Volunteer Discrimination

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Volunteer Discrimination

Angela Onwuachi-Willig

INTRODUCTION

Being the target of certain kinds of race discrimination can be understood, in a perverse way, as a matter of “choice.” As this Essay will detail, a person can “volunteer” for race discrimination by choosing to remain complicit with structures of group subordination.

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1895
Nothing may demonstrate this point more than the debate regarding the new National Basketball Association (“NBA”) dress code.

In this Essay, I focus on the dispute concerning the alleged racial motivations behind the new NBA appearance code. In particular, I explore one recurring theme throughout the NBA dress policy debate: the way in which some Blacks’ remarks in support of the code have been used as powerful tools to directly refute other Blacks’ claims that the code’s enactment was motivated by racial stereotypes.1 I analyze

1 Throughout this Essay, I capitalize the words “Black” and “White” when used as nouns to describe a racialized group. I do not capitalize these terms when used as adjectives. Also, I prefer to use the term “Blacks” to the term “African Americans” because the term “Blacks” is more inclusive. Additionally, “[i]t is more convenient to invoke the terminological differentiation between black and white than say, between African-American and Northern European-American, which would be necessary to maintain semantic symmetry between the two typologies.” Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Defending the Use of Quotas in Affirmative Action: Attacking Racism in the Nineties, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 1043, 1044 n.4.

2 In another article, Professor Mario Barnes and I address general allegations of race discrimination through the NBA’s imposition of a new dress code. See generally Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Mario L. Barnes, Lakisha and Jamal Go to Work: Analyzing Workplace Appearance and Grooming Standards as “Racial Stereotyping” Under the Mixed Motive Standard of Race and Sex Discrimination (Dec. 8, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). In so doing, we recognize the conflicts between anti-discrimination law that targets improper stereotyping in the workplace and anti-discrimination law regarding appearance codes, under which employers are generally free to enforce their regulations so long as they are applied substantially equally across gender and race. Specifically, we raise the question of whether grooming and appearance codes that are alleged to be racially discriminatory should be evaluated under a new mixed-motive theory of discrimination. We use the NBA dress code debate as one example to explore our claims that even so-called legitimate purposes for workplace policies may be premised upon negative stereotypes related to race and that such policies can improperly attempt to regulate identity by eliminating traits and behaviors that reflect or reinforce these negative racial stereotypes. See id. In mixed-motive cases, the employer’s decision is motivated by both legitimate and illegitimate reasons. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 229, 250 (1989) (“Each time, we have concluded that the plaintiff who shows that an impermissible motive played a motivating part in an adverse employment decision has thereby placed upon the defendant the burden to show that it would have made the same decision in the absence of the unlawful motive.”). Under this theory of discrimination, “the employer has a limited affirmative defense that does not absolve it of liability, but restricts the remedies available to a plaintiff.” Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 94-95 (2003) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2003)). “In order to avail itself of the affirmative defense, the employer must ‘demonstrat[e] that [it] would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor.’” Id. at 95. Just as Professor Charles Lawrence has explained about unconscious racism, I must note, however, that many of our ideas regarding acceptable appearance are unconsciously racialized. Lawrence explicated the
this recurring theme as a means of examining the evidentiary power of what I call “black-on-black” testimony in employment discrimination cases. As I see it, this theme adds an important layer to our current understanding about how fact-finding judges and juries may improperly weigh witness testimony by minorities against other minorities during their deliberations. Specifically, it exposes the failure of juries and courts to recognize that black-on-black testimony may be a type of conscious racial identity performance; such failure,

following about unconscious racism:

[M]ost of us are unaware of our racism. We do not recognize the ways in which our cultural experience has influenced our beliefs about race or the occasions on which those beliefs affect our actions. In other words, a large part of the behavior that produces racial discrimination is influenced by unconscious racism.

Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322 (1987); see Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 33-34 (1998) (contending that “[u]nconscious racism, although arguably less offensive than purposeful discrimination, is no less harmful. . . . because it is often unrecognizable to the victim as well as the perpetrator”).

Professors Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati have written about the work that people of color do to counter harmful stereotypes about minority identities in employment environments. See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259, 1279-1308 (2000) [hereinafter Carbado & Gulati, Working Identity] (describing how women and people of color attempt to alter their racial identities in order to prevent discrimination and preempt stereotyping in workplace). Carbado and Gulati have also more generally addressed the notion of race as a “performative identity.” Id. Racial identity performances may allow a person of color to “fit within” the corporate culture more easily, but they never challenge the underlying racial assumptions about minority workers’ abilities, attitudes, and commitment. Id.; see also Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Race to the Top of the Corporate Ladder: What Minorities Do When They Get There, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1645, 1676-77 (2004) [hereinafter Carbado & Gulati, Race to the Top] (asserting that businesses prefer to hire Blacks “who are phenotypically but unconventionally black — that is to say, people who ‘look’ but do not ‘act’ black”). Carbado and Gulati’s claim is that “the social meaning of, for example, a black person’s racial identity is a function of the way in which that person performs (presents) her blackness,” such that Blacks can choose to accept or reject societal expectations of behaving “conventionally” — that is, in accordance with predominant stereotypes. Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law and Economics of Critical Race Theory: Crossroads, Directions, and a New Critical Race Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1757, 1771-72 (2003) [hereinafter Carbado & Gulati, The Law and Economics] (reviewing FRANCISCO VALDES ET AL., CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY (2002)); see also Barbara J. Flagg, Fashioning A Title VII Remedy for Transparantly White Subjective Decisionmaking, 104 YALE L.J. 2009, 2009-29 (1995) (creating two fictional, black sisters, Yvonne Taylor and Keisha Akbar, who perform their racial identities
in turn, may cause this black-on-black testimony to receive more weight than it should during the fact-finding process.

To this end, I use the debate regarding the NBA appearance code as a case study to identify three different categories of performative behavior by Blacks: (1) accommodating,4 which occurs when racial outsiders accept dominant cultural norms as a means of advancement, without any concern about or challenge of their potentially racialized meanings; (2) distancing, which occurs when conforming outsiders consciously work to distinguish themselves from other racial outsiders who reject dominant cultural appearance standards and performances; and (3) resigned modeling, which occurs when racial outsiders do not necessarily buy into mainstream definitions of culturally acceptable norms but resign themselves to these norms for the sake of serving as role models to those in their group who may look up to them.5 I contend that each of these behaviors constitutes a form of “volunteer discrimination”6 and must become an integral part of fact-finders' differently in their corporate workplaces and detailing how Keisha, who “place[d] an emphasis on her African heritage, would not be able to assert legal discrimination because she “arguably was given the same treatment that would have been afforded anyone who was perceived as unable or unwilling to fit smoothly into the corporate culture”); cf. Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 142 (2003) (“Rather, the discrimination arises in the application of that criterion by members of the white majority according to dominant definitions of the term.”).

4 I do not use the term “accommodating” as it is understood legally in anti-discrimination disability law. I do not use it to mean “a requirement . . . that employers make individualized changes in facially neutral rules, structures, or tasks to enable a protected class member to perform a given job and produce as much output as non-accommodated coworkers.” Samuel R. Bagenstos, “Rational Discrimination,” Accommodation, and the Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825, 836-37 (2003). Rather, I define it as the acceptance of society’s “requirement” that individuals must adopt mainstream cultural norms if they want to advance in society. See, e.g., Flagg, supra note 3, at 2051 (discussing fictional character she created, Keisha Akbar, and noting: “Keisha confronts a form of race discrimination that is as pervasive as it is painful: the expectation that she must conform to norms that challenge her racial sense of self if she is to succeed in her chosen career”) (emphasis added). At the same time, I acknowledge that these same behaviors, even when the black actor does not experience them as conscious conduct, may have similar effects in reproducing structures of subordination. See generally Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis: Race Theory and Political Lawyering Practice in Post-Civil Rights America,
evaluations of testimony from pro-defendant minority witnesses in race discrimination cases. In fact, looking at the NBA dress code debate itself, I maintain that, rather than negating allegations of racism, the reactions of the policy-defending Blacks actually may highlight the immense pressures that Blacks generally have in our society to perform their identity in a way that is racially palatable — in other words, accommodating of cultural norms that place what is perceived as being white at the top of the social hierarchy and what is perceived as being black at its bottom.

As Professors Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati have explained, “working within an organization necessarily entails negotiating and performing identity,” and for racial minorities, such performances require “extra” work in order to counter negative stereotypes that are attached to minority groups. Furthermore, Professor Frank Rudy Cooper has detailed in his article Against Bipolar Black Masculinity: Intersectionality, Assimilation, Identity Performance, and Hierarchy how outsider groups in society have incentives to perform their identities in ways that help to maintain their place within society’s hierarchies of race, gender, class, and sexuality. For example, middle-class, heterosexual, black men — who are caught between the bind of the socially constructed images of the assimilationist “Good Black Man” and the dangerous “Bad Black Man” — receive incentives to perform their identity in a way that fits the assimilationist ideal of the “Good Black Man” by downplaying their race and highlighting their social class in order to maintain their place above black women and gay

95 Mich. L. Rev. 821 (1997) (explaining how people of color may reproduce subordinating power relations within and among social groups).

7 See Carbado & Gulati, Race to the Top, supra note 3, at 1658 (“A person is racially palatable if she is perceived to be peripherally or unstereotypically nonwhite; she is racially salient if she is perceived to be centrally or stereotypically nonwhite.”); see also Emily Houh, Toward Praxis, 39 UC Davis L. Rev. 905, 910 (2006) (noting that “members of outsider groups in the workplace often feel compelled to perform and signal loudly against negative identity-related stereotypes in order to prevent discrimination based on those stereotypes”).

8 Carbado & Gulati, Working Identity, supra note 3, at 1260-61, 1277-79.


10 According to Cooper, the “Good Black Man” and the “Bad Black Man” are defined as follows: “The Bad Black Man is animalistic, sexually depraved, and crime-prone. The Good Black Man distances himself from black people and emulates white views.” Id. at 857.
black men.11

Finally, as Professor Mario Barnes and I clarified in our article *By Any Other Name? On Being “Regarded As” Black, and Why Title VII Should Apply Even If Lakisha and Jamal Are White*,12 racial identity performance by Blacks who wish to be included in the mainstream “carries with it [also] the need to . . . distance one’s self from persons who can challenge one’s identity performance.”13 In fact, I contend that what has occurred in response to the NBA dress code by some black players and leaders (even black journalists) may fit within three different categories of behavior — accommodating, distancing, and resigned modeling14 — that result in what I call “volunteer discrimination.”15 I argue that these three different behavioral categories help to prove my point that some Blacks' comments and actions in support of the new NBA dress code do not in themselves negate the presence of racism within the policy. Instead, such comments may provide further evidence of discrimination against minorities based on social constructions of race.16 Rather than challenging or working to defeat hierarchical, racialized social norms, these types of performative actions are used by outsiders — here, Blacks — for the specific purpose of ensuring acceptance within the dominant society or, at least, the opportunity for traditional success.17

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11 Id. at 853, 859-70, 874-88; see also Kenji Yoshino, *Covering*, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 772 (2002) (describing how outsiders downplay or “cover” their difference to make insiders feel comfortable).

12 Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Mario L. Barnes, *By Any Other Name?: On Being “Regarded As” Black, and Why Title VII Should Apply Even If Lakisha and Jamal Are White*, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 1283.

13 Id. at 1308 n.101.

14 See infra Part II.B.

15 This term is, in part, inspired by the book *Jill Nelson, Volunteer Slavery: My Authentic Negro Experience* (1994). In her book, Nelson details her experiences as a black woman working for the *Washington Post*, where she often found herself with the dilemma of wanting to promote short-term individual progress within the rules while at the same time wanting to change the rules themselves. See also infra Conclusion (discussing this same dilemma within context of dress codes). See generally *Nelson*, supra.

16 Devon Carbado, *E)racing the Fourth Amendment*, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946, 978 (2002) (defining social construction of race as “the idea that race does not exist at all antecedently of its invention in culture. . . . [R]ace does not exist outside of, but is instead the effect of, discourses . . . . [A] particular race consciousness emerges: namely, that race is real and that everyone has one”).

17 See Carbado & Gulati, *Working Identity*, supra note 3, at 1278 (asserting that
I. BUSINESS CASUAL, OR CASUALTIES OF BUSINESS AS USUAL?

In October of 2005, Commissioner David Stern issued a new dress code for players in the NBA, an organization of athletes that is nearly

identity performances, though not all of them, are “function[s] of conscious strategic choices”).

18 See supra note 6.

19 See John Eligon, In NBA, Clothes Dress Up the Image, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2005,
eighty percent black. The new code, which specifies appropriate league-business dress styles for NBA athletes, requires players to wear “Business Casual attire whenever they are engaged in team or league business,” meaning: (1) a long or short-sleeved dress shirt (collared or turtleneck) and/or a sweater; (2) dress slacks, khakis, or dress jeans; and (3) appropriate shoes and socks, which do not include sneakers, sandals, flip-flops, or work boots. The code also directly prohibits players from wearing certain types of clothing, in particular, clothing that society links to hip-hop culture, which has been negatively stereotyped and racialized as black. Specifically, the code...


21 Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, NBA Player Dress Code, http://www.nba.com/news/player_dress_code_031017.html [hereinafter NBA Player Dress Code]. There are three exceptions to this Business Casual policy. Id. The first exception is stricter than the usual policy and requires players who are in attendance at games but not in uniform to wear a sports coat, dress shoes or boots, and socks while seated on the bench or in the stands. Id. The second exception allows players to wear either Business Casual attire or neat warm-up suits that are issued by their teams as they are leaving a basketball arena. Id. The third and final exception permits players to wear attire that is not Business Casual at special events or player appearances where other attire would be appropriate, such as at basketball clinics. Id.

prohibits the wearing of sleeveless shirts, shorts, t-shirts, jerseys or sports apparel, chains, pendants, medallions, sunglasses while indoors, headphones, and headgear of any kind, while a player is placed on the bench, seated in the stands at a game, or making an appearance for media interviews or a team or league event.23

The announcement of the new NBA dress code sparked a number of claims from players and journalists, including one controversial claim that policy is motivated by racial stereotypes.24 Commentators and

planet. . . . The terms of the assaults on rap music, . . . are part of a long-standing sociologically based discourse that positions Black influences as a cultural threat to American society."

But see Paul Butler, Much Respect: Toward a Hip-Hop Theory of Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REV. 983, 986 & n.10 (2004) (noting that while most hip-hop artists are black, “[t]he consumers are mainly non-black” — around 75 percent non-black); see also Jeffrey A. Williams, Flagrant Foul: Racism in “The Ron Artest Fight,” 13 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 55, 75 (2005) (“Most saliently, middle-class whites form a significant chunk of the revenue base behind the hip-hop industry.”). The way in which hip-hop has become racialized as black is also evident in the labels that are often placed on white rappers like Eminem, such as the terms “wigger” or “wannabe.” The idea behind these terms is that Eminem is “acting black” by being a part of hip-hop. In his song “The Way I Am,” Eminem attacks his critics, rapping:

And I just do not got the patience (got the patience).
To deal with these cocky caucasians who think
I'm some wigger who just tries to be black cause I talk
With an accent, and grab on my balls, so they always keep askin . . .

EMINEM LYRICS, The Way I Am, on CURTAIN CALL (Aftermath Records 2005), available at http://www.azlyrics.com/lyrics/eminem/thewayiam.html. But see Catherine L. Fisk, Privacy, Power, and Humiliation at Work: Re-examining Appearance Regulation as an Invasion of Privacy, 66 LA. L. REV. 1111, 1120 (2006) (“[T]he heart of the offense if there is an offense) is not that the NBA and the Yankees are discriminating on the basis of race or gender; the offense (if there is one) is that they are trying to make players project an image that some players don’t want to project. There may be, especially in the case of the NBA, an aspect of the dispute that is about discrimination in the way that people perform racial or gender identity, but there is a larger sense in which the disputes are not about discrimination, they are about the power to project an image.”).

23 See NBA Player Dress Code, supra note 21; see also Rose, supra note 22, at 277-80 (describing “fly” hip-hop gear as including chunky jewelry and baggy pants).
24 See, e.g., Adrian Wojnarowski, Dis-dress Call; Suddenly, The NBA Doesn’t Like the Way It Looks, RECORD (Bergen County, N.J.), Oct. 20, 2005, at S1. One author wrote:

[W]hite America had grown so disillusioned with the NBA, so wary of its young, black players with the understood uniform of hip-hop — cornrows, tattoos and do-rags.

. . . .
players alike argued that the code is targeted at negative media-driven images of young black men, who make up the vast majority of the league. For example, Indiana Pacers guard Stephen Jackson asserted the following in response to the newly instituted dress code: “I have no problem dressing up... because I know I’m a nice-looking guy. But as far as chains, I definitely feel that’s a racial statement. Almost 100 percent of the guys in the league who are young and black wear chains.”

Jackson further stated, “When we’re talking about big chains and stuff, it’s obvious who wears those. Not Austin [Croshere], Not Jeff [Foster],” both of whom are white. Boston Celtics forward Paul Pierce, who willingly complies with the code, agreed with Jackson, proclaiming, “[W]hen I saw the part about chains, hip hop and throwback jerseys, I think that’s part of our culture. The NBA is young black males.” One commentator even referred to Jackson’s...

“...we know who the league is going after right now, and it isn’t Steve Nash and Mark Cuban,” one NBA official laughed on Wednesday.

No, this desire for a so-called professional dress code isn’t about the MVP’s thrift-store wardrobe, nor the Dallas owner’s T-shirt and blue jeans ensemble.

After all, those NBA stars aren’t mildly foreboding to people. They don’t frighten them. They don’t make them change the channel, and tell their kids to change the channel and find something else to watch. This is the commissioner’s target. This is about a generation of NBA stars immersed in the hip-hop culture, inspiring a disconnect with the paying public.

Id.


26 See Montieth, supra note 25; see also Marc Stein, Pacers’ Jackson Calls Ban on Chains “Racist Statement,” ESPN, Oct. 18, 2005, http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/print?id=2197001&type=story (quoting Jackson as saying, “But it’s one thing to [enforce a] dress code and it’s another thing if you’re attacking cultures, and that’s what I think they’re doing”).

27 Kravitz, supra note 25 (quoting Jackson as stating that he will follow new dress policy). Jackson engaged in a short protest against the new NBA dress code by wearing four chains at the Pacers’ exhibition game against the San Antonio Spurs on October 18, 2005. See Michael Lee, New Dress Code Draws a Few Threads of Protest, WASH. POST, Oct. 20, 2005, at E3. Jackson, however, has since abided by the dress code because, as he states, he is not fond of “giving money back” in fines. See Stein, supra note 26.

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comments as he highlighted how the policy seemingly targeted young black basketball players, stating:

[T]ell me though, what kind of card [other than the “race card”] is Jackson going to play to protest a policy that prohibits the use of heavy chains, do-rags, and throwback jerseys? You think Steve Nash’s closet is bursting with bling? Can you picture Dirk Nowitzki with a do-rag without cracking up?29

It is difficult to deny the racial overtones of the NBA’s new dress code, especially in light of the league’s racial composition30 and the comments that players, coaches, and pundits have made while debating the merits of the policy.31 For example, Los Angeles Lakers head coach Phil Jackson made the following comment, which essentially displays the way in which young black men, hip-hop, and criminality have become so linked in the minds of the American public:32 “The players have been dressing in prison garb the last five or six years. All the stuff that goes on, it’s like gangster, thuggery

sjackson_x.htm.

29 See Kravitz, supra note 25. The natural questions are: Why did the NBA find it necessary to include a list of items that are specifically prohibited after the league had already clearly defined “Business Casual” wear? Why target specific items in the policy at all?

30 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.

31 See generally Timothy Davis, The Myth of the Superspade: The Persistence of Racism in College Athletics, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 615 (1995) (arguing that subtle racism pervades sports such as basketball).

32 See Dwight L. Greene, Naughty by Nurture: Black Male Joyriding — Is Everything Gonna Be Alright?, 4 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 73, 74-75 (1994) (“Often, a young Black male is suspected of being a criminal simply based on his status as a young Black male, rather than because of any act he may have committed.”); see also R. Richard Banks, Beyond Profiling: Race, Policing, and the Drug War, 56 STAN. L. REV. 571, 598 (2003) (noting that “[t]he association of blacks with criminality may even contribute to the tendency to associate other negative characteristics with blacks as well”); Katheryn Russell-Brown, Black Protectionism as Civil Rights Strategy, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 3 (2005) (“[T]he prevailing image of Blackness as something loathsome, marginal, and deviant — the criminalblackman — persists.”). See generally Cooper, supra note 9, at 875-79 (describing “key aspects of the image of the Bad Black Man” as being “animalistic, crime-prone, and sexually unrestrained”); N. Jeremi Duru, The Central Park Five, the Scottsboro Boys, and the Myth of the Bestial Black Man, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1315, 1348-63 (2004) (reporting how stereotype of criminal, “Bestial Black Man” worked in Central Park Five case, in which youth were alleged to be “singing the Tone Loc hip-hop song, ‘Wild Thing’.”).
Similarly, black columnist Jason Whitlock declared, “Too many young, black professional athletes have too closely aligned themselves with the hip-hop culture, which in reality is nothing more than prison culture.”34 One comedian even joked about the policy in a way that worked only to more deeply entrench the media images that have so often linked black men, especially those who are athletes, with crime and criminality; he ribbed, “Players can [now] go straight from the locker room to the courtroom without having to change clothes.”35

But the fact remains that, just as some black basketball players have spoken out against the policy as motivated by racial stereotypes, other black players, both former and current, have argued in its favor. For example, former Dallas Mavericks guard Derek Harper remarked, “I applaud the commissioner [on the new dress code]. . . . I just think if you check into the Ritz-Carlton, it’s a five-star hotel, so you should be a five-star individual going through there.”36 Many other commentators have pointed to statements similar to Harper’s to support their argument that no connection lies between racism and the new NBA dress code. For example, Sports Illustrated columnist Frank Deford argued that former NBA star Charles Barkley’s comments in support of the appearance code were evidence of no racism behind the policy. Deford declared that “[e]ven Charles Barkley, famously on record for telling children not to look up to NBA players as role models, says the new code is ‘fantastic,’ for it shows young African American males how best to dress in the wider world.”37 Moreover, Deford argued that, in light of the fact that teams headed by former black basketball players themselves have

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34 Jason Whitlock, NBA Players Should Learn Stern Is on Their Side, KAN. CITY STAR, Nov. 3, 2005, at D1. There are aspects of hip-hop culture that are closely related to prison culture — for example, the wearing of loose, baggy jeans. See John L. Mitchell, Baggin’ and Saggin’: Parents Wary of a Big Fashion Trend, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1992, at B1 (noting that trend of saggy jeans in hip-hop culture began with people “emulating the garb of prison inmates whose pants perpetually sag because prisoners are not issued belts”).


36 Jeff Caplan, Rule Wears Out Its Welcome with Some Whose Slips Show, STAR TELEGRAM (Fortworth, Tex.), Jan. 20, 2006, at D1.

37 Deford, supra note 20.
implemented more restrictive dress codes than the league’s general policy, the new NBA dress code cannot and should not be considered to be racially motivated. In fact, a number of these commentators include both former and current black NBA athletes and journalists, who have essentially expressed their support for the new clothing policy and have cited each other, as well as comments made by other outspoken Blacks, to deny any racial motivations behind the dress code. Indeed, such action is a strategy that is regularly employed in attempts to defeat or discredit claims of racism or discrimination by racial minorities — and often persuasively so. The persuasiveness of such comments, however, is overemphasized, and in the next two Parts of this Essay, I explain exactly why.

II. UNDERSTANDING “VOLUNTEER DISCRIMINATION”

A. The Social Meaning of Race

In order to understand how and why black support of the new NBA dress code does not necessarily negate allegations of racism behind the policy, one must first appreciate and comprehend how race is defined and practiced within our society. As Professor Barnes and I detailed in an earlier article in the Wisconsin Law Review, “race, although considered primarily in terms of physical features, carries different meanings based upon societal understandings of particular groups.”

Race is socially constructed. It is formed through human interactions and commonly held notions of what it means to belong to a certain racial group. In other words, in our society, markers other than physical characteristics are used to define and identify race. This is further supported by sociological theories that emphasize the role of social and cultural factors in the construction of race.

38 Id. (asserting that teams such as New York Knicks and Atlanta Hawks, which are run by former black NBA stars Isiah Thomas and Billy Knight, respectively, enforce more stringent dress policies than NBA’s policy).
39 See, e.g., Whitlock, supra note 34 (asserting, as black columnist, that “[i]t’s comical to listen to [NBA players] call Stern’s dress code racist when black-owned nightclubs have been enforcing similar dress codes (and using metal detectors) for years just to keep hip-hop thugs out”).
40 See, e.g., Ellison v. Best Foods, 598 F. Supp. 159, 168 (E.D. Ark. 1984) (relying on positive testimony from other black employees as persuasive evidence that allegations of discrimination by other Blacks were untrue).
41 See Onwuachi-Willig & Barnes, supra note 12, at 1295.
than just one’s skin color, such as dress, hairstyle, and voice, play a role in defining a person’s race. As we have learned from Carbado and Gulati, when it comes to discrimination, how one performs their racial identity matters almost as much as how one looks in the post-Civil Rights era.

In fact, the way in which race is socially constructed is most evident in reporters’ comments regarding the differences between Michael Jordan’s generation of NBA players and today’s hip-hop branded basketball players. For example, one writer noted in favor of the new NBA dress code, “[L]et’s be honest, in a very short period of time, the snapshot of an NBA player off the court has gone from the impeccable and classy Michael Jordan to what Phil Mushnick of the New York Post calls ‘looking like recruitment officers for the Bloods and the Crips.’”

As this interlocutor’s statement demonstrates, the problem for those

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44 See Onwuachi-Willig & Barnes, supra note 12, at 1297-1312 (discussing how people become racialized as black despite their actual skin color based on name and voice); Camille Gear Rich, Performing Racial and Ethnic Identity: Discrimination by Proxy and the Future of Title VII, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1134, 1166-71, 1194-99 (2004) (arguing that courts should hear “claims concerning discrimination based on voluntarily chosen physical traits or ‘performed’ behaviors that communicate racial or ethnic identity”).

45 See Carbado & Gulati, Working Identity, supra note 3, at 1262-63 (“Racial conduct discrimination derives, not simply from the fact that an employee is, for example, phenotypically Asian American . . . but also from how she performs her Asian-American identity in the workplace.”); see also Kenji Yoshino, Covering: The Hidden Assault on Our Civil Rights 21-22 (2006); Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Undercover Other, 94 CAL. L. REV. 873, 885-94 (2006); Rich, supra note 44, at 1158-66.

46 Deford, supra note 20. The irony is, as Professor Timothy Davis has highlighted, that black NBA players are “both scorned and loved” by the American public; a “dual existence . . . [that] represents ‘a microcosm of the contradictions of a segregated society.’” Timothy Davis, Who’s In and Who’s Out: Racial Discrimination in Sports, 28 PAC. L.J. 341, 347 (1997) (reviewing Kenneth Shopshire, In Black and White: Race and Sports in America (1996)).
who want to impose the new appearance code is not that the players have black skin — not that they are “black” as that term is physically defined — but rather that they are performing their identities in a way that comports with stereotypes accorded generally to Blacks. 47 As Professor Kenji Yoshino detailed in his book Covering: The Hidden Assault on Our Civil Rights, the face of discrimination and racial acceptability has changed. 48 He explained, “We are at a transitional moment in how Americans discriminate. . . . [I]ndividuals no longer need[] to be white, male, straight, Protestant, and able-bodied; they need[] only to act white, male, straight, Protestant, and able-bodied.” 49 In essence, aspiring to be like a racially palatable Michael Jordan, who in many ways has been given the status of an “honorary White,” 50 is acceptable, but even looking like a person who is outside of that “classy” image is not. 51 This pressure to perform one’s identity such that it cuts against black racial stereotypes gives new meaning to the slogan, “Be like Mike.” Today, it is not the black man himself who is not worthy of inclusion, but primarily just the black man who fails to conform to traditional notions of white, middle-class masculinity. 52

47 See Carbado & Gulati, Race to the Top, supra note 3, at 1675-78; Onwuachi-Willig & Barnes, supra note 12, at 1314-16.

48 See YOSHINO, supra note 45, at 21-22.

49 Id.; see also Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365, 387-88 (explaining that “stereotypes arise most often not from immutable traits but from negative associations with those traits”).

50 See TODD BOYD, YOUNG, BLACK, RICH, AND FAMOUS: THE RISE OF THE NBA, THE HIP HOP INVASION, AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN CULTURE 152 (2003) (“Jordan had become an acceptable Black media icon who transcended cultural barriers around the globe. In order for him to be so widely embraced, he had to offer an image that was potentially appealing to multiple parties simultaneously.”); see also Cheryl I. Harris, Myths of Race and Gender in the Trials of O.J. Simpson and Susan Smith — Spectacles of Our Times, 35 WASHBURN L.J. 235, 236 (1996) (discussing how African Americans who are accorded status of honorary Whites have type of racial invisibility).

51 See Williams, supra note 22, at 65 (“It was not simply that so many of the athletes were black; it was that they dressed the part; and sold those shoes, their shorts, those shirts and their voices.”); see also BOYD, supra note 50, at 53 (“America seemed ready to accept Black celebrities if they conformed to the prevailing standards prescribed for them.”); cf. Fisk, supra note 22, at 1120 (“There may be, especially in the case of the NBA, an aspect of the dispute that is about discrimination in the way that people perform racial or gender identity, but there is a larger sense in which the disputes are not about discrimination, they are about the power to project an image.”).

52 See YOSHINO, supra note 45, at 134-35. In his new book, Yoshino quotes John T. Molly, the author of the book New Dress for Success. Molloy explained the following about why racial minorities should engage in appearance-based covering,
The fact is that people of color have incentives to act on these social understandings of race as a means of avoiding or minimizing the discrimination that they may encounter in their daily lives. For example, many professional black men make a special effort to wear suits or traditional, professional clothing when they are in public settings in order to minimize the discrimination that they may experience just based on appearance — their skin color, height, and other physical characteristics. After all, the black man in the Brooks Brothers suit is less likely to be followed in a department store than the black man in jeans or sweats, though both are highly likely to be viewed as suspicious despite their dress. Likewise, women of all which is dressing in a style that downplays their racial identity:

It is an undeniable fact that the typical upper-middle class American looks white, Anglo-Saxon and Protestant. He is of medium build, fair complexion, with almost no pronounced physical characteristics. He is the model of success; that is, if you run a test, most people of all socioeconomic racial and ethnic backgrounds will identify him as such. . . . Anyone not possessing his characteristics will elicit a negative response to some degree, regardless of whether that response is conscious or subconscious.

Id. (quoting JOHN T. MOLLOY, NEW DRESS FOR SUCCESS 234 (1988)). In fact, as Molloy describes in his book, when he wrote a report to advise a group of black executives in Chicago about dress at work, he gave the report the title of “Dress White.” JOHN T. MOLLOY, NEW DRESS FOR SUCCESS 233 (1988). That title was later changed to “Dress Very White” after one of the black executives informed Molloy that most of the workshop attendees already understood that they must dress white. Id. at 234. Such understandings by these black executives would also help to explain why black men such as Isiah Thomas and Billy Knight would adopt even more stringent dress codes for their teams than the general NBA code. Perhaps, Thomas and Knight understand that their players, who are primarily black, must not just “dress white” but must “dress very white.” See supra note 38 and accompanying text.

53 See Mary Jo Wiggins, Race, Class, and Suburbia: The Modern Black Suburb as a “Race-Making Situation,” 35 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 749, 797-98 (2002) (detailing how even professionally dressed Blacks are routinely followed in stores); see also Kevin R. Johnson, The Case for African American and Latina/o Cooperation in Challenging Racial Profiling in Law Enforcement, 55 Fla. L. Rev. 341, 344 (2003) (“Racial profiles punish, embarrass, and humiliate innocent people, whose skin color is used as a proxy for criminal conduct.”). Professor Patricia Williams related her story of being informed by a white store clerk in Benetton, who had looked her over, that the store was closed when another customer, who was white, was inside shopping. See PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 45-46 (1991). Also, billionaire Oprah Winfrey was reportedly prevented from entering a Hermès store in Paris because the store had been having problems with North African women. See James Ragland, Black Shoppers Feel They’re Unwelcome, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 7, 2005, at 7E (“The Oprah incident renewed talk about racial profiling in stores. The study found that 36
races are less likely to cross the street or clutch their purses when they see a black man in a Prada suit versus one in Phat Farm\textsuperscript{54} sweats, though women are highly likely to cross the street and clutch their purses in either situation.\textsuperscript{55} Famously, Larry Mungin, the subject of the book \textit{The Good Black: A True Story of Race in America},\textsuperscript{56} dressed in traditional, professional clothing as often as he possibly could in his former suburban neighborhood in Alexandria, Virginia as a means of signaling to his white neighbors that he was a “good Black” — a safe Black.\textsuperscript{57} As Mungin explained, when he was wearing a suit, his neighbors would greet him with nods, but when he was dressed to work out at the gym, those same people would “visibly tense up,” and

\textsuperscript{54} Phat Farm is a clothing company and brand born out of the hip-hop style that was created by Russell Simmons, the founder of Def Jam Records. Phat Farm clothing is very expensive and is likely to be worn by men of middle class or upper middle class stature. Despite the expense of the clothes, however, it may not convey the same signal of “safety” as a Brooks Brothers suit \textit{would}, but rather may convey an image of “danger” because of its association with hip-hop.

\textsuperscript{55} See Regina Austin, \textit{Beyond Black Demons and White Devils: Anti-Black Theorizing and the Black Public Sphere}, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1021, 1024-25 (1995) (“The effect of the demonization is also apparent in myriad mundane examples; for instance when white people encounter black males on the street, the men often clutch their women while the women clutch their purses.”); Martha R. Mahoney, \textit{Whiteness and Women, In Practice and Theory: A Response to Catherine MacKinnon}, 5 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 217, 243 n.135 (1993) (describing racialized social meanings behind actions of women who clutch their purses when black men are walking toward them, actions which exhibit “a pattern of social treatment of these men as dangerous, dishonest, criminal”); see also Carbado, supra note 16, at 949-50 (describing how women have clutched their purses or crossed street upon seeing him). \textit{See generally} ELLIS COSE, \textit{THE RAGE OF A PRIVILEGED CLASS} (1993) (describing how black professional men experience these daily microaggressions).

\textsuperscript{56} PAUL M. BARRETT, \textit{THE GOOD BLACK: A TRUE STORY OF RACE IN AMERICA} (1999).

\textsuperscript{57} \textit{Id.} at 41-42. Different kinds of clothing convey varying levels of acceptability. For example, my colleague and friend Mario Barnes, a black man, has remarked that women cross the street even when he is nicely dressed but find him “least scary in [his] Navy uniform — a symbol that makes him more palatable than a nice suit.” E-mail from Mario Barnes, Associate Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law, to Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Associate Professor of Law, University of Iowa College of Law (Mar. 23, 2007, 21:29:00 EST).
“[o]n the elevator, some women would punch the control panel and get off on the next floor, or clutch their handbag to their chest.” 58 In essence, Mungin understood that, unlike white men, he had to dress in a certain manner — for example, wear a suit — in order to ease his white neighbors’ tensions; he had to show them that he was one of the “good Blacks,” or rather, that he was just like them, having achieved the status of an honorary White.

Likewise, many black women choose not to wear their hair in Afros, braids, or locks to avoid the perception that they are “too ethnic,” are “angry black women,” or are unworthy of inclusion. 59 Black men, too, are subject to stereotyping for these hairstyles, only they, along with being perceived as militant and angry, are also viewed as unkempt, drug-using, and lazy based on such styles. 60 In fact, at the Tenth

58 BARRETT, supra note 56, at 42. While describing his experiences in Alexandria to Barrett in The Good Black, Mungin proclaimed the following strong words:

I'm black, so they think I'm going to rob or rape them. But I'm the same person who walks in with the Armani suit. Don't they see me? The answer is no. They see a black man. I am the one who is robbed. I am robbed of my reputation because of the color of my skin.

Id. Upon moving to a different job in a different area that did not require professional clothing, Mungin described his experience as follows: “No more am I in Georgetown, dressed like a professional and at least getting some respect on the street. . . . I'm out in Chantilly, Virginia, or wherever, and the secretaries are afraid I'm going to attack them as they go to get in their cars.” Id. at 148.


60 See Kimberly Jade Norwood, The Virulence of Blackthink and How Its Threat of Ostracism Threatens Those Not Deemed Black Enough, 93 Ky. L.J. 143, 164 n.54 (2005) (noting, for example, that tavern in St. Louis would not allow two black men with dreadlocks in their establishment on ground that one cannot wash dreadlocks and tavern owner did not want “stinky” people in his establishment); see also Eatman v. United Parcel Serv., 194 F. Supp. 2d 256, 262-65 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (involving employer's appearance code that required all drivers with “unconventional” and “unbusinesslike” hairstyles, which included locks and braids, to wear hats over their hair and noting that 17 of 18 employees required to wear hats were African American, but finding no discrimination in policy because it applied equally to people of all races).
Annual Latina/o Critical Theory conference, one junior professor revealed his story about how he entered the law teaching market twice with long, dreaded locks, only to end up with no offers for an academic job at the end of his searches, but received an academic job offer the next year after he had completely cut off his locks.61

Other Blacks have masked their accent on phones, speaking in what they and others perceive to be white, standard English and with a “white” accent, even if that is not their usual tone, to avoid discrimination. For example, Professor Randall Kennedy has described how his mother used her regular, standard English voice over the phone to pass as white and receive proper treatment.62 Likewise, The Good Black’s Larry Mungin often made sure that he spoke “with a precision that guaranteed his being described as ‘very articulate’” to demonstrate to Whites that he is “a black person who doesn’t use street vernacular” — again, not one of the “bad Blacks,” but rather one who fits in, one who is accommodating. More recently, Senator Joseph Biden’s comments about Senator Barack Obama as a presidential candidate highlighted the way in which “articulateness” is often considered synonymous with “acceptability” for Blacks.64

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61 See E-mail from D. Aaron Lacy, Assistant Professor of Law, Barry University, Dwayne O. Andreas School of Law, to Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Associate Professor of Law, University of Iowa College of Law (Mar. 19, 2007, 12:28:00 EST) (on file with author).

62 See RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES: SEX, MARRIAGE, IDENTITY, AND ADOPTION 290 (2003) (describing how his mother would “pass” over phone because listeners imagined she was white); see also Jerry Kang, Cyber-Race, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1130, 1145 (2000) (“This is similar to what happened in my Tennessee roommate anecdote, in which the telephone veiled my race.”); Thomas Purnell et al., Perpetual and Phonetic Experiments on American English Dialect Identification, 18 J. LANGUAGE & SOC. PSYCHOL. 10, 11, 22 (1999) (conducting study that measured impact of Chicano English, African American Vernacular English, and Standard American English dialects on access to rental housing in four San Francisco and Bay Area communities and showing that qualified black and Chicano renters were discriminated against in rental market in certain white residential areas because of dialect).

63 BARRETT, supra note 56, at 41.

64 In an interview on January 31, 2007, Biden stated the following about Obama: “I mean, you got the first mainstream African-American who is articulate and bright and clean and a nice-looking guy. I mean, that’s a storybook, man.” Jason Horowitz, Biden Unbound: Lays into Clinton, Obama, Edwards, N.Y. OBSERVER, Feb. 5, 2007, at 1; see also Eugene Robinson, An Inarticulate Kickoff, WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 2007, at A15 (“The word articulate is being used to encompass not just speech but a whole range of cultural cues — dress, bearing, education, golf handicap. It’s being used to describe a black person around whom white people can be comfortable, a black person who not only speaks white America’s language but is fluent in its body language as well.”).
so, it revealed how a black person's acceptability within the white mainstream extends beyond single factors such as voice or articulateness; acceptability is instead premised on the overall perception of a black person's racial identity as displayed by a variety of markers. As several commentators, including Obama, indicated, past black presidential candidates such as Jesse Jackson, Sr., and Al Sharpton are clearly articulate, but the word "articulate" was not being offered to describe speech alone, "but a whole range of cultural cues — dress, bearing, education, golf handicap... Articulate [was] really a shorthand way of describing a black person who isn't too black — or, rather, who comports with white America's notion of how a black person should come across."65

The fact is that race has a greater meaning than skin color or tone; it is also about performance — how one displays his or her racial identity.66 Blacks who wish to be accepted by mainstream white society and do not want to be discriminated against have a tremendous incentive to perform their racial identities in ways that place them in closer proximity to what is perceived as whiteness.67 Unfortunately, the end result is that such incentives encourage Blacks to submit themselves to what I have defined to be "volunteer discrimination."

B. The Roles of Black Folks

But one may ask, "What is the harm of this 'volunteer discrimination' if it ultimately means inclusion for those who conform to commonly held notions of middle-class whiteness?" Why should we not accept supportive comments by Blacks who have conformed to

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65 Robinson, supra note 64, at A15. Senator Obama stated, "I didn't take Senator Biden's comments personally, but obviously they were historically inaccurate. African-American presidential candidates like Jesse Jackson, Shirley Chisholm, Carol Moseley Braun and Al Sharpton gave a voice to many important issues through their campaigns, and no one would call them inarticulate." Id.

66 See Carbado & Gulati, Working Identity, supra note 3, at 1279-1308 (describing how actions of women and people of color in attempting to alter their perceived racial identities is form of discrimination); see also Catherine Smith, Queer as Black Folk?, 2007 WISC. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 28-29, on file with author) (describing how Blacks are complimented when their identity performance interferes with socially constructed stereotypes of Blacks).

67 See Carbado & Gulati, Race to the Top, supra note 3, at 1676-77. But see Frank Rudy Cooper, "Who's the Man?: Performing Masculinity in Terry v. Ohio 18-19 (Feb. 9, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (explaining how some gang members seek to be intimidating in their identity performance and thus may actually act in accordance with racial stereotype).
these norms as clear evidence of no improper racial motivations behind the new NBA dress policy? Viewing black support of the new NBA dress code as a negation of racial stereotyping claims has broad appeal for many reasons. First, in a time and age when the American public, especially white Americans, are uncomfortable talking about race,\(^\text{68}\) it is much easier to point to non-complaining minorities as rational and discount complaining minorities as ultrasensitive or, as the saying goes, of “playing the race card.” Additionally, as Professor Richard Ford may contend, the remarks by pro-dress code Blacks symbolize a rejection of socially imposed racial definitions that may unfairly “encourage[] members of minority groups to define themselves in terms of group stereotypes” and may alienate group members who do not believe a particular behavior is essential to their racial identity.\(^\text{69}\) Finally, analyzing the imposition of the new NBA dress code as a clear issue of non-discrimination allows one to ignore the full complexity of racism. For example, it allows one to avoid the difficult task of grappling with the notion that arguments against the policy as racially driven also can, in a way, play into racist notions that Blacks do not dress in traditional, professional wear or can never look professional. As Philadelphia 76ers forward Chris Webber argued, “For everybody to say that [the code] is racist, what you’re saying to me is that the black man can’t be fresh or flower, can’t have a suit on, . . . [T]o say that we can’t wear suits, . . . that’s racial.”\(^\text{70}\)

Although Webber is correct to assert that the inference that a black man cannot wear a suit is racist, he is incorrect in saying that labeling the code as racially motivated necessarily suffers from that same inference. One can certainly acknowledge and understand the fact that many black men may feel more comfortable or “at home” in a Brooks Brothers suit than in Russell Simmons wear without implying that no black man can really wear a suit. To argue that the implementation of the code is improperly influenced by race is not to

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\(^{68}\) See Clarence Page, Online NewsHour: Essay: Left Behind (PBS television broadcast Sept. 22, 2005), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/essays/july-dec05/page_9-22.html (“Americans are uncomfortable with talk about race and even less comfortable talking about class.”).


\(^{70}\) Joe Juliano, Webber: Black Men Can Wear Suits, Too, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Oct. 23, 2005, at E3; see also Fisk, supra note 22, at 1135 (“The essentialism of discrimination analysis is its reliance on the idea that certain appearance conventions are ‘white’ or ‘black’ or ‘male’ or whatever. Some whites and some blacks can wear their hair in an Afro, some of both races cannot.”).
say that “real black men” do not wear Brooks Brothers clothing. Rather, it highlights the fact that one of the primary means for black men to counteract their default position in society as dangerous, criminal, and uneducated is to dress in a fashion that is perceived as being white (but is in fact race-less) and distance themselves from those black men who fail to assimilate by wearing hip-hop gear.

More to the point of this Essay, to argue that some Blacks’ support of the controversial policy cancels out any claims of racial discrimination misses the very danger in today’s new forms of discrimination.71 For one thing, it ignores the fact that Blacks who wish to be deemed “good” have every incentive to accept dominant cultural norms as “right” and to distance themselves from those within their group who challenge these norms. Furthermore, it overlooks a broad history of “volunteer discrimination” by Blacks who have engaged in the acts of accommodating, distancing, and resigned modeling for the very purpose of gaining acceptance, no matter how limited, within mainstream circles.

This Part of the Essay defines and describes the acts of accommodating, distancing, and resigned modeling and the reasons why Blacks may engage in these forms of behavior to avoid discrimination for themselves or to help prevent it for younger Blacks who may look up to them. Part II.B.1 considers the behavior of accommodating, in which actors simply assume or accept the merit behind definitions of culturally acceptable standards without challenge. Actors who “accommodate” encourage others to conform their behaviors to socially acceptable appearance standards, regardless of any potentially racialized meanings or, rather, in spite of such racialized meanings. Part II.B.2 explores the action of distancing, which, in a sense, is a required extension of the act of accommodating, in that it requires those who fit the mold — at least as much as outsiders can — to distance themselves from those who are even further outside the societal norm. Blacks who engage in distancing may or may not buy into the merit of culturally defined standards of acceptability, but they recognize the need to adhere to and follow such standards to succeed, especially in a way that publicly displays their

71 See YOSHINO, supra note 45, at 21-22 (describing the pressure to downplay outsider identities as one emerging form of discrimination); see also LU-IN WANG, DISCRIMINATION BY DEFAULT: HOW RACISM BECOMES ROUTINE 8-9 (2006) (“First, like a default in the traditional sense, we often discriminate through failure or neglect, reaching a bad result not through ill will or evil purpose, but because we are unaware of our failing or are incapable of doing differently.”).
difference from those who do not perform socially acceptable behaviors. Part III.B.3 then analyzes the work of resigned modeling. Actors who engage in resigned modeling may reject mainstream cultural definitions of socially acceptable performance or may recognize the ways in which socially acceptable norms can be racialized, but they resign themselves to conformity specifically for the sake of modeling behavior to members of their outside group who may look to them as role models for success. These actors do not buy into culturally acceptable norms as defined by society, but they, like their accommodating and distancing counterparts, “volunteer” themselves for such discrimination because they see no way around performing their identity in a way that adheres to these norms.

1. Accommodating

One of the reasons why some Blacks’ support of the new NBA dress code does not necessarily signify the absence of racial stereotyping is the incentive that many Blacks have to engage in the act of “accommodating,” or what I define as a practical acceptance of dominant cultural norms for the sake of advancement and inclusion.72 What is at issue for the accommodating individual is acceptance from the dominant racial group or at least a tolerance that can enable traditional success by Blacks who are willing to conform. The accommodating individual cares only about how to achieve acceptance or tolerance through an adherence to mainstream norms, not about whether those norms are right or improperly racialized or about how one should proceed in questioning those norms. These actors are strategic, asking first only what is deemed appropriate by mainstream standards and then shaping their behaviors in ways that fit into these socially acceptable molds.

The act of accommodating has long historical roots within the black community. For example, Booker T. Washington, who emerged as a leader of the black community during the post-Reconstruction era,73 adopted the philosophy of accommodation or accommodating as a

72 See supra Introduction.
73 See August Meier, Negro Class Structure and Ideology in the Age of Booker T. Washington, 23 PHYLON 258, 258 (1962) (describing Washington’s philosophy as being that “[o]nce Negroes had proven their ability to help themselves, to acquire wealth and respectability, it was believed, prejudice and discrimination would wither away”); Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE L.J. 758, 825 (asserting that Washington rejuvenated black nationalism during the post-Reconstruction era).
means of survival and encouraging the advancement of black people.74

As I explained in a previous article, “The ideology of Washington . . .
was as follows: ‘If [Blacks] play by [Whites’] rules, and prove [their]
worthiness according to [white] standards, [Whites] will have no
choice but to accommodate [Blacks].’75 Likewise, as one
commentator asserted about David Stern’s “Eureka moment” on the
new NBA dress code, the idea for the policy was that “[if] the players
dress[ed] better and look[ed] more responsible in public, they
[would] be more appealing across the board and in the board rooms of
Corporate America.”76

In our society, it does not matter if the accommodating individual
truly believes in the defined acceptable norms; rather, what is critical
is that the accommodating individual understands and knows that the
onus is on him or her to conform to these norms to advance. As
Yoshino explained about how John T. Molloy’s book New Dress for
Success revealed Blacks’ incentives to “accommodate” in order to
succeed:

Success, it seems, is white and bland. Molloy describes the
continuing vitality of white supremacy in American culture, a
supremacy that requires racial minorities to bend behavior
toward Anglo conformity. Indeed . . . racial minorities must
go ‘somewhat overboard’ to compensate for immutable
differences from the white mainstream.77

74 See Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Just Another Brother on the SCT?: What Justice
Clarence Thomas Teaches Us About the Influence of Racial Identity, 90 IOWA L. REV. 931,
941-42 (2005); see also Jeffrey Louis Decker, The State of Rap: Time and Place in Hip-
Hop Nationalism, 34 SOC. TEXT 53, 56 (1993) (“The key, as technocrat Booker T.
Washington understood it, was to imitat e white institutions within the black
community.”).

75 Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 74, at 941 (quoting Peter Eisenstadt, Introduction
to Black Conservatism: Essays in Intellectual and Political History, at xv (Peter
Eisenstadt ed., 1999)); see also Angela Onwuachi-Willig, The Return of the Ring:
Welfare Reform’s Marriage Cure as a Revival of Post-Bellum Control, 93 CAL. L. REV.
1647, 1662-63 (2005) (describing how many former slaves during post-bellum period
acted on “[t]he desire to prove themselves worthy of membership in society as truly
free citizens by conforming to white marriage laws and customs”).

76 Tim Kawakami, Dress Code Isn’t the Answer for NBA’s Image Problem, MERCURY

77 YOSHINO, supra note 45, at 135 (quoting MOLLOY, supra note 52, at 233) (noting
that Molloy, based on his research of grooming in corporate America, reported “that
blacks had not only to dress more conservatively, but also more expensively than
their white counterparts if they wanted to have an equal impact”); see also Carbado &
In other words, it is the outsider individual who must be accommodating, not those within the dominant culture.\textsuperscript{78} As a consequence, for the accommodating individual or group, racialized norms are never truly challenged.

One especially poignant example of accommodating behavior by Blacks that fails to question the potential racism behind societal norms on appearance is the hair policy that Hampton University, a prestigious historically black university in Virginia, implemented for students in its five-year Bachelor of Arts, Masters of Business Administration program. The policy, which was created in 2000, provides that “[b]raids, dreadlocks and other unusual hairstyles are not acceptable.”\textsuperscript{79} The idea behind the policy is that students at Hampton need to learn and abide by the appearance standards of a predominantly white corporate world, so that “[w]hen they get into corporate America, the transition will be easier.”\textsuperscript{80}

Despite resistance from students, faculty, and staff on campus,\textsuperscript{81} and

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\textsuperscript{78} See John M. Kang, \textit{Deconstructing the Ideology of White Aesthetics}, 2 \textit{Mich. J. Race \& L.} 283, 283 (1997) (“The consequence of this power dynamic is that the dominant group, Whites, can exercise preferences in deciding how to look or express themselves, whereas people of color are limited to either conforming to an imposed White standard or rejecting it.”).


\textsuperscript{81} For example, Sean Linder, a sophomore in the program, described the policy as “a way of making African Americans assimilate to the mainstream standards ‘what is professional and what is not.’” See McKinzie, \textit{supra} note 79. Linder, who was initially asked to sit in the back of the classroom when he did not comply with Hampton School of Business’s hairstyle policy by wearing his hair in twists, opted to complete extra work and assignments in order to make up missed seminars for classes he was not allowed to attend because of his violations of the policy. \textit{Id.} (quoting Linder as saying “I noticed everyone back there [in the classroom] had ethnic hairstyles”).

The fact that a historically black university — a school that normally espouses great pride in African and African American culture and heritage — has instituted a policy that targets black ethnic hairstyles is very strong proof of the great incentives that Blacks have to engage in the act of accommodating.
even Susan Taylor, editorial director of the popular black women’s magazine Essence, the Dean of the business school at Hampton, Sid Credele, has refused to change the policy. Instead, he has strongly expressed support for the policy, arguing that a “clean-cut” look is an asset for any student who seeks advancement in the corporate world. Again here, much like the argument made by black NBA dress code supporters, the argument in favor of Hampton School of Business’s hairstyle policy is that the students must change to accommodate corporate norms, not that corporate norms must be open to clean and well-groomed, ethnic hairstyles that may be primarily worn by Blacks or other minority racial groups. Vincent Vaughn, a senior in the program, proclaimed, “At the time when I cut [my dreadlocks], I figured there has to be some sacrifice in order to progress.” Likewise, Dean Credele has repeatedly declared that these acts of accommodating are necessary for fitting into and succeeding within the corporate culture. As Dean Credele contended, “Braids and cornrows could set you back. . . . The first thing they (interviewers) see is your appearance.”


83 See McKinzie, supra note 79; see also Dietrich, supra note 80 (noting that Dean Credele said that policy is “to help groom [the students] for the button-down, clean-cut corporate world to which they were headed”).

84 See McKinzie, supra note 79. Junior marketing major Chris Roy argued, “Even though we [Blacks] made a lot of progress as far as social norms, I still think dreads or a ‘fro will make it more difficult to be viewed in the same light as an applicant that fits the mold. . . . Your hair has nothing to do with your intelligence, but there are preconceptions that people may have about you.” Id. Roy agreed with the Dean that “African Americans need to be a step ahead of their competition, even if it means sacrificing a hairstyle.” Id.

85 Id.; see also Carbado & Gulati, Working Identity, supra note 3, at 1264-68 (describing how workers may compromise their sense of identity). Another commentator described his friend’s argument in favor of Hampton’s policy, stating: “[My friend] countered that the business world does not see either [tastefully styled braids or dreadlocks] as standard-issue hairstyles. When in the business world, she added, you do as the business people do. That’s how you get a job and it’s how you get ahead.” Johnson, supra note 82 (emphasis added).

86 See McKinzie, supra note 79. One anonymous blogger noted the following about the policy: “Now define professional — my definition might include dreads and braids, but how many black owned corporations are out there really? Reality check — we live in a white man’s world.” Posting of Anonymous #6 to The Polls: Opinions
make similar statements in support of what I define as an act of accommodating through the hair policy. For example, Tuesday Tibbs, a junior, said it best when she proclaimed that she simply “follows the ‘When in Rome, do as the Romans do’ philosophy.” To put it simply, outsiders — here, Blacks — must accommodate if they want to advance.

Unfortunately, while the act of accommodating may allow mainstream success for conforming Blacks, one must ask at what cost does this success come to those Blacks who would find such performances to be a negation of self. As Susan Taylor explained, “Trying to transform [ourselves] to fit into hardly welcoming environments has scarred countless numbers of Black people.” Indeed, one commentator argued the following about the Hampton policy: “To categorically deny males the right to wear dreads or braids smacks of cultural suffocation.” In light of these effects and the racial undertones driving the need for some Blacks to engage in accommodating, it makes little sense for commentators then to turn around and use what essentially may be cultural suffocation for many Blacks as determinative ammunition against claims of racial stereotyping behind a policy, whether instituted by Whites or by Blacks — in this case, not only the NBA appearance code, but also Hampton School of Business’s hairstyle policy.

2. Distancing

Another reason for not using black support of the new NBA dress code as proof of no racial stereotyping behind the policy is the


87 See McKinzie, supra note 79.

88 See Carbado & Gulati, Working Identity, supra note 3, at 1260-68, 1277-79. Of course, there are some Blacks for whom such behavior is not self-negating, but just the act of being one’s self. See YOSHINO, supra note 45, at 189 (explaining that “the covering concept might assume too quickly that individuals behaving in ‘mainstream’ ways are hiding some true identity, when in fact they might just be ‘being themselves’”).


90 McKinzie, supra note 79.

91 See Norwood, supra note 60, at 164 n.52 (noting that “Blacks can negatively stereotype Blacks as well”).
attraction for some Blacks to engage in a behavior I call “distancing.” Distancing involves actions or comments by outsiders — again, here Blacks — that are made or done to demonstrate to the dominant group that the outsider is a “good Black,” not a “bad Black” — in fact, one who does not speak, dress, or act according to the negative stereotypes generally applied to Blacks. The philosophy of the person who engages in distancing is the same as that which was announced by The Good Black’s Mungin, who described his past thinking as follows: “I wanted to show that I was like white people: ‘Don’t be afraid. I’m one of the good blacks.’”

Blacks who engage in distancing realize that mere conformity is not enough for success; one must actually actively distinguish himself or herself from those Blacks who are deemed to be outside of the acceptable mainstream. To these people, failure to distance one’s self from negative racialized connotations is in fact “bad for business” — a hindrance to advancement.

One good example of distancing involves actions that many first and second generation West Indian Blacks in the United States — a group that has been designated as the “model black minority” — may take
to distinguish themselves from black Americans who descend from
slaves in this country, a group that as a whole has been negatively
stereotyped as lazy, uneducated, and incompetent. As several
scholars have noted, some first and second generation West Indian
Blacks make a special effort to distinguish themselves from native-
born black Americans as a means of avoiding the full stigma and
discrimination that comes along with American blackness. For

“The model minority stereotype posits Asian Americans as uniquely successful among
minority groups. They work hard, save money, and achieve material success, while
their children study equally hard and earn high marks in school.” Jean Shin, The
Asian American Closet, 11 ASIAN L.J. 1, 3 (2004); see also Bob Chang, Toward an Asian
American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative
Space, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1241, 1264 (1993) (“In addition to hurting Asian Americans,
the model minority myth works a dual harm by hurting other racial minorities and
poor whites who are blamed for not being successful like Asian Americans.”); Frank
Wu, Changing America, Three Arguments About Asian Americans and the Law, 45 AM. U.
L. REV. 811, 813-14 (1996) (describing how myth negatively affects Asian Americans);
Sumi Cho, Misconceptions Harm Asian Americans, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 30, 2004, at C25
(analyzing how Asian Americans are harmed by “stereotypes that characterize Asian
Americans as an over-educated, over-achieving 'model minority' group that does not
suffer discrimination or does not deserve affirmative action”). Black Caribbeans have,
in a sense, been designated as the model black minority. See generally Angela
Onwuachi-Willig, The Admission of Legacy Blacks, 60 VANDERBILT L. REV (forthcoming
2007) (manuscript at 40-42, on file with author) (discussing how first and second
generation Caribbean and African Blacks are perceived differently in United States
from native black Americans with long-term roots in United States); see also MARY C.
WATERS, BLACK IDENTITIES: WEST INDIAN IMMIGRANT DREAMS AND AMERICAN REALITIES
116-23 (2001). For example, in comparing West Indian Blacks to African Americans,
one white manager explained:

They [Caribbeans] tend to shy away from doing all of the illegal things
because they have such strict rules down in their countries and jails. And
they're nothing like [African Americans] here. So like, they're really
paranoid to do something wrong. They seem to be very, very conscious of
it. No matter what they have to do, if they have to try and work three jobs,
they do. They won't go into drugs or anything like that.

Malcolm Gladwell, Black Like Them, NEW YORKER, Apr. 29, 1996, available at
http://www.gladwell.com/pdf/black.pdf (citing to and quoting from study by Professor
Mary Waters of Harvard University).

95 See Michele Goodwin, Race As Proxy: An Introduction, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 931,
933 (2004) (“Color is linked with laziness, incompetence, and hostility, as well as
disfavored viewpoints, such as a lack of patriotism and disloyalty to the United
States.”); Norwood, supra note 60, at 163 (asserting that there are “negative
stereotypes that depict Blacks as poor, lazy, criminal, promiscuous, unintelligent,
and/or incompetent”).

96 See WATERS, supra note 94, at 5, 64-76; M. Patricia Fernandez-Kelly & Richard
Schauffler, Divided Fates: Immigrant Children in a Restructured U.S. Economy, 28 INT'L
example, one woman of Jamaican descent, who believed that Whites would treat her better if they knew that she was not a native black American, admitted that she had her mother teach her a Jamaican accent to use when she applied for jobs so that she could distinguish herself from native black Americans.\textsuperscript{97}

Indeed, the incentives that some Blacks have to engage in distancing by conforming to the NBA dress code are readily apparent. Throughout the entire debate regarding the code, those in favor of the policy have repeatedly highlighted the need for the league’s black players to distance themselves from what are perceived to be the bad elements of black society — specifically, the hip-hop community.\textsuperscript{98}

For example, one commentator explicitly argued that NBA players need to distance themselves from negative images that are associated with blackness and have been negatively racialized when he asserted:

\begin{quote}
I believe there is a race component to all of this . . . but the fact is that when black players get into violent incidents like this one, scads of white people recoil in horror and regard them as thugs. . . . If [the new dress code will] play a tiny part in keeping some kid out of the slammer or the morgue, I’d be willing to do it. The league doesn’t need to get completely away from hip-hop, but to distance itself from the negative connotations of hip-hop.\textsuperscript{99}
\end{quote}

\textsc{Migration Rev.} 662, 675 (1994) (noting that success of study subjects, including second generation black students with roots in Haiti, was “rooted in deliberate attempts [by the students] to disassociate themselves from the stigma imposed upon black populations in the United States through an affirmation of their national identity and their religious fervor”).

Malcolm Gladwell has explained that “West Indians cannot escape the fact that their success has come, to some extent, at the expense of American blacks, and that as they have noisily differentiated themselves from African-Americans — promoting the stereotype of themselves as the good blacks — they have made it easier for whites to join in.” Gladwell, supra note 94. As Professor Mary Waters of Harvard University asserted, in some instances, it is immigrant Blacks who “voice some of the worst stereotypes and negative perceptions of American blacks imaginable.” Mary C. Waters, \textit{The Role of Lineage in Identity Formation Among Black Americans}, 14 \textit{Qualitative Soc.} 57, 69 (1991).

\textsuperscript{97} Waters, \textit{supra} note 96, at 70.

\textsuperscript{98} See Brunt, \textit{supra} note 28. Golden State guard Jason Richardson proclaimed, “They want to sway away from the hip-hop generation. You think of hip-hop right now and think of things that happen like gangs having shootouts in front of radio stations.” Id.

\textsuperscript{99} Emmett Shaw, \textit{A Coming NBA Dress Code?}, \textsc{HoopsWorld.com}, Oct. 7, 2005,
Likewise, black columnist Jason Whitlock advised young black NBA players to engage in what Professor Regina Austin defined as the “politics of distinction” within the context of criminal law, stating: “I can’t find fault with the NBA for wanting to rid itself of prison culture. You guys should be asking yourself why you’re embracing prison culture. You want to be 50 Cent?” In other words, the players should not want to be associated with a person who has been deemed to be a “bad Black,” such as 50 Cent; instead, they must distance themselves from him. The key is to highlight one’s difference from those who carry the label of “bad Blacks.” As NBA veteran Charles Oakley succinctly put it, “I’m not trying to sound like some old guy who says this is the way we used to do it. Why not look professional instead of looking like you belong on a street corner?”

Because the act of distancing is, in many ways, a necessary extension of accommodating, it, too, fits within the rubric of “volunteer discrimination.” As a consequence, arguments in support of the new NBA dress policy that emphasize the need for NBA players to “distance” themselves from negative, racialized elements that the league is currently associated with also lack some persuasiveness as proof that the policy was not racially motivated.

3. Resigned Modeling

Even for those outsiders who question the propriety of culturally defined acceptable norms or who view such norms as steeped in racism or racialized thinking, there is still a tremendous incentive to simply resign one’s self to those standards, if not for one’s self, then for the sake of the youth who look up to you. Like with accommodating


100 Regina Austin, The Black Community, Its Lawbreakers, and a Politics of Identification, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1769, 1772 (1992) (defining phrase as highlighting “the difference that exists between the ‘better’ elements of ‘the community’ and the stereotypical ‘lowlifes’ who richly merit the bad reputations the dominant society accords them”).

101 Whitlock, supra note 34 (emphasis added).

102 See Butler, supra note 22, at 993 (noting how 50 Cent is viewed by some as gangsta rapper).

103 See Norwood, supra note 60, at 164 n.52 (noting that “Blacks can negatively stereotype Blacks as well”).

and distancing, what I call the act of resigned modeling helps to highlight the incentives that some Blacks have to support the new dress code. Indeed, in this debate concerning the racial overtones of the new NBA dress code, some commentators, such as Charles Barkley, openly concede that the new NBA dress policy is racially driven,

but still argue in its favor. The rationale of those who engage in the act of resigned modeling is not that the racial sentiments behind the new appearance policy are appropriate. Rather, it is that the players, or more important, the young children who look up to the players, must abide by culturally acceptable norms to get ahead; thus, the players have an obligation to these children to resign themselves to model conforming behavior. For instance, Barkley argued the following, even though he conceded that the implementation of the new dress code is racially motivated:

All these black kids do every single thing [the NBA players] do. [The players] make 10 to 15 million dollars, and they can do what they want to. Unfortunately, all of these young black kids, when they go out dressed like that, they’re going to be discriminated against and not get good jobs. . . . If a well-dressed white kid and a black kid wearing a do-rag and throwback jersey came to me in a job interview, I’d hire the white kid. That’s reality. That’s the No. 1 reason I support the

105 See Mike Wise, Opinions on the NBA’s Dress Code Are Far from Uniform, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 2005, at A1 (noting that Charles Barkley “acknowledged that there are racial subtexts connected to the new dress code”). I note that Charles Barkley fits better under the “accommodating” role or bracket of behavior in many instances. In this debate about the NBA dress code, however, Barkley’s actions and comments best display the act of resigned modeling. For this reason, I use his comments as an example of resigned modeling, even though Barkley is better described as an accommodator in other instances of his life. Moreover, one could argue that Barkley’s political ambitions to be the Governor of Alabama provide strong incentives for him to engage in distancing as a means of obtaining cross-racial votes. These points I have made about Barkley’s position as one who engages in accommodating, distancing, and resigned modeling highlight an important point about the various strategies that I have identified as “volunteer discrimination” — behaviors that are, experientially, often mixed together and are at least, in part, in the eye of the beholder (as performances always are). One can think that he or she is “distancing” but may then be read by others as “accommodating.” Consequently, despite the appearance of three different strategies, these categories may, in fact, be more like a paint box from which individuals choose and combine their behaviors. Like art, such actions may then become something other than what the author intended.
In essence, Blacks, like Barkley, who engage in the act of resigned modeling, “volunteer” themselves for such discrimination, not because they see no discrimination at all, but instead because they see no way around it.107

106 Langston Wertz, Jr., NBA Has a Right to Set Dress Code for Its Players, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Oct. 26, 2005, at 2C. Of course, this statement also implies that Barkley would not hire the white kid wearing a do-rag either. As Barnes and I have argued, however, this action, too, is a form of race discrimination based on blackness. Here, the white kid is discriminated against for being the “wrong kind” of White,” meaning one who performs his or her identity as a black person or can be identified by markers heavily associated with black people — a white person who is too black. See Onwuachi-Willig & Barnes, supra note 12, at 1301, 1319, 1341; see also Emily M.S. Houh, Critical Race Realism: Re-Claiming the Antidiscrimination Principle Through the Doctrine of Good Faith in Contract Law, 66 U. PITT. L. REV. 455, 472-73 (2005) (noting that key difference between “an aligned outsider and ‘immutable’ outsiders, is that [the aligned outsider’s] conduct dictates his designated status as outsider, rather than his status dictating his conduct”).

107 Another good example of resigned modeling is shown through the position that some Blacks have taken in the debate over whether black parents should give their children ethnic-sounding names. Scholars Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan conducted a recent study that revealed that simply having an African American-sounding name significantly decreased one's opportunity to receive a job interview, regardless of occupation or industry. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable Than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9873, 2003), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w9873. Based upon an experiment that involved sending identical, fictitious resumes with an African American-sounding name, such as Jamal, and a white-sounding name, such as Greg, to the same employers in Boston and Chicago, Bertrand and Mullainathan found that resumes with white-sounding names received 50 percent more callbacks for interviews. Id.

In the debate over black names, some Blacks take the position that, although it is unfair for Blacks to be limited in naming their children because of discrimination that may ensue from having a racially identifiable name, it is necessary for black parents to give their children common, non-racially identifiable names, such as Cody or Greg, as a means of improving their children's chances of avoiding discrimination on the job market. See Dan Woog, Do “Black” Names Matter?, MONSTER.COM, http://diversity.monster.com/afam/articles/names/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2007). During this debate, one black journalist, Bill Maxwell, echoed comments that were strikingly similar to Charles Barkley's comments on the NBA dress code:

The reality is, white people joke about those names... They have a reaction when they see the name Loquisha or Tyrone. I suppose it's OK for entertainers. If you want to call yourself Ice Cube or Snoop Dogg, go ahead. But most kids are not going to go into entertainment, so I don't think we should be putting up unnecessary barriers to employment among our kids.
In this sense, the use of comments such as Barkley’s are the most damaging when people cite to them in order to negate claims of race discrimination through the policy because such comments rely upon an explicit acceptance of racism. They not only acknowledge the improper racial motives behind the policy, but they actually allow and accept defeat based upon other racially harmful factors — in particular, what Blacks who engage in resigned modeling see as the inevitability of racially discriminatory standards.

III. THE DANGERS OF MISUNDERSTANDING
VOLUNTEER DISCRIMINATION

The dangers in not understanding the incentives that many Blacks have to engage in accommodating, distancing, and resigned modeling extend beyond the NBA. In Title VII employment cases, courts and juries routinely cite to and rely upon contradicting testimony by black witnesses against black plaintiffs as extremely strong or conclusive evidence that discredits the plaintiffs’ race discrimination claims at trial. For example, in upholding a district court’s finding that a black plaintiff was not a victim of discrimination in *Williams v. Tallahassee Motors, Inc.*, the Fifth Circuit noted the following about the persuasiveness of the testimony by the defendant’s black witness Early Harris, Jr., to the district court, stating:

*Id.* Additionally, one black mother named Tiqua Gator “named her son Derek to help him get by in white America.” *Can a “Black” Name Affect Job Prospects?,* ABC NEWS, Aug. 20, 2004, http://abcnews.go.com/2020/print?id=124232. She explained, “If I was to have more children, it wouldn’t be any Tiquas or it wouldn’t be any Tamikas or Aishas. It would be something common... I wouldn’t want my child to go through the same thing I’ve went through.” *Id.*

108 See Carbado & Gulati, *Working Identity, supra* note 3, at 1291 (“[R]emaining silent can become not only a denial of that sense of self, but also a legitimation of and acquiescence to the implicit racial terms under which the outsider is expected to work...”).

109 See, e.g., Ellison v. Best Foods, 598 F. Supp. 159 (E.D. Ark. 1984) (relying on positive testimony from other black employees as persuasive evidence that allegations of discrimination by other Blacks were untrue); *see also* Tanya Kateri Hernandez, *Latino Inter-Ethnic Employment Discrimination and the Diversity Defense, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.* (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 34, on file with the author) (describing what she calls “the Diversity Defense” in disparate treatment claims where “legal actors immediately view a racially ‘diverse’ workplace as the equivalent of a racially harmonious workplace”).

110 607 F.2d 689, 695 (5th Cir. 1979).
As to the fact of discrimination, the [district] court was particularly impressed with the testimony of Early Harris, Jr., a black employee of the defendant, who testified that he had personally experienced no discrimination and had witnessed no discrimination against other black employees at Tallahassee Motors because of race.\footnote{Id. at 693 (emphasis added). When discussing witnesses, the Fifth Circuit noted only Harris's race. The court did not even mention the race of any other witnesses. \textit{Id.} at 693-94.}

Indeed, the Fifth Circuit noted how the district court found this testimony by Harris, a black witness, to be particularly convincing despite the fact that Harris was an old Air Force friend and a recruit of the white sales manager whom the plaintiff had accused of discrimination in his recruiting efforts, a relationship that normally would have made Harris's testimony suspect (especially if Harris himself had been white or had this case been a non-race discrimination case).\footnote{\textit{Id.} at 693-94; see also Cummings v. Retzer & Retzer, Inc., 646 F. Supp. 400, 406 (N.D. Miss. 1986) (noting how allegations of discrimination by Blacks were “discredited by the testimony of disinterested black witness, Fred Atkins”) (emphasis added).}

The point of this Essay, however, is not to say that such testimony by Harris was irrelevant, unconvincing, or should have been disregarded entirely; one must wonder, though, why one minority’s view that he has not experienced discrimination in the workplace is relevant to another minority’s individual disparate treatment claim. Instead, the question I ask, or rather the claim I make, is that fact-finders also should consider how identity performance — in particular, the immense pressures that Blacks have in our society to perform their identities in ways that are racially palatable — may be motivating the contradicting black witness’s testimony. Without any critical analysis into the motives of the contradicting black witnesses, “black-on-black” testimony may be given too much weight in the evaluation of a case. Indeed, as of now, at trials, judges and other arbiters, like the district court in \textit{Williams}, often assume that if the contradicting witness in a black employee’s race discrimination case is black, the witness lacks any motives for giving his or her opposing testimony. Although the black witness and the black plaintiff in these cases are usually unrelated — other than the fact that they work together — the assumption by arbiters is one of black solidarity.
between the two or of no bias on part of the black witness; accordingly, the testimony of the contradicting black witness is given tremendous weight. The decision-makers presume that, if discrimination were present, the black witness would identify it and agree that it was present. There is never any hint of consideration about how identity performances may have influenced the witness’s testimony.

For example, in *Ellison v. Best Foods*, the district court evaluated the merits of seven black employees’ race discrimination claims at Best Foods. The employees alleged, among other things, that the employer’s method of operating its plants had a disparate impact on black employees. “According to the plaintiffs, black employees advance[d] less rapidly, [were] disciplined more often, and [were] discharged at a greater rate, than their white counterparts” under the company’s “self-regulated work force system.” Under Best Foods’ work force system, employees were broken down into small teams that were “empowered through democratic processes to make certain decisions regarding employee discipline, working scheduling and assignment, training, etc.” The plaintiffs alleged that the system allowed an amount of subjectivity in decision-making that was disparately harmful to Blacks, who made up only thirty percent of the work population at the company. In issuing its ruling that the plaintiffs’ race discrimination claims had successfully been refuted, the district court emphasized that “several black employees testified that they did not feel blacks were, or are, treated less favorably than whites under the system” and that “[i]n fact many of the black employees including some plaintiffs praised the system in terms of its general operation.” Indeed, the district court found these black witnesses’ testimony to be so compelling as to refute the testimony of George McCarty, a white employee who testified “that he was offended by racist jokes that circulated the plant,” even though he himself admitted “that from time to time he also told racial jokes.”

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114 Id.
115 Id. at 160, 164-65. Disciplinary decisions were first considered by the small groups or teams and then considered by the Plant Review Board. Id. at 163-66.
116 Id. at 160, 164-65.
117 Id. at 164, 166-67.
118 Id. at 168.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 168 n.2.
Again, my intent here is not to suggest that the Ellison court reached the wrong determination in weighing the evidence or that the case was wrongly decided. I wish only to highlight how such evidence was given significant weight and relied upon without any consideration of what incentives the contradicting black witnesses had to engage in accommodating and distancing to ensure their jobs and their well-being within the workplace. These incentives especially rang true in Best Foods' self-regulated work force environment where group consensus of co-workers was important to one's status within the work arena. In fact, under this self-regulated work system at Best Foods, consistent proof that one was a team player was critical to a worker's success at the company. As Carbado and Gulati's article Working Identity suggests, for the black employees in Ellison, who already were likely viewed as outsiders because of their race status, the pressures to perform their identities in ways that showed them as belonging to the inner group — as non-threatening and, most of all, as accommodating — were immense.121 Furthermore, what better way for "good Blacks" in Ellison to distance themselves from the "bad Blacks" at Best Foods — to ensure that they would not be excluded from inner circles within this self-regulated work force system — than to testify against the complaining Blacks, and to do so in a way that not only declared there was no race discrimination in the workplace but that praised the employer and his work system. The fact is that various incentives were present in Ellison for each black witness employee at Best Foods to show, as the ultimate "good Black" Larry Mungin often hoped to do, that he or she was an acceptable Black, a "safe Black." Indeed, it may have been the varying degrees of assimilation among the black workers that accounted for their different experiences within the workplace and thus their varying views of discrimination.122 For these reasons, it was improper for the

121 See Carbado & Gulati, Working Identity, supra note 3, at 1260-61, 1277-1308.
122 See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Fifth Black Woman, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 701, 720 (2001) (describing how firm's discrimination against fifth black woman — in face of advancement of four other black women — derived "from an intra-group distinction based on Mary's dress, institutional identity, marital status, professional and educational affiliations, and residence"); Flagg, supra note 3, at 2014-15 (discussing varying difficulties in framing disparate treatment race claims for two sisters based on their decisions to assimilate or not assimilate into corporate culture); Barbara J. Flagg, Selecting Black Women as Paradigms for Race Discrimination Analyses, 10 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 40, 42-43 (1995) (discussing what author defines as "transparently white" decision-making as it relates to Keisha Akbar, who chose to emphasize her African heritage in workplace and thus "was just plain too different
court to rely on these witnesses' testimonies as though they were nearly conclusive of the question of race discrimination without further examination into the pressures behind their identity performances. In other words, while it is not clear that the black employees who testified to no discrimination in Ellison were engaged in “volunteer discrimination,” the possibility that they were so engaged was present; thus, the evaluation of their testimony without further scrutiny of these potential, race-based influences was incomplete and dangerous.

CONCLUSION

In sum, while I understand the appeal of using comments from black players and journalists who support the new NBA dress code as a means of negating racial stereotyping claims, I wish to highlight the dangers in using them in a forceful way to defeat other Blacks’ claims of racism. After all, many of these comments and actions themselves may be influenced by racism. In particular, these comments may be the result of race-based incentives that Blacks have not only to prove themselves worthy of inclusion by conforming to racialized norms of appearance, but also to distance themselves from those who do not conform. In this sense, such comments and actions work only to reinforce racialized hierarchies and norms.123

Moreover, the use of such comments and actions as determinative proof of no racial motivations ignores the fact that some of the Blacks who have made these comments in support of the policy (not all of them) may be “victims” of racial discrimination themselves, precisely because of the immense incentives they may have to consciously engage in the acts of accommodating, distancing, and resigned modeling.124 The same applies for witnesses who provide “black-on-black” testimony. In this sense, Blacks who perform these acts may be prisoners of their own racial performances, locking themselves into roles of perpetual accommodation and distancing while also alienating themselves from other Blacks, such as those who choose to challenge what may be racialized appearance standards or workplace norms.

As a black professional, I, in many ways, relate to this impulse to

123 See Cooper, supra note 9, at 902-03.
124 See Carbado & Gulati, Working Identity, supra note 3, at 1262 (arguing that “the kinds of work outsiders often feel pressured to do because of negative assumptions about their identities . . . is a form of employment discrimination”).
engage in resigned modeling, and even distancing and accommodating. For example, although I believe that the new NBA dress code itself is motivated by racial stereotypes, I do not question whether it is wise, in our society, for the league to impose the policy or for the players to follow it, precisely because I, too, feel the impulse to resign myself to model conforming behavior. In fact, I understand and even acknowledge the great impulse for me and other Blacks to engage in accommodating or distancing. But, the fact that I feel and understand these impulses and even engage in these acts, whether consciously or unconsciously, does not mean that they are not premised upon racism. I, too, “volunteer” myself for discrimination nearly every day of my life. That reality, however, does not militate in favor of using my behaviors or those of other conforming Blacks as proof of no discrimination.125

The irony here is that the hip-hop culture that so many of us, including the NBA, wish to distance ourselves from does not “practice a politics of respectability” but instead, at times, challenges it.126 As Professor Paul Butler has explained, “[u]nlike civil rights culture, hip-hop . . . is as concerned with fairness for drug sellers as for the law-abiding middle class people who are stopped by the police for ‘driving while black’ or ‘driving while brown.’”127 In this sense, there may be a lesson to be learned from the hip-hop community about resistance to mainstream norms.

At the least, the claim by some Blacks that the NBA dress code is good or is not improperly motivated by race is not a slam dunk in favor of a finding of no discrimination. In order to truly combat racism, one must examine these claims of racism separate and apart from the actions of the policy’s black supporters and focus on the way in which appearances in general have been racialized — the way in which race generally infects our judgments about professionalism, including appearance standards.128 Even Commissioner David Stern

125 See Caldwell, supra note 49, at 393 (explaining that “[w]hat appears to be merely an aesthetic judgment” for people of color is “part of the[ir] subordination”).

126 See Butler, supra note 22, at 1015 (“Unlike civil rights culture, hip-hop . . . champions the human rights of criminals as enthusiastically as the rights of the falsely accused.”). I note, however, that many types of inequities, such as sexism and homophobia, exist in certain types of hip-hop.

127 Id.

128 See MOLLOY, supra note 52, at 233 (“It is unfortunate but true that our society has conditioned us to look upon [Blacks] as belonging to the lower classes, and no matter how high a minority individual rises in status or achievement he is going to have some difficulty being judged by his success rather than his background.”);
acknowledged the way in which race may affect judgments of the NBA in general (although not within the context of the dress code) when he stated:

I think it's fair to say that the NBA was the first sport that was widely viewed as a black sport. And whatever the numbers ultimately are for the other sports, the NBA will always be treated a certain way because of that. Our players are so visible that if they have Afros or cornrows or tattoos — white or black — our consumers pick it up. So, I think there are always some elements of race involved that affect judgments about the NBA.129

What is critical here is that we analyze the policy in a way that comports with the realities of race and its functions in our society — that we look at race as it is broadly defined, not only through skin color but through other markers such as dress and clothing. We need to understand racism as a set of interlocking social institutions and norms rather than as a mere attitude. Otherwise, we just may be using one form of “volunteer discrimination” to then impose a clearly involuntary form of discrimination upon others — either in the NBA or other workplace environments.

Caldwell, supra note 49, at 381 (questioning how companies arrive at their “conception of a business-like image” and considering role of race and sexuality in building those conceptions); see also Houh, supra note 7, at 911 (“That a non-minority insider need not negotiate his racial status by altering his conduct in the workplace, that he need not do the extra identity work that an outsider is expected to do, demonstrates just how normalized his culture and experiences in the workplace are, and the extent to which workplaces can function as materially and ideologically colonized and colonizing spaces.”); Peller, supra note 73, at 762 (“I believe that the failure of the progressive and liberal white community to comprehend the possibility of a liberating rather than repressive meaning of race consciousness has distorted our understanding of the politics of race in the past and obscures the ways that we might contribute to a meaningful transformation of race relations in the future.”).