exclusions that limit insurance coverage, and the fact that many perpetrators are judgment proof. Many negligence claims also failed to proceed against third parties due to the public duty doctrine, limiting civil claims against government entities. In the sexual assault context, few victims successfully recovered civil damages in tort claims against the perpetrator. They often confronted formidable barriers, including

165 MARTHA CHAMALLAS & JENNIFER B. WRIGGINS, THE MEASURE OF INJURY: RACE, GENDER, & TORT LAW 68 (2010) [hereinafter THE MEASURE OF INJURY] (“Barriers to tort liability now take diverse doctrinal, institutional, and ideological forms that tend to avoid explicitly characterizing the harms as trivial or offering justifications of the actions of abusers.”).


167 See CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, THE MEASURE OF INJURY, supra note 165, at 73 (“[T]he most formidable barrier to tort recovery for domestic violence victims lies . . . in the law’s failure to require or encourage insurers to provide adequate protection for victims of intentional harms.”); Carey, supra note 164, at 719 (“[H]istorical developments in common law, combined with current policy restrictions in insurance coverage, reveals an environment inhospitable to domestic violence torts.”).

168 See Carey, supra note 164, at 730 (“Intentional act and family member exclusions, as supported by state regulation, operate to deny recovery to domestic violence plaintiffs, especially those suing abusers who are judgment proof or have few assets.”).

169 See Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 766-68 (2005) (finding that a victim of domestic violence did not have a Fourteenth Amendment property interest in the enforcement of a civil protection order); G. Kristian Miccio, Exiled from the Province of Care: Domestic Violence, Duty and Conceptions of State Accountability, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 111, 117 (2005) (“The PDD [Public Duty Doctrine] functions at once as a form of immunity and as a waiver of state immunity. It is a positive and negative doctrine that protects both the state and litigants, allowing suit only in the narrowest of circumstances.”).

short statutes of limitations,¹⁷¹ the intentional acts exclusion from insurance,¹⁷² and unfavorable tort doctrine.¹⁷³

Despite these challenges, victims of sexual assault filed more civil tort claims against third parties,¹⁷⁴ and some victims succeeded under negligence theories.¹⁷⁵ Yet, plaintiffs still faced substantial obstacles. Some jurisdictions generally denied recovery, finding no duty to protect against criminal activity.¹⁷⁶ Plaintiffs often contended with comparative


¹⁷² ELLEN BUBLICK, NAT’L ONLINE RESOURCE CTR. ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, CIVIL TORT ACTIONS Filed BY VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT: PROMISE AND PERILS 6 (Sept. 2009), https://vawnet.org/sites/default/files/materials/files/2016-09/AR_CivilTortActions.pdf [https://perma.cc/5MRH-RMQ8] (“Victims typically cannot seek insurance coverage in actions against a perpetrator for sexual assault because insurance policies generally do not cover intended harms.”).

¹⁷³ Tort defendants, for example, often successfully defend tort claims by arguing that victims failed to consent when they say “no” or engage in physical resistance. See Bublick, supra note 19, at 57 (describing “significant set of concerns and challenges presented for victims” in tort cases by “doctrines such as consent that have criminal law analogs and through other doctrines such as comparative apportionment”); Martha Chamallas, The Elephant in the Room: Sidestepping the Affirmative Consent Debate in the Restatement (Third) of Intentional Torts to Persons, 10 J. TORT L. 1, 20 (2017) (explaining the framework of “affirmative consent” doctrine and describing how in the current Restatement the “burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish the absence of actual consent”). Defendants too can lean on the doctrine of apparent consent to argue that a defendant reasonably believed that the plaintiff gave her consent. See Merle Weiner, Domestic Violence and the Per Se Standard of Outrage, 54 Md. L. REV. 230 (1995) (discussing the issue of apparent consent how this and related concepts rest on “age-old notions about domestic relations”).

¹⁷⁴ See BUBLICK, supra note 172, at 6.

¹⁷⁵ Lininger, supra note 153, at 1569 (examining how plaintiffs’ attorneys have targeted new third parties in civil suits, leading to an increase in civil suits for sexual assault victims).

¹⁷⁶ See, e.g., Martha Chamallas, Gaining Some Perspective in Tort Law: A New Take on Third-Party Criminal Attack Cases, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1351, 1354 (2010) (noting a lack of consensus on whether third party defendants owe a duty of care in cases involving sexual assault and criminal attacks when “plaintiffs press negligence claims against landlords, businesses, employers, and other entities for failing to detect and remedy dangerous conditions or otherwise failing . . . to take reasonable precautions to prevent the attacks”).
negligence arguments that may reduce recovery.\textsuperscript{177} Even when plaintiffs did recover, damages awards were capped\textsuperscript{178} in certain contexts and varied greatly.\textsuperscript{179} Thus, victims — in the face of immense challenges and uncertainty — often chose to settle civil claims and trade their silence for whatever monetary recovery was readily available.\textsuperscript{180}

\section*{C. Generative Trend}

Most of these institutions like the Weinstein company are so well-funded and have such incredible . . . resources. It is so important for lawyers to be continually adapting and responding to these really intensive defensive efforts and coming up with new theories — not giving up on the novel ones, pushing forward the novel ones. Even when the initial

\textsuperscript{177} See Bublick, \textit{supra} note 19, at 83 (“Although traditionally intentional tortfeasors such as rapists were not allowed to defend based on the victim's contributory fault, a few courts have permitted victim comparative-fault defenses to even the most egregious intentional torts.”).

\textsuperscript{178} Many states, for example, have capped damages against third parties, including limitations on compensatory and punitive damages. \textit{See}, e.g., \textit{STATE TORT LIMITS, supra note 171}.

\textsuperscript{179} \textit{See}, e.g., Univ. of S. Miss. v. Williams, 891 So. 2d 160, 175-76 (Miss. 2004) (initially awarding $800,000 to a doctoral student who was sexually assaulted by a member of her doctoral committee but remanding for new trial because the damages were too speculative); A.R.B. v. Elkin, 98 S.W.3d 99, 103-05 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) (remanding case to calculate new damages when the trial court only awarded $100 for the cisgender male child victim and no damages for the cisgender female child victims); Kravitz v. Beech Hill Hosp., 808 A.2d 34 (N.H. 2002) (initially awarding the plaintiff $130 but later reducing to $0); Smith v. Holmes, No. 03-02-00438-CV, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 2509, at *1 (3d Dist. Mar. 27, 2003) (awarding $18.5 million in damages against the perpetrator of sexual assault); Kink v. Combs, 135 N.W.2d 789, 791, 798-99 (Wis. 1965) (upholding an award to the plaintiff of $12,500 against the victim’s employer).

\textsuperscript{180} Nondisclosure agreements also have proliferated, allowing defendants — both perpetrators and third parties — to settle claims silently and for abuse to continue in some cases. \textit{See} David A. Hoffman & Erik Lampmann, \textit{Hushing Contracts}, 97 \text{\textsc{Wash. U. L. Rev.}} 165, 174 (2019) (“When a firm pays a survivor to remain silent about past abuse, it is more likely to leave in place abusers and the culture that enables them.”); \textit{see}, e.g., Elizabeth A. Harris, \textit{Despite #MeToo Glare, Efforts to Ban Secret Settlements Stop Short}, \textit{N.Y. Times} (June 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/14/arts/metoo-movement-nda.html [https://perma.cc/N5NM-X6PM] (“When these men were accused of sexual abuse or harassment, they would use a legal tool that was practically magical in its power to make their problems disappear: a nondisclosure agreement.”).
reaction is, oh, that doesn’t work. That doesn’t apply. We’ve got to keep pushing forward.\textsuperscript{181}

— Plaintiff’s attorney

The #MeToo Movement has brought new attention to the problem of gender-based violence in its many forms.\textsuperscript{182} Driven by journalists who provided in-depth accounts of abuse of Weinstein and new social media accounts of victims,\textsuperscript{183} the #MeToo Movement brought forward new accounts of sexual misconduct.\textsuperscript{184} It also showcased continuing gaps in the legal system and bolstered the credibility of victims who stepped forward.\textsuperscript{185} In addition, the #MeToo Movement highlighted the role of institutions — including USA Gymnastics,\textsuperscript{186} the Weinstein

\textsuperscript{181} Zoom Interview with Tim Hale, Partner, Nye, Stirling, Hale & Miller LLP (May 25, 2020).

\textsuperscript{182} See Deborah Tuerkheimer, Beyond #MeToo, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1146, 1147 (2019) (“As allegations against Weinstein multiplied in the coming weeks and months, the media intensified its focus on sexual misconduct by other powerful men.”).

\textsuperscript{183} See, e.g., Farrow, supra note 127; Swetha Kannan & Priya Krishnakumar, A Powerful Person Has Been Accused of Misconduct at a Rate of Nearly Once Every 20 Hours Since Weinstein, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 29, 2017), https://www.latimes.com/projects/la-na-sexual-harassment-fallout [https://perma.cc/4MQJ-LHVK]; Kantor & Twohey, supra note 127.

\textsuperscript{184} See MacKinnon, Where #MeToo Came From, supra note 7 (“But #MeToo has been driven not by litigation but by mainstream and social media, bringing down men (and some women) as women (and some men) have risen up.”).

\textsuperscript{185} See id. (“This unprecedented wave of speaking out has begun to erode the two biggest barriers to ending all forms of sexual abuse in law and in life: the disbelief and the trivializing dehumanization of victims.”).

Corporation, Miramax, and Michigan State University — that covered up or benefited from abuse.

In response, scholars and activists advocated for much-needed reform. Some scholars called for improvements in the existing criminal legal framework. Others eschewed criminal law altogether, arguing that only restorative justice and community-based models could better respond to victims — each with unique motivations, identities, and circumstances. Some scholars focused squarely on civil legal

187 See Megan Twohey, Weinstein Company Was Aware of Payouts in 2015, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/11/business/weinstein-company.html (describing evidence that the board members of the Weinstein Corporation had been “grappling with Mr. Weinstein’s behavior for at least two years” before the allegations became public).

188 Several victims have filed civil suits against Miramax, alleging that the company “turned a blind-eye to the alleged abuses and some were complicit in facilitating some encounters.” See, e.g., Lauren del Valle, A New Civil Lawsuit Alleges Harvey Weinstein Raped a 17-year-old in the 1990s, CNN (May 29, 2020, 7:45 PM ET), https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/29/us/new-weinstein-rape-allegations-lawsuit/index.html (describing a new civil suit by four Jane Does against Weinstein, his brother, Robert Weinstein, Miramax, and Disney, which owned Miramax for a time).


190 In the context of gender-based violence, many scholars readily acknowledge the deficiencies of criminal legal responses to domestic and sexual violence but view state intervention as a necessary — though imperfect — means to ensure victim safety and punish perpetrators. See, e.g., Donald Dripps, After Rape Law: Will the Turn to Consent Normalize the Prosecution of Sexual Assault?, 41 AKRON L. REV. 957, 976 (2008) (proposing a sex crimes court that could not impose more than six months in jail to bypass “popular prejudice”); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reforming the Law of Rape, 35 LAW & INEQ. 335 (calling for continued reform of criminal rape laws).

191 Legal scholars have written persuasively about the need to envision restorative justice approaches to gender-based harms. See, e.g., Laurie Kohn, What’s so Funny About Peace, Love, and Understanding? Restorative Justice as a New Paradigm for Domestic Violence Intervention, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 517, 521-22 (2010) (arguing that criminal legal interventions have not been effective and advocating for restorative justice approaches to domestic violence); Lesley Wexler, Jennifer K. Robbenolt & Colleen Murphy, #MeToo, Time’s Up, and Theories of Justice, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 45, 48 (2019) (articulating a “call for restorative justice by exploring its key components — including acknowledgement, responsibility-taking, harm repair, nonrepetition, and reintegration” in application to sexual harassment in the workplace); Lara Bazelon & Aya Gruber, #MeToo Doesn’t Always Have to Mean Prison, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/02/opinion/metoo-doesnt-always-have-to-mean-prison.html (arguing that “#MeToo rightly emphasizes
remedies, ranging from civil protective orders to civil suits, as an important site for justice.192

Meanwhile, civil litigators, confronted with imperfect legal avenues, have, in real time, adopted new, creative strategies.193 They have engaged in proactive, dynamic refashioning of existing civil statutes and common law remedies, many of which were not designed initially to combat sexual assault or interpersonal violence. Strategies have included the filing of new defamation, federal RICO, and anti-trafficking claims.194

Victims have tested the waters in many jurisdictions and, some — at least in the initial pleadings stage — have won.195 Such efforts, while still nascent, have the potential to be broadly transformative. In

victims’ healing and accountability” and that “[r]estorative justice may be a way to achieve both”). Other legal scholars have long advocated for abolitionist approach, which seeks “a long-range goal” to eliminate the criminal legal system and prisons. Angela Y. Davis, legal scholar and activist, has highlighted that “there are many versions of prison abolitionism—including those that propose to abolish punishment altogether and replace it with reconciliatory responses to criminal acts.” Angela Y. Davis & Dylan Rodriguez, The Challenge of Prison Abolition: A Conversation, 27 SOC. JUST. 212, 215 (2000). Critical legal scholars and activists, thus, have fought to envision an abolitionist approach to gender-based violence. In 2001, Critical Resistance and INCITE! Women of Color Against Violence, for example, issued a call to “develop responses to gender violence that do not depend on a sexist, racist, classist, and homophobic criminal justice system.” Incite! - Critical Resistance Statement: Statement on Gender Violence and the Prison Industrial Complex, INCITE! (2001), https://incite-national.org/incite-critical-resistance-statement/ [https://perma.cc/Z8MT-MPC6] (“It is also important that we develop strategies that challenges the criminal justice system and that also provide safety for survivors of sexual and domestic violence.”). Moreover, feminist legal scholars have articulated abolitionist approaches to gender-based harms. See generally Goodmark, supra note 161, at 46-47 (arguing that the narrow solutions offered by the criminal legal system — including “arrest, prosecute, secure a protective order, go to a shelter, get a divorce” — fail to offer women “real choices” or honor the “diversity of women’s goals”).

192 See, e.g., Carey, supra note 164, at 696 (exploring “the many benefits offered by tort law for domestic violence plaintiffs and propose[ing] a paradigm shift in domestic violence lawyering to incorporate significantly more tort litigation”); Margaret E. Johnson, Redefining Harm, Reimagining Remedies, and Reclaiming Domestic Violence Law, 42 UC DAVIS L. REV. 1107, 1114 (2009) (arguing that civil protection orders to “provide for remedies that permit a multidimensional reordering of the relationship”).

193 This phenomenon is not new. In the late 1990s, as criminal domestic violence and sexual assault cases failed to proceed, litigators turned to tort remedies to find “a more congenial and effective forum.” Bublick, supra note 19, at 68. This development led to the doctrinal expansion of tort law to address both perpetrators and third parties in the sexual assault context. See id. at 58-67.

194 See infra Part.II.C.2, for more information about relevant RICO claims. For a detailed discussion of cases brought under the TVPA, see infra Part III.

195 See infra Part III.
particular, the deployment of trafficking statutes in federal civil suits has provided a new federal forum for victims to seek expansive civil damages and a mechanism to hold accountable third parties that “knowingly benefit[]” from gender-based harms. This trend has potentially dramatic and lasting implications.

1. Defamation Claims

Defamation is a common-law tort with deep roots in the law of England and the United States. The underpinning of defamation law is defense against reputational attacks. Yet, victims are now wielding defamation suits to validate their claims of gender-based harms and win monetary damages. Leigh Corfman, for example, alleged that Alabama U.S. Senate Candidate Roy Moore sexually abused her when she was 14-years-old. Far after the statute of limitations had run on applicable civil and criminal avenues, Corfman brought a defamation suit in 2018 against

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196 See Rodney A. Smolla, Law of Defamation § 1.2 (2d ed. 2020). For example, the Laws of Alfred the Great in the ninth century noted that public slander was “to be compensated with no lighter a penalty than the cutting off of [the slanderer’s] tongue.” Colin Rhys Lovell, The “Reception” of Defamation by the Common Law, 15 Vand. L. Rev. 1051, 1053 (1962).

197 David Rolph, Reputation, Celebrity, and Defamation Law xxi (2008) (“Defamation proceedings constitute the principal remedy afforded by our legal system for defending an individual’s reputation.”).

198 The trend towards defamation suits has been buoyed by the #MeToo Movement. See Julia Jacobs, #MeToo Cases’ New Legal Battleground: Defamation Lawsuits, N.Y. Times (Jan. 12, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/12/arts/defamation-me-too.html [https://perma.cc/57VZ-P97J] (noting how some 17% (33 out of 193) of cases supported by the TIME’s UP Legal Defense Fund involved defamation claims).

199 Defamation claims have been used by both victims and alleged perpetrators to validate their version of events. See Jacobs, supra note 198 (“[U]nable to pursue justice directly, women and men on both sides of #MeToo are embracing the centuries-old tool of defamation lawsuits, opening an alternative legal battleground for accusations of sexual misconduct.”); Peter S. Lubin & Patrick Austermuehle, #MeToo Movement has Spawned a Flood of New Defamation Lawsuits, Lubin Austermuehle (Mar. 15, 2020), https://www.chicagobusinesslitigationlawyerblog.com/metoo-movement-has-spawned-a-flood-of-new-defamation-lawsuits/ [https://perma.cc/L65W-G2YF] (“For many plaintiffs, suing for defamation provides them the opportunity to air the facts of what happened years ago, even if they are unable to hold the accused criminally liable.”).

Moore after he and his campaign denied her accusations of abuse. Commenting on the defamation suit, Corfman noted that she sought, “to do what I could not do as a 14-year-old — hold Mr. Moore and those who enable him accountable.”

Similarly, actress Ashley Judd, one of the first women to bring allegations of sexual misconduct against Harvey Weinstein, used defamation law to keep her civil claims afloat. Judd filed her complaint in Los Angeles Superior Court, alleging that in the 1990s, Weinstein invited her to a breakfast meeting and allegedly pressured her to allow him to touch her sexually in his hotel room. In her civil suit against Weinstein, Judd included defamation claims. She asserted that it was defamation when Weinstein's studio, Miramax, later called Judd a “nightmare to work with” who should be “avoid[ed] at all costs,” and when Weinstein convinced producer Peter Jackson not to hire her. While a federal judge dismissed her sexual harassment claims in 2018, he allowed the defamation claims to move forward. Similar

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201 See Astor, supra note 200.
202 Associated Press, supra note 200.
205 Id.
206 Id. at 2.
Defamation suits have been brought by plaintiffs against President Donald Trump, actor Bill Cosby, and actor Johnny Depp. Despite some victories, defamation claims still face considerable legal challenges. In particular, courts have deemed some victims, who have waded into the #MeToo debate, as “limited-purpose” public figures and required them to meet a heightened standard of “actual malice.” For example, in *Hughes v. Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc.*, Fox News guest Scottie Nell Hughes alleged that she was sexually assaulted by Fox host Charles Payne and filed a defamation suit after Fox’s statements to the *National Enquirer* “mischaracteriz[ing] the nature of the sexual relationship as consensual.” The district court dismissed her defamation claims, finding that Hughes was a public figure who failed to demonstrate “actual malice.”

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212 These heightened pleading and evidentiary standards, especially early in the litigation, remain challenging to overcome. The Supreme Court in *New York Times Co. v. Sullivan*, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), established a heightened standard applicable to public officials, requiring them to show that the defendant engaged in the defamatory conduct with “actual malice.” *Id.* at 279-80. This standard then was extended to “limited-purpose” public figures, including “an individual [who] voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular public controversy and thereby becomes a public figure for a limited range of issues.” *Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.*, 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974).


214 *Id.* at 433.
2. RICO Claims


When RICO passed in 1970, it was conceived as a tool to prosecute large criminal enterprises, such as the Mafia.\footnote{RICO was enacted shortly after the Senate Committee determined that “organized crime in the United States is a highly sophisticated, diversified, and widespread activity that annually drains billions of dollars from America’s economy.” Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, §904(a), 84 Stat. 922-23 (1970).} RICO provided a civil remedy that allows for “powerful and intrusive” remedies, including the recovery of treble damages and attorneys’ fees.\footnote{Section 1964(c) provides that “any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 . . . may sue therefore in any appropriate United States District Court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.” 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2018). The remedies are expansive, including “injunctive relief, reasonable restrictions on defendants’ future activities, disgorgement of unlawful proceeds, divestiture, dissolution, reorganization, removal from positions in an entity, and appointment of court officers to administer and supervise the affairs and operations of defendants’ entities and to assist courts in monitoring compliance with courts’ orders and in imposing sanctions for violations of courts’ order.” \textit{U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RICO: A MANUAL FOR ATTORNEYS} 3 (2007), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usam/legacy/2014/10/17/civrico.pdf [https://perma.cc/S3S6-JTDN].} It also offered plaintiffs a generous statute of limitations.\footnote{While RICO has a four-year statute of limitations, it has a very generous accrual rule. See \textit{Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc.}, 483 U.S. 143, 156-57 (1987) (finding that RICO established a uniform statute of limitations for civil cases).}
Victims recently have turned to class action RICO claims to secure greater damages, hold third parties accountable, seek out greater publicity, and overcome statutes of limitations issues. For example, in 2017, plaintiffs in *Geiss v. Weinstein Co. Holdings LLC* filed a federal civil complaint under the RICO statute against Harvey Weinstein, the Weinstein Company, and others, alleging that his sexual misconduct amounted to a “Weinstein Sexual Enterprise.” In particular, plaintiffs argued that Weinstein’s inner circle engaged in a cover up of the harassment conduct through obstruction of justice and “multiple instances of mail and wire fraud.” By assisting Mr. Weinstein, they engaged in an “association in fact,” which amounted to a RICO violation.

RICO claims, such as in *Geiss*, however, have been slow to gain traction. While some lawyers see the Weinstein case as a “classic RICO case,” many plaintiffs have failed to survive the initial pleading stage. Some scholars and litigators argue that this is, in part, because judges are increasingly skeptical of RICO claims. Further, the pleading standard is quite high, and it is often difficult to demonstrate

219 See Mark, supra note 215 (“In my opinion, the RICO claim’s primary value is to bring publicity to the lawsuit,’ Jeffrey Grell, a University of Minnesota law professor who has written a book on RICO, told Business Insider.”).

220 *Geiss Complaint*, supra note 215, at 3; see also Maya Salam, *6 Women Sue Harvey Weinstein and His Former Businesses in Proposed Class Action*, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/06/business/harvey-weinstein-class-action.html [https://perma.cc/KKW5-348K] (“A lawsuit seeking class-action status was filed on Wednesday against Harvey Weinstein, Miramax, the Weinstein Company and members of its board, claiming that these entities worked to ‘perpetuate and conceal Weinstein’s widespread sexual harassment and assault,’ a cover-up that amounts to civil racketeering.”).

221 *Geiss Complaint*, supra note 215, at 56.

222 See id. at 55-59.

223 See, e.g., Mark, supra note 215 (quoting Steve Berman, who called the case “a classic case for RICO”).

224 See id.

225 Zoom Interview with Ryan Hudson, Attorney, Sharp Law LLP (May 21, 2020) (noting that, “a lot of federal judges are hostile to civil RICO”).
a qualifying injury. In Geiss, for example, a federal judge dismissed all RICO claims against Weinstein for failure to state a claim.

3. Anti-Trafficking Claims

Where defamation and RICO claims have stalled, civil anti-trafficking claims have gained momentum. Indeed, in some cases, the same plaintiffs who raised novel RICO claims have turned now to the TVPRA. They have argued that certain forms of gender-based harms, may constitute federal trafficking violations, including sex trafficking, forced labor, or involuntary servitude. Plaintiffs have diverse motivations for this shift. Some have invoked the TVPRA to overcome statutes of limitations, implead third parties who “knowingly benefit[]” from the conduct, and seek civil damages and attorney’s fees.

226 See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2018) (providing that “[a] person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor”). This requirement has been interpreted narrowly by many courts, requiring that the plaintiff show a proprietary type of damage. See, e.g., Grogan v. Platt, 835 F.2d 844, 847 (11th Cir. 1988) (interpreting the term “injury” narrowly to apply to a business or property).


228 See supra Part I.D, for greater discussion of the motivation of plaintiffs’ attorneys and the benefits of filing under the TVPRA.

229 See supra Part I.D.

230 See supra Part I.D.

have sought a federal forum, which may be friendlier to claims than state courts.\footnote{232 See supra Part I.D; see, e.g., Zoom Interview with Jonathan Little, Attorney, Saeed & Little LLP (May 21, 2020) (describing the benefits to filing federal claims if state courts are not as receptive to civil tort claims).} For example, in Geiss, the same plaintiffs who alleged RICO violations filed an amended complaint to include new civil violations of the TVPRA. \footnote{233 See Geiss v. Weinstein Co. Holdings LLC, 383 F. Supp. 3d 156, 168 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).} Therein, plaintiffs argued that Weinstein’s sexual assault conduct amounted to “commercial sex acts” and thus sex trafficking.\footnote{234 Id.} On April 18, 2019, Judge Alvin Hellerstein of the Southern District of New York, allowed the TVPRA claims to proceed, relying on two prior district court decisions that applied the TVPRA to Weinstein’s conduct.\footnote{235 For example, see infra at Part III.A.} While this new trend is still in its early stages, it has the potential to transform civil and criminal legal responses in significant ways.

III. COURTS SEEK TO RESOLVE TENSIONS

Part III examines how civil litigators have turned to the TVPRA to generate new remedies for victims of gender-based crime and how judges have signaled growing receptivity to such claims. Some federal district courts, for example, have interpreted “labor” or “services” to mean “work involving mental or physical exertion.”\footnote{236 See infra at Part III.C.} Similarly, judges have held that a “commercial sex act” includes sex in exchange for job advancement, allowing plaintiffs effectively to reframe certain sexual assault conduct as sex trafficking.\footnote{237 See infra at Part III.C.} These federal court decisions allow civil litigators and prosecutors to re-envision new cases and conduct as human trafficking under federal law. Trafficking, for example, could now include a victim of domestic abuse, forced by her spouse to fold the laundry. Trafficking also could include a perpetrator of sexual assault who uses power or the potential to advance the career of his victim to coerce sex.
A. United States v. Marcus

In *United States v. Marcus*, the court considered whether the TVPA applies to an intimate, domestic relationship. Marcus involved a BDSM relationship between the defendant, Glenn Marcus, and his victim. The relationship eventually became nonconsensual, and according to trial testimony, Marcus exposed the victim to increasingly severe “punishments.” The defendant also forced her to create a website, called “Slavespace,” and work for approximately eight to nine hours per day to update pictures and online diary entries. The government, in 2007 through a superseding indictment, charged Marcus with violating the federal sex trafficking and forced labor statutes.

While the facts of the case were particularly unique and egregious, one of the primary questions presented was quite basic: Should the TVPA apply to intimate, domestic relationships? The trial transcript makes clear that the parties understood the far-reaching implications of any ruling. During jury deliberation, the jury asked for clarification about whether sexual acts could be considered “labor” or “services.” This question incited spirited debate from counsel. Counsel for Marcus strenuously objected to the government’s broad definition, which defined “labor and services” as acts involving mental or physical exertion. He argued that this interpretation would “broaden[] the

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238 BDSM is a sexual lifestyle involving erotic practices or roleplaying, including bondage, discipline, dominance and submission, sadomasochism, and other dynamics. Marcus, 583 F.3d at 98.

239 See generally id. at 99 (“Marcus engaged in BDSM activities with Jodi and Joanna . . . . ”).

240 See id. (describing these “punishments” as activities involving egregious sexual violence that was photographed and posted online).

241 Id.

242 Id. at 100.


244 See id. (“Your Honor, for count two, we they [sic] want clarification what constitutes acts of labor in this case. Which of the following alleged acts are to be considered? Setting up and maintaining web sites, writing diaries, posing for pictures, HTML coding, clicking ads, recruiting services of other trainees, commercial sex acts?”).

245 See id. at 1428-41.

246 Id. at 1429.
statute beyond its intended scope."²⁴⁷ He offered the example of a married couple who operate a bed and breakfast together and their relationship turns violent.²⁴⁸ “[W]as the [forced labor] statute intended to punish that kind of behavior?,” he asked. “I don’t think so.”²⁴⁹

The government disagreed, arguing that this hypothetical fit squarely within the forced labor statute:

The point is yes, it could be a forced labor. If I said to my husband or wife, you will make breakfast every morning for me or else I’ll kill you, that could be a form of forced labor. I’m sorry, that is the definition.²⁵⁰

Defense counsel commented that such a broad definition would risk labeling any BDSM relationship, regardless of consent, forced labor.²⁵¹ Even further, he argued, it would risk relabeling all rape as forced labor.²⁵² In response, the judge paused, seeming reluctant to adopt either definition. The government then offered a third way forward — to “not define labor at all”²⁵³ — and the court agreed to adopt this “wait and see” approach.²⁵⁴

After a jury trial, Marcus was convicted on both counts.²⁵⁵ On appeal, the defendant asked to set aside the convictions, arguing again that the TVPA should not apply to “intimate, domestic relationship[s].”²⁵⁶ The court ultimately disagreed, upholding both convictions. In particular, the court remarked that the TVPA can apply to “intimate, domestic relationship[s].”²⁵⁷ The court found that “the Congressional purpose and findings of the TVPA make clear the intended broad scope of the

²⁴⁷ Id. at 1428. Defense counsel advocated for a definition of labor that is “work of any type for which either remuneration or compensation . . . .” Id. at 1429.
²⁴⁸ Id. at 1432-33.
²⁴⁹ Id. at 1433.
²⁵⁰ Id.
²⁵¹ Id. at 1437.
²⁵² Id. at 1439-40 (quoting the government attorney as asserting, “All I can say, I think technically, it is possible to bring a case based on a factual situation that looks like rape. It is technically within the law”).
²⁵³ Id. at 1440.
²⁵⁴ Id. At the trial court level, the judge refused to explicitly define the term, noting that “labor” should be “understood in its common, everyday sense.” Id. at 1441.
²⁵⁵ United States v. Marcus, 628 F.3d 36, 38 (2d Cir. 2010).
²⁵⁷ Id. at 301-04. The judge adopted the government’s broad interpretations of both “labor” and “commercial sex act,” finding that “labor” should be defined to include “an expenditure of physical or mental effort especially when fatiguing, difficult, or compulsory” and defining “services” as “useful labor that does not produce tangible commodity.” See id.
The court pointed out that, “while the legislative history does not address situations where traffickers have intimate relationships with their victims, the court’s survey of the TVPA’s legislative history reveals no expressed intention to preclude criminal liability in those contexts.” The court also adopted broad definitions of “commercial sex act” and “labor and services.” It thus opened the door for the TVPA to apply to other forms of gender-based violence.

B. United States v. Kaufman

In 2008, the Tenth Circuit, relying upon Marcus, endorsed a similarly expansive view of forced labor and involuntary servitude offenses. United States v. Kaufman involved two defendants charged with involuntary servitude and forced labor for forcing mentally ill patients to engage in sexual acts and perform manual labor. As in Marcus, the defendants argued that “labor” and “services” should be interpreted narrowly to include only “work in the economic sense” and exclude the nudity and sexual acts that defendants video recorded.

Ultimately, the district court disagreed with this narrow framing, instructing the jury that “labor” means “the expenditure of physical or mental effort,” and “services” is “conduct or performance that assists or benefits someone or something.” The jury then convicted the Kaufmans of two counts of forced labor and three counts of involuntary servitude, among other charges. On appeal, the defendants argued that the district court plainly erred “by failing to limit the definitions of ‘labor’ and ‘services’ to ‘work in an economic sense.’” The Tenth

258 Id. at 301.
259 Id.
260 See id. at 301-04.
261 United States v. Kaufman, 546 F.3d 1242, 1263 (10th Cir. 2008).
262 Id. at 1246 (describing how federal authorities “learned that, over a period of more than fifteen years, the Kaufmans had directed the severely mentally ill residents of the Kaufman House to perform sexually explicit acts and farm labor in the nude while maintaining that these acts constituted legitimate psychotherapy for the residents’ mental illnesses”).
263 See id. at 1260. At trial, the jury was instructed that “labor and services” were defined, as in Marcus, using their ordinary meaning to define “labor” as “the expenditure of physical or mental effort” and “services” as “conduct or performance that assists or benefits someone or something.” Id.
264 Id.
265 Id. at 1246.
266 Id. at 1247. The defendants contended that such a broad definition impermissibly “allowed them to be convicted for inducing the nudity and the sexual acts recorded on the videotapes.” Id. at 1260.
Circuit, however, disagreed. While the court acknowledged that traditional Thirteenth Amendment and involuntary servitude jurisprudence applied to “work in the economic sense,” it adopted a wider construction of “labor” and “services.” The court, moreover, pointed to Marcus, to support its views that the TVPA applied to intimate relationships.

C. Civil Litigators Test the Boundaries

Armed with Marcus and Kaufman, creative civil litigators have now filed civil suits, deploying the TVPRA in new ways. The federal civil case against Warren Jeffs highlights this creative deployment of federal anti-trafficking statutes. Jeffs, a self-proclaimed “prophet” in the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Chris of Latter-Day Saints (“FLDS”), was infamous for sanctioning the spiritual marriage of children and using religion to hide his chronic sexual abuse of minors. In 2011,

267 Id. at 1261-63.
268 Id. at 1261-62 (quoting Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 241 (1911)).
269 See United States v. Marcus, 487 F. Supp. 2d 289, 301 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (“While the legislative history does not address situations where traffickers have intimate relationships with their victims, the court’s survey of the [Trafficking Victims Protection Act’s] legislative history reveals no expressed intention to preclude criminal liability in those contexts.”).
270 See, e.g., Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant Harvey Weinstein’s Motion to Dismiss, Noble v. Weinstein, 333 F. Supp. 3d 504 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2018) (No. 17 Civ. 9260), 2018 WL 4292552 (arguing that the TVPRA applies to a single sexual assault in exchange for job advancement); Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint, A.J. et al. v. Weber, No. 18-cv-12112 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2019) (showcasing the creative use of TVPRA by applying it to a casting-couch sexual exploitation case).
271 See Bistline v. Parker, 918 F.3d 849, 854-61 (10th Cir. 2019) (describing the civil complaint filed by plaintiffs that alleges that Jeffs and his law firm contributed to sex trafficking and forced labor when he sanctioned the sexual abuse of minors). It is important to note that not all such cases have enjoyed success. At least one court has required the plaintiffs more clearly establish a connection between the sex act and the “exchange of an item of value” to amount to a “commercial sex act.” See Kolbek v. Twenty First Century Holiness Tabernacle Church, Inc., No. 10-CV-4124, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180463, at *53 (W.D. Ark. Dec. 24, 2013). Despite facts quite similar to Jeffs, the district court in the Western District of Arkansas dismissed the federal civil TVPRA claims, finding that while the conduct fell within the ten-year statute of limitations, the sex acts did not amount to “commercial sex acts” under the TVPA. See id. at *22, *53-55, *55 n.17.
272 Bistline, 918 F.3d at 856-57 (alleging that Jeffs used the FLDS Church and his affiliation with a local law office to “institutionalize this atrocious practice and to cloak it with the superficial trappings of legal acceptance”).
Jeffs was found guilty of sex crimes and sentenced to life in prison. Even so, the criminal case did little to help Jeffs’ many victims. Slow to come forward due to fear of reprisals and social stigma, dozens found their civil claims barred by statutes of limitations.

In 2016, thirty-one of Jeffs’ victims fashioned a new legal strategy. Plaintiffs filed a federal civil suit under the TVPRA against Jeffs, his attorney, and the law firm who represented Jeffs, seeking civil damages. The plaintiffs in Bistline v. Parker alleged that Jeffs and his law firm and attorney, Rodney Parker, coordinated with Jeffs “to create a legal framework that would shield him from the legal ramifications of child rape, forced labor, extortion, and the causing of emotional distress by separating families.” While this may seem like the quintessential “sex slavery” that Congress sought to address, plaintiffs still faced challenges showing that Jeffs engaged in a “commercial sex act” for sex trafficking or “labor” or “services” to establish forced labor.

In 2017, the attorney defendants filed motions to dismiss. Attorneys for the law firm asserted that while Jeffs allegedly committed “wrongs,” “it is legally incorrect to refer to the FLDS Members as ‘slaves’ or ‘involuntary servants.’” They further asserted that the forced labor

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274 Bistline, 918 F.3d at 862 (holding that civil claims under other statutes were barred by the statute of limitations). A few victims were successful in bringing civil suits. See, e.g., Former Child Bride Wins $16M Lawsuit vs. FLDS, Associated Press (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/arizona/2017/09/06/ex-teen-bride-wins-16-million-case-against-flds/638020001/ [https://perma.cc/96T6-BBRR]. Many victims faced reprisals, ostracism, and stigma from FLDS preventing them from filing suits until the statute of limitations had expired. See, e.g., Sarah Tory, Lawsuit Sheds Light on How Jeffs Ruled FLDS, Journal (Apr. 28, 2018, 8:24 PM), https://thejournal.com/articles/1729 [https://perma.cc/HE72-9CH6] (describing how victims feared expulsion and threats, including having rocks thrown at cars and dead animals left on their porches).

275 See generally Bistline, 918 F.3d at 854, 870. Plaintiffs in Bistline argued that “the FLDS Church in general, and Mr. Jeffs in particular, were the primary offenders who forced FLDS members to engage in labor and sexual acts” and that law partner Rodney Parker and his firm participated in a prohibited “venture” and thus benefitted financially from prohibited conduct. See id. at 871.

276 Id. at 834.

277 See discussion supra Parts I.B, I.C.

278 See generally Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum in Support, Bistline, 918 F.3d 849 (No. 2:16-cv-00788).

279 Id. at 15.
and involuntary servitude statutes were not intended to reach Jeffs' conduct. The federal district court agreed, dismissing the plaintiff's TVPRA claims for failure to state a claim without further explanation.

Then, on March 14, 2019, U.S. Circuit Judge Stephanie Seymour, writing on behalf of the three-judge panel in the Tenth Circuit, revived the TVPRA claims. She adopted the plaintiff's broad definition of "labor" and "services." Judge Seymour noted that, "[l]abor or services in § 1589 is not limited to work in an economic sense and extends to forced sexual acts" and that Jeffs' conduct, thus, may amount to forced labor. She pointed to the fact that Jeffs "purported control over every aspect of their lives, which create[d] the ability to punish malcontents or recalcitrant followers with swift and horrendous punishments, including the loss of all shelter, food, medical care, cash, livelihood, and other essential support mechanisms necessary to an endurable daily existence." The case, thus, is remarkable on two fronts — first, the broadened interpretations of "labor" and "services," and second, the application of the TVPRA to new third parties, such as lawyers, who "knowingly benefit[ ]" from trafficking conduct. The civil case was remanded and remains pending as of this writing.

In *Gilbert v. United States Olympic Committee*, the federal district court in the District of Colorado also found that sexual abuse by a Taekwondo coach and his brother could amount to "labor" or "services" under the forced labor statute and "commercial sex acts" under the sex trafficking statute. This case did not originate as a TVPRA claim. Rather, it began as a civil complaint for negligence in the U.S. District of Colorado on April 25, 2018, filed by Heidi Gilbert against Taekwondo coach Jean

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280 *Id.* at 15-16 (stating that the involuntary servitude statutes "have been construed 'in a way consistent with the understanding of the Thirteenth Amendment,' which was enacted after the Civil War to abolish slavery"). Similarly, the defendants argued that the plaintiffs' allegations of forced labor are a "a far cry from either the requirements of or purpose" behind the statute, which was "passed to implement the Thirteenth Amendment against slavery or involuntary servitude." *Id.* at 16-17.

281 *See Bistline*, 918 F.3d at 862.

282 *See id.* at 876.

283 *See id.* at 872 (first citing *Ricchio v. McLean*, 853 F.3d 553, 556 (1st Cir. 2017); and then citing *United States v. Kaufman*, 546 F.3d 1242, 1259-63 (10th Cir. 2008)).

284 *See id.* at 872-73.

285 *Id.* at 871.

286 *See Docket, Bistline*, 918 F.3d 849 (No. 2:16-cv-00788).


288 *See Complaint and Jury Demand, Gilbert*, No. 18-cv-00981 (D. Colo. Mar. 6, 2019), ECF No. 1.
Lopez. Then, on May 4, 2018, the plaintiff, along with three other named victims, filed an amended class action complaint, alleging violations of the TVPRA against Lopez, his brother, the United States Olympic Committee ("USOC") and USA Taekwondo, Inc. ("TKD"), among others. The plaintiffs argued that “over two decades of sexual abuse, exploitation, and trafficking of Team USA’s Olympic Taekwondo athletes by the Olympic entities, officials, coaches, and mentors who were entrusted to protect them.” In particular, they alleged that the pattern of sexual abuse amounted to forced labor under 18 U.S.C. § 1589(a)(2) and “commercial sex acts” under 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1). Plaintiffs asserted that the USOC knowingly benefited from this conduct by engaging in a “feedback loop of sexual abuse, exploitation, and trafficking of young athletes, all so that the officials leading the USOC . . . can feed the U.S. Olympics machine, which runs on ‘medals and money.’”

The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the TVPRA was not intended to reach such sexual abuse conduct. On March 6, 2019, the district court denied the motion. The court adopted the definition of “labor” or “services” from Kaufman, relying on the ordinary definition of “labor” or “services” and finding that it covered the defendants’ conduct. The civil case remains pending with the district court, as of this writing.

Civil cases against Harvey Weinstein further raised a new, but closely related question: can a single act of sexual assault amount to sex

290 First Amended Class Action Complaint and Jury Demand, Gilbert, No. 18-cv-00981, ECF No. 6.
291 Id. at 5; see also Complaint, supra note 288 (filing a civil claim “relating to sexual assault, abuse, molestation, and nonconsensual sexual touching and harassment by her coach, Defendant Jean Lopez”).
292 First Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 290, at 72-113.
293 Id. at 8.
294 See Defendant United States Olympic Committee’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Class Action Complaint at 5, Gilbert, No. 18-cv-00981 (D. Colo. Mar. 6, 2019), ECF No. 58 (arguing that “[e]ven incendiary allegations such as ‘[t]he USOC [U.S. Olympic Committee] has long known of sexual assaults of female athletes at their training centers’ are insufficient to allege any of the crimes at issue”).
296 See id. at *28 (“In light of Kaufman, I conclude that the pay-to-play sexual acts alleged in the complaint are ‘labor’ or ‘services’ as those terms exist in the TVPA.”).
297 See Docket, Gilbert, No. 18-cv-00981.
trafficking? In 2017, famed movie producer, Harvey Weinstein, was accused of widespread sexual assault against prominent actresses and other individuals. As public outrage grew about his conduct, victims sought justice through civil suits against Weinstein and his corporate backers. Meanwhile, criminal prosecutors filed sexual assault charges against Weinstein, and he was subsequently convicted and sentenced to twenty-three years in prison.

In a surprising legal twist in 2017, Kadian Noble joined other plaintiffs to file a civil complaint under the TVPRA in the Southern District of New York against Weinstein and his corporate backers. The complaint argued that Weinstein “travelling in foreign commerce, recruited and enticed a young aspiring actress, . . . Kadian Noble, with the promise of a film role, . . . knowing that he would use means of force, fraud or coercion to cause her to engage in a sex act in his hotel room.” It further asserted that defendants, Bob Weinstein and The Weinstein Company LLC, “participated in this venture of Harvey Weinstein, knowing, or in reckless disregard of the facts, that he would use . . . force, fraud and/or coercion to engage aspiring young actresses in sexual activity.”

Never before had a court been asked to decide whether one act of sexual assault — wholly disconnected from a prostitution offense — amounted to sex trafficking. Judge Robert Sweet, the first to decide about the viability of the plaintiff’s TVPRA arguments, remarked in pre-trial hearings that he was in “uncharted waters.” Weinsteins’s attorneys vociferously disagreed with the plaintiffs’ assertions of trafficking. Counsel took note that Congress intended to “preven

299 See supra text accompanying note 1.
302 See, e.g., Noble, 335 F. Supp. 3d 504 (discussing Noble’s complaint against Weinstein); see also Colin Dwyer, Harvey Weinstein Sentenced to 23 Years in Prison for Rape and Sexual Abuse, NPR (Mar. 11, 2020, 11:06 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/03/11/814051801/harvey-weinstein-sentenced-to-23-years-in-prison [https://perma.cc/3DYW-8Z46].
303 Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 1, Noble, 335 F. Supp. 3d 504 (No. 1:17-cv-09260).
304 Id.
305 See Maddaus, supra note 17.
slavery, involuntary servitude, and human trafficking for commercial gain” not “a single, gender-based sexual incident that was not connected to a sex trafficking scheme.”

In pleadings, Weinstein’s attorneys argued that federal trafficking law should be interpreted only to proscribe economic or commercial activity, not gender-motivated activity. Weinstein’s attorneys pointed to Morrison, wherein the Supreme Court invalidated the VAWA civil remedy because Congress lacked the authority under the Commerce Clause. They asserted that Congress, therefore, cannot regulate non-economic activity, including gender-based violence. For these and other reasons, Weinstein’s attorneys argued that “commercial sex act” must be narrowly construed to be “economic in nature.”

Judge Sweet ultimately denied Harvey Weinstein’s motion to dismiss, allowing the TVPRA claims to proceed. He rejected the defendant’s arguments that federal trafficking violations should be limited to acts of “sex slavery” and forced prostitution. In addition, the court adopted a broad interpretation of “commercial sex act.” To that end, the court opined that, “[t]he contention, therefore, that Noble was given nothing of value — that the expectation of a film role, of a modeling meeting, of ‘his people’ being ‘in touch with her’ had no value — does not reflect modern reality.”

The district court downplayed concerns that such a broad interpretation would result in application of the TVPA to consensual sex after “a free dinner and a movie.” In its rejection, however, Judge Sweet signaled a potentially sweeping acknowledgement of the

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306 Defendant Robert Weinstein’s Memorandum of Law in Support of his Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint at 3, Noble, 335 F. Supp. 3d 504 (No. 1:17-cv-09260).
307 Id. at 10.
308 See id.; supra text accompanying note 151.
309 See Defendant Weinstein’s Memorandum of Law in Support of his Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint at 9, Noble, 335 F. Supp. 3d 504 (No. 1:17-cv-09260).
310 See Noble, 335 F. Supp. 3d at 514-15. Instead, he noted that Congressional intent should be broadly construed because ‘Congress noted that ‘trafficking in persons is not limited to the sex industry,’ and that ‘traffickers lure women and girls into their networks through false promises of decent work conditions at relatively good pay as nannies, maids, dancers, factory workers, restaurant workers, sales clerks, or models.” Id. at 514.
311 The court failed to limit the definition of “commercial” to mean only economic value. In particular, the court noted that “anything of value,” “requir[ed] a liberal reading.” See id. at 521.
312 Id.
313 Id. at 523.
application of federal trafficking law to domestic violence and sexual assault conduct. The court noted that, “notably absent from this hypothetical [about consensual sex] are necessary elements of force, fraud and commerce, all of which have been established here.” Given that most cases of interpersonal violence would have the requisite “force, fraud, or coercion,” this dicta signaled an expansive application of the TVPA to such conduct.

The implications of this ruling are uncertain. Weinstein’s attorneys quickly moved to certify an interlocutory appeal, but Judge Alison Nathan denied the motion on August 5, 2019. Regardless, the decision in Noble has already had an impact. Thus far, at least four federal courts have adopted Judge Sweet’s analysis of the TVPRA in civil cases against Weinstein. It has been cited positively in multiple jurisdictions in unrelated cases and encouraged new federal civil suits.

For example, a little over two months after Judge Sweet’s decision in Noble, victims of Bruce Weber, “the most powerful and influential fashion photographer in the male modeling industry,” filed an anonymous civil complaint under the TVPRA. As in Noble, Weber’s attorneys filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the sex trafficking statute “only covers ‘real sex trafficking and modern-day sexual slavery.’” On July 25, 2019, Judge George B. Daniels disagreed. The court found in favor of the plaintiffs, allowing the TVPRA claims to proceed. In dicta, the court took note of the rise of TVPRA claims “since

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314 See id.
315 See id.
316 Opinion & Order at 1, Noble, 335 F. Supp. 3d 504 (No. 1:17-cv-09260), ECF No. 122 (finding that the defendant failed to demonstrate there was substantial ground for difference of opinion on how the Court resolved the question of law, specifically whether Weinstein’s conduct amounted to a “commercial sex act” under the TVPA). If Weinstein settles all civil suits, he could deprive the Circuit Court of the opportunity to resolve this question or establish any definitive precedent. See Twohey & Kantor, supra note 32.
320 See Ardolf, 332 F.R.D. at 473.
321 See id. at 467.
the rise of the #MeToo movement” and the increasing judicial recognition that the TVPA applies to such sexual conduct.322

IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE GENERATIVE TREND

A. New Remedies for Victims

I think it is helpful to be able to . . . broaden the scope of your . . . thought process . . . and think about things out of the box. And, when you look at what . . . Weinstein was doing, . . . it was trafficking.323

— Plaintiff’s attorney

1. A New Federal Civil Remedy

This Part briefly considers the potential benefits and risks of efforts to invoke trafficking law to apply to sexual assault and domestic violence conduct.324 The normative and strategic implications of this move, while still nascent, are significant. It is “a whole new world” for victims in a number of key respects.325 The TVPRA may well provide certain victims with a new federal forum for civil suits — one with a relatively long statute of limitations and higher potential damage awards.326 This means that victims, whose claims were time-barred or not otherwise recognized under existing civil remedies, may have a new venue for civil damages.327 It also permits certain victims to target a

322 See id. at 467, 473. In support of its findings, the court also heavily relied on the three district court decisions against Weinstein in civil TVPRA claims. See id. at 473-75 (citing Geiss v. Weinstein, 383 F. Supp. 3d 156, 167-68 (S.D.N.Y. 2019); Canosa v. Ziff, No. 1:18-cv-04115, 2019 WL 498865, at *23 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2019); Noble v. Weinstein, 335 F. Supp. 3d 504, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)).
323 Zoom Interview with Stuart Mermelstein, Senior Attorney, Herman Law LLP (May 29, 2020).
324 I look forward to examining these issues further in future work.
325 Mackinnon, Where #MeToo Came From, supra note 7.
326 See, e.g., Zoom Interview with Ryan Hudson, Attorney, Sharp Law (May 21, 2020) (commenting that “statutes of limitations are reasons one through thirty [why to invoke the TVPRA] because you lose any state law claim in any state that hasn’t extended in”); Rosemary Feitelberg, Bruce Weber’s Legal Team Fires Back at Model’s Sexual Misconduct Claims, WWD (Jan. 2, 2019), https://wwd.com/eye/people/bruce-webers-legal-team-fires-back-model-sexual-misconduct-claims-1202942927/ [https://perma.cc/S9YU-XUA2] (quoting Lisa Bloom, plaintiff’s attorney, describing that in Ardolf v. Weber, “[w]e realized that this [the TVPRA] might open the courthouse door for many accusers whose claims were more than three years old and less than 10 years old”).
327 See supra Part I.D.
wider range of third parties who knowingly benefit from the conduct and potentially recover in new ways from insurers. More broadly, the TVPRA gives these victims a new vocabulary for public discourse. Thus, the TVPRA gives new hope to certain victims, especially those who may come forward after existing statutes of limitations are exhausted, and provides greater optimism about potential civil recovery.

2. New Federal Criminal Responses

New judicial interpretations of federal trafficking law also have the potential to reverberate through the criminal legal system. By resolving ambiguities in existing federal case law, federal prosecutors may view new conduct as trafficking. This has three important implications. The first is largely discursive. Prosecutors may come to see new sexual and domestic violence crimes as trafficking, instead of state crimes of assault and battery or sexual assault. Second, greater use of federal trafficking statutes may trigger the exercise of federal jurisdiction. Third, we may see new defendants subject to increased criminal penalties and mandatory minimum sentencing under trafficking statutes.

In the criminal context, we see very early evidence of this shift. In 2019, federal prosecutors in the Eastern District of New York indicted Keith Raniere, an accused sex cult leader, with sex trafficking and forced labor charges. Testimony at trial established that Raniere engaged in sexual abuse of women whom he induced to have sex with him and other members of the cult by collecting damaging collateral. In 2019,
Raniere filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the TVPA was never intended to apply to such conduct. One of the primary questions before the district court was whether the TVPA transforms such sexual conduct into sex trafficking and forced labor.

In response, the federal district court found the defendant’s arguments unconvincing, citing to Noble and other civil TVPRA claims against Weinstein. In particular, the court rejected the defendant’s arguments that sex “in exchange for an increase in [ ] social status” was not “commercial.” The court noted that, “[c]ourts have consistently held that ‘anything of value’ encompasses more than simply monetary exchanges,” looking to Judge Sweet’s decision in Noble. The court also rejected the limited construction of “labor” and “services” proffered by the defendant, citing to Kaufman and Marcus, to find that the government’s theory was not overly expansive. On June 19, 2019, the jury convicted Rainiere on both counts, and appeal is likely.
3. New Energy Aimed at Gender-Based Harms

 Trafficking discourse can have powerful expressive value, reframing conduct to generate new public outrage and compel new action.\(^\text{340}\) TVPRA claims can potentially shape public discourse, promote settlement, and foster positive outcomes for victims.\(^\text{341}\) One plaintiff's attorney remarked how calling conduct trafficking, rather than sexual assault, often results in “a different connotation to it in the public eye.”\(^\text{342}\) Similarly, plaintiffs in TVPRA litigation against Weinstein have noted that generating media coverage was precisely their purpose.\(^\text{343}\) Some plaintiffs in the Weinstein litigation commented that, “[o]ne thing is clear: to create a permanent change in the culture, we need to send a message to the powerful and wealthy individuals, companies and industries that feted their Harvey Weinsteins, instead of protecting the victims.”\(^\text{344}\) Thus, new labels of trafficking can create new, long-needed momentum and political will to address these persistent gender-based harms.

B. Risks of the “New World”

[B]ad lawyering will inevitably lead to bad decisions, a paring back of remedies, and skepticism if not hostility from the courts to these claims.\(^\text{345}\)

— Plaintiff’s attorney

Greater use of trafficking law to combat gender-based harms, however, simultaneously presents new challenges to the fields of trafficking and gender-based violence. New efforts to invoke trafficking in the domestic violence and sexual assault settings may raise new constitutional questions. As litigators rush to federal court to invoke

\(^{340}\) See, e.g., Peters, *Trafficking in Meaning*, supra note 47, at 3 (arguing that ideas and interpretations of “trafficking” influence how the laws around trafficking are implemented); see also supra note 33 (discussing the expressive meaning of law).

\(^{341}\) See, e.g., Zoom Interview with Steven Hurbis, Attorney, McKeen & Associates PC (May 29, 2020) (notes on file with author) (describing how “the more we could talk about this as something truly nefarious, the more people would actually pay attention” with the potential to prompt positive outcomes for victims).

\(^{342}\) Telephone Interview with Brian Kent, Attorney, Laffey, Bucci & Kent (June 8, 2020) (notes on file with author).


\(^{344}\) Id.

\(^{345}\) E-mail from David Frank, Civil Rights Attorney, Neighborhood Christian Legal Clinic, to author (May 22, 2020) (notes on filed with author).
trafficking law, there also is potential to make bad law, expand the federal statutory framework too far, and stretch the meaning of trafficking in new and undesirable ways. Unlike efforts to define sexual harassment many decades ago, this trend has the potential to displace existing, tailored responses to gender-based violence. Also, in certain cases, it can give rise to disproportionately harsh criminal penalties — precisely at a moment when scholars and activists have called for criminal legal reform.346 Thus, while trafficking law can generate solutions, it may also create new risks for victims and the field of trafficking itself.

1. Constitutional Questions

Expansive judicial interpretation of the TVPRA will likely raise new constitutional questions. As judges interpret federal trafficking law to apply to non-economic harms, defendants are likely to bring new constitutional challenges, seeking to invalidate the TVPRA civil remedy — in part or altogether.347 In Morrison, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the VAWA civil remedy, which provided a federal cause of action aimed at gender-motivated crime because it violated the Commerce Clause.348 The Court found that “gender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense, economic activity.”349 In particular, the Court sought to truly distinguish between “what is truly national and what is truly local,” finding that “there is no better example of the police power, which the Founders undeniably left reposed in the States and denied the central government, than the suppression of violent crime and vindication of its victims.”350


349 Id. at 613. While the plaintiff and amici made “numerous findings regarding the serious impact that gender-motivated violence has on victims and their families,” the Court ultimately rejected the “but-for causal chain from the initial occurrence of violent crime . . . to every attenuated effect upon interstate commerce” because the Court found that this “reasoning would allow Congress to regulate any crime as long as the nationwide, aggregated impact . . . has substantial effects on employment, production, transit, or consumption.” Id. at 614-15.

350 Id. at 617-18.
As the TVPRA civil remedy expands more clearly to cover conduct traditionally considered local crimes, such as domestic violence and sexual assault, defendants will argue that it extends beyond Congressional authority under the Commerce Clause. These arguments have already been raised. Counsel for Weinstein, in *Noble*, pointed to *Morrison* in federal pleadings, arguing that applying the TVPRA to gender-based crimes, such as a single act of sexual assault violated the Commerce Clause.\(^{351}\) As such arguments are heard on appeal, there is a risk that an appellate court or the Supreme Court could further limit the TVPRA civil remedy. Such a decision has the potential to eviscerate federal civil liability, in whole or in part — a move that could have lasting implications for a wide range of trafficking victims.

2. Discursive Dangers

The discourse of trafficking also brings challenges. It may compel action, but it also risks losing important expressive nuances. Tarana Burke, who first introduced “Me Too” to show solidarity with victims of sexual assault and harassment, when asked about bringing too many harms under one umbrella, noted that, “[Y]ou can’t cover so much, and so many things. And sexual violence is wide enough.”\(^ {352}\) Implicit in her words were concerns about the utility of distinctions amongst such diverse legal categories, and the need for discrete, tailored responses — both in discourse and in hard law.

The language of “trafficking” also can present challenges in the courtroom. While litigation efforts have been largely successful at the initial pleading stages, litigators may find it harder to convince judges and juries that new, broader conduct is trafficking at trial.\(^ {353}\) Also,
trafficking law erects new evidentiary barriers, and the plaintiff must show, for example, that the sex act was “commercial” or that the defendant “entice[d]” the victim. These additional requirements may make trafficking claims still quite challenging to prove at trial.

3. Untailored Solutions

Moreover, trafficking law, as it evolves to apply to a broader variety of victims, may lose its ability to respond in a tailored, nuanced manner. Scholars have acknowledged the need for tailored responses to discrete gender-based crimes, noting the unique, individualized needs of victims of gender-based crimes. There may be truly egregious cases, such as that of Harvey Weinstein or Warren Jeffs. However, as new, less stark cases fall within the scope of the trafficking statute, new questions will arise about whether the term “trafficking” — with its associated invocation of federal jurisdiction, mandatory sentencing, and expansive civil damages — is appropriate.

Questions will arise. For example, if an abusive spouse tells his partner to fold the laundry, should this warrant the invocation of federal jurisdiction and mandatory minimum sentences? In contrast, states have evolved robust responses to state-level crimes, including child abuse, domestic violence, and sexual assault. While these concepts are imperfect, they offer sites to create tailored responses. State responses also allow localities to create contextual, collaborative approaches, such as “multi-disciplinary teams,” to engage with victims and understand their varied needs. Moreover, they allow for criminal

may require that you “sort of recondition” the jury about the meaning of sex trafficking.

354 See Chuang, Exploitation Creep, supra note 22, at 611 (explaining that “exploitation creep” allows anti-trafficking measures to be used in contexts not traditionally thought to be trafficking).

355 See, e.g., Zoom Interview with Maurice Sercarz, Attorney, Sercarz & Riopelle, LLP (June 1, 2020) (notes on file with author) (“You’re just going further and further afield from the core elements of the crime, as they were meant to be applied in a criminal case, and you’re undermining the justification for having federal prosecutors intrude into what is ordinarily a state court offense.”).


357 See, e.g., DAVID E. GRIEKENFELDER, JANICE R. HILL-JORDAN & PETER C. WEITZEL, INST. FOR LEGAL, LEGIS. & POLY STUD., MULTISITE EVALUATION OF THE MULTIDISCIPLINARY
sentencing that may allow, at least in theory, for a more nuanced balancing of factors.\footnote{358}

4. Dilution and Backlash

As trafficking law recognizes broader harms, these efforts — while beneficial to some victims — have the potential to dilute the energy, resources, and momentum to combat the core conduct that Congress sought to address. Congress passed the TVPA in 2000 with an eye to address “sex trade, slavery, and slavery-like conditions.”\footnote{359} Broadening the scope of the trafficking beyond this sphere increases the law’s potential to protect and prosecute in some cases, but it also may complexify or slow other efforts aimed at trafficking.\footnote{360}

Moreover, stretching the TVPRA too far can prompt a backlash by judges or legislators.\footnote{361} As one plaintiff’s attorney warned, “[this] is going to lead to it being changed in some way, shape, or form. And that’s probably not good for anyone.”\footnote{362} As more courts are asked to decide cases, especially at the appellate level, judges may limit the TVPRA civil remedy.\footnote{363} Courts have confronted this precise question in the context of multidisciplinary approaches violence.\footnote{358 While these models are criticized as insufficient and needing of reform, they remain anchored in local communities and more equipped to respond to the conduct as it occurs.\footnote{359 TVPA, supra note 3, § 102(a)-(b).\footnote{360 Maurice Sercarz, the defense attorney in \textit{Marcus}, noted that as you move “further and further afield from the core elements of the crime,” there becomes “a real question about whether or not this results in the deployment of prosecutorial resources that’s far different from the one that was intended when they drafted the legislation.” Zoom Interview with Maurice Sercarz, Attorney, Sercarz & Riopelle, LLP (June 1, 2020) (notes on file with author).\footnote{361 Zoom Interview with Brett Godfrey, Attorney, Godfrey Johnson PC (June 1, 2020) (notes on file with author) (“I think it’s a positive trend, but it’s going to create a backlash. You know, when Civil RICO got real popular there, it was just like it woke up out of a deep slumber . . . . But since then it’s gotten much, much, much tougher to make a Civil RICO claim stick.”); see also E-mail from David Frank, Civil Rights Attorney, Neighborhood Christian Legal Clinic, to author (May 22, 2020) (on file with author) (“There will inevitably by a heavy and coordinated reaction against the TVPRA by courts, corporations, and cops of all stripes, and its most powerful aspects stripped out.”).\footnote{362 Zoom Interview with Steven Hurbis, Attorney, McKeen & Associates PC (May 29, 2020) (notes on file with author).\footnote{363 See, e.g., Zoom Interview with Jonathan Little, Attorney, Saeed & Little LLP (May 21, 2020) (notes on file with author) (“[I]t’s going to go up on appeal, and . . . we’re . . .”)}}
of child abuse and the TVPA. 364 The Sixth Circuit, in United States v. Toviave, for example, found that, “[c]hild abuse is a state crime, but not a federal crime.”365 In particular, the court noted that “[o]nly by bootstrapping can this combination of two actions that are not federal crimes — child abuse and requiring children to do household chores — be read as a federal crime.”366 Thus, especially as more plaintiffs are inspired to file civil suits, courts may respond by limiting or changing the TVPRA civil remedy in some form.

C. Blueprint for Reform

As efforts to file new trafficking civil claims gain steam, one thing is certain. Civil efforts to invoke trafficking unearth a number of gaps within existing legal responses to domestic violence and sexual assault. As such, they provide us with an opportunity to remedy them.

Statute of Limitations. Civil litigators invoke the TVPRA, in part, because statutes of limitations are short. Legislators, thus, should consider extending existing statutes of limitations under state and federal civil statutes. State legislatures have already begun to do so.367 In February 2019, New York Governor Andrew Cuomo signed into law the Child Victims Act, loosening the tight statute of limitations for state sexual assault cases, and providing victims with a one-year window in which to file previously time-barred civil claims.368 This legislation has already had a tremendous impact. When it went into effect in August 2019, hundreds of child abuse victims filed civil suits against a range of

364 See generally United States v. Toviave, 761 F.3d 623 (6th Cir. 2014).
365 Id. at 623. The court held that while “[f]orced labor is a federal crime . . . the statute obviously does not extend to requiring one’s children to do their homework, babysit on occasion, and do household chores.” 366 Id.
366 In other contexts, the Supreme Court, when asked to decide the constitutionality of a potentially expansive statute, has interpreted the law narrowly to avoid unintended consequences. See Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 859 (2014) (narrowing the construction of the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 to avoid deciding constitutionality of statute under the Commerce Clause).
defendants, including Jeffrey Epstein, the Catholic Church, the Boy Scouts, and various other institutions.\textsuperscript{369} Eight states had new laws going into effect in 2020 to eliminate or modify the state statute of limitations in existing child sexual abuse, including Florida, Indiana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York, Utah, Virginia, and West Virginia.\textsuperscript{370} Continuing statutes of limitations reform is essential and must address a broad range of victims — including both children and adults.

Third Party Liability. The move to invoke the TVPRA also highlights continued deficiencies in tort liability for victims in state and federal claims against third parties. It brings attention to the challenges in recovering from third parties and uneven outcomes in existing civil tort remedies, especially in state courts. The TVPRA allows plaintiffs to file claims against third parties who knowingly benefit from a “venture.”\textsuperscript{371} This standard, thus far, has been easier to meet and leads to more predictable outcomes for victims. It also provides an important legal vehicle against institutions that participate in or benefit from cultures of abuse. Thus, legislators should look to the TVPRA as they envision new approaches to third party liability for victims of sexual assault and domestic violence.

Insurance Coverage of Gender-based Harms. Scholars also have long critiqued existing insurance exclusions that deny coverage for intentional torts, including many domestic violence and sexual assault cases. The fact that the TVPRA may provide a basis for recovery from insurance carriers is significant. If sustained, the TVPRA can provide greater avenues for damages and strengthen calls to reevaluate existing insurance exclusions for intentional torts.\textsuperscript{372}


\textsuperscript{371} See supra Part I.D.

\textsuperscript{372} See, e.g., Christopher C. French, Debunking the Myth that Insurance Coverage Is Not Available or Allowed for Intentional Torts or Damages, 8 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 65, 93-95 (2012) (describing the public policy reasons supporting the extension of insurance coverage for intentional torts).
CONCLUSION

Trafficking, as a legal concept, was established to fill a void that had allowed for impunity and insufficient protections for victims of “sexual slavery” and labor trafficking. The TVPA and subsequent reauthorizations sought to fill these gaps and erect a meaningful criminal and civil infrastructure to address these harms. Judges now have begun to carve out new federal jurisdiction over certain gender-based crimes. It is indeed a “new world,” but it too is an uncertain one. Victims may yet benefit from this shift, but it is not without risks. Still, the trend, by showcasing deficiencies in existing criminal and legal responses, offers an important roadmap to understand existing deficiencies in state and local responses to gender-based violence. As such, it also provides us with an opportunity to remedy them.